Natural Law

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I have a hypothesis about the universality of morality. It goes as follows.

When I speak of moral law, I don't speak of preferred behavior. I speak of behavior that is consistent with the reality of innate morality. Humans are individuals. As such, they are innately opposed to those actions that obstruct individuality. These include the initiation physical aggression and coercion. In the time between when I am punched in the face and when I react, I am not thinking rationally and consistently about my response; I respond naturally. That is I respond by reclaiming my individuality. This is where the differentiation between being opposed to "aggression" and being opposed to the "initiation of aggression" comes in: acts of physical aggression necessitate further aggression so as to terminate it. If I were a moral person, and being opposed to all physical aggression was moral, then when someone initiates physically aggression upon me, I would not be able to respond. Thus the initiation portion is vital to the argument. We account for the "morality is subjective" argument by concluding that all human actions are moral insofar as they don't physically aggress upon other individuals. This presupposes a standard of universal, innate, natural law, which is governed by the opposition to the obstruction of individuality. For example, you can adhere to a moral code that enforces punching people in the face repeatedly as a good thing, and I can be OK with that (that is I can see this as moral) only insofar as you don't punch me in the face repeatedly; being what it was required to do.

What are some possible inconsistencies here?