Bentham vs. Mill: is pleasure purely quantitative or can certain pleasures be qualified as 'higher' (pleasures of thought) or 'worthier' than other kinds of pleasure (bodily pleasures)?
Who was arguing which position?
Both were overly reductionist autists who failed to recognize that no one would be happy even if their naive goals were achieved.
>>9442170
It's probably a lot more important to distinguish between qualitatively worse pains than it is qualitatively higher pleasures.
Otherwise you end up with the absurdity of the whole "it's better to torture one person than have a significant enough number of people get dust in their eye" thing, which is the big nail in the coffin for straight hedonism.
So, Mill is edging it, but also working in entirely the wrong direction. Bentham a shit.
>>9442473
But isn't the distinction between "torture" and "getting dust in your eye" a quantitative measure? Both inflict physical pain though one of them significantly less so.
nah
>>9442170
>Anglo philosophers
>Anglo philosophy
>>9442699
Sure, in one sense, it is.
But it seems intuitively absurd to claim that you could ever use avoiding a significant enough number of people getting dust in their eye as a justification for torturing even one person.
However, if we regard the difference between torture and getting dust in your eye as a solely quantitative distinction (i.e. different quantity of pain), we have to accept this conclusion.
I think personally there needs to be some way for a system of value, even a hedonist one, to distinguish torture as a different quality of pain than getting dust in your eye, in order to defend the intuition that no number of slightly irritated eyes, however inconceivable or abstract the number becomes, could ever justify even one instance of serious torture.
>plebs thinking they can define good
>>9442786
>I have hands, therefore I am
Bravo George
The only remotely good philosopher to (sort of) come out of utilitarianism