Schopenhauer & Idealism

>>9163954
Did you read Kant?

>>9164005
No. He was religious though. I assumed their argument would be different.

>>9164238
Kant wasnt religious wtf
and idealism need not have any religious arguments for it

>>9164238
>>9164281
Kant was religious but he had an idealistic argument for religion, not a religious argument for idealism.

>>9164281
afaik he wasn't explicitly an atheist, unlike Schopenhauer.

>and idealism need not have any religious arguments for it
I know. This should be clear from the OP. What I'm trying to understand his support for idealism from a non-theist position.

I have yet to read him but at least want a basic understanding before I start.

>>9164281
Kant was deeply religious, it gets more obvious in his moral philosophy. Regarding the groundwork, there is an often made argument that he snuck an "invisible" christian god in his philosophy. Hegel was very religiou, too. some argue that his whole project did stem from a life-long search for the trinity.

I agree that idealism doesn't need to have theological support though and there aren't many overly overt christian references in Kant and hegel. Really, idealism just comes from the zeitgeist at the time, people were aware that Kant totally changed the game and then efforts were made to invent systems to build on that.

Idealism is based on subject-object relations. I'm not sure what you're thinking but theist or atheist doesn't matter.

Schopenhauer firmly believed that philosophy should go back to the most fundamental question of metaphysics, to what he called “the puzzle of existence” (das Rätsel des Daseins). About his allegiance to metaphysics he left no doubt: “One can declare as the necessary credo of all the just and good: ‘I believe in a metaphysics’ ” (WWV II, 227; P 175).

Philosophy must begin from the intuition of what is given, and it must limit itself to the interpretation and understanding of that alone (WWV I, 609–10; P 452–53). Its task is to interpret the meaning of what lies in experience, and never should it stray beyond that to speculate about its ultimate causes. The business of metaphysics, therefore, is “the correct understanding of experience,” and its method consists in “the interpretation of its meaning and content” (WWV II, 238; P 184).

Schopenhauer would stress that his philosophy is strictly immanent, that it stays within the limits of possible experience (WWV I, 375–79;P 271–74). It was this immanent conception of metaphysics as an interpretative discipline that was his via media between Kantian scepticism and dogmatic rationalism. In stressing that metaphysics must be immanent, Schopenhauer was simply trying to justify it by the Kantian standard of knowledge: possible experience.

Schopenhauer’s attempt to justify metaphysics lies crucially with his reinterpretation of 'The thing-in-itself,'. An object that is neither representation nor will, is a "phantom of a dream". The thing-in-itself is not something that lies beyond appearances but it is “that which appears in appearances” (das in ihr [die Erscheinung] Erscheinende) Or, to use another of his formulations, it is the what that appears as opposed to the how, when, and where. Hence the thing-in-itself, properly seen, is simply the content or essence of appearances. It is not a supernatural object lying beyond appearances but the inner essence or intrinsic nature of appearances themselves.

How, though, do we know the inner essence of things? That is the crucial question of method for Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. Unfortunately, however, it is precisely here that Schopenhauer leaves us with little more than hints and suggestions. The crux of his defence of metaphysics rests with his claim, scarcely explored or explained, that the task of the philosopher lies in the “interpretation” (Deutung) and “explication” (Auslegung) of appearances
(WWV II, 237; P 183).

The metaphysician does not engage in dogmatic demonstration, in trains of syllogistic reasoning, and still less in causal explanations of things according to general laws. Rather, his task is, as Schopenhauer puts it, “to decipher appearances,” as if they were texts, or as if they were someone speaking to us. After all, the aim of the metaphysician is to know “the meaning” (die Bedeutung) of appearances, not the laws that govern them (WWV I,151, 156; P 95, 98–99).

What Schopenhauer needed was a hermeneutics, an account of the logic of interpretation, a theory about how interpretation differs from demonstration and causal explanation. Nowhere, however, does he provide such an account.

>>9164369
>>9164372
Nice. Can you explain the last bit a little more? Why interpretation?

>>9164369
>Hence the thing-in-itself, properly seen, is simply the content or essence of appearances. It is not a supernatural object lying beyond appearances but the inner essence or intrinsic nature of appearances themselves.

Isn't that just straight up going back to Plato?

>>9164356
Underrated comment.

>>9164623
Yes that's where it begins and ends, with some modifications

Who cares about what this or that argument S EVER made. I read the 2 volume Dover because he's the Proust of philosophers! For enjoyment purposes, read only the second vol-- that's where all the little essays are. Same applies to the 2 vol Vintage Tocqueville.

>>9164372
>>9164369

Why didn't you cite your source?

>>9166057
what did he mean by this