I have a question pertaining Kant's transcendental philosophy. This question can be applied to both the pure intuitions of space an time and the categories of pure understanding, but I will articulate my doubt dealing only with the pure intuitions of space and time (for the sake of simplicity).
Now, for Kant, space and time are not properties of the world, according to him, our cognitive apparatus applies the spatial/temporal structure to the world. The reason for this is that we cannot derive space and time from our experience of the world, since we need space and time to even be able experience the world. Space and time are the necessary conditions for sensibility.
So, to say again, why we can't derive space and time from experience? Because we need them to even be able to experience. Now my question is: why Kant infers from this that is our cognitive apparatus aplying space and time to the world? Why does he exclude the possibility that the world has this spatial and temporal structure and for that reason we're able to experience it? Certainly from the fact that space and time are necessary conditions for sensibility we cannot infer that the world doesn't have a spatial/temporal structure. So why Kant infers from that that we are the ones applying space and time to the world?
Thanks your attention.
>>9143471
Thanks for your attention*
Just read the Prolegomena, dude; it's short. If you're scared by the language being, perhaps, at all, difficult, check out this site for a modernized, less "Kanty" translation: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/kant
Best regards, and fuck your mom,
Elephant Steve
>>9143471
Kant does not argue that space and time must be forms of sensibility in order to have experience. He just gives several arguments showing that they cannot be derived from experience and are not concepts.
>>9143583
I don't think so dude, Kant explicitly states that space and time are necessary conditions for sensibility.
>>9143471
>So why Kant infers from that that we are the ones applying space and time to the world?
>>9143526 has the right idea. It's a lot easier to make sense of Kant as a response to Hume's conception of causality. When we look at one billiard ball colliding with another, for example, we don't actually see one cause the other: all we have is a perception of spatial contiguity and temporal succession between the two balls. For Hume the idea that one ball "causes" the other to move is only generated from repeated experiences of the event. Once we've witnessed it, its almost impossible not to anticipate it happening again under similar conditions, but the point is that we derive an awareness of causality from a kind of illusion. The real existence of causality isn't something that can be directly apprehended, which is where Kant's response comes in. Space and time are instead the components of our mind to which our experience conforms, creating a palpable and logical reality which would be completely incomprehensible otherwise. Its not that they aren't necessarily "real" properties of the world, just that we wouldn't be able to make sense of space, time or causality without the mind processing sense data accordingly.
>>9143633
Maybe I phrased that poorly. I mean that Kant doesn't prove directly that they must be a priori.
To address OP further, he doesn't say that we can't derive them from the world because we need them for experience. He has arguments regarding the nature of space and time purporting to show that they cannot be derived from experience or be concepts.