What do you think about moral relativism? Pic not related of course.

>>8530514
It's fucking stupid

>>8530514
it's dumb, but not as dumb as moral absolutism.

>>8530514
My objection to realism is primarily metaphysical. I am not willing to maintain ontological commitments to moral entities, so relativism is my only real option and it seems that's just a slippery slope that inevitably leads you to moral nihilism.

When you hear normie drones laugh off philosophy with a "oh philosophers don't do anything, they just sit around and make problems for themselves to solve and argue over nothing", moral relativism is one of their most salient examples. It is the unwanted masturbatory birthchild of generations of philosophical salon culture. Of course that could apply to many things (postmodern aesthetics), but moral relativism is by far the most useless.

>>8530514
>What do you think about moral relativism?

It is the only sensible position, unless you think that certain moral standards are innate within human beings. I don't.

>>8531953
What about the Golden Rule?

File: time for death.jpg (5KB, 121x125px)

5KB, 121x125px

>>8530514
It's one of those words that may or may not at some point have had a sane meaning but is entirely forgotten now

define what the fuck you are talking about

>>8530514
It's so self evident that it's astounding that anyone tries to contest it.

>>8530514
Moral sentiments boil down to emotional appraisals/condemnations.

That's inherently local to individual minds. It' subjective preference.

>>8530514
The quality of morals can be measured in their effectiveness in enabling a healthy society.

So not all morals are equally good and you can't just pick whatever you like personally, but there might be different sets of morals that are equally effective but different in their design philosophy and origin.

Also some morals might be good in theory, but incompatible with human nature.

>>8532580
>The quality of morals can be measured in their effectiveness in enabling a healthy society.
Who's to say that this is a valid way, the most important way, or the only way, to measure the quality of morals?

Consequentialism is just one branch of ethical theory.

>>8532569
Emotivism and non-cognitivism in general died 50 years ago mate.

t. Geach

>>8532264
It's appliable to literally any morality, from christian solidarity to greek elitism. If I was an slave, I'd understand that I must be treated like a slave, and so on.

>>8532586
>Who's to say that this is a valid way, the most important way, or the only way, to measure the quality of morals

Nobody. All other ways are shit though.

>>8532569
That's what a non-rational, pre-theoretical ethical world is like, yes. But when you try to think of some plausible set of axiomatic moral rules or principles to restrain the beast within, we can reprogram ourselves for the better; as it is with science--we need not limit ourselves to our pre-theoretical intuitions about the world. You well know what the products of that kind of shallow and deeply instinctive thinking bring us: Aristotelian physics, Flat Earth, Geocentrism, etc. So, as it is with science, we can ponder what the good life and our societies consist in and what kind of moral principles would improve the good life and the societal conditions.

That ethics is nothing but "emotional appraisals/condemnations" is a cop-out and a gateway to not thinking and proposing moral frameworks that would override the beast.

>>8530514
Well, everything else is hilarious bullshit, so we're stuck with it.

>>8532932
how about moral nihilism?

>>8530514
I oppose it as professionally as a lawyer, philosophically as an aristotelian and religiously as a Catholic.

>>8532601
Peter Geach?
If I may refer to MacIntyre emotivism is the main ethical razor in the western society. Unless we are talking about different meanings of the word emotivism.

>>8532264
The golden rule is as good as the person who's applying it

>>8532661
>we can reprogram ourselves for the better
>we can ponder what the good life
This is true. However, it does not render what fundamental moral opinions we not inextricably tied to our emotional reactions to things.

Moral relativism can be used as a copout and a gateway for not thinking about morality. Those, however, are normative concerns. A normative objection to a descriptive theory does nothing to weaken its descriptive strengths.

One can be a moral relativist, in the descriptive sense, and still hold subjective moral opinions. It would be odd for anyone not to.

The truth of moral relativity makes it all the more important to discuss ethics and the good life. Else, how will we see which moral sentiments are the most widespread, and which ethical principles are the most broadly reaching?

>>8532601
Brain scans and trolley dilemmas, m8:
>Greene et al. (2001) have used functional magnetic resonance imaging to measure brain activity as subjects consider trolley cases. They showed significant activation in emotional areas of the brain when subjects were asked whether it is appropriate to push someone off a footbridge into the path of a trolley. Emotion activations were lower when subjects were asked whether it is appropriate to pull a lever that would divert a trolley away from five people toward one person.
>...imagine an emotionally attenuated variant...you are located in a control room, and learn that a trolley is heading toward five people. By pulling a lever, you can open a trap door, causing a person standing on a footbridge to fall in the trolley's path and derail it. In this scenario, no physical contact with the victim is required. This has recently been tested by Greene et al. (forthcoming), and they found that most people think it is permissible to kill the man on the footbridge in this variant. If subjects are told that they have to push the man off the bridge, only 31 percent say it is permissible, and if they are told they just need to pull a lever that opens a trap door, 63 percent think it's permissible. Diminishing the emotional intensity of the method of killing doubles the approval rating.

t. Jesse Prinz: The Emotional Construction of Morals, 2007

>>8530514
this
>>8531779