U.S. Navy Investigating if Destroyer Crash Was Caused by Cyb

To be clear, proof of a cyber attack successfully disabling a ship would be an even bigger admission of failure and vulnerability than saying 7th is staffed with retards with no seaman ship.

>>35193640
But the 7th is staffed with retards

Its those Nork hackers again....

https://www.duffelblog.com/2014/12/north-korea-hackers-sgt-maj/

>>35193663
I didn't disagree

>>35193640
That would be some Chaos Theory shit right there.
Where's Sam?

>>35193640
This, actually.

Saying it was a cyberattack will increase the morale of those that were trying to do this crap already.

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>>35192981
So who are we going to war with?

>>35194863
China probably.

>>35192981
Merchant seaman here, it shouldn't fucking matter if a cyber attack took out your electric equipment steering is powered by hydraulics and the most important job for a look out is to look out the fucking window.

>>35196249
It was Russia who was spoofing the GPS of ships in the Black Sea a few months ago.

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>>35196291
They were too busy with the trannie/faggot/wimmin sensitivity training. If that affects readiness, that is acceptable collateral damage.

>>35196436
While that is true they have no reason to be fucking about that close to chinese territory... well unless of course they're shifting blame onto China, which still brings us back to china being blamed and that's where the war goes.

>>35196436
you do realize gps timing signals are encrypted and spoofing a timing signal is actually somewhat difficult, and a more likely jsutifciation would be AIS spoofing or false broadcasting position reports, which would just mean it would be left up to the lookout to spot objects paired with radar contact reports.

spoofing a GPS timing signal would also be difficult for military vessels.

>what are paper maps
and gyrocompasses and magnetic compasses are not hooked into any wireless systems

>Detecting a spoofed GPS signal is hard. The computational load associated with cryptographic signatures on the signal is high, and the inability to interact with the sending satellites makes it impossible to use a challenge-response protocol where the receiver generates a random number, signs it with the satellite's public key, sends it to the satellite and then gets it back from the satellite signed with the sat's private key, then sets up a one-time session key.

>Other tactics for validating signals involve direction-detection (raising the bar on spoofers, who'd have to physically array their fake base-stations in spatially plausible locations -- think of a cluster of drones) and distortion-detection.

>But both of these tactics have easily imagined countermeasures, and both are difficult/costly to implement.

>The US military has an encrypted, hardened GPS system for its own use, but that is also potentially vulnerable, and in any event, they're not interested in sharing.

while possible, there are at least 3 levels of actions to prevent EW tactics from being effective, unless the bridge teams were overly reliant on technology instead of the skills that they should be. 1.gps/ais 2. radar 3. mobords, shooting bearings (visually) , and visual confirmation (lookouts)

>>35197911
>what are paper maps and gyrocompasses and magnetic compasses are not hooked into any wireless systems

Retarded millenials with gutted training standards and deferred refresher courses can't use those tools.

>>35196291
You see, naval personnel are not really sailors. They're no longer trained in proper seamanship like merchant sailors. They're x-specialists where x is some very narrow task. They know fuck about tying knots, reading map or using a sextant. Heck, many can't even swim. Most of the time in the Navy, this is fine. A navy ship has a lot more crew than a merchant ship of the same size so its ok to specialize.