San Carlos landing

They didn't think they'd actually do it; the absolute madmen.

>>34585482
Much like Normandy they knew it was coming, just not exactly where. Since they didn't have the manpower to fortify every bit of coastline they did the most logical thing and tried to hold hilltops and ridgelines while they figured out WTF exactly was going on.

>>34585482
> Attacking an enemy encampment that has direct and indirect support from numerous warships

>>34585577
But they knew they would land SOMEWHERE. They should have kept a mobile reserve to repond as soon as they were certain it was the real thing. They lost the war just sitting on their asses hoping the air force could sink enough ships.

The Argentine sub-tropical light infantry conscripts weren't really suitable for offensive operations on foot across the island. The British were supposed to be defeated by taking out their logistics from the air, while the defensive positions around Stanley would deny them victory. Honestly though, they didn't expect the British to fight back, let alone land significant forces, they hadn't really planned for this, of the Argentine bombs had been fused properly, it might have worked.

>>34585597
Well when they knew it was the real thing was when they were engaged, by which point it was too late to catch boats on the beachs. Unless you have a truly overwhelming force to arrive with you need to be there pretty much at the moment to contest a landing, as soon as the landing force takes the first significant cover/hill to get off the beach you've missed the best chance to fuck things up for them.

Also they needed the air force to sink enough ships for it to be a no-go well before that point, that the task force was still (just about) in a state to continue with attemping the landings at all was all down to their airforce not getting the job done when they had too, and during that phase the army really couldn't do anything more than dig trenches and prepare positions to try and cover all possible landing scenarios. Whilst inflicting catastrophic losses on the task force from the air could still have won them the war, having failed to do so up to that point it wasn't hugely likely to occur later.

File: Falklands_258648k.jpg (77KB, 580x386px) Image search: [Google]

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>>34585597
The Argentines couldn't establish air superiority, and if they had positions in view of the beaches, they would have been sitting ducks for RN bombardment/air support.

>hoping the air force could sink enough ships
They came very close to doing just that.

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It just seems like such a shitty, defeatist, foolish strategy to just sit there and not take the initiative. I appreciate the Argentine troops were largely freezing, half-starved, neglected conscripts but they should have put together some sort of reaction force.

>>34585482
Why didn't the American colonial regulars or militia attack the redcoats camping in Boston Commons instead of waiting until they set out to march on Lexington and concord?

Same reason; smaller, relatively untrained conscripts attacking a larger force that landed prepared to come out swinging? That'd be an unwise tactical decision.

>>34586334
>largely freezing, half-starved, neglected conscripts

This is when you should have realized why the Argentinians couldn't push the Brits off their landing beaches.

>>34586334

And done what?

By the time they discovered the landings, any mobile force they could have assembled and dispatched would have been overwhelmed by an enemy with superior; numbers, quality, firepower, and position. The most I would have argued would be that once the Paras attack on Goose Green was prematurely disclosed, such a ready mobile force could have been sent and made a big difference there. Since the British Paras were outnumbered and only won so easily through a bluff and the low morale of the defenders.

>>34585482
General Menendez (commander of all land forces in the islands) was a retard and thought that the landings would be the closes to Stanley as posible, so he concentrated most forces there.

>>34586461
That's not unreasonable - the initial British plan was to pile straight in near Stanley. Although he could not cover every potential landing site he should still have had a strategic reserve ready for contingencies. Instead they were just an inert mass asking for defeat.

>>34586482
You are asking the same fag who didn't ask for long range artillery until the las weeek of the war to have a strategic reserve.

The army was commanded by retards, man. Giving commies free rides in C-130s is easy, fighting a real war is not.

>>34586548
>Giving commies free rides in C-130s is easy,
thats chile yo

>>34587163
Chile used helicopters for that. We pumped those fuckers with sodium thiopental and droped them on the atlantic.