What would a modern Maginot line look like? Will large scale

A huge stack of sanctions.
No.

>>34320828
>What would a modern Maginot line look like?

A line of craters.

>Will large scale fortifications every make a comeback?

No.

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>>34320828
Pic related is what a modern line of fortifications looks like.

Something magical has to eliminate air power for the kind of forts you're talking about to make a comeback.

>>34320854
>Something magical has to eliminate air power for the kind of forts you're talking about to make a comeback.

If I was some kind of sci-fi author writing shitty genre fiction I would use the development of fusion reactors + lasers to justify this.

>>34320875
That's pretty much what I was talking about. Most cruddy mil sci-fi authors (and some good ones) that don't want to write about air war handwave it away with "direct energy weapons".

>>34320828
North korean border.
No.

>>34320854
>Air power makes land based fortifications useless
>Sea based... things that a single missile can sink are totally modern fortifications

>>34320946
>implying the sea power depicted doesn't include the ability to project air power for offensive or defensive purposes
>implying I said such modern fortifications were invulnerable themselves
You're wrong on a couple fronts, but I get that you're just earning your fifty cents.

>>34320828
I am going to assume you mean in a war between modern western nations. As that makes it easier to talk about than, say, the wars of the middle east: where seemingly equipment, training and funding work at random.


>What would a modern Maginot line look like?
Ignoring the logical reasons why a nation wouldn't fortify a region in an age of bunker busters and such, it would be a interesting sight.


Primarily it would be the anti-air armaments that would be important. Consider that the modern american military before entering the Gulf war on the ground so to speak used a five week long period of naval and air based bombardment to eliminate potential dangers.

The deciding factor as to the modern line's use and effectiveness would be it's ability to nullify, resist and respond against such a attack. If they can avoid significant damage, then arguably the line has had a fair degree of effect as to the survival of any troops, material and bases in the region. Not to mention the potential for them to eliminate attacker aircraft as well and thus weaken the attackers. Without the ability to bombard the defenders (who very well might achieve local air control and thus be able to bombard the attackers) approaching the front line of the defences would be unwise if not outright insane depending on the effectiveness of the defending air force.

>>34321474
The next thing to consider is the benefits of having set buildings / bases: Far better conditions compared to improvised, repaired or transported bases; pre-built infrastructure far better for the transport and storage of war material between every part of the network; the whole region has been shaped to favour the defender. So not only are your troops better supplied and given better conditions. They are also able to retreat or fight more safely.


Other things to consider is the fact that concrete reinforced with steel and such is, although breakable, still a long lasting and resilient material and the fact that when you have been setting up the region for defence for years, as previously mentioned, you can shape the landscape to give perfect firing lines, to funnel enemies to a particular area and to slow down the attackers.

Even if the attackers can break open your bunkers with their fire, you can fire on them just as well if not better thanks to the fact your armour and weapons isn't something you need to be able to move. So they'll take heavy losses over that period. Especially with heavy landscaping.

An example of landscaping being concealing your firing positions or creating a series of concrete-rebar tank traps to slow or hold them at a distance. Along with canals / channels along the front of the line wide enough to need bridging. As the attacker is unlikely to own a large number of vehicles capable of bridging the distance and those they do have you can attempt to eliminate over the time they take to the channels.

>>34321482
Thus we see that such a defensive line would be heavily situational but once built, thanks to modern materials, would be cheap to maintain in a mothballed state.

You would realistically only start building such a thing if you had a surplus of war material but lacked manpower, as such a line would augment the survival time and lower the number needed to hold the region or if you knew your enemy was coming for literally years, potentially even a decade or two in advance and you didn't have any way of going on the offensive and winning but knew the enemy couldn't sustain a war or otherwise thought you only needed to delay defeat. Such as if you had a powerful but distant ally (America) whom would rush to your aid but might be too later otherwise.

Alternatively you might build it just to outright dissuade the enemy from even trying or to protect a fragile / valuable region, such as your industrial, economic, agricultural or other such heartland. For example, if your oil fields and refineries were all within that region such defences would help to prevent their destruction.

>>34320828
Air defenses out the ass and mobile artillery.

>Will large scale fortifications every make a comeback?
Maybe, if someone invents shield generators.

>>34321488
>Will large scale fortifications every make a comeback?


Doubtful. At least under the current conditions.

I could actually see traditional static fortifications being useful because of atgms. They replace the shorter ranged at guns so you can hit incoming armor 2-3 km out.

So it basically looks like a line of interlocking hidden atgm fox hole/concealed bunker fields of fire supplemented by the best aa you can get. Mix in a few mortars/ Arty and pray that your air Force can at least keep parity in term of air superiority

>>34320946
>even has abm capabilities and can down planes 700km away
>not fortifications

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>>34320828
Four a Chaux in Alsace is the most amazing piece of military engineering I've ever seen (when considering how advanced it was for it's time).
Even without being used, The Maginot Line was the reason the Allies won the war. Either there is no line and Germany invades straight across the border and takes France without provoking Britain. Or, as history has demonstrated, the Germans are faced with the choice of sacrificing an entire army trying to attack an impenetrable line, or go around it and provoke Britain. They knew it was an impossible task, and decided to risk provoking the Allies just to take France.

>>34323545
That was Hitler's first mistake. If he had been allowed to take one nation at a time without instigating large scale opposition he would have gotten farther than he did. Crossing Belgium flared up memories of WW1 and instigated all of the Western World.

>>34320828
It would look like the maginot line, hidden bunkers and forts with retractable artillery to bombard friendly bunkers when the enemy is on top.

>>34320946
>>34323452
All kinds of anti-air, anti-missile, air power, whatever capabilities are much easier to hide and spread out, much more survivable and much cheaper on land. I get the point about making it sea based and mobile and that the US navy especially is taking efforts to defend it there, but it's still vulnerable in ways that land based capabilities aren't.


>>34323545
Are you confusing WW1 and WW2? The attack through belgium in WW1 supposedly made the brits join, in WW2 they were in since the start.
Also, note that most of the maginot line was in territory that was german before WW1; they still attacked through belgium.

>>34324260
>putting a military base with a airport that holds more fighters than most air forces of the world anywhere in the ocean is bad

>>34324308
>but it's still vulnerable in ways that land based capabilities aren't.
>but it's still vulnerable in ways that land based capabilities aren't.
>but it's still vulnerable in ways that land based capabilities aren't.
>HURR U SEY CARRIAS ARE BED 4 WAR U DUM

holy fuck can you not comprehend simple sentences you illiterate retard

>>34323545
>>34323630
>>34324260

maginot on itself is overrated, the entire german-french border is rough terrain for heavy vehicles, heavily forested, large rivers, mountains and steep valleys, slowing down any major land army, the allies struggled all the same, see ardennes.

going through the lowlands of belgium was always the only way to paris.

>>34320828
>What would a modern Maginot line look like?

Switzerland.

>>34320828
>What would a modern Maginot line look like?

A bunch of AAA and SAMs placed on Hospitals and schools. Whenever the enemy takes one out you cry to the international community about your enemy committing war crimes. It's a win/win.

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>>34320946

>>34324710
This

Palistine is OP with this tactic

>>34324769
>We put so much effort into it, it just has to work
Guess what the french said right before someone circumvented their nice maginot line.

>>34324439
LIKE WHAT NIGGER? NAVAL MINES AND SUBMARINES, WHILE A LAND INSTALLATION IS VULNERABLE TO TROOPS ON FOOT, BUNKER BUSTERS, LAND VEHICLE ASSAULTS, MISSILES, ARTILLERY, AIR FUEL WEAPONS, TOXIC GAS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

>>34324932
Except that was the whole goal. It freed up men from defending their whole border to go and intercept their enemies in the one region which they couldn't fortify without insulting their neighbours, since to fortify your own border with an ally is to either imply you expect an attack or that they are a shit ally and will capitulate in 2 seconds.

Now if you were talking about their tanks, then you'd have a point. Those were well made, decently designed but horribly misused and far from mobile enough, if only they'd made them more mobile.

>>34325203
True. Had the french poured those ressources into their army instead, it's very possible they would have lost similarly. The real problem was the outdated tactical and operational thinking in the french army and various small shortcomings that weren't recognized beforehand. Can't spend that away though.

How good can anti-aircraft and anti-missile technology get?

If anti-missiles get so good that they can shoot out all enemy aircraft and missiles before they hit, then that would negate the advantages of air-power. Maybe even undo MADs effect on preventing conventional wars.

>>34324769
saved, do you have anything else like that?

I don't think so. There are so many ways to get around fixed ground fortifications now. The modern battlefield is much more fluid and multi-dimensional than in the past. Controlling airspace dominates as the main component in conventional war today.

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Anyone interested in modern fortification should read "Fixed Permanent Fortifications at the Operational Level of War"
>http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a240407.pdf

Future fortifications will probably focus on preventing the enemy from getting air supremacy which is easily the deciding factor for most modern wars.
An effective modern fortification would consist of a high distributed network of remotely operated weapon systems in soft, medium, and hard positions.

The idea is to provide too many soft targets for effective use of precision guided munitions but enough medium and hard targets to make saturation bombing dangerous, This makes enemy aircraft incredibly vulnerable to AA systems as no single approach is going to cripple the AA defense from the air or ground. This makes also PGMs ineffective on the hard targets as modern combat has shown that virtually any air defense stops the effective delivery of PGMs.

The massive ordnance penetrator can defeat 200 feet of 5,000 PSI concrete, This penetration drops to 24 feet when striking 10,000 PSI concrete and 6 feet when facing 30,000 PSI concrete.
Ultra-high-performance concretes with PSI strength within or exceeding 100,000 have and are being developed, A fort made of such concrete would abbsorb dozens of MOP attacks on a single spot from heavy bombers which are very vulnerable to AA weapons and interceptor aircraft. In fact the attackers would have no choice but to redevelop siege artillery like the kind of WW1&2 if they didn't want to wage a war of attrition on such a defense network.

>>34320828
A bunch of ridiculously tall skyscrapers decked out with missile launchers and long-range artillery. No seriously, those things are able to withstand being bombarded like you wouldn't believe.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavlov%27s_House

>>34320828
Most likely, when the white race dies out and everything goes back to the stone age but with some leftover modern technology.

>>34320828
No large forts, but earthworks and low walls/barriers are effective at blocking VBIEDs. Just look at the Syrian city battles, it like modern trench warfare.

>>34327133
lol untill wave attacks of kamikazi 747's come in with loads of chaff

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The weakest part of the Maginot line bunkers were the cloches, They were vulnerable to direct fire from 88mm guns from the front for the fort.
With the cloches silenced and blinded the forts ability to spot and call artillery strikes from other forts became very limited.

The turrets were potentially vulnerable in that if they had direct fire to the front they could be jammed by 88mm guns and left raised up and vulnerable to satchel charges.
I'm pretty sure they figured this out and the later forts had all their turrets and cloche weapons facing perpendicular to the enemy like the casemate guns.

>>34320828
Lasers will allow for the return of large armored anti-air towers. Enough electricity for these purposes will likely require a generator on-site, which is cheaper and more efficient when it gets larger rather than making many small generators. Electricity is easy to transport over cables but power loss does occur with distance.

The construction of a heavily armored tower to protect the generator and give all those lasers a platform to work on makes sense. The higher the tower and the higher the position, the less likely that a ground skimming missile can sneak its way in.

If both sides have lasers, both sides will also understand that they can only hit each other with solid rounds from cannons or railguns. Put those on top of the tower too.

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>>34327869
The ditches and overhangs in front of casemate guns are probably the most import design design of the maginot forts in terms of resistance to infantry attacks.
Compare Eben Emael which had virtually all its weapons silenced by infantry carried explosives because they could get right up next to the embrasures.

In fact the only casemate that didn't get silenced on Eben Emael was Canal Nord, Because they only way the Germans could get explosives to it was by lowering it on a rope which did jack shit.
>Picrelated is actual combat footage of germans getting shot at by Canan Nord while they tried to cross the Albert canal to relieve the glider force that took town Eben Emael.

Something something fixed fortifications something something monument to man's stupidity

>>34327087
>59 tomahawk missiles

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>>34328124
Shut the fuck up Patton, You had your ass kicked at Fort Driant and you get bloodied by the dilapidated Maginot line.

A modern Maginot line would be a series of rail guns to shoot down any missiles and behind them a mountain of missiles to shoot anybody getting close. Also buried nukes to detonate if the enemy gets close

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>>34328226
Detonating buried nukes on your own territory to stop a land invasion is a great way to radioactively contaminate your own population.

>>34327277
Jet fuel cannot melt steel beams!

>>34329956
It was a French plan in case of cold war going hot desu. Send something like 20 nukes in Belgium on advancing soviet forces to create a radiation wall and to tell the soviet leadership "next time, we use it on your cities for rea, just stop moving in our direction".

>>34323630
god you fucking armchair generals are so fucking annoying. what are you even basing your argument off of? what you think the allies would have sat back if germany went through the maginot line?

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>>34330278
>what are you even basing your argument off of?
Not him but my guess is hindsight, Something armchair generals take for granted.

>>34320894

To be fair, writing about air warfare is really difficult.

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>>34324932
>Guess what the french said right before someone circumvented their nice maginot line.
You somehow think that the French didn't figure Germany would invade through Belgium yet again? In reality, the Maginot Line extended to the Belgium forts which were made of a similar construction. There was no forts on the Belgium border until 1935 when Belgium decided to sign a treaty with Germany which caused them to scramble building forts which they didn't want to build in that area anyways since the water table is so close to the surface.

They had 80 thousand men on the Maginot Line. That sounds like a lot, but they had 2 million men held in reserve for a counter attack. The entire point of the Maginot Line was to hold until the counter attack, which is pretty much every defense position entitles even today. That idea WORKED just fine in 1940 as it does now.

>>34324439
>maginot on itself is overrated,
Who says that? You can read thousands of historians going on about the "failures" of the Maginot Line, but I've read few praise it.

>>34325203
>Now if you were talking about their tanks, then you'd have a point. Those were well made, decently designed but horribly misused and far from mobile enough, if only they'd made them more mobile.
No one had used tanks like Germany did before. It was a huge gamble.

>>34324260
>Also, note that most of the maginot line was in territory that was german before WW1; they still attacked through belgium.
*French territory stolen by Germany.

>>34331841
>No one had used tanks like Germany did before. It was a huge gamble.
Very true but I am simply stating the facts: had they just been a little more easy to move about they'd have delayed and fought the Germans far more effectively.

>>34331841
I wasn't even trying to make a point about the maginot line. See
>>34325269
The point is that the french thought their army and their way of warfare oh so capable, right before it failed spectacularly. A common theme with dominant and lately victorious armed forces.

>>34331980
The failures of the French and British in 1940 was the entire British Expeditionary Force and best of the French Army being surrounded in Belgium.

>>34320828
>What would a modern Maginot line look like?
Barbed wire, land mines, pre-sighted artillery and perfectly mapped out coordinates for air and artillery strikes.

>Will large scale fortifications every make a comeback?
No, unless somehow via magic both planes and artillery were made obsolete. The Maginot line was obsolete before even WW1 was over. The only large scale fortifications that survived battle were in locations that artillery could not reach because of ground conditions prevented their transport.

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>>34332160
>The Maginot line was obsolete before even WW1 was over.
No, no it wasn't. You, like many others, have zero clue what the Maginot Line was. You think the designers couldn't build it to hold up to modern artillery? The French made that mistake in WWI when they just let the Germans walk in and take Fort Douaumont without a fight when Fort Douaumont was designed to handle modern artillery and it took them a year to retake it.

>>34332185
>when they just let the Germans walk in and take Fort Douaumont
Uhh

>>34332337
They kinda did.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Douaumont

Less than 100 men were needed to take it.

>>34321493
If they have shield generators, just use lasguns. Screw the collateral damage, SHAI HULUD VULT.

Going with the assumption that static, exposed fortifications are viable and present, I would say shielded and automated sentry systems. We have plenty of remote options now that don't require a permanent guard. There would be no point in wasting bombs trying to hit all the tiny recessed turrets that you could dot all over a border line and retract underground. They could all be capable of stopping tanks too.

>>34320828

A 50' ditch with a 20' concrete wall at the top, surrounded by sensors (much like a prison). What Israel does.

It won't stop an attack, but it'll be enough of an obstacle to slow it down.

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How about sea fortifications, the anti submarine barrier in Edinburgh always looked stance to me

>>34333542
Strange* don't know why stance came out there

>>34320828
It would look like a big cleared area that is well zeroed by In direct fire weapons and easy to hit with air power.

Just a big ole kill zone.

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>>34332160
>>34332185
The entire reason the French abandoned Douaumont was because the german 420mm big bertha mortars completely smashed in the Belgian forts which were of similar design.
What the French would later learn was that the Belgian forts were obsolete in internal layout and improperly constructed.

The main artillery turrets of the Belgian forts sat directly atop the magazines that feed them and the builders of the fort had never used concrete before so the unreinforced mass concrete the fort got made of was of very poor quality.
Additionally the artillery turrets on the belgian forts were clumped together and exposed to direct enemy fire, All of this meant that the Belgian forts didn't just get disabled by 420mm mortar fire but they suffered catastrophic failure.

>Picrelaterd is one of the turrets of the destroyed Belgian forts.

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>>34334188
Here is a pic of the layout of one of the destroyed ww1 Belgian forts, You can see how the turrets and magazine of the are so densely packed together.
I believe the redline and yellow highlight is the trajectory and detonation location of the 420mm shell that destroyed the fortress.

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>>34320828
Maybe, but not made to stop major first world armies. The real benefit they give people now days is that the assets needed (not counting the B2 of course) to crack them open are easily detected. Tanks are very damn loud, the really strong types of bunker buster can not fit inside the internal bomb bays of a F-35, almost no fields the heavy artillery to do the job quickly these day, etc.

Infantry can not over take trenches faster then they be reinforced even with the lastest Russian man portable thermobaric weapons. Pic is of said trenches were it was tried in 2016.

>>34334188
That's because the French didn't listen to their designers and engineers who designed and built the forts.

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>>34334923
I misspoke when I said the Belgian forts were of similar design, I meant to say they were similar in construction.

>>34327087
>too many soft targets for effective use of precision guided munitions
I don't think you understand the degree of HARM and SDB spam a modern carrier group can unleash. You'd have to have literally thousands of SAM turrets.

>>34334871
I like the face that someone took the time out to include decorative gardening.

>>34335028
How many of those will get through a functioning AA network?

>>34334994
Douaumont was designed around modern artillery. It had 12 meters of dirt over the reinforced concrete. It held up pretty well to artillery as it was designed.

>>34335094
Depends on the quality of the network. Iraq and Kosovo have demonstrated that if the air defense radars and command centers are taken out quickly, AA networks quickly fall apart.

And remember, you don't need to take out the whole AA network at once. If the opposing air force is able to open up a corridor in even one sector, you're pretty much fucked.

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>>34334871
Temporary and semi-permanent remotely operated weapon systems is where the real danger to invading first world nations, Hard structures require investments that only a first world nation can afford to make or destory.

>>34335028
That's why you abuse the ever living fuck out of decoys with your soft. But in any case the soft RWS are just part of a network of medium and hard RWS.

>>34335141
That is why you make your AA defense hyper distributed and networked so that it can't be decapitated and your airspace and by extension ground is dangerous thought your territory.

Here is an excerpt from the PDF in OP:
>As demonstrated during the OPERATION DESERT STORM percislon guided munitions can have a devastating effect on a target that can be pinpointed and has little or no air defense. However, if their is an adequate air defense system which is hardened and protected by retractable launchers with hardened fiber optic communications from disperesed and hidden acquisition sites, the efficiency of these air deliver munitions will not be nearly as effective. Even with our complete air supremacy, the simple field fortifications and expedient protection techniques of the Iraqis required many thousands of sorties to reduce. And even then, there was not total destruction of the fortifications. If the Iraqis had been able to stand and fight, the fortifications remaining would have still caused the infliction of many casualt!es and s'ved the attacter-. Obviously fortifications can not make up for surrendering the air completely to the enemy, but with fixed permanent fortifications, which employ available technology appropria ely. it is possible to offset an attackers air force with hardened air defense sites. This must be possible or the Navy's aircraft carriers will not survive the next war.

>>34335263
I misspoke when I said in OP.

>>34327087
>http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a240407.pdf

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>>34320828

>What would a modern Maginot line look like?

>>34334871
What war is that from? Russo-Georgian war?

>>34335378
Wait, Im retarded you said 2016

>>34327087
NEAT

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>>34335619
>AGS-17 grenade launcher (360 rounds)
>NSV-12 heavy 12.7mm machine gun (480 rounds)
>Type PKM light 7.62mm machine gun (1700 rounds)
>Single ATGM (type can vary)

There is apparently a "smaller" version that just has the ATGM.

>>34320828
sort of. anti air radar and ground to air missile sites sort of already exist.
Most of the time though you'd like your AA defenses to be mobile to make them harder to target.
>>34320854
and the large SAM batteries are more the future.

>Will large scale fortifications every make a comeback?
No, but modern cities still have plenty of small fortifications, eg. heavy concrete planter boxes aren't just there for the flowers.

>>34334188

>>34334188

they didn't abandon the forts due to concern over german artillery, the reduced their garrisons and stripped them of much of their artillery because they felt it was needed elsewhere and that there was little chance of an attack. If the french felt the forts were useless the wouldn't have had various levels of garrisons in each one, and they wouldn't have continued to rely on the for Verdun's defense. it was a simple matter of unpreparedness that douamont was so undermanned, not because it was purposefully abandoned. The French stuck hard to other forts in the ring even in the face of artillery and they were decently effective, look at fort Vaux for example.

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>>34337092
AFAIK the French only disarmed Douaumont after the Belgian forts were broken so quickly by the german high caliber artillery.
The only guns left on the fort were the 2 turreted guns because they couldn't remove them and the garrison was only 56 troops and a few artillerymen who surrendered immediately.

I'm pretty sure Vaux and the other forts were also mostly disarmed but had far larger garrisons.

>all this ree about the Maginot Line
It was literally designed to be the "anvil" that the French Army would smash the Germans against until they were no more. At no point did anyone except a handful of complete fucking retards think, "oh yes, this will be enough." It just so happened that the aforementioned retards were also the people running shit when the war happened.

>>34320828
A modern set of massive fortifications would look a lot like the Maginot Line did, except include hardened ABM/SAM sites and point-defense like the C-RAM. There really isn't any way to do it differently, the same principles that worked then work now, and despite the technological differences the simple fact is it is a physical barrier. Tank traps still work on modern tanks, so do landmines, machine guns still kill, and artillery is still scary.

If we didn't have massive oceans to protect us you can bet your sweet ass that the USA would have Swiss-style forts all over in the Rockies and Appalachia. We are the undisputed masters of fire support, we would use our incredible talents to craft the most impressive line of fortifications known to man.

>>34320875
>>34320854
What would modern warfare even look like without air power? Basically every doctrine and decision assumes it is there in some form or another.

>>34340347
If air power were suddenly cut off from reliably affecting the ground, you'd have to use them mostly for moving troops and cargo around. In combat you'd only call them in after you're sure that all air defenses along the way were destroyed. Everyone who relied on airstrikes to do all the hard work will now have to pull their weight on the ground.

Basically warfare would become just like in muh video gaems with epic charges to blow up the anti-air batteries before the bombers arrive.

>>34327087
Never read about that one before nice. Thank you.

Also related to defensive enginnering: Infrastructure denial. NK for example has some nice big concrete "statues" right next to every logistically important street. If you don't want to see the enemies logistics train drive trough = blow the base and the street is blocked.

Same goes for German bridges. Little known fact that most bridges in Germany have predesigned weak spots where a standartized demolition charge will destroy the entire bridge.

Also a highly distributed system of small military stashes with mortars, guns and shoulder fired weapon systems to arm partisans behind the front lines.

If you prepare enough you can really fuck over any attacker. But in those cases you get to know the modern siege = 2 decades of sanctions and you can't pay for the upkeep any longer. Then it's time to invade.

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>>34342094
I don't think the sanctions affect NK as much as they used too, Same goes for any nation that has the technology to grow its own food and generate power.

>>34320833
Only when we found materials able to sustain wmd direct hit.

>>34342094
That's Swiss bridges

Realistically if the Swiss would feel the need to update their national redoubt, that would be the modern equivalent of massive fortifications. Even as it sits now, being dismantled through the decades, it's very impressive

>>34320828
I dont know but I would assume it would have to involve tons of active defense measures, SAMs and lasers to shoot down artillery shells and missiles, maybe CIWS even.

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>>34344165
I think CWIS would have marginal effect on the effectiveness of permanent fortifications; They're already survivable enough that focusing on expendability will have a significant effect on everything else.

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>>34344165
>>34345681
Both of you see my post here: >>34339119

A few C-RAMs swatting down even a tenth of the incoming munitions will do wonders when everything's desperately trying to out-range the other guy. Keeping things expendable on STATIC FUCKING TARGETS is just asking to get flipped over and savagely fucked right up the ass, you are not going to defy the logic of siege warfare and somehow "out-breed" the enemy while under blockade. (which is basically what you're saying)

What you probably meant (hopefully) is keeping the fortifications easy to manufacture and able to be distributed over a large area. Neat, still have the problem of shit from far away busting up your stuff in a type of fight that, by definition, means you cannot replace your losses. (unless you can teleport concrete structures into place, which you can't) You still need point defense, you still need counter-battery fire, you still need some way to cover your mobile forces (you WILL need those) as they sally forth to fight the enemy where appropriate. Maskirova out the ass too, your distributed defenses will be best served by being hard to spot, hard to track, (yes, this is possible) and possibly just plain bullshit. Five pillboxes is neat, but five pillboxes concealed in a hillside behind heavy foliage among five decoys is better.

Meanwhile further back heavily-armored ABM and SAM emplacements along with permanent superheavy artillery (rocket/gun, doesn't matter) to support the front and allow your mobile and garrison forces to move back and forth as necessary.

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>>34346981
Everything is expendable in war.
Trenches, hesco bastions landmines are all expendable fortifications.because they are disproportionately effective for the cost and setup time.

With a remotely operated system micro pillboxes like >>34327087 >>34335755 >>34335263 >>34345681 are no longer tombs for the operator.
So now you can have dozens of micro pillboxes to support every bunker which should also be remotely operated from fullsize forts deeper in the network of defense.

>>34348463
>Everything is expendable in war.
Wow, so you did go full potato. Literally could not be more wrong, you are absolutely 100% incorrect. Go back and re-read whatever it is that has filled your head with this retarded idea, because somewhere you fucked up.

You will lose every single motherfucking engagement you fight if you think any of your pieces are expendable. You can reluctantly accept losses, but aside from temporary fieldwork like trenches and hesco bastions, nothing you have is "expendable." Certainly not expensive remotely-operated weapon systems, and I've already explained why: You cannot replace your losses.

Let's examine the "everything is expendable" approach, everything has to be A: cheap and B: quick to manufacture. Firstly, building any type of fortification under fire is a hilariously bad idea, and placing remote weapon systems that are obviously in range of the enemy means you're going to lose the (likely extremely few in number) replacement things/systems/units to enemy action. Additionally your remotely-operated systems will inevitably run out of ammunition, which means you need to get the ammunition to them, which means exposed ammo carriers who will become enticing, highly explosive targets. Your other alternative is to seed the defensive line with thousands and thousands of tiny entrances into your network.

Secondly, remote-operated systems that aren't hardwired need to be wireless which means SIGINT issues and also jamming. Hardwire means it isn't going to be remote and easily replaceable, so it's basically making the entire network more expensive, cumbersome, inflexible, and logistically infeasible.

So at some point you're going to have to drop the "he he we can sacrifice it all :DDD" bullshit and start concentrating valuable things. So that means the remote systems are just force multipliers and not the primary means of defense, and then the "micro pillboxes" become bunkers and forts, and then you have exactly as I said.

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>>34349064
You don't want to over or underinvest in material made for war as it won't last forever unless it becomes irrelevant, That is why everything in war is expendable.
Generally speaking personnel are the most expensive and least expendable part of a military, A RWS that covers the same area with far less personal shouldn't be more expensive because your standards should different.

Remote weapon systems that are designed to be expendable only need to fight for a certain period of time, If it runs out of ammunition it has fulfilled its purpose meaning anything else like spotting or resupply is just a bonus. Repairing and replacing cable isn't hard or expensive if you are not burying the cables deep which you don't need to if you organize it as an "actor network" so you get a highly connected and redundant system. Having your communications on hardwire also means espionage is harder and you can abuse ECM far more than the attackers would use themselves. I never suggested that you replace fortifications outside your own territory or when you can't provide adequate support in your own lines.

I have already stated that expendable RWS are part of a network of soft, medium, and hard RWS fortifications which all support each other.
Anything beyond a soft fortification isn't relying on camouflage, numbers, or range for survivability and impact.

Additionally expendable RWS can be replaced or upgraded when the technology or strategy moves forward for minimal cost or downtime to the network.

>>34340399
>what is artillery

>>34349422
Replacing cable isn't hard, except when it is.

RWS goes down, where is the break?
Where is your link hub? Has the hub been hit?
The hub can't be hit? Well that means there either an easy entrance or dificult access to the cable runs.
Oh and surface layer cables? Fine e
Any artillery fire / high altitude paste equates to dead RWS links.

Then good luck relaying miles of cable under arty fire, assuming snipers aren't watching you checking every system and logging the locations.

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>>34351334
Maginot line forts like La Ferte managed to repair/replace communication cables while the fort was attacked by artillery, A modern network can have communication lines tracked and replaced through different routes instead of being forced to follow the same path the cable previously had.
How the hell does the invading military which isn't likely to have any hardwire communications not have SIGINT issues? You're acting like anything that isn't a rws can function effectively when completely cut off from communications when every system suffers under such conditions.

Even then you shouldn't be letting the enemy bombard your lines with impunity.
So if they disconnect large swaths of systems the enemy will still have to spend resources destroying disconnected rws or risk it still you reconnecting it, same goes for rws that run out of ammo.

>>34352742
You realize I was replying to the retard who was suggesting that the red systems didn't need to protect their cables.

Please select which of the following you would like.
1. Surface layer cables as described by retard 1
2. Entrenched cables, which require access tunnels creating like in the maginot line, which are strong enough for surface artillery not to collapse for easy safe maintainance.
Completely negating the make believe fantasy as every soft RWS now needs medium strength infrastructure and is an unmanned potential ingress.
3.RWS with hard line buried cabling where it is adequately protected but has no access if it is taken down.
This is the most likely.

This is why people have calmly explained that a small number of RWS in hidden locations fitted as described in point 3 would be a force multiplier, covering known defiles that lead to the complex, but are not suitable as a sustainable defence.

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>>34320854
>literally destroyed by a filipino cargo ship

LOL

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>>34353125
Why not use all 3 methods of connection where it as advantageous to do so?

1: You use surface cables to network the soft rws because burying cables that connect to those isn't worth the investment.
2: IIRC the maginot line forts didn't use entrenched cables to communicate with outside forts, The forts internal systems used entrenched cables which made them as tough as the fort itself.
3: Buried cables were used to connect maginot line forts to other forts, These cables did get destroyed and repaired during battle.

My point is that ultimately cables will be destroyed and cut no matter what you do, SO the best strategy is to increase the number of connections between each node for maximum redundancy. There are methods to efficiently do this without excessive connections or cable laying like actor network theory.

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>>34320875
You are literally describing the Hammer's Slammers series. Space PMC goes on adventures with hover tanks, no air power really because they would get laserd.

>>34320828
Wth is the point of those horizontal protrusions?

Once a CIWS version of a railgun/anti-munition laser is generalised then they'll return.

Air power succeeds because there's a lack of effective counters to it. As we saw in Ukraine, once air power doesn't matter, fortifications and artillery become king again.

It's just that Russia cannot into laser/railgun tech and unless the US sells it to Israel, neither can China.

>>34334871
Is that trench landscaped?

>>34349422
>You don't want to over or underinvest in material made for war as it won't last forever unless it becomes irrelevant, That is why everything in war is expendable.
That isn't what you were talking about.

You're talking about seeding a large area with RWS (we'll use the acronym) and having that become your primary method of force. So instead of augmenting things like they should be, you're placing all the eggs in that basket and then throwing up your arms claiming it's expendable. They're not. Existing systems are designed to be expendable, but YOUR systems (by their very nature) cannot be expendable. They need hard defense and protection, because without them it's just a line of smoldering wrecks.

>Repairing and replacing cable isn't hard
lmao what? Even without people shooting at anyone it's not hard. Above-ground cables are going to get fucked up in the open weather so they need to be robust which means heavy, inflexible, and expensive which means more difficulty in replacing them. This needs bigger, stronger vehicles and a longer logistics chain, so in addition to the smoldering wrecks of gun turrets and chopped cables the replacement vehicles are also destroyed too.

Congratulations you have 100% missed the point of RWS and distributed defense.

>I never suggested
You did, actually. You suggested exactly that in your last post and this response to my rebuttal.

>part of a network of soft, medium, and hard RWS fortifications
See the end of >>34349064

>expendable RWS can be replaced or upgraded
During periods of peacetime or when the enemy is routed or otherwise not shooting. This will change the moment you bring out your replacing hardware, they will absolutely concentrate on such specialized and expensive units.

We're, once again, back to the Maginot Line where manned stations are cheaper and possible because we're concentrating defense and only using RWS to augment existing systems.

Don't feature creep.

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>>34354489
>That isn't what you were talking about.
You're right it's not what I was talking about, But it is the idea the drives the theory of this defense network.
That if any particular asset of the defense is critical for immediate function of the defense, It will immediately be destroyed or made irrelevant regardless of how you design the defense.

>So instead of augmenting things like they should be, you're placing all the eggs in that basket and then throwing up your arms claiming it's expendable.
It's my fault for assuming that everyone else would assume/infer that only individual soft RWS would be expendable rather than whole network of soft, medium, and hard RWS being expendable.

>Existing systems are designed to be expendable, but YOUR systems (by their very nature) cannot be expendable. They need hard defense and protection, because without them it's just a line of smoldering wrecks.
You probably are referring to just those micro pill boxes to which you are correct but I never intended to say they didn't need hard assets.

continued-

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>>34354489
>>34355587
>You suggested exactly that in your last post and this response to my rebuttal.
>Additionally expendable RWS can be replaced or upgraded when the technology or strategy moves forward for minimal cost or downtime to the network.
I don't see the implication or statement that such actions be in the midst of danger.
>Maginot line forts like La Ferte managed to repair/replace communication cables while the fort was attacked by artillery, A modern network can have communication lines tracked and replaced through different routes instead of being forced to follow the same path the cable previously had.
I'm basically saying that repairing cables can be done even when under danger not that you should do so, But I'm probably retard and missing the exact lines I stated this right?

>See the end of >>34349064
The idea is you need enough soft assets to ensure the enemy has to deal with it by methods that your medium and hard assets are able to resist and operate against, Weapons that are effective on those expensive assets should be ineffective if not economic overkill on the network of soft assets. Those expendable soft RWS should be able to attack the methods of destroying your medium and hard assets by shear area saturation and "economy versions" of expense weapons. As long as the triangle of soft, medium, and hard assets exists the network will not collapse and the defense will function.

>During periods of peacetime or when the enemy is routed or otherwise not shooting. This will change the moment you bring out your replacing hardware, they will absolutely concentrate on such specialized and expensive units.
Or you start the upgrades deeper in your lines where you are safe and have your mobile forces to do the replacement work near the front of the netwrok.

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>>34354489
>>34355690
Hard or soft if the network is attacked continuously it will falter through attrition so ultimately you need the mobile arly to take pressure off, When they take the pressure off even if for just a day you need to repair and replace as much as you can.
Something you might never have the time to do with hard or medium fortifications.

We're, once again, back to the Maginot Line where manned stations are cheaper and possible because we're concentrating defense and only using RWS to augment existing systems.

>We're, once again, back to the Maginot Line where manned stations are cheaper and possible because we're concentrating defense and only using RWS to augment existing systems.
The Maginot Line didn't require that many men to operate in the first place (Didn't stop high command from trying to use the garrison as a field army.), WIth modern robotics technology just how many men are the occupied forts going to have?
Take the casemate guns for example, They were very vulnerable when switching between AT and MGs, Something the robot would do faster and fearlessly. But why use a robot to just switch the guns?
You could eliminate quite a lot of unnecessary space, equipment, and supplies. In the end all weapon systems can run out of ammunition whether operated in person or remotely.

>>34355587
>That if any particular asset of the defense is critical for immediate function of the defense
This is an inevitability in any system, you will have mission critical components in every thing you do. Hesco bastions have the wire mesh, if that fails the bastion fails, it becomes a pile of rocks.
>It will immediately be destroyed or made irrelevant
Uh? No. Fuel tanks on an aircraft aren't immediately exploded into clouds of flame and they're absolutely critical for the immediate function of the aircraft. What happens is the tank is ruptured, the self-sealing function takes over, and the tank operates with diminished functionality until it simply cannot self-seal anymore. Same thing with defensive works, there isn't a "push button, make enemy forces irrelevant" device out there; not even ballistic missiles are capable of that.
>It's my fault for assuming
Fair enough, forgiven, so it's more in line with what I originally said then.
>you probably are referring to
Whatever you've put up for defense. Whatever is the main "this is the backbone of everything" element that those cheap to deploy/use RWS (which are not going to be anything but soft) will support and enhance. Things like heavy weapon emplacements, guidance systems, SAM/ABM sites, howitzers, large mortars, bunkers, magazines, etc; everything needed to hold the line.
>>34355690
>be in the midst of danger
So you're going to wait until your enemy just goes away? In a manned system the primary component, the people, can flee back to a secondary position under cover from other areas. They can also take their weapons and everything else with them, a RWS is stuck there and you said it yourself that these are expendable things so their loss is to be tolerated. While your robots are waiting to be plopped down, my ATGM and forward spotters are rushing back out to hidden fighting positions. I can just pack up my shit and move, for whatever reason, while you can't.
(continued)

>>34355690
I can use RWS to augment my forces while you're relying on them to last long enough. This goes back to what I said earlier, you're essentially hoping to out-breed a besieging enemy. You lose gun/missile launchers, I lose men here and there, but my forces are constantly moving as necessary. Even though I'm static, I'm not necessarily static in the same place at any one time.

My forts and massive defensive structures take most of the heat and make for enticing targets, but my real teeth are in the rest of the garrison and the mobile forces that aren't restricted to the defensive line.
>I'm basically saying that repairing cables can be done even when under danger
They really can't be repaired, though. If they're above-ground they're going to be big, snake-like targets because they have to be robust enough to survive the elements. Do you know why we bury cables? We bury them so they're in a nice, comfy environment where they can be kept safe.

Above-ground lines are short-term temporary, they will inevitably start attracting snipers just like thinner telephone cables used to do in the world wars.

>Weapons that are effective on those expensive assets should be ineffective if not economic overkill on the network of soft assets
See this is the problem. They won't focus on the soft stuff with these weapons, they'll switch to using light munitions for the light targets. Our two plans are similar in that they have trifecta of different systems, but mine relies on mobility of the garrison forces while yours takes the losses on the chin. I will last longer than you because I am not trying to out-breed the siege.
>mobile forces to do the replacement
Mobile forces should be fighting the enemy, not playing repairman.

>why use the robot to just switch the guns?
>You could eliminate quite a lot of unnecessary space, equipment, and supplies
I covered this already but:
You give up flexibility by relying on robots. I don't. They're nice to have, but I won't rely on them.

>>34320828
"Fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man." --George S. Patton, Jr.

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>>34328124
>>34356345
"Fort Driant is a monument to the stupidity of General Patton" --General Otto von Knobelsdorff.

>>34327087
Nobody is going to use 100,000 psi concrete for anything other than mega hardened structures, even then, it is prohibitively expensive. The MOP can go through rebar reinforced 10,000 psi concrete, with follow on strikes, penetration is easily achievable. If killing the structure isn't possible, then cutting it off from communicating is almost certainly an option.

>>34356241
>This is an inevitability in any system, you will have mission critical components in every thing you do. Hesco bastions have the wire mesh, if that fails the bastion fails, it becomes a pile of rocks.
The idea specifically applies to application static fortifications strategically, Designwise too but moreso in that resouces you spend for a static defense that doesn't see use should have been spent to your mobile forces.
So if you can ensure that no matter what every asset of your defense is used, You will have not wasted a cent. Maybe you could have spent it better but it won't be as waste.


>Uh? No. Fuel tanks on an aircraft aren't immediately exploded into clouds of flame and they're absolutely critical for the immediate function of the aircraft.
Even then in your example you could say the fuel tank has been made irrelevant, Because most weapons for fighting aircraft will outright destroy if not cripple and force abandonment of the aircraft.


>everything needed to hold the line.
This is either a misunderstanding or a disagreement on how the defense is shaped, I don't think a line of fortification can secure your airspace.

I believe optimally, You want soft, medium, and hard RWS as homogeneously distributed as possible over as much critical territory as effective RWS density will allow you.
Now you're unlikely to get that close to optimal because terrain makes that impossible/unnecessary, But the strongest locations will be in homogeneous/fractal distribution growing towards the greatest threats.
Natural lines will form but it's basically the combination of defense in depth and and hedgehog defense made possible by robotics.


>So you're going to wait until your enemy just goes away?
Well no, Your mobile army should push them back or secure the line enough that you can move new RWS behind them if they can't push forward.
That would allow you mobile army to move somewhere else because the new defenses that is better tailored to threat.

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>>34356258
>I can use RWS to augment my forces while you're relying on them to last long enough
How is this less true for massive forications let alone a line of them?
It's more likely that they will get avoided or crippled at relatively low cost early into the war, Either you over or under invest with massive fortifications you waste your resource.


>but my real teeth are in the rest of the garrison and the mobile forces that aren't restricted to the defensive line.
This is also true for the network defense, But it relies on being able to change and adapt to relieve the garrisons and mobile forces for other tasks.


>They really can't be repaired, though
This is more true with massive fortifications then surface and sub-surface cables as the amount of effort it takes to damage them is similar to how much it takes to repair them.


>If they're above-ground they're going to be big.
If they don't have to transmit power it can just be a narrow fiber optic line that could probably be sown into the ground by a mobile machine.
You seem to think that ultimately everyone is going to have to rely on wireless technology because all cables will be cut 24/7, In which case big whoop the attackers and defenders have roughly equal footing in communications.


>See this is the problem. They won't focus on the soft stuff with these weapons, they'll switch to using light munitions for the light targets.
No that's the point, It forces the enemy to diversify their weapon systems and target selection order which slows down every aspect of the advance both strategy and tactically.


>Our two plans are similar in that they have trifecta of different systems, but mine relies on mobility of the garrison forces while yours takes the losses on the chin.
My defense supports itself continuously and isn't reliant on outside force for it function and or maximise the amount of time it buys you, The mobile army is free to do what it needs like relieving the failing defenses.

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>>34356258
>I will last longer than you because I am not trying to out-breed the siege.
No, I'm trying to ensure my permanent defenses are never a waste of resources.


>Mobile forces should be fighting the enemy, not playing repairman.
If your defensive mobile forces never get bogged down and thus never get the time to repair or rearm the RWS they are fighting near, They are probably doing their job good enough that the specialists can do the work with the limited time.


>You give up flexibility by relying on robots.
I don't think that applies to something that isn't mobile, In my opinion you're limiting your men by having them fight in fortifications.

>>34342094
>Same goes for German bridges. Little known fact that most bridges in Germany have predesigned weak spots where a standartized demolition charge will destroy the entire bridge.
That's Switzerland and Finland
>Also a highly distributed system of small military stashes with mortars, guns and shoulder fired weapon systems to arm partisans behind the front lines.
That's Finland

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>>34355831