Morality in Politics

virgin politics

>>3255259
you could consider politics a game where the goal is to bring about a system to benefit your allies and harm your enemies, if that's the case then politics isn't a moral field

i don't know why you have a portrait of kant as your op as what you've written has virtually nothing to do with his political philosophy.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/

>>3255279

But no one could play that game, because it wouldn't be moral. Agents playing it would be free rational agents, and therefore be subject to morality.

>>3255284
I'm partially Kantian in ethics, and I had no other pictures to put up.

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>>3255259

>>3255296
what if you and your cabal of goons got together to make the laws to allow you to steal all the stuff of your hated rivals?
There you go, politics without morality. I don't see the holdup.

>>3255308

Me and my goons would presumably be rational and free beings, meaning we ought to follow the laws of morality (the laws of morality = what ought to be). Presumably, it's immoral to steal things from rivals, and, since by definition morality is what ought to be, then it ought not to be that we should make such laws. Therefore, you cannot make such laws under any circumstances, which includes politics.

Why did Ayn Rand hate this guy again?

>>3255336
If we "ought" not to do things, I don't see how suddenly we "can't" do them.

>>3255344

You can still do them, although you'd be immoral. Ought not implies that you shouldn't do those things, and because the laws of morality dictates what you ought to do, how you ought to act, and that politics also describes a subset of those actions, then the political acts (which determine what you politically ought to do), must be in line with the acts morality allows or demands.

Of course, you can still do whatever you want and not follow morality, but you'd be immoral.

>>3255363
So everyone "must strictly follow in all cases the laws of morality", or not follow them.
Sounds more like guidelines of suggestions.

>>3255386

Well you must do it, unless you want to be an immoral jerk who has brought a world state worst than what it should have been.

>>3255363
>You can still do them, although you'd be immoral.
Why would I care whether or not I'm "immoral" by your standards?

>>3255400
What if I don't abide by the """Laws""" of morality but I bring about a better world?

>>3255408

How could the world be better than what it ought to be?

>>3255402

It's not my standards, it's universal. And i you don't care, then people who have reason to punish you and avenge themselves for the wrong you've caused until it's repaired, and you've lost all advantage you'd have gained from it.

>>3255418
Lets just say it is, what now?
Seems like those "Laws" weren't so ironclad.

>>3255418
>It's not my standards, it's universal.
nah

>people who have reason to punish you and avenge themselves for the wrong you've caused until it's repaired
If I'm a politician and my choice is between letting a nation die or ordering the death of an individual, I think I know which one will piss more people off.

>>3255425

It's impossible to bring a better world by not following the laws of morality, as in doing so you'd harm others and bring a world state which should not have been.

>>3255436

Then you'd be wrong. Why would it not be universal? If you're a free rational being, then the laws apply to you ; and since there's no difference between two free rational beings, thy laws apply equally to everyone.

And if you do that, you'd be immoral, and your rule ought to be overthrown.

>>3255439
What if there was a matter of morality that would randomly make things better or worse with no way to predict it, what """ought""" we do then?
I mean if we are just brainstorming here, we are free to invent whatever """Laws""" we want.

>>3255450
>If you're a free rational being, then the laws apply to you ; and since there's no difference between two free rational beings, thy laws apply equally to everyone.
But you yourself said we are free to not follow these """Laws""", so I guess the laws equally don't apply to anyone.

>your rule ought to be overthrown.
What if I make up a """Law""" that says it oughtn't?

>>3255259
if you could save your life by sacrificing your toenail, would you do so? of course you would, and it is not immoral in the least to do so
likewise the living body of a nation may morally sacrifice parts of itself in order to survive

>>3255455

I'm not sure I follow you, but the laws of morality are independent of our will, following Plato's Euthyphro. If we decide that X is moral, the we could also decide that non X is moral, which is contradictory.

>>3255459

You are free to not follow them yes, but you'd be immoral, as I've said.

See >>3255464

>>3255463
I can consent to sacrificing my toenail. A nation has no consciousness, only individuals have consciousness. A nation doesn't act, only individuals do. Therefore, a nation cannot consent to killing anyone. Those people who could be sacrificed to save others are the only ones who can consent to their own deaths.

>>3255464
>If we decide that X is moral, the we could also decide that non X is moral, which is contradictory.
So?

Which is moral, Chocolate or Vanilla? Clearly one of these must be moral and the other immoral, according to our immutable and transcendant """Laws""" that someone somewhere once thought of at some point maybe.

>>3255480

Well, considering it doesn't change anything to eat chocolate over vanilla or otherwise, then it's morally permissible to eat chocolate or vanilla or both.

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Stop thinking of morality as a set of laws imposed on you by some spooky external force and start thinking of it as a guide to living a fulfilling life.

>>3255259
Morality is subjective.

>>3255500

See >>3255464

>>3255493
Then by that token it doesn't change anything when I kill someone or shit on a baby's face or have to complete NINE captchas to be able to post.

>>3255498

This is just redefining morality from what ought to be done or not done to the set of criterion that ought to be accomplished for you to live a fulfilling live. It also implies moral nihilism, because then there's nothing you ought to do. Which means if for someone the path to living a fulfilling live is genocide (like Hitler), then that person, to live a fulfilling live, should commit a genocide. That's okay if you can rationally show there's no morality, but I don't think that's the case, especially when others have shown convincingly otherwise, like Kant.

>>3255507

Yes it would, because your act would be contradictory. If you decided to kill a baby or someone else, then you'd contradict yourself as you couldn't wish to kill yourself. And it would also be contradictory following the Categorical imperative, in all it's formulations, whereas I don't see anything contradictory or wrong in eating chocolate over vanilla.

>>3255523
Seems mighty suspicious that when I want to do totally harmless like shit on a baby it's nihilistic but when you want me to do something I don't want to do it's a """Law""" that I absolutely """ought""" to obey whatever you say.

>>3255532
Any shabby morality system that so casually dismisses the monumentally important choice between chocolate or vanilla so flippantly, while at the same time seems so irrationally hung up on the simple gesture of shitting on a baby, doesn't seem very worthwhile to me.

>>3255523
>This is just redefining morality from what ought to be done or not done to the set of criterion that ought to be accomplished for you to live a fulfilling live.
Living a fulfilling life is precisely what you ought to do.

>It also implies moral nihilism, because then there's nothing you ought to do
Not true unless you believe that any way of trying to be happy is as effective as any other. There are things you should and shouldn't do both in specific cases and as a matter of habit, it's just that there are no "laws" dictating what to do to everyone in the universe. That's some christfag shit.

> if for someone the path to living a fulfilling live is genocide
You don't actually believe that could be the case for anyone, do you?

>>3255573
Just to play doubles advocate, what if there was someone with a neurological condition where if he wasn't carrying out a murder he experiences inexplicable searing pain, but while he was killing he experiences an overwhelming rush of joy beyond that which typical people could ever comprehend. Lets just say that these two extremes blot out any other sensation such as regret or sadness. Wouldn't this person be more fulfilled by killing others?

>>3255585
>doubles advocate
Check these doubles.

I'd say that person is fucked however you look at it and should probably just an hero. Even if he can get some momentary joy from offing people, there's no way things are going to turn out well for him.

>>3255607
All right then instead of migraines + euphoria, lets walk back each of the pain/joy aspects bit by bit, until we find the sweet spot of angst + thrill that counts as a normally morally fulfilling life of a violent murderer.

>>3255626
It would still be better for him if he could overcome his condition and actually love people, but if that's really impossible and assuming he's free to inflict his sadism on people without fear of retaliation, then yes, I would say that's what he should do. But we're talking about a person who's very far from what we normally think of as a human being. Also, I'd add that it's not as if such a person is likely to be stopped by any amount of Kantian philosophy or any other argument.

>>3255500
That is the whole premise of Kantianism.

>>3255259
Kant would not have said that. The NAP is gay, if the entire universe and billions of people were going to perish, and you had the ability to prevent it by lightly scratching the back of an innocent person's finger, you would have to be beyond autistic to think the morally correct option was to sit back and do nothing.

but, friend, hear my plea

How do you cross the is-ought gap ? You say that we have to do so-and-so, however you do not mention how you arrived to it. Surely you must be making a mistake, because no one yet has closed the unfathomable ravine between these two shores.

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>>3255259
>Implying that I masturbate

Any political ideology which doesn't have liberty as one of it's greatest principles cannot be moral OP, because people cannot be moral if they aren't free.

Slaves aren't responsible for their actions.

>>3255714

How would Kant not have agreed to that? Morality encompasses all of our actions, which presumably includes political ones.

>>3256829

It's simple : people are bound by the laws of morality they themselves can will in a non-contradictory manner, following the categorical imperative.

>>3255552

Well, have fun living with your contradictions and being immoral. In your shoes, I would be afraid, for real. Anything you ever that's immoral can never be forgiven or taken back : it's with you forever.

>>3255573

OP here, but to follow on what the doubles advocate said, you would then admit that mentally deviant people like pedophiles, ought to follow their desires? Your premise for morality (or for what you think is good behaviour) lies in a number games? In the assumption that the majority of people won't be that way?

>>3255714
Kant would have said that, yes. If the universalization of a maxim entails a contradiction either logical, following the first formulation, or otherwise following the two others, or that you could not rationally will to live in such a place where such a maxim would be a natural law, then the maxim and act which underlies it are immoral and should not be done. Since killing is moral, then killing someone to save a nation full of people is immoral.

In the case of scratching an innocent's finger, it would depend on the reason behind the maxim. I don't think universalizing such a maxim leads to a contradiction, so it should be fine. That's what I think Kant would say.

For my part, being partially Kantian, I would probably say that as well, though it would also depend for me on whether or not one would need someone else's consent to scratch a person's finger, as it is their property. If it turns out that you need their consent, then the entire universe be damned.

>>3256875

True enough. Not only can you not force people and do violence against their will as free agents, because yourself being a free agent, in doing so, would deny to others (their freedom) what you will for yourself (to be free and constrain others). Moreover, I think following Aquinas you could make a good argument for freedom ; as if you create a society without freedom, them vice and virtue (moral action) becomes impossible, which entails that such a society would not be moral.

>>3255269

Go back to /pol/

Autism.

The end justifies the means, their bodies will be the mortar used in creating the foundation of a greater nation.

>>3257574
no it's not simple, the categorical imperative does not cross the is-ought gap. At best, it's an interesting tool to evaluate different couses of action
>formulate a maxim to be made into a law of nature
>if it's not contradictory, then it's moral
how does that make an action moral, an ''ought'' ? you skim over that step, because it isn't here
you should not simply parrot what some ''great mind of the past'' declared before.

>>3259140

Yes it does, because it doesn't start from something that is, but from something that ought, i.e. what your will establishes as a maxim. It doesn't start from any factual thing of the world.

Also, it doesn't determine what is moral per se, it determines what is morally permissible. Since a contradictory doctrine cannot be moral, then it only determines what is immoral.

>>3259096
>Autism.
Great argument there, buddy.

>>3259194
that sounds like fancy sophistry, at best. Your will doesn't establish anything as an ought. Let me show why
>you have a will
>your will establishes a maxim
how does that follow ? How can it be said that possessing the will to do some action means that you establish a maxim ? Instead, you started with some craving and then a structured will guide you to the desired result, there is no maxim that comes into existence after the fact.

This whole theory comes off as some wonderful magic trick, but the gap persists

>>3259577

It's not sophistry. You will something (like you want to eat an apple), which means that you already are talking about an ought from your perspective, as if you decided to eat the apple then you have established a rule that you ought to eat it. The maxim is a formulation of that rule you set for yourself by deciding to eat the apple. And because you decided to eat the apple, you determined that it was better for you to eat it, than not eat it, so we're talking about an ought. There is no is n that situation. You might not have thought of the maxim yourself, but your action can still be described by one.

>>3259577
Also, to make things clearer, let us admit that you're right, that the will doesn't establish anything, and that it's just sophistry.

When you ask : ''what ought I do?'' The answer to that question must minimally be non-contradictory, it can't be illogical. Right? From there, even if you disagree with the specifics of Kant's categorical imperative or its three formulations, you can at least eliminate ''oughts'', or maxims which entail a contradiction for they would be immoral (they couldn't be something you ought to do, as it would be contradictory, therefore if you ought not to do it, then it is immoral). That test gives you the set of actions which are morally permissible, but it doesn't tell you what you ought to do, just what you ought not to do. For instance, it might allow you to drink coffee, read or do sports ; but it doesn't say if you ought to do those things. Those things simply happen to not imply a contradiction, which means they aren't immoral, and are therefore at least permissible.

Also, if you believe this isn't a valid solution to bypass the is ought gap, then what is your moral system? There doesn't seem to be any alternative, so anything can be done.

>>3259598
>>3259615
you gloss over the most important part each time and try to talk about things that differ from what I asked.
>You want the apple
>You deem it to be preferable to any other food
This does not lead to
>You ought to eat an apple
You didn't get to it by deductive reasonning, you didn't solve the is-ought gap. Stop mentionning irrelevant matters, because the crux of the question is not to be found elsewhere than here

You still haven't proven that
>muh laws of morality
Exist, or are somehow preferable. This 'better world' that you speak of, you have not proven it to be 'better', or better to the person specifically. Or that 'better' is relevant, or that 'reason' is correct or relevant or anything but a sense.

Fucking kid read Kant once and now thinks he's got it all figured out. Kantian ethics are for children drowning in Ressentiment. "Follow the law! It is good for you!"

>>3259676

Read my second example again. Even if I cannot cross the is-ought gap, the answer to the question what ought I do must still be logical and non-contradictory.

And I think that wanting an apple = establishing an ought. Because if you act on that desire, then implicitly you have decided that eating an apple was what you should have done. Otherwise, you wouldn't have done it.

>>3255259
Yes, of course.
However, often the situation is that if the nation perishes, more innocent lives will be lost than if that person was killed.

>>3259676

Also, if you want a clearer deduction of the thing :

You have a set of possible actions, let's call them A, B and C.
If A, then not B and not C.
A.
Then not B and not C.
Therefore, you have chosen that you ought to A, because you have deemed it the best possible action.

And if you were to justify why you chose A over B and C, you could say :

Because it I thought it was nice.

Then you could ask : why did you choose something that was nice?

You could say : because it gave me pleasure.

Then you could ask : why did you choose something that gave you pleasure?

And so on and so forth, and the ultimate answer you could give is because A was good, which is an ought.

If that's not clear and point out the flaws in my reasoning, and also please tell me what your moral system is.

>>3259678

The laws of morality are by definition preferable, because they dictate how you ought to act. What is better? Better is a relative term which describes something which is more good than somethings else, which means something that is more moral than something else (by definition).

Morality can be not relevant to you, yes. But you'd be an immoral person if it was so.

>>3259731
>The laws of morality are by definition preferable, because they dictate how you ought to act.
Not preferable; you're just being circular here.

Morality is a humanist construction. Kant is a nonentity humanist. Show me proof of moral laws or stop regurgitating what you've read for your first day of Philosophy 101.

>>3259736

I never studied philosophy, I'm nearly failed high school. And I'm not circular. It's a definition. Morality is what ought to be. What ought to be by definition means preferable, unless you mean something else by preferable, like something that is preferable for a specific individual in terms of their desires. But I assume you meant preferable to other laws which would tell you how you ought to act. If that's the case, then morality tells you how you ought to act in the abstract and in the absolute, in all situations, while other kind of laws (like the rules you could derive to become the richest man possible) are relative to a set goal, and therefore are a subset to the laws of morality. It would be nonsensical to claim that it is preferable that you follow the laws that dictate how you can become rich, while the laws of morality are by definition the laws that dictate what you ought to do in all possible situations, including one where you try to become the richest man.

>>3259746
No, that is circular. No wonder you nearly failed high school.

>>3259736

Also, if morality is a humanist construction, then doing a genocide is perfectly reasonable and okay.

And I can tell you that whatever the laws of morality are, they must be logical, which means they must not be self-contradictory. Therefore, any act or maxim which underlies it that is self-contradictory (for example following Kant's categorical imperative) is immoral.

The proof of moral laws is your own reason when you establish maxims for your actions. Reason establishes the moral rules.

>>3259762
>Also, if morality is a humanist construction, then doing a genocide is perfectly reasonable and okay.
You just made a moral claim you fucking idiot.
'muh rasins' isn't a reason, it's a cop-out.

>>3259753

I don't understand your question. Tell me exactly why it is circular, because I don't see it.

Morality = what ought to be done in all cases
Specific hypothetical imperatives = what you ought to do to achieve X specific goal

If you ask why is morality preferable to a specific hypothetical imperative (like becoming rich), then all I can do is point you towards the definition of morality and tell you that because it encompasses all actions, including those required to become rich, then it is preferable to follow morality if it is conflict with the actions required to become rich, because by definition morality is what ought to be done. Morality literally means the set of rules that are preferable to any other.

>>3259765

And? If there's no morality, then genocide just is. We can make moral claims about it, but they'd be false, since there's no morality.

I don't get your point. And what did I do that's a cop-out, I'm not following you.

>>3259770
>ought is good becuz i sed so
>>3259777
You don't get anything because you're an idiot.

>>3259785
What you ought to do means that you should do something... I'm just using the meaning of words here... How am I saying it's because I said so?

>You don't get anything because you're an idiot.
Yeah I'm an idiot, and? Just tell me where I'm wrong instead of just repeating how I'm a failure. You did more studies than me and you're smart, good on you, but tell me where and why I'm wrong.

>>3259794
>the meaning of words
Go read some modern philosophy instead of 'enlightenment' horseshit. You're being tricked by language.

>>3259801
Then what should I read?

>>3259801
And how am I being tricked? I'm so fucking lost and I feel like the dumbest idiot.

>>3259806
My asshole. Go do some research yourself.
>>3259812
You're extrapolating from a definition as if there is more to a definition than itself.

>>3259814
All I see is that morality is what ought to be done, I don't get what I'm extrapolating from it. Never mind, I just don't get it, you're probably right. Sorry.

>>3259820
Morality is not 'what ought to be done', not only is that a bad definition, but it is incredibly vague. Also, there is no reason to assume that 'what ought to be done' is the best thing to do. Or what 'best' means. No, 'best' and 'better' cannot be subjective if used in a moral context, if there is a 'moral law'. In addition, there is no proof for a moral law. I've read some Kant, and his arguments for morality are ridiculously weak. Kant is the vodka of philosophers: so many young idiots hype it up, but when you really try it, it isn't so amazing. Also, it's bland, easily mixed, and cheap. Trash or top-shelf, I want nothing to do with it.

>>3259827
Then what's your definition for it? And I was simply stating that when I mentioned what ought to be done, I didn't imply that is was the best (subjective) thing to do. It might be that what ought to be done is very harmful to a lot of people.

And for Kant there's no ''proof'' : it's just the laws (maxims) that reason gives itself for action. The categorical imperative is just a test to see if that maxim is logically coherent.

liberals want their politicians to be ammoral

>>3259847
>laws
'muh reason' and 'muh logic' don't exist.

>>3255259
Jesus Christ, it's the moralfag again.
Dude there's no such thing as objective ethics. Get over it.

>>3255259
Politics is literally the opposite of morality.

Guilt is biologically apparent in socially adapted animals. It's a mechanism that allows for self-sacrifice for the greater good, almost like an ant colony. Individually, guilt is useless. In fact, self-destruction is a biological imperative among most mammals with depression"; suicide doesn't discriminate between the mammals. Take an adult lion from its pride, and it will suffer depression, starve itself, become anemic, will hide, and will kill itself; depression, it exists in us all, and affects us all similarly. Depression is just a heightened sense of guilt; except instead of feeling guilty to "others", there ARE no "others", and is often mistaken for selfishness. In America where about 1/10th of the American population is on some kind of anti-anxiety med, it's also the most selfish country. South Korea is following that trend, also becoming a hotbed of suicide.

Anyway, the primal guilt comes from either not being intuned with society or not having society. The western environment, is void of society, but replaces itself with laws. For example, if law was taken out of a city, the city would be rampant with thieves and murderers, while the small close-knit town would thrive and cooperate with one another because law had very little bearing on them.

Politics is compromise; Compromise between whites and blacks, compromise between catholics and protestants, compromise between left and right, compromise between nationalists and critics... When you build a society on compromise, you are taking away their need for morals; laws replace those morals.

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>>3259706
>>3259720
>Because if you act on that desire, then implicitly you have decided that eating an apple was what you should have done.

not an argument, doesn't logically follow

>Even if I cannot cross the is-ought gap, the answer to the question what ought I do must still be logical and non-contradictory.

yes, however you don't know what are the oughts amond the logical and non-contradictory that you should do, because you didn't cross the gap

>If A, then not B and not C.
A.
Then not B and not C.
Therefore, you have chosen that you ought to A, because you have deemed it the best possible action.

does not compute
at best, you can say that you have chosen to do A, not that you ought to do A. You don't cross the gap in this line of thought

>And if you were to justify why you chose A over B and C, you could say :

you can stop at because it's pleasure, i don't see how you cross the gap

pic related is my system of thought, my god, and even more, but let's talk about yours

>>3259827
you're quite smug for a pseud, know your place brainlet/poser

>>3260933
>muh biology
Fuck off, STEMsperg.

>>3260939
You can stop at it's pleasure, but if I further asked, why is pleasure important, you couldn't just answer, because it's pleasure. You'd have to answer because pleasure is good. The fact that you chose pleasure over something else means that you deemed it good, that you recognized it as an ought for you.

And even if you disagree with that, you cannot disagree that people establishes oughts all the time. For instance, I think that we ought not to kill others. That's an ought, and it is non-contradictory, so at best, I can show it is probably not immoral. Moreover, if I posit that I ought to hamper someone's pursuit of happiness, then that is contradictory, and therefore immoral, because I would deny to another agent who can will and has interests in the world, what I, also being such an agent, wishes for myself (happiness), and because there are no relevant moral differences between us, then it would be a contradictory ought.

And if you think all I say is meme-tier, and if you really have no real moral system, then why don't you commit genocides?

>>3260933

And? Even if what you said is completely true, if there is an objective morality, an answer to what we ought to do, then the biology is irrelevant, or only relevant insofar as objective morality would say it is.

>>3260006

>logic
>doesn't exist
Dropped.

>>3261990
I'm not saying that morality is objective... Just objectively biological. We have a tendency to think of a human as just an individual. We don't think of a cell in terms of its individuality; we consider the cell's natural environment, the human body. Humans, likewise, shouldn't be thought of in terms of our individuality but by our society.

Point is, our "collectiveness" defines our morality. If we are multiple collectives (or no collective at all) within a polity, then there ceases to be a morality on the political level, because political law (like natural law) transcends morality.

There are essentially no "Moral politics"... Just politics that are "more moral" than other politics.

>>3262082
Fuck off commiecuck.

>>3261986
you're forcing a bit too much when you say we could not stop at pleasure. I don't see how that follows logically, that I have to answer that pleasure is good.
why do i do i want pleasure?
>because it is good
why is that the final answer ? you will tell that, it is because good is good, so it ends the infinite recursion. However, the alternative,
>because it is pleasant
stands equal to the first case. Why do I want pleasure, because it is pleasant, pleasure is pleasant. The infinite recursion thus can be ended. I don't see why I should logically prefer the first explanation to the second.

And simply saying that people establishes oughts isn't a justification. They can postulate oughts, because that 's what seems to be the only way to cross the is-ought gap, or they might utter words lacking meaning, simply repeating them in a given context by absent-minded mimicry.

>The fact that you chose pleasure over something else means that you deemed it good, that you recognized it as an ought for you.
This step is also faulty, you simply reworded the same thing. Why does something that I deem good is an ought ? This derivation is dubious. Following this, if there was a person A thinking that eating bred squirrels is good, and a person B thinking that it is bad, would eating bred squirrels be an ought and not an ought at the same time ? This is breaking the law of contradiction. If you answer that they can possess different oughts, then morality degenerates in a subjective matter.

>>3257580
If your morality system arbitrarily dismisses certain actions while exaggerating the importance of other actions, i don't see why I should care about your social labels since they merely reflect your biases and emotional reactions.

>>3260006
lol he's back to ruin another thread

>>3261986
Bad logic. Pleasure isn't good.
>The fact that you chose pleasure over something else means that you deemed it good,
More terrible logic.

Goodness you are pathetic.
>>3261993
Prove otherwise nonlogically and noncontingently.

>>3262187
>Asking people to question their methodology is 'ruining a thread'
Ideologues, everybody.

>>3262396
>"logic doesn't exist"
>criticizes someone's logic

Delusional faggot.

>>3262418
>anybody who doesnt behave according to my autistic systems is just le crazy!

>>3262437
No see there's a difference, when I post I use your own words to show that you don't make sense. When you post you invent complete nonsense unrelated to anything someone else said. That's why you are delusional, the thoughts in your head don't match what is actually happening. It's also why you've trained yourself to vindictively lash out with greentext and insults, since you've started to notice that the content of your ideas is never met with consideration.

>>3262456
>don't make sense
According to 'logic'. Prove logic exists first, nonlogically and noncontingently.
If you can't do that then I'll stick to epistemological anarchism.
>he thinks i care if ideologues 'consider' my 'content'
btw nothing's actually happening, prove otherwise, but first prove logic is existent nonlogically and noncontingently.

>>3262462
I baited you into the "Caring Reply" paradox, if you don't care what other people think, why post? Even more specifically, let's assume that your posting is an attempt to relate to other human beings on a purely social level, unrelated to any ideology. Then why be such a disagreeable cunt?
Either you are trying to express your views, or you are just trying to talk to people.
Basically your fucked either way, you can't actually explain your own ideology without lashing out with schizophrenic denials and objections and causing people to think you are stupid. So no matter what your goal is, you failed.

>>3262492
>paradox
No it's not. I post because I can. Stop psychobabbling away you coal-burning teenage girl.

>>3262144
I don't think I'm really forcing it, because I could ask you why do you choose something that's pleasant over something that's not or less so? The only real answer is that you think that, at least on some level, pleasure is good. You always choose the act that you deem the best one, and from that you can derive that no matter why you act, when you act, you act because you think what you are doing is good.

>because it is pleasant
But why do you desire something that's pleasant? Also, why in the case of pleasant would it end the infinite recursion, but in the case of good it would create one? Even if I were wrong, I don't see how there's a recursion.

Besides, I think you could make an argument, that even if you disagree the reason is because it's good, you should at least admit, that everyone would necessarily answer because I believe it will make me happy, since we all necessarily strive for happiness. So at the very least, everyone must necessarily admit that everyone else has a right to pursue happiness ; as they cannot deny something to others, which they wish necessarily for themselves, there being no relevant differences between all those concerned with happiness.

>they might utter words lacking meaning, simply repeating them in a given context by absent-minded mimicry
What do you mean by this?

>Why does something that I deem good is an ought ? This derivation is dubious.
Never mind, you're correct on this, I can't hold this point.

And concerning your contradiction, you'd be right if people create the oughts based on their individual action, but it's not the case ; what you point out is that people can have different contradictory conceptions of what ought to be which entails that one of those (or both) is in the wrong, as morality cannot be a subjective matter, as shown my Plato in the Euthyphro.

>>3262462

Seriously, if you ask someone to prove you logic, you're stupid. You're asking someone to use logic for a proof that proves logic.

>>3255259

Well OP, by my guess you've rencently read about Kant and CI's so now you're trying to prove a poiny however you havent given a "for instance" in your initial argument.

>>3263168
>For instance
>For example, if you could save a whole nation by killing an innocent person, the whole nation should perish, as it would be immoral to kill an innocent live.

And I have been a Kantian for some years now, I haven't just recently read his works.

>>3262723
no the point was that both the pleasant and the good paths ended in similar recursions, so that one answer is not to be prefered to the other on the basis of this.

>I don't think I'm really forcing it, because I could ask you why do you choose something that's pleasant over something that's not or less so? The only real answer is that you think that, at least on some level, pleasure is good.
The point is that, ''pleasure is pleasant'' is as satisfying as an answer than ''pleasure is good''. You're stating that the only answer is ''pleasure is good'' because you're postulating that we only choose the good.
If ''you act because you think what you are doing is good.'' is true, then Q1: if a criminal kills someone, he did what was good to him. does that make murder a good thing ?
A1a: yes, then morality is subjective according to you because you can find someone else to desire the opposite; you namedrop Plato, and say it is impossible, OK, so there is no morality. A1b: no, then we don't always do what is good.

Q2: You said: ''And I think that wanting an apple = establishing an ought. Because if you act on that desire, then implicitly you have decided that eating an apple was what you should have done. Otherwise, you wouldn't have done it.'' Like Q1, if a criminal kills someone, he did what he ought to do. Does that make murder an ought ? A2a yes, conflicting, subjective mroalities, impossible, so no morality. A2b: no, then acting on desires does not estblish ought, so you didn't cross the is-ought gap.

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>>3262723
Q3: You say:
>I think you could make an argument ... between all those concerned with happiness.
Formally stated, your argument is: P1 everybody strives for happiness, P2 if agents share the same relationship to happiness then they ought to allow others to pursue happiness, C therefore everybody has a right to happiness.
P1 is weak, but I'll accept it for the sake of the argument. P2 does not make sense, except if you were already able to cross the is-ought gap, but we see with Q2 that you don't. Therefore this argument doesn't stand.

So you ahve to abandon this system you defend dogmatically, and accept the political derivations of this.

This thread has the greatest amount of pedantic wankery I've seen in a long time.

Let's get two things settled:
1. The death of a nation causes greater suffering than the death of one person
2. the widespread idea of moral relativity is already a reason not to bother. The Chicago School of Economics and everything it spawned is already doing a better job at producing a generally more moral society.

>>3263433

But why would you have chosen somethings pleasant over something not pleasant? How would you answer this?

>If ''you act because you think what you are doing is good.'' is true, then Q1: if a criminal kills someone, he did what was good to him. does that make murder a good thing ?

No, the criminal acts on what he thinks is the good. It doesn't mean that killing objectively is good, just that he, in his present state, perceives it as being good. Everyone strive towards the good necessarily, but not everyone perceives it the same way, such that some people can make mistakes on what it is. Same goes for seeing at a distance : someone might perceive the shape of a man, while the other might think it's a giraffe. In reality, it's a human, but it doesn't entail that there's both a human and a giraffe in the distance, just that people perceive things differently.

>Q2: You said: ''And I think that wanting an apple = establishing an ought.
I conceited this. You're right, I was wrong there. Wanting an apple and acting on it =/= establishing an ought, simply it indicates that you think acting on it is good.

>>3263437
How is P1 weak? Everyone necessarily pursues happiness. I don't see how that could not be the case.

How does P2 does not make sense? If you pursue happiness (P1) there's no reason you can come up to deny that pursuit to other agents who share the same relevant qualities you have, because you pursuit happiness yourself and because there's no relevant differences between yourself and others. I'll rephrase it.

>>3263437

Here's the rephrasing :

P1 : Everyone necessarily pursues happiness.
C1 : Therefore, you pursue happiness.
P2 : All those that pursue happiness have identical qualities pertaining to that pursuit of happiness (everyone is an agent who can feel and has interests in the world, grossly put)
C2 Therefore, your pursuit of happiness is equivalent to anyone else's pursuit.
C3 Therefore, because your pursuit is equivalent to anyone else's, there are no reason to deter a person from pursuing their own happiness.
C4 Therefore, because you strive for happiness, and because the conditions or qualities which allow you to strive for happiness are the same for yourself and for others (they are equivalent), you must necessarily recognize that they are equivalent, otherwise you would be wrong.
C5 Therefore, because you strive for happiness, and because you recognize your pursuit is equivalent to any other person's pursuit, you must necessarily recognize the fact that others can pursue their own happiness, otherwise you would contradict yourself (because your pursuit is equivalent to anyone else's).
C6 Therefore, the only logical conclusion for you to draw, is that everyone has a right to pursue their own happiness, because you must recognize that they also strive for happiness and that their pursuit is equivalent to yours. (A right, meaning that they can pursue their own happiness without limitation from your part.)

From that, I don't see any jumps from an is to an ought. In fact, they are either all ''oughts'' or all ''is'''. And if it's the latter, than you'd be right, but for different reasons. Though I think it's all ''oughts''.

>>3263437

Never mind, I don't concede the point about the apple/good.

>>3263553

I agree that economic freedom produces the greatest amount of good possible. But if you can't morally justify economic freedom, then there's nothing wrong with protectionism, genocide, lying, betraying your promises, etc.

>>3262082
Societies don't think, act or have consciousness. They are fictional entities. They don't ''exist''.

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>>3263636
It has already been said. You could choose to do something because it is more pleasant.

Q1+: You think you answered Q1. ''Everyone strive towards the good necessarily, but not everyone perceives it the same way, such that some people can make mistakes on what it is.'' I'll explain how it'll go: i will say ''how do you know that he is making a mistake on the good ?''. If you answer: ''he cannot will something contradictory'', you have a circular argument because you are trying to prove that the is-ought gap has been crossed, and this premise is post-gap. Thus, he is not making a mistake and murder is good to him, and unless you ahve another rebuttal, Q1 still stands.

Q3+ : P2 is post-gap, you can't invoke such a premise before having the is-ought gap covered.

With Q2 out of the way, I can already conclude you didn't close the gap. However, I don't want you to do a derivation of ought from the good (you'll try, this much is clear), so I framed Q1+. Q3+ is simply a response to a misguided argument. Therefore, if you don't have anything to answer back, and if you're honest with yourself, you'll want to get rid of this germ-anic philosophical smegma and distance yourself from complete political autism, for your own sake.

>>3263811
Then if all actions are made in terms of pleasantness, how can people make moral judgments, at all? If everyone acts on the basis of pleasantness, then no one can ever act morally, because everyone necessarily acts for pleasure. However, we can see people act following oughts despite pleasure.

The fact that something is more pleasant than another is no reason for action though, it's still an ''is''. Why do you act on something that is pleasant? How can you act on a simple ''is''? If all that you see are ''is'', why is the fact that something is more pleasant than another reason for action, but the fact that some cats are black is not?

Well, I can answer differently : it could be that the good differs between people for the most part, but that certain rules apply to all (the one of C6), and a mistake would be for someone to think the good is something contradictory with C6. Now, I'll know you'll say C6 is post-gap, because of P2, but P2 isn't post-gap. P2 is a matter of fact : I am stating that the properties required for being able to strive toward happiness are the same among all people who strive towards happiness. There is no ought here. (If you mean your P2, then I'd say that you phrased it wrongly because the ought doesn't come from P2, but from P1, from admitting that everyone pursues happiness, which means everyone sees that as the good, but I know you don't agree with this.)

Being honest, I can see your argument, and I did what exactly you said I would do. The core of the issue I think is Q1, and I can see why I could be wrong, but I'd still like to hear you nonetheless, on the soundness of my argument in Q3. You said that is was weak, but why? If there's another way to show I'm wrong, without involving Q1, then please do it.

Also, I'd just like to say that I'm not completely Kantian, I have other sources, though I mainly am. And what other moral theories would you have? I have to have some kind of moral doctrine.

>>3255259
Go read some machiavelli

>>3263870

Machiavelli says nothing of worth on the subject. Machiavelli talks about hypothetical imperatives (if X goal - here politics -, then Y actions should be taken to fulfill it) ; however, all hypothetical imperatives are subject to the categorical imperative (morality). Therefore, because morality cares about all actions, and because political actions are a type of actions, then political actions are subject to whatever morality asks of us. But Machiavelli doesn't talk about that, and therefore reading him is not relevant in discussing the application of moral rules to politics.

>>3263869
I'll do as you ask.

>>3263869
You're committing a language game in C5. The ''can'' can take two meanings in your argument. In P2, for instance, ''everyone is an agent who can feel'': in this sense, ''can'' means they have the possibility, the potential to do so. In C5 (and in the definition in C6), however, the ''can'' means there ''have the right to''. If you replace the different ''can'' by these propositions, it is obvious that the original sense is kept intact. So, in C5, this shift in meaning skews the argument, because you're not trying to show there that we have to''recognize that they also have the possibility to pursue their own happiness''. Therefore this argument is to be discarded.

I don't have another system to suggest to replace Kantian deontology, I don't believe that there are any successful attempt to solve the is-ought gap.

>>3263138

This.

>>3255339
Because Kant believed we have an obligation to help our fellow man better himself and Ayn Rand's Objectivism flatly rejects such an obligation.

>>3265113
The meaning of can in C5 was meant to be understood as something of a right from the get-go, not simply stating that they could do it, the logic being that any reason you could come up to justify your pursuing your own happiness would apply to them as well, and that you must recognize that fact.

Thanks for your answer. And what about the reason for action problem? I can honestly see why the ''good'' might not be a valid answer, but I don't think pleasant is either. Why would a state of fact such as something being pleasant be reason for action (to eat an apple), but not some cats being black? Why is the fact that eating an apple is pleasant reason to eat an apple, but saying that some cats are black is not a reason to eat an apple? Both seem like they are stating facts. The only answer I can see is that there's a maxim in both case, upon which you act, when certain factual scenarios present themselves.

>>3255259
I wouldn't disagree with your premise, which really, is a rather inoffensive one that I think at its heart is what most people believe.

However, there's plenty of questions of what constitutes a moral or immoral act in regards to politics and the problems they typically deal.

For example, in relation to the idea of property rights, which is probably one of the bigger issues when it comes to domestic politics, we must first define how property is established in the first place and who, if anybody, can act as an issuer of property. Can property exist without force (of government)? What gives a claim on territory or capital any legitimacy? This is something frequently debated and these are the issues that can lead one person to commit a political act they think is perfectly within moral guidelines and is what ought to be done, while others see it as an immoral act.

>>3265113
>>3266246

It's also essentially why I'm saying that when you act on something you desire you establish an ought. Because everyone necessarily pursues happiness (formally) then everyone, necessarily establishes, under all cases, that they ought to pursue happiness, which means P1 is stating an ought from the start, so there's no crossing the is-out gap. Afterwards, people's particular conditions differ, meaning that they have different content for that happiness they pursue, but those different kinds of happiness, only existing because of the fact that you can pursue happiness, must not be in contradiction with what rules can be derived from that fact. And also, it would be necessary that every necessarily pursues happiness, otherwise some people would be exempt from morality. I don't know if that helps tearing down what I've said already or not.

>>3255259
wouldn't the person refusing to be sacrificed be very selfish in allowing the entire society to perish? It wouldn't be very moral of him to put his life before the lives of everyone else. Wouldn't there possibly be millions upon millions of innocent people who perish because of that person's refusal to be sacrificed, even though he's innocent? And, realistically, does anyone get in that position by being innocent? I don't think that is vey likely.
>innocent
>the lives of everyone else hinges on your disposal
I don't think you can have just one of those.

Thinking of politics in that way is also really limiting and shallow. Sometimes, the supposed moral thing to do is not the best thing to do for everyone. Sometimes dirty things have to be done, like war. Not to mention, my definition of what is and isn't moral most likely differs from yours. So then, who's feelings do we base "good" politics on? Feelings should rarely be considered in politics at all. Objectivity ought to be king. Whatever objectively helps to produce the greatest amount of happiness and prosperity for the population is surely best. Their happiness and prosperity is surely better than the society perishing altogether.

>>3266246
C5+.1: I did not say that ''can'' in C5 was to be understood as a possibility. I wrote that the ''can'' is to be red as ''have a right to'', so that we end up with ''Therefore, because you strive for happiness, and because you recognize your pursuit is equivalent to any other person's pursuit, you must necessarily recognize the fact that others *have the right to* pursue their own happiness, otherwise you would contradict yourself (because your pursuit is equivalent to anyone else's).''

P1 you strive for happiness
P2 your pursuit is equivalent to any other person's pursuit

The conclusion to this is not
C1: therefore the others have the right to pursue their own happiness
It's rather C2: therefore others strive for happiness
This is the result of the syllogism, so with this you don't get to close the gap.

C5+.2: I have a feeling you're trying to say or will say in these words

P1 you ''can'' (have the possiblity to) strive for happiness
P2 your pursuit is equivalent to any other person's pursuit
C: therefore the others ''can'' (have the right) to pursue their own happiness

Two problems with that, first, the syllogism doesn't stand, like shown in C5+.1. Secondly, if this followed, this would be a language game where there is a tweak in the sense of can to arrive to an unrelated proposition in the conclusion.

Reason for action problem: I didn't say that pleasant was a valid answer as opposed to the good, I showed that it produced similar results to the good when you tried to impose ''the good'' as the only justification of actions.

>>3266681

Perhaps I wasn't clear, but to me a right is simply something someone can do (has the possibility to do), and that others recognize this (or are forced to by exterior factors, though this wouldn't be the case here). Because I believe P1 is an ought (that everyone necessarily admits they ought to pursue happiness because they pursue happiness), then this conclusion is not unrelated, it comes from :

P1 Everyone necessarily pursues happiness.
P2 If you act on something, then you have established that you ought to do that thing (you disagree with this)
C1 Therefore, you necessarily must admit that you ought to pursue happiness.
P3 Your pursuit is equivalent to any other person's pursuit.
C2 Therefore, others have a right to pursue their own happiness.

Would this then stand?

And for the reason for action problem : I wasn't asking what would be a valid reason for action per se, because that would be restating the is-ought gap, but rather, what are the conditions that allow us to act. If free will exists, which I posit, because otherwise there's no reason to talk about morality, then what motivates people to act freely? What makes a free action possible? What would allow me, for instance, to eat the apple, instead of just leaving it there? Certainly, it can't be the case that simply an ''is'' would make me act : because an ''is'' doesn't imply an action, just that it is. Hence, why do people act? I think it's because of oughts. I was asking you of an alternative answer to that question because if people don't make oughts when they decide to act, then how can they act, if there are only ''is''?

>>3266907
Well if you decide uniterally to change the meaning of ''right'' to something heterodox, of course you can get wherever you want to.

''but to me a right is simply something someone can do (has the possibility to do), and that others recognize this (or are forced to by exterior factors, though this wouldn't be the case here).''

Let's contrasts this with: ''Rights are entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or (not) be in certain states.'' (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#1) Your definition doesn't give any normative weight to the concept. If you want to play the philosopher instead of a poet, create new words instead of using common knowledge concepts that have specific connations to solve a centuries-old problem.

>>3267297

I don't see how my meaning is different from yours? Let us take your definition then, is there still a problem if we adopt it?

>>3267297

And what about the action problem?

If you have an ought in P1, then the ''right'' in the conclusion holds normative value.

>>3267297

>>3266907
Following this, I mean, that the ''right'' holds normative value because you would have to recognize other people's ought to pursue happiness, as the reason you justfiy your own ought (that you necessarily pursue happiness) is the same for all .

>>3266907
What is the definition of happiness ?

>>3267685

Since you're using the stanford entries, this is what they define happiness as : ''There are roughly two philosophical literatures on “happiness,” each corresponding to a different sense of the term. One uses ‘happiness’ as a value term, roughly synonymous with well-being or flourishing. The other body of work uses the word as a purely descriptive psychological term, akin to ‘depression’ or ‘tranquility’.'' (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/happiness/)

That being said, it seems that a state of well-being or satisfaction with one's self seem to be the definition of happiness I used. It would be somewhat of a psychological state in the mind.

Of course, the conditions to attain that state are diverse and depend on any particular individual (the substantive conditions), but the conditions to be able to pursue happiness, the formal conditions of happiness, are general and shared among all.

>>3266357
It might be that that person has a moral duty to kill themselves, but you'd have to show me that, and simply appealing to consequences doesn't show that one ought to strive for the best possible consequences (which is also a vague term - can you really compare individual lives together?). Moreover, if killing is immoral, then it is so under all circumstances, it being a contradictory act. No matter the consequences not killing that person would entail.

And I don't think it's shallow to think this way. Morality tells us what we ought to do in all circumstances. Politics are a set of circumstances, and are therefore subject also to morality. Morality isn't linked with what is the best thing for everyone. If everyone liked genocide, would genocide be fine? And no matter that our conceptions differ, if you can prove yours or if I can prove mine (which I think I've done), because then everyone would be forced to adhere to it.

>>3267990
''One uses ‘happiness’ as a value term, roughly synonymous with well-being or flourishing.''
Then clearly by happiness, it is implied that it is linked to a pleasant, agreable life, a flourishing one, the term is quite strong, at least moderately strong.

If it is true that everybody yearns for happiness, then why are there people commiting suicide, leading terroristic last stands ? They do not strive for well-being, they literally go to their deaths. There are atheistic terrorists, that do not intend on living on in the after-life: these ones, they are headed for their deaths and they expect to end in the void. In their final moments, they seek to harm people; if they do have empathy, they suffer terribly in front of the suffering they bring about; if they do not have empathy, and feel instead a sadistic joy, this pleasure is ephemeral and does not lead to the long-lasting well-being that is understood to be happiness. These men, that exist in the world, whose lives have been recorded in history, do not strive for happiness at the very least for the few moments before their demise.

Such an exception should be concerning since this yearning is supposed to be universal.

>>3268176

Well, the easiest way to explain it would be that at some point for these people they believe that the future wouldn't allow them to preserve the happiness they have, or stop it from from diminishing, or they believe that the only way to reach the highest possible happiness would be to do a terrorist attack. In the case of the suicides linked to depression, it would be because those people strive for happiness, but they believe that they won't be able to stop their happiness from decreasing into unhappiness or that they cannot stop their unhappiness from increasing such that they think they have reached their peak happiness level. From there, they kill themselves to cut their losses.

As for terrorists, I think it's because they believe that their duty requires them to commit such acts that would lead to suicide, such that the only way for them to feel good about themselves, to be happy, it to commit terroristic last stands. They, like everyone, strive for happiness, but their conception of the conditions to achieve happiness (commit a crime) are different than most other people.

>>3268190
>As for terrorists, I think it's because they believe that their duty requires them to commit such acts that would lead to suicide, such that the only way for them to feel good about themselves, to be happy,

are you equating feeling good with happiness ? Because happiness, as per the definition, is fairly strong well-being. By dying, the terrorists aren't getting their happiness. If by not committing the murder-suicide, they are left in a state of guilt and shame, so not-happiness. If they commit their murder-suicide, they take the means to never feel well-being again. So are they in a situation where they can't strive for happiness ?

>>3268223

Well happiness is a psychological state where you are satisfied with yourself, so it's not feeling good in the sense of pleasure, but feeling good in the sense of being satisfied.

The terrorist strive for happiness : their happiness is risking their lives to kill people and in doing so inflicting terror on others. To accomplish that, they do terrorist attacks, which makes them feel satisfied about themselves, feeling that they have accomplished their duty, not needing to do anything else. Dying in doing so, doesn't mean they didn't strive for happiness : death isn't a negative or a positive, you don't feel ''death'', you're dead. They simply believe the only way to be happy it to risk their lives in a suicide attack.

>>3268231
This is very dishonest from you, to fiddle like this with the definition of happiness.

>Well happiness is a psychological state where you are satisfied with yourself, so it's not feeling good in the sense of pleasure, but feeling good in the sense of being satisfied.

No it's not. ''One uses ‘happiness’ as a value term, roughly synonymous with well-being or flourishing.'' It's a sense of STRONG satisfaction, of FLOURISHING.

>The terrorist strive for happiness : their happiness is risking their lives to kill people and in doing so inflicting terror on others.

This can't be called happiness. In the cases of a unique murder-suicide, this is a very short-lasting satisfaction, if satisfaction there is at all.

>>3268254
>The other body of work uses the word as a purely descriptive psychological term, akin to ‘depression’ or ‘tranquility’.'' (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/happiness/)
>That being said, it seems that a state of well-being or satisfaction with one's self seem to be the definition of happiness I used. It would be somewhat of a psychological state in the mind.

You haven't fully read what I've said. And I think the terrorist are flourishing while doing terrorist acts, yes. And I don't associate happiness with long-lasting feeling or psychological state. It can be short. But, even if it were long lasting, if you die right after you have achieved a state of happiness it doesn't mean you weren't happy : the long-lasting applies to the person. A happy person, if happiness implies a long-lasting feeling, would be happy despite the circumstances, but death isn't a circumstance that happens to you, because you would not be there anymore, you'd be dead. Those terrorists, if they were to miraculously survive their act, would still be happy.

>>3268275
>And I don't associate happiness with long-lasting feeling or psychological state. It can be short.

hmmm ?

''Philosophers who write about “happiness” typically take their subject matter to be either of two things, each corresponding to a different sense of the term:

A state of mind
A life that goes well for the person leading it

In the first case our concern is simply a psychological matter. Just as inquiry about pleasure or depression fundamentally concerns questions of psychology, inquiry about happiness in this sense—call it the (L O N G - T E R M (as found on the SEP page)) “psychological sense”—is fundamentally the study of certain mental states. What is this state of mind we call happiness? Typical answers to this question include life satisfaction, pleasure, or a positive emotional condition.''

>>3268286
I am talking about a state of mind, yes. Now, even admitting that happiness is necessarily associated with a long-lasting feeling, the long-lasting feeling only means that you are happy despite the circumstances - be they sad or tragic or pleasurable, you'll remain happy. However, if you die, this doesn't mean that you aren't in a state of happiness, because, if instead of dying, you had faced sad circumstances, you could have stayed happy and remained so. Death doesn't affect the quality of your state of mind because it simply ends it.

To point out the incoherence of your position : take a person who needs to eat a bagel to be happy. If he eats the bagel on monday the 21th of august 2017 at 9:00am, and lives until 2060, you would say that he was happy, because his state of mind persisted for a long time. But, take the same person, who eats the same bagel, at the same time, but an hour later, after eating his bagel, a tray bullet pierces his skull and kills him, then he would not have been happy, even though he would have had the same mental state as the first scenario? That doesn't make much sense. The only answer is that in both scenario, the person is happy.

>>3268304
withotu commenting on your argument, let's have a stronger case to speed things up a bit

There are young people with bright futures ahead. Some of them are willing to sacrifice a happy life to take unsafe, lethal amount of crystal meth while knowing so taht it would be deadly. This is the case of someone choosing something over his own happiness, not striving for ahppiness.

>>3268317

This simply means that while striving towards happiness, they have made a mistake on what they thought would make them happy. They thought meth would have made them happy, but it wasn't the case.

>>3268334
ad-hoc
There are people in the world that knew what is happiness, and left their happy life for meth. Explain this

>>3268338

How is that ad hoc? Literally, no one actually knows how to achieve happiness, and does the opposite of it freely. They thought meth would make them happy, or they didn't really believe in their conception of happiness, or thought it was unattainable such that meth was one way to increase momentarily their level of happiness. Also, they could have valued immediate happiness they thought meth would have given them more than a promised happiness in the long run .

>>3268348
damn those yuroposters...
There is one person in the world who had the right conception of happiness (which is very well-known, and puts emphasis on long-term life satisfaction, pleasure, and positive emotional condition.) and who chose instead to take meth for twenty minutes in a night

>>3268360
Two things. First, if you ask me to provide an explanation for how this could be possible, assuming everyone strives for happiness, I already have. Second, if you start by positing that not everyone strives towards happiness from the get-go, then obviously I'll never be able to answer your question, but you'd be disingenuous if you did that.

Here are possible explanations : it could be that they made a mistake on what they thought happiness was, thinking taking meth would have lead them towards happiness ; they could have taken meth in a not free manner (for instance, because of impulses) ; they could have thought their conception of happiness was unattainable such that taking meth was their best option to reach happiness or the little of it they could find ; or they could have valued the short-term happiness of taking meth more than the long-term happiness of their conception.

>>3268392
short-term happiness doesn't exist, the term is euphoria or ectasy, not happiness.

So, some person with a clear conception of happiness, that did not act on an impulse, took some meth for twenty minutes or any other insignificant period of time and died while knowing so, and forbade the happy life he knew he was going to have

>>3268408
>short-term happiness doesn't exist, the term is euphoria or ectasy, not happiness.

Why not? You could have a state of mind that is one of happiness on a countdown, I don't see how it's not possible. Maybe meth can trick you into being happy for a few moments, but then, when things go back to normal, you're not happy anymore.

Also, they might have thought meth would not have the effect that it does, or they wouldn't have thought that they would die by taking it. Literally, they must have thought it would make them happy in some fashion, or they weren't free. It's either one or the other. If you're not satisfied with this, or my other explanations, to which you haven't given an answer, it's because you posited from the get-go that not everyone strives towards happiness.

>>3268418
Such a case has happened in the world, and this is the proof that not everybody strives for happiness.

Rules-based moral systems are desperately missing the point of morality.

Originally, the basic concept was that human beings taken as individuals and political groupings had goals, and made rules to advance those goals or codify certain standards of behavior. The rules existed for the sake of the benefit received for following them, not because they had any inherit merit.

Man was not made for the Law, the Law was made for Man. It is no crime to do good on the Sabbath.

What Nietzche called slave morality, what Rand understood as pathological altruism, and what Christ understood as the poison of the Pharisees, all are related in concept.

Kant's moral system is not only not morality, it is very near to anti-morality, it is the morality that is the most gone astray, the most missing the point, the morality which takes as its basis not values, not the ends sought after, but the rules which were originally created for the sake of those ends, given transcendental importance for no good reason.

If you have the option to let a thousand people die, or tell a lie, you lie, and kill the Kantian while you're at it.
>>3268421
He's using an Aristolean conception of happiness I think, where its not an emotional state its a physical-mental state of generalized well-being. Its objective in the sense that you can define it and tell if someone has it or not, and that only certain things bring it, but it has little connection to the concept of happiness in the vernacular which is mostly an emotional state.

Also not everyone strives for happiness, regardless of whether you define it as eudaimonia or as pleasure. The only way to universalize the search for "happiness" is to define happiness so broadly that any kind of satisfaction in your will, circumstances, or actions, counts, which is retarded.

>>3268431

I don't think rule-based systems are missing the point ; I mean, if you only base your ethics around values individual hold, then you create major problems. First and foremost, people's value differs : how do you solve their differences in values and desires? Why ought you obey the rules of morality if they simply are stated to make society function? Because your conception entails relativism, then what do you make of terrible people with terrible values or ideas? Of fascism and communism?

On the conception of happiness, I am using a restricted definition close to what Aristotle says. However, according to Aristotle, the eudaimonia is what everyone strives for, it being the ultimate goal, the only ultimate goal, all other goals being intermediary goals towards it. Also, I think a broader sense for happiness like the one you describe or the one Kant uses - when the object of your will is satisfied, or when the state of the world is according to your will - would also work for what I was trying to show above.

>>3268138
Killing isn't always immoral though. Would defending yourself be immoral if it involved killing someone? Taking another life is serious, but it is often something that needs to be done. I feel like you're getting murder and killing confused. If someone is breaking into a house and is going to rape and murder the family living there, how is it immoral to kill that person breaking in? If a group of barbarians is coming over the horizon to pillage and kill, how is it immoral to defend your village? If a murderer has killed 12 people and plans on killing again, how is it immoral to execute them? Or would you rather that person either go free or sit in prison taking up resources for no good reason?

And I think I missed the part where you "proved" your morality. You seem to just dealing in absolutes really. Either it is or it isn't x. In reality it isn't that cut and dry. Moral gray area exists more than moral black and white. Besides, you can prove your morality to begin with, because it's all based on how you feel. Your feelings differ from my feelings, thus my morality will differ from yours. There is no such thing as objective morality. Only objective conclusions that are arrived to with some form of valid reasoning, although not always perfect. Like with Utilitarianism. Going off of that method, one puts the group welfare above a single individual. I.e. Save the group over a single person. One could see how that objectively produces a better outcome for more people, like if it were a life and death scenario. Reasoning with numbers, one can say that 8 alive and 1 dead is better than 8 dead and 1 alive.

Also, feelings and morality in politics produces weak governments and bad situations. Look at Sweden for example. Their politics is filled with nothing but moral policing and feelings. Their feelings pull them more economically left to eventual ruin and their feeling bad for 3rd worlders will lead to the eventual collapse of the country.

>>3262168
Hey OP how come you don't address this, you fucking hack?

>>3266907
So now, P1 seems very unlikely to be true when you don't get to play with vague meanings. You're trying to avoid clear reasonning and you don't state your arguments in a formal mode because you're scared of being wrong, which you'll end up being anyway.

Let's hear you about Q6 (and I want you to keep adressing arguments by their formal names, not apple-good-right hand-thunder problem, because you're artificially creating difficulty in following your reasonning, perhaps even consciously).

P1 Your pursuit is equivalent to any other person's pursuit.
P2 You either can or cannot prevent other people from pursuing happiness.
P3 If you cannot, morality does not have any normative power on you because you cannot do wrong anyway.

P4 If you can, then you can infringe on their pursuit of happiness
P5You cannot infringe on your own pursuit of happiness.
P6 Therefore, your relationship to the pursuit of happiness isn't equivalent to theirs.

For a thing A to be logically equivalent to a thing B, it has to share every property of B.

Inb4 ''not what I'm meant by equivalent'' go read a book seriously this is very sad, learn how to use language in a clear fashion, and don't use words you don't understand, that's not very hard.

>>3270048
What did you think I meant by happiness? I'm using a pretty standard usage of the word, as far as I know.

I said equivalent, not identical. They don't share the same exact properties : only the properties relevant to the pursuit of happiness, otherwise you'd be right. They are equivalent in respect to that, to their formal aspects, to the conditions that allow a thing to be able to strive towards happiness (as opposed to a thing that had no concept of happiness). That much I already have said previously - perhaps though in an unclear manner, you'd be right and I'm sorry. However, they differ in respect to the content of that pursuit, and since each individual has a different content of that pursuit, then it is possible to infringe on someone else's pursuit. Maybe I've formulated it poorly, but the general idea is that if you desire something for yourself, and others desire it as well, and the conditions for desiring are equally present in you and others, then there cannot be any reason that can justify you hampering their progress towards satisfying their desire. Let me rephrase it logically so you don't say I'm purposefully trying to keeps things blurry, which I'm not, I just don't write well. Though, I am indeed scared of being wrong, you got that much right. If I were wrong, and there was no alternative solution, I'd be pretty devastated.

>>3270048

P1 The forma aspects of your pursuit are equivalent to any other person's pursuit (they are exactly the same). (The formal aspects being the pursuit of happiness, in general, regardless of its object.)
P2 Different people have different feelings or state, including happiness, and necessarily so, because otherwise someone could feel subjectively the happiness of someone else, which is not so.
C1 Different people have different objects for their happiness (the subjective state in which you could identify them as happy and the object which they pursue)
P3 You either can or cannot prevent other people from pursuing the object of their happiness.
P4 If you can, then you can infringe on the object of their pursuit of happiness.
P5 You cannot infringe on the object your own pursuit of happiness.
C3 Therefore, your relationship to the object o your pursuit of happiness isn't equivalent to theirs.

(I'm pretty sure this doesn't work, since you could substitute in the conditions of possibility).

I think this would be the argument in the clearest terms I can put it :

P1 Everyone necessarily pursues happiness.
P2 Because everyone is subjectively different, the object of an individual's pursuit differs from every other's object.
C1 Because everyone pursues happiness, but the object of that happiness is different, then only the formal aspects of that pursuit are equivalent.
P3 When someone acts on something, that person establishes that he ought to do that thing.
P4 Free will exists.
P5 For someone to act freely, he must act for a reason.
C2 No matter the reason you use to justify the fact that you can act formally on pursuing happiness, because everyone's pursuit in the general sense (not its object) is equivalent, that reason could be applied to someone else.
C3 Therefore, you cannot morally prevent people from pursuing happiness.

My reasoning is flawed, for many reasons, and some which you haven't even brought up. I'll still post it though.

>>3270048

And sorry if I'm not clear - it's not really my intention to not be clear. I mean, you can't combine always acting on X and free will to start, then you're also right that they aren't equivalent, and I can also I think come up with reasons that reference the individual to make them not applicable to others.

Yeah you're right, in the end I'm pretty sad and pathetic. Thanks for everything I guess.

>>3270313
Exactly, you meant ''equivalence''. You simply DON'T KNOW THE WORDS YOU ARE USING.

''In logic, statements p and q are logically equivalent if they have the same logical content. This is a semantic concept; two statements are equivalent if they have the same truth value in every model (Mendelson 1979:56).''
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_equivalence)

''The other characteristic properties of identity, symmetry (x = y → y = x), and transitivity (x = y & y = z → x = z), may be deduced from Ref and LL. Any relation that is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric is called an ‘equivalence relation’. Thus, identity is an equivalence relation satisfying LL. But not all equivalence relations satisfy LL.''
(https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/)

The only logical equivalence that is possible for two objects(the pursuing of happiness) is the identity relation. Usually, most logical equivalences are between propositions. So if you say that your striving for happiness is equivalent to others' striving, then you're wrong. As simple as that. Nothing personal,but this 4chinz and you'll get your ass handed over.

>>3270706
Fair enough, then there's no morality and genocide is fair territory, and so is lying, betrayal and other stuff. It's honestly disheartening. Also, since the only way to ''solve'' the is-ought gap is to start from an ought, and the only existing oughts are those you set-up for yourself, and there's no way to evaluate the validity of anyone's oughts, then anything is fair deal.

>>3270706

Then how do you yourself even choose how to act if you can follow no morality? How can you decide between following one desire, over another? How can you actually act and do something? Everything is an ''is'' and all oughts are worthless. From there how can you even decide which action you should take and why?

>>3271115
>>3271123
This is the hardest part of all: there is no consensus in the academic circles, and no easy explanation to come by. These are daunting questions that have eluded the greatest minds in the world for millennia. What I can suggest to you, since this seems to be a crucial question for someone eager to learn, is to read the current developments in analytical philosophy. Find some academic journal, pick an article on the subject you're interested in, read it. If something there is unclear, don't let your pride stop you from reading introductive texts for novices, college manuals, etc. Ethics, action theory, probs some philosophy of mind, logic for it is central to all philosophical activities. Avoid the continental tradition, for they cannot think straight and produce anything else than gibberish. A good philosopher must avoid obscurity and complexity for the sake of it. Kant, for instance, could have been clearer, and the difficulty one has to read his works is not a quality, but a defect. He is certainly a very intelligent man with a fecund mind, but his tendency to produce shitton of pages with poorly defined concepts is a bane and a lack of respect for his readers.

I am a /his/torian, but when they come to be, good discussions are to be found on /lit/, moreso on the subjects than /his/. Lurk here and there, and you'll come to recognize the shitpost from the sound argument.

You said you didn't study philosophy earlier, and honestly, the fierce will you show in trying to figure out these questions is very respectable. Good luck and keep up the good work

>>3255259
>morality has laws
I wasn't aware morality wasn't made up.

>>3271329
Any precise works I should read pertaining to these questions? I am loosely familiar with somethings in philosophy and have read most of Kant's important works. I also don't have a lot of pride, if any, as you could see I'm not that bright. Thanks otherwise for your answers and help.

Related question though, but what's your subject in history?

>>3272000
Start with the Principia Ethica I guess

Colonial South America

>>3273267

Thanks, friendly anon.