is he the indisputable goat?

>advances faster than his supplies can keep up

What did he mean by this?

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>>3222923
"goat" as in "easy thing to fuck in desert"?

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>>3222939

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>>3222939
Outfuckingskilled.

>>3222923
>>3222931
He was but that was a problem, that was a problem with the whole of the heer tho. They all advanced way too quick for their supply lines. See Barbarossa.

>>3222923
Excellent tactician, extremely poor strategician.

>>3223282
Is there any famous general that wasn't like that? Even Hannibal was a bad strategician

>>3223295
Scipio?

>>3223295
Not him, but off the top of my head

Caesar, Subotai, Frederick the Great, Guo Ziyi, Belisarius, Quintus Fabius, Themistocles, Winfield Scott, and Napoleon pretty much all qualify.

>>3223282
Why do people keep saying this? He never really held strategic level control. he didn't even control his supply network with Italians being responsible for the supply of the italo-german army.


What was he supposed to do in North Africa? Buckle down and eventually lose to superior numbers and materiel either way? Literally the only way to win in Africa was to push hard, push quickly and seize the Suez and Alexandria. People who non-ironically suggest that he should have been on the defensive don't actually offer a solution on how to win, rather it revolves around the assumption that winning was impossible to begin with and the aim should be to prolong an eventual defeat. This then begs the question of why are you even fighting and wasting resources in Africa aside from keeping the nearly useless Italians happy?

>>3223364
>He never really held strategic level control
He had operational control. The decision to turn the theater into what it's known for with his drives to Egypt, were definitely within his control, and displayed a very poor grasp of any sort of strategy beyond fight and win battles and hope for the best.

>Buckle down and eventually lose to superior numbers and materiel either way?
Yes, you retard. His entire purpose in being there was to shore up the Italains for as long as possible with as little of a commitment as possible. Winning in North Africa was not the job. Not losing in North Africa for as long as possible was the job, but Rommel didn't feel like doing that.

>Literally the only way to win in Africa
There was no way to win Africa. Thinking that there was, and that doing so would be part of Germany's overall strategic war aims, is the fundamental mistake.

>rather it revolves around the assumption that winning was impossible to begin with and the aim should be to prolong an eventual defeat.
It's not an assumption. It's a well supported reality.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf

>his then begs the question of why are you even fighting and wasting resources in Africa aside from keeping the nearly useless Italians happy?
Because the Italians are not "nearly useless", as their presence keeps the Med closed; and British shipping from taking the shortcut through the Med instead of going around Africa like they did for most of the war. Furthermore, if they collapse, you now have Allies planes threatening southern Germany, Romania, Hungary, et al, as well as the possibility of actually invading through Austria or into Yugoslavia, as well as opportunistic landings out of Italy like happened in southern France and threatened to happen in Greece which tied up an enormous amount of troops. Fighting in North Africa is enormously cheaper than fighting in Italy proper.

>>3223396
>t. Rommel Hater
you guys are the worst, the most easily triggered people in the internet

>>3222923
babby's first general

>>3222923
Overrated meme general

GOOD German generals include
>Hasso von Manteuffel
>Heinz Guderian
>Erich Von Manstein
>Walter Model
>Hermann Balck

>>3222923
overpromoted captain

>>3223360
>Winfield Scott
is this because of muh Anaconda Plan?

>>3223460
And the prosecution of the Mexican war. You had a lot of contemporaries, especially in Europe, thinking that the war would be a long, bloody affair and a very real possibility of an American loss, instead of the rollover that it turned into.

>>3223396
>He had operational control.
But that's blatantly false, he had no overreach over the airforce or the navy. Malta should have been taken, but it was never up to him despite personally lobbying with Hitler.

He was literally unable to operate on a strategical level because his scope of command was so narrow. Securing your lines of supply is literally impossible when you don't have the authority to do so. You're left working with what you're given. I guess you can say his fault lies in going with it instead of resigning because losing was literally inevitable(?)


>and displayed a very poor grasp of any sort of strategy beyond fight and win battles and hope for the best.
Give me examples. Not like there were several avenues of approach. The aim is clear, reaching Alexandria and the Suez. This would remove the largest British port in the med and force the supplies to be either shipped trough the Gibraltar straight to bases in the Med or unloaded somewhere in east Africa or Arabia and be transported by land to their destinations thus extending the allied supply train while at the same time giving the Germans and Italians a new forward port from where to supply their units.

Coupling that with Arab rebellions was the only way to win in North Africa. And the aim was to win in North Africa, even if not the German aim, it was the Italian aim, realistic or not.

>>3223396
>There was no way to win Africa.
Even if true, hindsight is 20/20. There was no way to win world war 2 for Germany so I don't see how doing your best attempting it is a direct fault of his.

>The decision to turn the theater into what it's known for with his drives to Egypt, were definitely within his control
True, but that does not mean he had strategic control. If anything he had theater control, not control at the strategic level.

>Because the Italians are not "nearly useless", as their presence keeps the Med closed
The Italians never kept the med closed, most of the Navy was sitting in ports for the majority of the war and their airforce was not only small with mostly outdated airframes but performed badly attacking on sea on top of it, secondly, Libya was not some key piece of territory for the Italians (aside the prestige) neither was it, in any way, necessary to keep the "med closed".


Lastly, prolonging the defeat, assuming it would even be prolonged, does not change the situation in any way. You can't "shore up" against an opponent who is both capable and willing to replace his losses and then some more while you are in a state where more time passes the weaker you get.


This idea that Germany should have pursued a "long war" in North Africa is the pinnacle of retardation that could only end in defeat so nothing really changes.

>>3223486
>But that's blatantly false, he had no overreach over the airforce or the navy.
That's not necessary for operational control. None of the Heersgruppe commanders in Russia had control over the airforce. Guderian didn't have control over the airforce in France. They still managed to formulate operational plans and execute them.

>Malta should have been taken,
Why? The amount of damage that Malta did is hugely overstated, which you can check on the amount of supplies actually being delivered to Tripoli vs how much of them could actually be transported to where Rommel wanted to fight.

>but it was never up to him despite personally lobbying with Hitler.
Do you not understand what operational control over North Africa means? Because that isn't part of the purview.

>Securing your lines of supply is literally impossible when you don't have the authority to do so. You're left working with what you're given.
Yes, and that is often a fact of military command. But Rommel didn't "work with what he was given", he decided to launch a crazy ass crusade and figured that all of the problems, problems which other people informed him of, would somehow solve themselves. That's a shit plan.

>Give me examples.
Sonnenblume pursuing to Tobruk. Advancing further after Gazala. Leaving Cyrenica at all, in fact, since it had nothing to do with his mission.

>And the aim was to win in North Africa, even if not the German aim,
So, in other words, he should overwrite not just theater strategy, but national strategy?'

>it was the Italian aim
Not after Compass it wasn't. And that was well before Rommel even got into the theater.

>>3223497
>Even if true, hindsight is 20/20.
It's not fucking hindsight. Halder told him before he went that he shouldn't be trying crap like this.

>There was no way to win world war 2 for Germany so I don't see how doing your best attempting it is a direct fault of his.
Because Germany actually did have a strategy for winning the war. Ultimately, it was flawed, yes. But it's the part of a front commander, especially a tertiary front commander, to try to keep in mind the overall war picture when exercising operations. Rommel didn't want to do this. That makes him a shitty general, pretty much by definition, subordinating the overall plan to his theater instead of the reverse.

>True, but that does not mean he had strategic control. If anything he had theater control, not control at the strategic level.
I've said repeatedly that he had operational control, not strategic control. You do not seem to be aware of the distinction.

>The Italians never kept the med closed,
They kept it mostly closed. That's why you didn't have resource shipping going through the Med until after Avalanche.

>Libya was not some key piece of territory for the Italians (aside the prestige) neither was it, in any way, necessary to keep the "med closed".
It was, however, necessary to keep the Allies away from Italy proper. The fighting in North Africa was of enormously smaller scale than the fighting in the next step in Italy itself; and when you're trying to free up every available division for operations in Russia, you want to fight in the smaller theater where supply limits (for both sides) keeps armies small for as long as possible.

>Lastly, prolonging the defeat, assuming it would even be prolonged, does not change the situation in any way.
Yes it does, as those troops that now no longer can be committed to Italy can be tasked for other jobs, like continuing operations in the Soviet Union.

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>>3222923
He doesn't even compare to the French generals of the century before him

>>3223497
>This idea that Germany should have pursued a "long war" in North Africa is the pinnacle of retardation that could only end in defeat so nothing really changes.
The idea that the longer you spend fighting in North Africa as opposed to Italy where doing so will be enormously more expensive isn't idiotic, it's math. Big numbers on a defensive theater are worse for you than small numbers. You want to keep those numbers small for as long as possible. Rommel decided "Fuck actually running a unified strategy for the entire war. I want to take Suez! I know that I can't, and that I have one road which will have to stretch over 2,000 kilometers and even my motorized transport pool that would supply an entire army group in Russia isn't enough for it, but I'm going to try anyway because I'm just that awesome."

That's retardation, not actually proceeding with a plan.

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>>3223522
>They still managed to formulate operational plans and execute them.
>None of the Heersgruppe commanders in Russia had control over the airforce
Why are you making shit up?

>Why? The amount of damage that Malta did is hugely overstate
Yeah meanwhile 250 thousand tonnes of shipping was sunk between November 1942 and may 1943 alone. So, you're full of shit.

> But Rommel didn't "work with what he was given", he decided to launch a crazy ass crusade and figured that all of the problems, problems which other people informed him of, would somehow solve themselves. That's a shit plan.
Trying to win rather than sitting in Tunisia until you lose is a far better fucking plan than what you are proposing.


>So, in other words, he should overwrite not just theater strategy, but national strategy?'
No, if you want to talk about Rommel as a strategist perhaps he should have been given strategic control first, you fucking idiot. In North Africa he did not have strategic control, he had limited control in scope smaller than a field army in Russia, let alone an army group.


>Not after Compass it wasn't. And that was well before Rommel even got into the theater.
Not true either, Compass just fucked their plans up, you're legitimately retarded if you believed the Italians simply dropped their territorial ambitions because they were unable to achieve them at the start of the war.

>>3223546
>It's not fucking hindsight. Halder told him before he went that he shouldn't be trying crap like this
Like I said, sitting in fucking Libya and Tunisia was certain defeat either way.


>Rommel was a bad strategist
>because his strategy was not compatible with the faulty strategy put in place by the German high command
This is your argument now as to why he was a bad strategist.

>I've said repeatedly that he had operational control, not strategic control. You do not seem to be aware of the distinction
No, what you said is that he was a bad Strategist, when in fact he didn't have Strategic control, you fucking retard. Now you're arguing something completely different.

>They kept it mostly closed.
Well, no, they didn't.

>That's why you didn't have resource shipping going through the Med until after Avalanche.
But that's also false

>Yes it does, as those troops that now no longer can be committed to Italy can be tasked for other jobs, like continuing operations in the Soviet Union.
This sentence doesn't even make sense you fuckface.

>>3223556
Fighting in africa WAS more expensive than fighting in Italy. Why the fuck do you think that defending in fucking Tunisia would be easier than defending against an amphibious invasion in Italy with direct rail links with Germany?

>I want to take Suez! I know that I can't, and that I have one road which will have to stretch over 2,000 kilometers and even my motorized transport pool that would supply an entire army group in Russia isn't enough for it
But that's a bunch of horseshit. Tunis and Benghazi was not the only port in North Africa. Tobruk-Alexandria is fucking 600ish kilometers.

>>3223574
>Why are you making shit up?
I'm not. Luftwaffe held their own commands (and sometimes even their own land armies), and would liase with the Heer.

>Yeah meanwhile 250 thousand tonnes of shipping was sunk between November 1942 and may 1943 alone. So, you're full of shit.
Again, read the article I cited. It's on page 12. I also like how you talk about the period AFTER Rommel's assaults were broken and the U.S. had made the torch landings, not 1941-42 when Rommel was actually attacking, which you seem so keen on. And of course, your complete ignoring of the more salient point, that even with unlimited supplies being delivered to Tripoli, he couldn't transport them to the front anyway, thus making their presence pretty meaningless.

>Trying to win rather than sitting in Tunisia until you lose is a far better fucking plan than what you are proposing.
No, it isn't. If you buy an extra 6 months, that means another MILLION men you can keep in Russia to blunt those horrible 1943 summer offensives. That is a lot better than making an impossible attack in a tertiary theater.

>No, if you want to talk about Rommel as a strategist perhaps he should have been given strategic control first, you fucking idiot.
Except of course, he tried to dictate strategy by embarking on said offensives and expecting the rest of Germany following along behind him.

>Not true either, Compass just fucked their plans up, you're legitimately retarded if you believed the Italians simply dropped their territorial ambitions because they were unable to achieve them at the start of the war.
Which is why the Italians kept trying to curtail Rommel's offensives.

>>3223629
hes right mate stfu

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>>3222939

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>>3222939
wehraboos btfo

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>>3223639
>t.

>>3223601
>Like I said, sitting in fucking Libya and Tunisia was certain defeat either way.
Not all defeats are equal. The longer you can postpone defeat, and the less you spend on the inevitable defeat, the better. The Germans understood this. Even the Italians fucking understood it. Rommel was the only one who didn't.

>>3223601
>This is your argument now as to why he was a bad strategist.
Yes. When you're not acting in furtherance of your nation's plan, you're probably not going to do real well, especially when you're constantly demanding resources that can be better employed elsewhere.

>No, what you said is that he was a bad Strategist, when in fact he didn't have Strategic control, you fucking retard.
Meanwhile, you keep repeating this mantra, unaware of how it doesn't help your case.

Hint: Trying to drag a theater (and in fact more) on a plan when you can't actually run everything is making a strategic action, in pursuance of a (bad) strategy.

>Well, no, they didn't.
Show me all that Indian food, Iranian oil, Malayan rubber, and Australian metal that was shipped through the Med and didn't go around Africa to get to England.

>But that's also false
It isn't.

>This sentence doesn't even make sense you fuckface.
Yes it does, you're just very stupid. Once North Africa fell, Germany needed to shore up Italy proper. That took on the order of a million soldiers, which had to be diverted from other jobs.

If you hold out longer in North Africa, you don't need to send those troops in quite as quickly, and you can use them for other fronts.

>>3223619
>Fighting in africa WAS more expensive than fighting in Italy. Why the fuck do you think that defending in fucking Tunisia would be easier than defending against an amphibious invasion in Italy with direct rail links with Germany?
This just in; 3-4 divisions cost more than 26. Courtesy of Anon the moron.

Also, I'm talking about Cyrenica, which isn't fucking in Tunisia you dimwit. I also didn't say "easier" I said CHEAPER. Because the local transport infrastructure is so primitive, neither side can focus a lot of troops in the area, there aren't the roads or rail lines to support them. This is less true in Italy, where you can field much larger armies.

>But that's a bunch of horseshit. Tunis and Benghazi was not the only port in North Africa. Tobruk-Alexandria is fucking 600ish kilometers.
First off, you're simply wrong.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220715.pdf
Secondly, I've been saying Tripoli the entire time, which was the main point of disembarkation. Benghazi wasn't even available in any real way after the British took it post Crusader and blew up most of the port on their retreat.

> Tobruk-Alexandria is fucking 600ish kilometers.
Funny how there was no shipping to Tobruk even after Rommel took it in Gazala. Maybe it had something to do with how the Italian naval air arm couldn't cover that route, but it could cover the route to Tripoli.

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>>3222939

>>3223629
>I'm not. Luftwaffe held their own commands
They were literally attached to armies and army groups and operationally under their command.

> (and sometimes even their own land armies),
Never happened, luftwaffe field divisions never formed field armies and they were under the command of the Herr not the Luftwaffe. Why do you keep being full of shit, faggot?

>Again, read the article
So, again, you're changing the statement? Malta was important, it was important from the start of the war and only grew in importance. Seriously, will you stop making shit up? Acutally LOOK UP why Rommel retreated from Cyrenaica for the first time, pro tip, Malta force sunk his supplies creating a massive shortfall.

>Which is why the Italians kept trying to curtail Rommel's offensives.
Nice generalization.

>>3223665
>Not all defeats are equal.
Yeah, yours is based on retarded assumptions that defeat would be prolonged to begin with..

>Yes. When you're not acting in furtherance of your nation's plan, you're probably not going to do real well,
Yet you literally stated that the plan was faulty. How can following a faulty plan make one a good strategist or even a good general? The fact he failed in his endevour makes him no worse or better.

>especially when you're constantly demanding resources that can be better employed elsewhere.
More assumptions

>Meanwhile, you keep repeating this mantra, unaware of how it doesn't help your case.
Maybe you're just too fucking stupid and keep reverting to falsehoods?

>Show me all that Indian food, Iranian oil, Malayan rubber, and Australian metal that was shipped through the Med and didn't go around Africa to get to England.
Ahh, yes, because only the things you list are considered convoys in the med.

>Benghazi wasn't even available in any real way after the British took it post Crusader and blew up most of the port on their retreat.
But that's false again. The Germans used the port after re-taking it. Why are you making up shit AGAIN?


>Funny how there was no shipping to Tobruk even after Rommel took it in Gazala. Maybe it had something to do with how the Italian naval air arm couldn't cover that route, but it could cover the route to Tripoli.
Or maybe it has nothing to do with it. Fun fact. Crete is closer to Tobruk than Sicily is to Tripolis.

Fun fact 2: The Italian air arm was not able to cover either route any way.

>>3223686
>They were literally attached to armies and army groups and operationally under their command.
No, they were liased with. Very effectively, mind you, but they were liased with.

>Never happened, luftwaffe field divisions never formed field armies and they were under the command of the Herr not the Luftwaffe
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Conrath
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Schmalz
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanns-Horst_von_Necker

>So, again, you're changing the statement?
Nope.
>Malta was important, it was important from the start of the war and only grew in importance.
Again, nope. The limiting factor on Rommel's supply situation wasn't how much stuff crossed the Mediterranean. It's how much stuff got out of Tripoli to the front line. While British actions out of Malta did disrupt SLOCs, those were not the critical point of failure.

>Acutally LOOK UP why Rommel retreated from Cyrenaica for the first time,
You mean the twin defeats in El Alamein and Torch? What did Malta have to do with that?

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>>3223721
>No, they were liased with. Very effectively, mind you, but they were liased with.
Luftflottes were literally attached to specific army groups.


>While British actions out of Malta did disrupt SLOCs, those were not the critical point of failure.
You are wrong. If you're not being shipped the minimum amounts of supplies into your ports that you need to operate your army then THAT is your critical point of failure. And they were not able to deliver those supplies due to the Malta force.


>You mean the twin defeats in El Alamein and Torch? What did Malta have to do with that?
>What did MALTA, a base in the med that was disrupting the supply to north africa have to do with the defeat of supply stricken troops in north africa
Hard to put a finger on it.

>>3223717
>Yeah, yours is based on retarded assumptions that defeat would be prolonged to begin with..
Yes, how crazy would it be to assume that without going off and losing battles like Crusader and El Alamein, or burning through zillions of tons of supply to attain those losses, the DAK would be better off and in more of a position to resist the Allies.

> How can following a faulty plan make one a good strategist or even a good general?
Because substituting an even more faulty plan that you can't even authorize and you certainly haven't vetted with the rest of the command structure is even dumber.

>More assumptions
Not assumptions, literally part of the overall war plan. And one, I might add, that every country I've ever been aware of works by: Attack on a main theater, defend in the others until you can secure victory in the main effort.

>Ahh, yes, because only the things you list are considered convoys in the med.
No, I didn't list that. In fact, my first mention of it is here>>3223396
> and British shipping from taking the shortcut through the Med instead of going around Africa like they did for most of the war.
That's not talking about stuff being delivered TO the Mediterranean, it's talking about stuff being delivered THROUGH the Mediterranean to other destinations. Which did not happen until Italy was crippled.

> The Germans used the port after re-taking it.

>Although the more eastern coastal ports of Benhgazi and Tobruk provided some relief, the central issue of sustainability was governed by the continuing requirement to move 80% of Axis supplies overland from Tripoli to Alamein.
Don't forget to factor in the seized supplies into that calculation.

>Or maybe it has nothing to do with it. Fun fact. Crete is closer to Tobruk than Sicily is to Tripoli
Fun fact, Tripoli was the overwhelming port of destination for Rommel's advances. I'm sure you have a reason for that tucked somewhere away, and that it's completely retarded.

>>3223759
>or burning through zillions of tons of supply to attain those losses, the DAK would be better off and in more of a position to resist the Allies.
It wouldn't be, it consistently out-fought the British that had the upper hand. Had they not done so the British would have achieved massive superiority even sooner, like they eventually did.

>Because substituting an even more faulty plan that you can't even authorize and you certainly haven't vetted with the rest of the command structure is even dumber.
And yet he actually almost made it, and probably would have made it were he adequately supplied and supported.

>No, I didn't list that. In fact, my first mention of it is here
All you have to do is google a list of convoys in the med, you'll quickly come to realize that the Med was in no way, shape or form closed to the UK.

>That's not talking about stuff being delivered TO the Mediterranean, it's talking about stuff being delivered THROUGH the Mediterranean to other destinations. Which did not happen until Italy was crippled.
How is that relevant to your statement that the Mediterranean was fucking "CLOSED" to the British? Clearly it wasn't. Again you're stating falsehoods and shifting the subject.


>Don't forget to factor in the seized supplies into that calculation.
Don't forget to make up more shit and then post in on 4chan! Luftwaffe field armies and all!

>>3223358
Zama?

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>>3222939
holy shit

>>3223758
>Luftflottes were literally attached to specific army groups.
http://www.ww2.dk/misc/command.htm

>You are wrong.
No, I'm not. By the way, why do you keep trying to make a point about the supply situation after the loss of El Alamein and the landings in Torch after which an offensive posture is impossible even with unlimited supply? Are you just stupid?

>If you're not being shipped the minimum amounts of supplies into your ports that you need to operate your army then THAT is your critical point of failure
First off, Rommel is (stupidly) setting the amount of supply he needs to operate by taking that offensive stance. Secondly,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220715.pdf

>Together with the Italians, the Axis forces in Libya now totaled seven divisions, which when air force and naval units were added, required 70,000 tons per month. This was more than Tripoli could handle effectively, so additional prots were required.

>From February to May, Rommel and his Italian allies received a total of 325,00 tons of supplies, or 45,00 more than current consumption, but he was unable to bridge the enormous gap from Tripoli to the front, so his supplies piled up on the wharves while shortages arose in the front line.

>And they were not able to deliver those supplies due to the Malta force.
As you can see, simply wrong.

>Hard to put a finger on it.
No, it isn't. It's the closest port (until Tunisia is occupied) to air bases in sicily, and it's the largest, most well developed port under Axis control in the region. Both of these things are known to anyone with even basic knowledge of the North African theater.

>>3223772
>>3223772
>It wouldn't be, it consistently out-fought the British that had the upper hand
Yeah, like at Crusader!

>ad they not done so the British would have achieved massive superiority even sooner, like they eventually did.
No, they wouldn't. The logistical blade cuts both ways; the limiting factor for the British was never overall troop count, it was ability to get those troops to where the fighting is. And as you get closer to their nodes of support, that rises higher. That's why Rommel faced tiny contingents in Sonnenblume and the Mersa El Brega attacks, huge ones in Crusader and Gazala, and huger still ones in El Alamein.

>And yet he actually almost made it,
No he didn't. He petered out hundreds of miles away from Alexandria, still needing to fight his way through even more hundreds of miles to the Nile, through Cairo, and then to Suez. All the while having been rolled all the way back after his first failed attempt.

>and probably would have made it were he adequately supplied and supported.
Which is literally impossible owing to the difficulties getting his supplies out of his ports.

>All you have to do is google a list of convoys in the med, you'll quickly come to realize that the Med was in no way, shape or form closed to the UK.
I have looked this up. I have never seen a single one that entered through Gibraltar and exited Suez, or the reverse, traversing the Med to points outside of it. Perhaps you can google one for me.

>How is that relevant to your statement that the Mediterranean was fucking "CLOSED" to the British?
Because that is what "Closed" means you retard. Closed to shipping through the region. Similarly how areas of the Pacific would be "Closed" to this, that, or the other shipping when fighting was going on, but that doesn't mean there was no resupply to the forces fighting in the islands.

1/2

>>3223772

>Don't forget to make up more shit and then post in on 4chan!
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf Page 15

>This operational overreach would repeat itself during the 1942 offensive. The difference this time was that Tobruk fell to Rommel, moreveor the capture of significant stores -""2,000 vehicles, 5,000 tons of supply, and above all, 1400 tons of fuel" provided an operational spark to a dying supply line. Rather than consolidate, however, Rommel continued to press the attack.

Yeah, so made up that I can cite the exact passage.

>>3223978
>http://www.ww2.dk/misc/command.htm
What's wrong with? Do you think you posting random links on the luftwaffe makes you look less retarded? Luftflottes were directly attached to army groups on the operational level. Ie. Luftflotte 1 was attached to Army group Center.

>No, I'm not. By the way, why do you keep trying to make a point about the supply situation after the loss of El Alamein and the landings in Torch
Turns out you can't even read properly. Its you who keeps alluding to Torch and El Alamein when my sources talk about events that pre-date the battle and operation Torch. Retard. 1941


>As you can see, simply wrong.
I fucking LOVE how you ignore sources >>3223758

Let me quote it for you:
"On this broad assumption, only in June did deliveries exceed requirements, after which they fell during the July-October period to the lower end of the scale of his need. This helps to explain why Rommel's planned attack on Tobruk was first postponed until October and then to November. Nevertheless although Malta operations coupled with Rommel's other supply constraints, caused a vital delay[...]Later that month, having been fought to a standstill by Ritchie in the desert, Rommel and General Bastico appealed for substantial reinforcments. However, on 5 December, Colonel Montezemolo, Head of the Operations staff of Comando Superom, brought the news that only the most essential supplies could be delivered[...]."

"There can be no doubt but that it was the supply shortfall in November, which was entirely the result of force operating from Malta, and the expectation that this would continue in December, that compelled Rommel to abandon Cyrenaica"

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>>3222939

>>3223985
>>3223981
>Yeah, like at Crusader!
Love how you ignore sources again literally stating that it was the lack of supply, lack of supply because simply ships were not coming trough. Get it? You can't blame the fucking road network or over extension when the minimum amount required to sustain an army was never delivered.


Look faggot, I'm getting annoyed by your bullshit and constant goal post shifting when you claim one thing, and when proven wrong, modify the claim. Thus the med was closed to British shipping changed into assertions that I must prove ships entering one side and exiting another otherwise it constitutes as "closed". Moreover you even asserted that it was the Italians keeping them out. Both false.

>This operational overreach would repeat itself during the 1942 offensive. The difference this time was that Tobruk fell to Rommel, moreveor the capture of significant stores -""2,000 vehicles, 5,000 tons of supply, and above all, 1400 tons of fuel" provided an operational spark to a dying supply line. Rather than consolidate, however, Rommel continued to press the attack.
Again, ignoring sources stating he needed between 70 thousand to 100 thousand tonnes every month and somehow trying to make a case that 5000 tons of supply with 1400 liters of fuel was a massive boon. Worse yet, then you suggest that he should have "consolidated" which literally means "wait until you are outnumbered and lose" because that's what was happening in North Africa and only a retard would say that the path to success was waiting on your enemy growing stronger while you are gradually weakening.
The laughable part is how this all distracts from the original claim. FACT is that Rommel did not have strategic control in the Med thus he can't be judged as strategist because he was not in a role of a strategist and was unable to implement his ideas to begin with.

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>>3224108
>What's wrong with? Do you think you posting random links on the luftwaffe makes you look less retarded?
I think that posting a chain of command structure for the Luftwaffe is important in seeing whether or not the luftwaffe was subordinate to Heer commanders like you claimed.

>Turns out you can't even read properly. Its you who keeps alluding to Torch and El Alamein when my sources talk about events that pre-date the battle and operation Torch. Retard. 1941
When you're talking about Tunis all the time?

>I fucking LOVE how you ignore sources
Considering how it is fucking WRONG, yes, I've been ignoring it. Allow me to send a picture of the relevant part of what I've been quoting. It will require a little math, but I'm sure you can add and subtract. Well, actually, I'm not, but I'll be here to help you with the arithmetic.

>>3224152

>>3224152
>Love how you ignore sources again literally stating that it was the lack of supply, lack of supply because simply ships were not coming trough.
I'm not ignoring sources. And the lack of supply was most clearly caused by the inability ot get supply from Tripoli to Tobruk, as stated in my sources.

> You can't blame the fucking road network or over extension when the minimum amount required to sustain an army was never delivered.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf
Page 12

70,000 tons a month needed. June-December inclusive is 7 months, so we're talking 490,000 tons. 481,676 tons were disembarked in that time period. You're telling me the 1.8% shortfall is the decisive factor, and not the near 40% attrition moving it there? You're aslo completely ignoring the inability to land more supplies, which has absolutely nothing to do with Malta.

>Look faggot, I'm getting annoyed by your bullshit and constant goal post shifting when you claim one thing, and when proven wrong, modify the claim.
I have not done that once.

> Thus the med was closed to British shipping changed into assertions that I must prove ships entering one side and exiting another otherwise it constitutes as "closed".
Show me where I asserted it meant otherwise. It should be easy, we have the whole thread to work with.

>Moreover you even asserted that it was the Italians keeping them out. Both false.
Then why did you start seeing convoys going through (not to, THROUGH, as in entering one end and leaving the other) the med after Avalanche? What was it exactly that changed.

>>3224152

>Again, ignoring sources stating he needed between 70 thousand to 100 thousand tonnes every month and somehow trying to make a case that 5000 tons of supply with 1400 liters of fuel was a massive boon.
Oooh, the retard missed the point, again. Total axis forces needed 70-100,000 tons. Guess how ROmmel solved his problems? That's right, he left most of his forces behind! That's why he doesn't have 7 full divisions out in Libya, or in Egypt.

And remember how this came up because you kept denying the importance of the shipping limitations in Tripoli? That you still haven't addressed at all?

>retard would say that the path to success was waiting on your enemy growing stronger while you are gradually weakening.
Does making bizarre strawmen make you feel better, or is it that you're too stupid to understand the disyllabic words I tend to use? Do you not understand how North Africa is not the whole war, and the aims in North Africa should be subordinated to the overall war aims?

>The laughable part is how this all distracts from the original claim. FACT is that Rommel did not have strategic control in the Med thus he can't be judged as strategist because he was not in a role of a strategist and was unable to implement his ideas to begin with.
No, once again that is not what I'm claiming. I'm claiming that the decisions Rommel DID make, namely defiying his own high command, as well as his regional allies, to make hopeless attacks that actually weaken, not strengthen the position of the overall war goal, betrays a fundamental misunderstanding not only of the theater strategy, but the overall German strategy, and thus he can reliably be said to be a bad strategist.

>>3222923
Look up Bir Hakeim my dude

>>3224320
>I think that posting a chain of command structure for the Luftwaffe is important in seeing whether or not the luftwaffe was subordinate to Heer commanders like you claimed.
Maybe you don't comprehend the concept of attaching luftflottes to army groups making them subordinate to them?

>I'm not ignoring sources. And the lack of supply was most clearly caused by the inability ot get supply from Tripoli to Tobruk, as stated in my sources.
My source outright contradicts you claiming that the lack of supply was most clearly caused by the fact supplies were not being shipped or arriving at port in the first place again see >>3223758


>Allow me to send a picture of the relevant part of what I've been quoting
Thanks for proving my point! Supplies needed 70-100 thousand tonnes a month. Never did they get the full amount needed to supply their armies in the first place, and it was literally due to the fact Malta was not taken.

Literally your pic states supply which was below the bare minimum needed. Most importantly those are averages, while during operation Crusader, that you keep bringing up, they were getting half of that minimum.

It's also amazing how the tonnage lost directly contradicts your earlier claims of the unimportance of Malta.

>>3224326
>That's why he doesn't have 7 full divisions out in Libya, or in Egypt.
No, you fucking retard, he doesn't have 7 full divisons in Egypt because the allies keep sinking his supply. Does your shitbrain comprehend the fact that the units in north africa were almost constantly short on supply? Do you understand why attacking was the only possible way out of this mess? Are you aware the British were only growing in strength? The only, literally the only way, to avoid losing was to win fast before allied superiority makes holding any land in North Africa impossible, which is what happens anyway. The fact Rommel advanced and took the innitiative literally delayed the fall of Africa for fucking years otherwise it would be reduced to a siege

>And remember how this came up because you kept denying the importance of the shipping limitations in Tripoli?
I didn't deny anything, it's you who keeps ignoring all the other ports the Axis used to move supply to North Africa, but that's not even the fucking problem to begin with.

>No, once again that is not what I'm claiming. I'm claiming that the decisions Rommel DID make, namely defiying his own high command, as well as his regional allies, to make hopeless attacks that actually weaken, not strengthen the position of the overall war goal, betrays a fundamental misunderstanding not only of the theater strategy, but the overall German strategy, and thus he can reliably be said to be a bad strategist.
Yeah, man, pushing back superior forces and delaying the fall of Libya by years really makes him a bad general innit, because he failed to win. Should have sat in Tripoli and surrendered when they ran out of supplies, which is the superior course of action to you.

>>3224418
>Maybe you don't comprehend the concept of attaching luftflottes to army groups making them subordinate to them?
No, it means they're attached to them, not subordinate to them.

>Thanks for proving my point! Supplies needed 70-100 thousand tonnes a month. Never did they get the full amount needed to supply their armies in the first place, and it was literally due to the fact Malta was not taken.
And again, this is wrong, especially since you only have a shortfall of 9,000 or so tons between June and December, and an excess of 45,000 leading up to that. I'm pretty sure that 45,000 is more than 9,000, but maybe your "source" says something different.

Furthermore, even if the problem was unloading into North Africa, you have yet to demonstrate that it is exclusively to Malta, as opposed to say, shortage of harbor space, other than of course citing to your "source" that can't do arithmetic.

> Most importantly those are averages, while during operation Crusader, that you keep bringing up, they were getting half of that minimum
And before Operation Crusader, they were getting quite a bit more, and were bringing up the supplies that were piling up on the wharves of Tripoli.

>>3224429


>No, you fucking retard, he doesn't have 7 full divisons in Egypt because the allies keep sinking his supply.
Again, see above; the limiting factor was land transport, not sea transport.

>Does your shitbrain comprehend the fact that the units in north africa were almost constantly short on supply
Because he put them on offensive postures, raising their supply requirements, and because he moved his units away from the supply dumps without adequate transport.

> Do you understand why attacking was the only possible way out of this mess
No, I don't see how attacking (thus consuming more supplies) and moving away from his supply dumps helps solve the problem. In fact, it creates a problem when one didn't exist before.

>Are you aware the British were only growing in strength?
And this happens regardless of what Rommel does.

> The only, literally the only way, to avoid losing was to win fast before allied superiority makes holding any land in North Africa impossible, which is what happens anyway.
You. Cannot. Avoid. Losing. You are fighting on a tertiary theater. That means the job is NOT to win, but to delay defeat as long as possible. This is part of that whole" strategy" thing that Rommel missed out on, because he didn't feel like playing a supporting role, or maybe he was just too dense to see anything not in front of him. The main thrust of the German war effort was in Russia, the war was won or lost on the Eastern Front. As soon as North Africa falls and the Allies invade Italy, you need colossal numbers of troops to do things like shore up Italy proper and protect all those areas that the Italians used to defend against partisans and opportunistic landings by the Allies. The longer you can put this off, the better, because it means those same troops are in the Soviet Union where it really matters.

>>3224429
>The fact Rommel advanced and took the innitiative literally delayed the fall of Africa for fucking years otherwise it would be reduced to a siege
Imagine this for a second. (Imagining is where we use our brains to think of things that did not in fact happen). Rommel does a Sonnenblume. Then he doesn't waste months, thousands of tons of supply, and about 40,000 men trying and failing to get into Tobruk, and instead goes back to Cyrenica. Now, if the british want to fight, they have to cross that exact same expanse of desert, with little to no infrastructure, where Rommel can beat them up again with a rested, and much better supplied force.
Then, in 1942, instead of chasing them all the way to El Alamein so he can have the exact same thing happen, he again throws them out of Cyrenica (if he even loses it), and again does not overrun his limited ability to move things to the front. This now preserves another 60-70,000 troops, and leaves you in a much better position to react to the Torch landings, since you're not in fucking Egypt when they happen.

>It's also amazing how the tonnage lost directly contradicts your earlier claims of the unimportance of Malta.
No, it doesn't, because my claims about the unimportant of Malta were always predicated on the inability of Rommel to bring supplies from Tripoli to the front line, which Malta has nothing to do with.
>Yeah, man, pushing back superior forces and delaying the fall of Libya by years really makes him a bad general innit, because he failed to win.
He pushed back superior forces a grand total of once, at Gazala. Every other victory of his was beating up the British when they were at the end of their supply tether and locally outnumbered. Which was working, and what he should have continued to do. He did not delay the fall of Libya for years. He in fact accelerated it by throwing men and supply away on useless offensives where he could get crushed in a way that he couldn't where he was relatively stronger.

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>>3224429
You are vastly overstating the effect Allied naval interdiction had on sea transport

>>3223721
>1st Fallschirm-Panzer Division Hermann Göring
>Division

What is a field army.

>>3225940
A unit of organization I never claimed but the other anon did, to which I didn't bother responding, instead focusing on the point that they were under Luftwaffe commanders. If you look up at >>3223629, I'm just referring to Luftwaffe land forces in general (an army), not that they were organized into "Armies" the way the Heer did. If that caused confusion, I apologize.

>>3223550
Let's be fair, not many generals do.

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>be like Rommel but actually successful
>fade into obscurity anyway

Why is history so cruel?

>>3226471
That's what happens when you fuck little boys.

>>3226471
Maybe because he wasn't an egoist and suckup to Churchill, so unlike Monty he never got any recognition because he never tried to demand any.

>>3226477
each man has his frivolity

>>3223282
What does that mean?

Who was the best German general of the war then and why was it my boy Heinz G?

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>>3222923
No retard, even among ww2 German generals he wasn't the best. Pic related