What exactly were the war aims of the Central Powers?

Big Booty Bitches

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>>3057430
Well initially the main aim of Imperial Germany was to prevent further mobilization of the European powers and as such prevent escalation.
Despite how he is portrayed in revisionist entente history, Wilhelm II did everything he could to prevent the war and of all of the leaders involved in the first weltkrieg, was the one who worked the hardest in regards to ending the conflict and preventing further loss of life.

As the war dragged on.
Imperial Germany became determined to prevent Europe from ever again being shaken and bled by Anglo-Frog aggression.
As such the war aims of Imperial Germany involved a large amount of land annexations and dependency creations in the east (most importantly, the breadbasket of Ukraine) in-order to make Mitteleuropa impervious to any sort of shortages resulting from an anglo blockade.

In the west, there were several goals.
The first was to prevent the French from having a defensible border with the Kaiserreich (to discourage further frog war-mongering).
Secondly, Imperial Germany hoped to fix some accidents of history by uniting various west-German peoples into the holy Kaiserreich.
Finally in a further attempt to discourage the frogs from doing what they do best (war-mongering), Imperial Germany intended to annex the resource rich french territory that bordered Elsaß-Lothringen.

It is harder to ascertain what Imperial Germany plans were in regards to colonies.
However striping the French of its Afrikan colonies and the anglos of Malta seems like the most likely scenario.

>>3057430
1. Cripple Russia. With Russia's rapid industrialization following the Russo-Japanese War, the German High Command felt that a confrontation with Russia needed to happen as soon as possible to solidify german Hegemony over Eastern Europe

2. Cripple France
Russia was the threat down the line. France was Germany's current and historical continental rival. To ensure continental dominance, it had to be reduced to an economically dependent and militarily defensive rumpstate.

3. Deny English access to continental Channel Ports
Once the former two goals were achieved, British influence had to be curtailed. Historically, England had been the most detrimental force opposing any rising continental power, given their foreign policy centered on not letting a european country get too strong. To this end, Belgium and the Netherlands had to at the very least be brought under German influence, if not outright annexed.

4. Muh Mittleafrika, muh Weltzmarine
I can't say how much of this was Willy's goal versus the people actually calling the shots, but there were plans for a german controlled southern Africa. Of course it was an impossible pipedream without the subjegation of rival European powers.

>>3057505
>this entire post
ayyyy

>>3057630
How achievable were their goals against Britain? I don't see Britain losing territory in a peace agreement unless it collapsed internally. Obviously the Germans could do whatever they wanted to France (and we know what they did to Russia in Brest-Litovsk)

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>>3057505
>espite how he is portrayed in revisionist entente history, Wilhelm II did everything he could to prevent the war and of all of the leaders involved in the first weltkrieg, was the one who worked the hardest in regards to ending the conflict and preventing further loss of life.

Sorry that goes to the Hungarian Prime Minister


As for the Kaiser

>Kaiser Wilhelm II came to share the views of the German General Staff and declared on 4 July that he was entirely for "settling accounts with Serbia".[42] He ordered the German ambassador in Vienna, Count Heinrich von Tschirschky, to stop advising restraint, writing that "Tschirschky will be so good to drop this nonsense. We must finish with the Serbs, quickly. Now or never!".[42] In response, Tschirschky told the Austro-Hungarian government that same day that "Germany would support the Monarchy through thick and thin, whatever action it decided to take against Serbia. The sooner Austria-Hungary struck, the better".[45] On 5 July 1914, Count Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff, wrote that "Austria must beat the Serbs".[43]

>Starting 7 July, the German Ambassador to Austria-Hungary, Tschirschky, and the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Berchtold held almost daily meetings about how to co-ordinate the diplomatic action to justify a war against Serbia.[59] On 8 July, Tschirschky presented Berchtold with a message from Wilhelm who declared he "stated most emphatically that Berlin expected the Monarchy to act against Serbia, and that Germany would not understand it, if ... the present opportunity were allowed to go by ... without a blow struck".[59] At the same meeting, Tschirschky told Berchtold, "if we [Austria-Hungary] compromised or bargained with Serbia, Germany would interpret this as a confession of weakness, which could not be without effect on our position in the Triple Alliance and on Germany's future policy"

>>3057737
Furthermore see >>3057630 and read this quote from the Hungarian Ambassador. War in 1914 was their only chance of achieving their goals


>On 12 July, Szögyény reported from Berlin that everyone in the German government wanted to see Austria-Hungary declare war on Serbia at once, and were tired of Austrian indecision about whether to choose war or peace.[66] He added that this:

>"absolute insistence on a war against Serbia was based on the two considerations already mentioned; firstly that Russia and France were 'not yet ready' and secondly that Britain will not at this juncture intervene in a war which breaks out over a Balkan state, even if this should lead to a conflict with Russia, possibly also France ... Not only have Anglo-German relations so improved that Germany feels that she need no longer feel fear a directly hostile attitude by Britain, but above all, Britain at this moment is anything but anxious for war, and has no wish whatever to pull chestnuts out of the fire for Serbia, or in the last instance, Russia ... In general, then, it appears from all this that the political constellation is as favourable for us as it could possibly be."[66]

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>>3057737
>>3057744
>Implying that treacherous asiatic horsemen are a reliable source of information
The Kaiser made repeated appeals to his relatives in both Brittan and Russia to settle the Serbian problem diplomatically and prevent further mobilization of forces.

>>3057737
>>3057744
>implying Russia wasn't using Serbia to provoke a war with Austria-Hungary

Germany and Russia share equal responsibility for the Great War desu

>>3057766
They were trying to gain influence in the Balkans for a while, it's no secret. They were probably the ones who paid the Black War-I mean the Black Hand.

>>3057763
>The Kaiser made repeated appeals to his relatives in both Brittan and Russia to settle the Serbian problem diplomatically and prevent further mobilization of forces.

We can tell from the events of the July Crisis that those were not in earnest given not only the knowledge of the outcome of Austria declearing war on Serbia but the fact that the Kaiser and his diplomatic team literally put pressure on the Austrians to declare war?

Indeed not only did they create a list of impossible demands but when Serbia offered to accept all but 1 of them they refused to negotiate or even allow for international mediation.

>On 17 July, Berchtold complained to Prince Stolberg of the German Embassy that though he thought his ultimatum would probably be rejected, he was still worried that it was possible for the Serbs to accept it, and wanted more time to re-phrase the document.[78...On 18 July, to reassure Stolberg, Count Hoyos promised him that the demands in the draft text of the ultimatum "were really of such a nature that no nation that still possessed self-respect and dignity could possibly accept them".

Here is Willy personally torpedoing a mediation to prevent war

>On 23 July, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey made a mediation offer with a promise that his government would attempt to influence Russia to influence Serbia, and Germany to influence Austria-Hungary as the best way of stopping a general war.[114] Wilhelm wrote on the margins of Lichnowsky's dispatch containing Grey’s offer that Britain’s "condescending orders" were to be totally rejected, and Austria-Hungary would not retract any of its "impossible demands" on Serbia. He continued: "Am I to do that? Wouldn’t think of it! What does he [Grey] mean by ‘impossible’?"[114]..... Lichnowsky reported to Berlin "If we do not join the mediation, all faith here in us and in our love of peace will be shattered."[114]

>>3057777
Damn

>>3057766
>Germany and Russia share equal responsibility for the Great War desu

Equal responsibility but Germany was more war mongering (although I think its more accurate to say that there were warmongering individuals and people pushing for peace in both governments - the warmongers had more influence in Germany). Tzar Nick was trying to pull off the same stratergy that blew up in his Face with the conflict with Japan over korea

>>3057714
Anglo-German relationships were interesting during the War. On the one hand, by 1916 or so Germany (rightly) viewed Britain as their most dangerous foe. On the other hand, they would never be able to bring Britain to heel the way they would France and Russia. So in the immediate term, the goals "against Britain" involved denying it their continental foothold of Belgium. Even in the most optimistic Central Powers scenario wouldn't have Britain losing any actual territory.

Now, one could argue that a Germany triumphantly bestriding the continent could build a Navy to challenge the British Navy, but by 1914 the German naval policy no longer revolved around matching Britain, but rather defending its colonial holdings. Though it is likely that the events of the war itself would demonstrate that the British navy was an existential threat that must be checked; after all, the British blockade did more to destroy the German war effort than any other single factor. However, even if the German navy were strengthened to the point of breaking a future British blockade, that is a far cry from having a sufficient navy to invade the home islands.