Icebreaker by Suvorov

Could as well discuss Fomenko at this point.

>discussion
There was no fucking sicussion
Taking Suvorov seriously is something a mentally challenged person would do

>>3023266
Looks like. Concentraiting of tanks, fuel, avoiding of fortifications.

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Reposting, because I can, also found some more stuff.
>To justify the concentration of its own forces, the Soviet command, unintentionally or deliberately, exaggerated Wehrmacht forces. Thus, in the September 1940 strategic deployment plan, Wehrmacht forces were estimated at 205-226 infantry divisions (of which 8 were motorized) and between 15 and 17 tank divisions, reinforced by 10,000 tanks and 14,000-15,000 airplanes. According to Red Army General Staff estimates, Hitler was to send up to 173 divisions, including all tank and motorized divisions, and 12,000 airplanes against the USSR.
Voenn istoricheskii zhurnal 1 (1992) pp.24-25
>In reality, by the beginning of May the Wehrmacht had only 45 divisions, including 2 tank divisions and 1 cavalry division, against the USSR.
The Defeat of German Imperialism (note 27) pp.213-22
L. Bezymenskii, Osobaia papka 'Barbarossa' [Special file 'Barbarossa'] (Moscow: APN 1972) pp.300-1.

>According to the 1941 mobilization plan, first-echelon forces in the West, which included 114 divisions and first-line fortified regions, as well as 85 per cent of the Air Defense forces, air assault forces, more than 75 per cent of the Air Forces, and 34 regiments from the Reserve of the Main Command, were to be fully mobilized between two and six hours from the moment that mobilization was announced, using attached personnel and vehicular transport from nearby regions. Some 58 second-echelon divisions were to be fully mobilized in two to three days. An additional 60 divisions were to be full combat-ready in four to five days, and the remaining 71 divisions in six to ten days. The Air Forces were to be fully mobilized in three to four days; all combat units and rear subunits servicing them were to be brought to combat readiness in two to four hours, and first-echelon Air Defense forces in two hours.
Sandalov, The First Days of the War (note 56) p.106.
A.M. Nekrich, 'Doroga k voine' Ogonek 27 (1991) p.8. Mne bylo prikazano byt' spokoinym i ne panikovat" [I was ordered to be calm and not panic], Neizvestnaia Rossiia [Unknown Russia] 2nd ed. (Moscow: Istoricheskoe nasledie 1992) p.101.

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According to a statement by Marshal K. A. Meretskov, it was just this way with the attack against Finland in 1939, which was prepared as a 'counterstroke' within the framework of protecting the state borders […]
K.A. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe narodu [In service to the people], 2nd ed. (Moscow: Politizdat 1971) pp.177-8.

>At the beginning of June, assigning a mission to the 19th Army commander, Timoshenko was already talking about a counterstroke: 'The Army must be in a state of full combat readiness in case of a German offensive in the southwestern theater of military operations against Kiev. The Army must be ready to launch a flank attack and drive the Germans into the Pripiat' Marshes.'
I.S. Konev, Zapiski komanduiushchego frontom [Notes of a front commander] (Moscow: Voenizdat 1991) pp.53-9.

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>the plan for a preventive strike against Germany, written by A. M. Vasilevskii, was approved by Stalin, and concrete development of the details, called 'plans for the defense of the state border', was to be completed by 1 June 1941, in accordance with instructions by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense.
V.D. Danilov, 'Gotovil Ii Stalin napadenie na Germaniiu?' Poisk 24 (1994) p.15.

>>3023266
There is even graph of increasing of Soviet resources. With a most likely date of Soviet invasion - July 6.

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Based on the published strategic deployment variant dated 18 September 1940,", it can be assumed that at that time the main attack was planned on the Warsaw axis. The principal variant of the September 1940 plan envisioned the main attack south of Brest-Litovsk, but, depending on the situation, allowed for a main attack by the northern grouping of Soviet forces to capture East Prussia. Under peacetime conditions it was considered necessary 'to have both variants worked out'.
Gotovil li SSSR preventivnyi udar?, Voenn istoricheskii zhurnal 1 (1992) pp.24-29.

>Former Commander of the Western Special Military District D. G. Pavlov admitted at an inquiry: 'I made a criminal mistake, allowing aviation to be located at temporary airfields nearer to the border, at airfields designated for occupation in case of our offensive, but in no way for defense.' At the trial he elaborated that he was guilty only of the fact that he 'was physically unable' to verify the correctness of a report by subordinates concerning the dispersion of aviation.
V.D. Danilov, 'Gotovil Ii Stalin napadenie na Germaniiu? (note 60) p.15
'Mne bylo prikazano byt' spokoinym i ne panikovat" [I was ordered to be calm and not panic], Neizvestnaia Rossiia [Unknown Russia] 2nd ed. (Moscow: Istoricheskoe nasledie 1992) p.101.

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>It is true that in June one of the Moscow agents sent a report that the Kremlin was discussing a plan for such a strike, and that it was postponed.
A.M. Nekrich, 'Doroga k voine' [The road to war] Ogonek 27 (1991) p.8.

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That's all I have for now, might find more later.
Suvorov wasn't the only one thinking about this, and his claims do have plausibility.

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>>3023276
>>discussion
>There was no fucking sicussion
>Taking Suvorov seriously is something a mentally challenged person would do
why?

>the Soviets developed the concept of deep battle and by 1936 it had become part of the Red Army Field Regulations

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_operation

They had complete offensive plans in place for fighting the next war by 1936.

They did this thinking about their primary enemy: Germany.

Offensive operations against Germany was always the Soviet plan.

The Great Purge destroyed their ability to carry it out, or even maintain a successful defense, until The Battle of Moscow.

Just facts yo.

File: At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts are in full combat readiness, to face a possible sudden strike by the Germans or their allies..jpg (332KB, 900x645px) Image search: [Google]

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>inb4 not give in to provocations
Ignoring huge part of the original information signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov, whole document implies that there is a possible sudden German attack. Also, while not to give in to provocations that can cause major complications, various troops are to be in full combat readiness to repel a sudden attack.
Pic related
http://archive.mil.ru/archival_service/central/re ources/collection/gallery.htm id=10956@cmsPhotoGallery

There is a very good thread about this on Axishistory.