Napopo in WW1

Also he can't be sacked or replaced.

>>3002789
Napoleon had a great mind for logistics and grand strategy. That's not to say he wasn't a great battlefield tactician as well (he was), but it's what really set him apart.

You've got to remember most of the deadlock in WW1 on the Western Front came from generals applying a 19th century mindset to early 20th century weaponry. I'm not sure whether Napoleon would've adapted any faster than generals of the time did - but he did apparently have a distaste for new-fangled technologies like rifles, he favored mass infantry attacks, and these kind of point to him making the same mistakes everyone else did.

>>3002901

Wasn't he an artillery specialist though?

>>3002901
You only assume hed make the same mistakes as everyone else because everyone else was trying to fight in the same manner of war that the Napoleonic era defined

>>3002907
Yeah, he started his career as an artillery officer and favoured mass artillery tactics - that wasn't really a Napoleonic innovation though, 18th century France was really into grand battery style artillery tactics.

Besides which, massive use of artillery in a non-mobile role played a big role in the stalemate on the Western front, so I'm not sure he would have changed much there.

I suppose it's hard to say whether he'd have changed the course of the war - Sure, he sort of went against established doctrine at the time, but they were pretty blunt tactics, essentially smashing aside your the enemy with massed artillery and massed infantry attacks where they're weakest. That's not to say he was just mindlessly throwing human waves against the enemy, pulling this off correctly required a pretty keen mind as to where to best apply pressure to the enemy and how to wheel and deal your army. But his tactical approach was still rooted in the doctrinal mindset of late 18th century warfare, and the shift that came about in tactics in the early 20th century was more profound than the differences between the 18th century and Napoleonic period - which was more of a refinement of pre-existing concepts than a radically new form of warfare all together.

>>3002924
Not quite the same manner as the Napoleonic period - fighting on the Eastern Front was pretty mobile for example. I mean ultimately it's an impossible question to answer, but as I said in this post >>3002951, the change in warfare from the early 20th century was far more significant than the change Napoleon represented from earlier approaches, so I'd be doubtful that even Napoleon could have thought up a better way to fight and swung around the French army and its strategy.

he would have loved the artillery at his disposal

he's no idiot, I think he'd put two and two together with machine guns and infantry assaults

>>3002983

Would he care about casualties?

>>3002901
>You've got to remember most of the deadlock in WW1 on the Western Front came from generals applying a 19th century mindset to early 20th century weaponry.

/thread

>>3003278

>This meme

Tell me what tactics you can employ to break the stalemate? Protip: you can't.

There was no way of doing it until offensive technology caught up with defensive technology.

>>3002901
>You've got to remember most of the deadlock in WW1 on the Western Front came from generals applying a 19th century mindset to early 20th century weaponry
No. It didn't. It came from a host of very specific technological and geographical obstacles that were unable to be overcome at the current time. This "generals were all backwards" meme is really tired.

You could put a modern day general in Joffe's shoes and the problems would still be the same. Terrible mobile communications. Primarily horse drawn logistics. Rudimentary aviation. No tanks. Barbed wire. It took on average 6 hours for a message from the front to make its way up the chain of command to the general in charge and then another 6 hours working its way back again. By the time the order was received more often than not it was already obsolete. THAT's what stalled offensives, not the ineptitude of the generals.

>>3003310
I didn't blame the ineptitude of the generals anon, I just said they had a 19th century mindset - mobile, offensive warfare was possible (more evident on Eastern front). I'm not recycling the meme that the generals were all incompetent buffoons, just pointing out the same thing as you - offensive tactics were outdated in the face of modern defensive capabilities.

My main point, funnily enough, is essentially the same as yous - I don't think it'd matter if you put Napoleon, Caesar, or Alexander in charge with a knowledge of the weaponry, I can't really see them dreaming up something to fix the stalemate once the front had settled.

Also, I thought tanks didn't really turn out to be the stalemate breaking weapon they were hoped they'd be?

>>3003353

It wasn't the tactics though, you could use those 19th century tactics and win if you had 1920's tech.

>>3003377
Was it really new technologies though? I thought the breaking of the stalemate on the western front was mostly mastering more rapid warfare and getting a better handle on combined arms? Genuinely curious btw, not trashing what you're saying - I just thought it wasn't planes/tanks etc. per se, but figuring out a better way to use them.

>>3003416

How can you master rapid warfare though without better tech? You need to be mechanised, or use cavalry which was rendered obsolete by accurate rapid fire rifles and MG's.

I am talking exclusively about the western front 1915 onwards btw, at the outbreak of the war could have stayed mobile with tactical changes.

>>3003438
Well what's an example of the better tech? I mean the stalemate wasn't really broken until the very end of the war - and a lot of these technologies had been around since 1915/16.

>>3003466

Desertion, war-weariness of the troops, political instability and the naval blockade are what I would argue as the causes of the break, not really tech or tactics (though the move towards small unit tactics was significant).

>>3002901
>napoleon
>grand strategy

Napoleon's great strategic achievements
>stranded his army in egypt surrounded by ottomans and british, has to abandon them and secret himself away
>land war in russia
>getting himself exiled twice to an island

really a guy that had long term grand strategic mastery, definitely didnt burn every bridge in europe and get himself cornered through vanity and shitty diplomacy.

Napoleon was a tactical genius, not so good at establishing long term strategic gains for his nation.