Rhodesian Chemical and Biological Weapons

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BRIEF SUMMARY OF RHODESIAN BUSH WAR:

1965-69 – Phase 1. Guerillas decisively defeated by RA and BSAP, suffer heavy losses, fail to accomplish any meaningful objectives. Guerilla threat is more a police law-and-order issue supplemented by the military. ZANLA retreat to Mozambique/Northeast Rhodesia, ZIPRA retreat to Zambia.

1972-75 – Phase 2. Guerillas dismantle BSAP ground intelligence network in northeast Rhodesia, win passive co-operation from rural African population, and start hit-and-run raids on civilian targets. Rhodesia establishes 'protected village' (PV) system to minimise contact between guerillas and villagers. Selous Scouts form to compensate for loss of BSAP intelligence. FRELIMO seize control of Mozambique, ZANLA open up a second front on Rhodesian borders.

ZANLA still taking heavy casualties despite a brief respite of talks between South Africa, Rhodesia and the guerillas. Their situation is precarious, support from the PRC is inconsistent. Food, clothing, blankets and medicines are stretched thin as more recruits arrive.

1976-79 – Phase 3. Renewed guerilla offenses into Rhodesia, spreads across the entire country with logistics depending on local support. ZANLA guerillas are still incompetent in battle, but strategically their raids are overextending Rhodesian forces. ZIPRA activity is minimal despite continued Soviet support. Rhodesian military personnel begin searching for innovative and expedient solutions. Rhodesians raid Zambia and Mozambique.

Destruction of Zambian and Mozambican infrastructure puts pressure on the guerillas to negotiate. Rhodesia hasn't lost a battle, but is losing thanks to limited manpower and economic sanctions. Ian Smith's attempt at lifting international pressure on Rhodesia through the creation of 'Zimbabwe-Rhodesia' fails. Rhodesia dies in 1979, with control returning to Britain, which arranges for an election with majority rule. Robert Mugabe comes to power.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE RHODESIAN CBW PROGRAM

Rhodesia developed effective CBW agents undetected using materials, equipment and techniques that were readily available, in basic facilities with personnel (scientists and students) that were inexperienced in CBW development and weaponisation.

Utilising already available agricultural and industrial chemical agents minimises foreign sources of materials, and keeping to a small tightly knit group reduces likelihood of discovery. Rhodesia's CBW effort was undetected by the West, and mostly forgotten afterwards. It was mentioned in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's investigation, but viewed as a minor prologue to South Africa's 'Project Coast' CBW program.

Rhodesian and foreign doctors did discover evidence of poisonings amongst hospitalised patients, but either did not suspect a CW weapon, or were unable to investigate further due to the government and media control over information flow. It's also difficult to correctly attribute outbreaks of epidemics such as anthrax to BW weapons if the pathogens are already found naturally in the local ecology.

The idea for a CBW program came from Professor Robert Symington of the University of Rhodesia. P.K van der Byl, Rhodesian defence minister, approved and took it to Prime Minister Ian Smith, who also approved. It was implemented by Director-General Ken Flower of the CIO, and managed by Chief Superintendent Michael 'Mac' McGuiness. The team was led by Symington and operated at the Selous Scout bases in Bindura and Mount Darwin. It began in early 1976.

FACTORS LEADING TO CBW PROGRAM CREATION:

1. Scarce resources, particularly manpower against a numerically superior opponent.
2. An asymmetric threat or change in strategic military balance.
3. Status as a rogue nation outside conventional law.
4. Dehumanised or demonised adversaries.
5. Regime (race, values, religion, political/economic power) at risk.
6. Available materials and infrastructure.

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CW AGENTS:

Parathion: Organophosphate pesticide. Colorless, odorless crystals in pure form, technical form is yellow-to-brown liquid, odor like rotten eggs. Breaks down, forms lethal paraoxon. Rapidly absorbs through skin, most effective through the scrotum and armpits. Easily manufactured, commonly used. Symptoms in minutes to hours; Unconsciousness, incontinence, convulsions, respiratory depression. Death by respiratory failure.

Telodrin: Chlorinated insecticide. Whitish-to-brown crystalline powder, tasteless, odorless. Effective orally and dermally. Overstimulus of the central nervous system; agitation, confusion, convulsions. Death occurs in hours.

Thallium: Heavy metal rodenticide. Tasteless, odorless, water-soluble salts. Symptoms in 12-48 hours; hair loss, gastrointestinal discomfort, nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. Neurological symptoms; pain in lower extremities, headaches, senselessness, ataxia, restlessness, delirium, dementia, hallucinations, semi-comas, blindness, psychosis. Death in 3-5 days.

Warfarin: Anticoagulant rodenticide. Colorless crystal, non-water soluble, soluble in alcohol. Interferes with the manufacture of Vitamin K, important in blood clotting. Symptoms in a few days; nosebleeds, bleeding gums, bloody urine and feces, vomiting blood, bruising, fatigue, shortness of breath, fluid in lungs, pallor, hematomas around joints and buttocks, bloody eyes. Cerebral hemorrhage, paralysis, hemorrhagic shock and death within 2 weeks.

BW AGENTS:

Cholera: Diarrheal illness, bacterial intestine infection. Symptoms mild to severe; watery diarrhea, vomiting and leg cramps. Loss of body fluid leads to dehydration and shock. Death occurs in hours if untreated.

Botulinum Toxin: Neuroparalytic protein produced by clostridium botulinum. Foodborne, incubates from 6 hours to 10 days. Symptoms in 18-36 hours; dry mouth, double or blurred vision, difficulty in swallowing or speaking and peripheral muscle weakness. Ventilatory failure, death.

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FACILITIES, LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL PART 1

The CBW team that began operations in 1976 used the Selous Scout bases in Bindura. The bases were rudimentary, undermanned and only intermittently used by the Scouts. The base at Bindura had corrugated iron walls, a medical operating room but no laboratory. The Scout base in Mount Darwin was similar to Bindura, and used by the CBW team beginning mid-1977 to early 1978. Unconfirmed reports >imply the scientific head of the CBW team, Robert Symington had a laboratory built in his basement in a fashionable white suburb in the capital city Salisbury. Take that how you want.

The CBW team consisted of Robert Symington as the head, and medical or veterinary students selected from the University of Rhodesia. Other members included Victor Noble and St Clair Hayes, the main producers of the CBW agents. The program was managed by Chief Superintendent Michael 'Mac' McGuiness, a BSAP officer in the Special Branch, who was instrumental in the creation of the Selous Scouts. Due to a breakdown in the official chain of command late in the war, McGuiness served both the BSAP and CIO, and often ignored BSAP Commissioner Peter Allum in favour of CIO chief Ken Flower. The Selous Scouts were headed by Lt. Colonel Ron Reid-Daly, who coordinated with McGuiness.

The CBW agents were locally sourced, such as the Parathion and Telodrin. The chemicals were already being produced for agricultural products like Supermix DFF cattle dip, or pesticide used by the Rhodesian Department of Wildlife and National Parks. Clothing, food and beverages were bought from Madziwa Trading, a local retailer in Bindura. Some clothing items had Rhodesian labels replaced with South African ones. Participants claimed the CBW team used water bowsers filled with rotten meat and water to cultivate botulinum. This was not an effective method as botulinum requires oxygen free conditions for growth, and no evidence suggests the toxin was ever more than experimental.

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FACILITIES, LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL PART 2


South African Intelligence was intensely interested in the success rate of the program, and secretly funded it to the tune of US$800, 000 a month (not adjusted for inflation), money that came from the Saudi government. Nobody can explain why the Saudis were investing millions into the war, but they were possibly opposed to the spread of communism in Africa.

To determine the lethal dose for 50% of the population (LD50 ), it's likely the CBW team chose to conduct human experimentation at the Mount Darwin base, where there was a ready supply of captured terrorists to experiment on. Whilst no direct evidence confirms testing on captured terrorists, there are rumours and allegations of prisoners having been taken to Mount Darwin for testing, and the bodies being disposed down a mineshaft. Some 5000 bodies were discovered in a mineshaft 28km from Mount Darwin in 2004 that date from the time the area was under Rhodesian Special Forces control.

The effectiveness of the CBW effort had to take into account the different metabolic rate of Africans to Europeans. Symington estimated that the black African guerillas would defecate twice a day, due to their diet of corn meal, as opposed to more refined grains in the European diet. Therefore, higher dosages of Thallium and Warfarin would be needed. Parathion and Telodrin were most easily absorbed through the skin of the groin and the armpits, so the best items of clothing to poison were underwear and t-shirts.


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CW DISSEMINATION

The CBW program attacked guerillas on three fronts:

1. Contaminate supplies provided by contact men (local Africans recruited by the CIO), or recovered from hidden caches, or stolen from rural stores.
2. Contaminate water supplies along infiltration routes into Rhodesia.
3. Contaminate guerilla safe havens by poisoning food, beverages and medicines.

The method of applying CW agents was very basic. The team's protective equipment was rudimentary, limited to gloves, masks and aprons. The program did not manufacture the agents, instead it converted industrial chemicals to easily absorbed forms. Adding dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) to Parathion acted as a skin penetrant for rapid absorption. Liquid pesticide was sun-dried to a powder on sheets of corrugated tin, the flakes were gathered, crushed into powder, and brushed onto items of clothing. Alternatively, clothes were soaked in a vat of Parathion and methanol solvent.

Warfarin was mixed with corn meal, and thallium was injected into canned foods and drinks using a micro-needle. Cigarette tips were treated with a mixture of Telodrin crystallised in potassium chloride.

Poisoned supplies were sent to guerilla camps through contact men. Guerillas gave contact men lists of needed supplies. The lists went to Bindura, where poisoned supplies were readied and sent to the contact men. When African villagers were relocated to PVs, the shops that they left abandoned could be 'restocked' with contaminated supplies the guerillas would steal.

Examples of poisoned Items include canned peas, tinned beef, toothpaste, cookies, jam, brandy, medicines, vitamins, "Dr. Strong 500" capsules (supposedly to improve sexual prowess), Endo liver salts (to treat hangovers), and cigarettes.

The use of BW agents is a bit murkier. Reports suggest the Rhodesian Light Infantry had been contaminating water sources with cholera in Mozambique since the early 70s, and contaminated parts of the Ruya River with limited effect.

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EFFECTIVENESS PART 1

The CBW team and the overseeing officials first considered the program a great success. Though it was difficult to ascertain exact numbers of guerillas killed, there was optimism that the program was deadlier than conventional military operations. Its effectiveness only had a limited shelf-life, as eventually the guerillas would start to catch on, resulting in the need to vary dissemination techniques.

The lowest estimate of guerilla deaths, assuming the reported figure of 809 guerilla deaths due to CW agents in 1977 is accurate, would be 1239 deaths. A more middle-of-the-road estimate would be 1771 deaths. The highest estimate would be 2427, assuming 809 guerillas died annually for the next two years. These figures do not include the death toll from outbreaks of cholera, which would increase figures by hundreds.

As a percentage, the CBW program probably accounted for more guerilla deaths than CW use in WWI. A conservative estimate of both CBW related deaths and total guerilla deaths would lead to a figure of 15% of guerilla casualties dying of CBW agents, an unprecedented percentage in the history of warfare. Percentages of deaths in guerilla bands could range from 30% to 100%.

The tactic of contaminating certain water boreholes with cholera (A Rhodesian Army tactic unrelated to the CBW team in Bindura and Mount Darwin), but leaving others untouched allowed Rhodesians to funnel guerillas into ambushes, or force them to carry more water (and thus less ammunition) from Mozambique. It's estimated that cholera epidemics killed up to 200 guerillas in Southeast Rhodesia, and forced the evacuation of guerilla camps in Mozambique, as well as causing an outbreak of Cholera among villagers living along the Ruya River in Rhodesia.

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EFFECTIVENESS PART 2

The CBW program's secrecy was a double-edged sword. It had no political value as a deterrent, but it was also impossible for the guerillas to make a political scandal of it, being largely unaware of it, and what little evidence was discovered was not recognised as an attack by the doctors treating patients. Additionally, the secrecy of the program could not dissuade large amounts of guerilla recruitment, which exceeded the death toll the program was exacting upon them.

Former guerillas give little account of their experiences, and only a few statements have been made from those that observed the effects of the CBW program. From these perspectives, it seems the guerillas thought (perhaps retrospectively) the program was very effective against them, particularly on turning the guerillas against local villages that might have otherwise been supportive, and enacting witch hunts and massacres.

A side note: Not all deaths by poisoning in Rhodesia were the responsibility of the Rhodesian CBW program. Poisonings could occur between rivals and villages, and possibly villagers might poison guerillas themselves in response to their young men being forcibly recruited, or their women and girls being sexually abused. The fact that poisonings were already a prominent part of Shona tribal culture (in association with witchcraft) may have also made the Rhodesian CBW program more difficult to detect as the true cause for many deaths.

The Rhodesian CBW program would have ended around late 1979, and materials and documents from the Bindura and Mount Darwin bases transferred to South Africa around February-March 1980. What became of these materials and documents is uncertain, it's likely they were either destroyed then or at the end of South African Apartheid.

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CONCLUSIONS:
1. The Rhodesian CBW program was effective not only at killing communist terrorists, it also drove a wedge between the terrorists and villages that aided them.
2. The small-scale and basic nature of the operation helped keep it a secret from both enemy and international community. Even doctors treating civilians accidentally poisoned were not able to attribute chemical weapons due to their common use as agricultural or industrial products.
3. A functional and effective CBW program did not need specialised materials or experienced chemical engineers. Rather, it relied most on the deception of an enemy whose methods of logistical supply were known and vulnerable to sabotage.
4. The program was not able to save Rhodesia due to the large numbers of recruits in the guerilla ranks, and international pressure.

I will try to answer any questions about the Rhodesian CBW program if I can.

Now for an obligatory Rhodesian patriotic song:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RgXeLWp0c8E

(10/10)

>>2878168
Were there ever any repercussions against those who organized the Rhodesian CBW program (at least, those who were still alive when it was discovered)?

You forgot your source list

>Rhodesia will never exist again
W-we'll keep them n-north of the Zambezi, t-till that r-river's running dry...

>>2878223
Michael McGuiness was murdered in his South Africa home on the 4th of July 2011, but the murder was unrelated to his involvement in the CBW program.

Robert Symington died in 1982 in Cape Town, South Africa of a heart attack.

Victor Noble died in Cape Town in December 2011 of illness.

Robert Reid-Daly died in Cape Town in August 2010.

Ken Flower continued working as the head of the CIO under Robert Mugabe until his death in 1987.

AFAIK the program was first mentioned in Flower's autobiography Serving Secretly in 1987, US intelligence first began acquiring information on it in 1990, and a brief and incomplete mention of it came to light in relation to South Africa's 'Operation Coast' CBW program during the post-Apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission. By that time Symington and Flower were both dead, and there seems to have been no interest or pressure into investigating what seemed like a dirty footnote of an already obscure part of history.