The German invasions of France

>1st: French mobilised too slow, Prussian army had more troops and mobilised quickly, ran straight to paris to win
>2nd: they invaded through belgium and hit a wall of french and british troops, exactly what they were expected to do
>3rd: french expected them to do the exact same thing. also thought a forest was an impenetrable wall, also thought the belgiums had their own maginot line or thought they were good for anything
there's a very quick and probably inaccurate rundown

>>2592617
That sounds about right, I've heard about how the Germans went through an unguarded forests that the Allies thought was impassible. Thanks.

In 1870 didn't the French expect war? Bismarck had just whooped Austria and there was tensions over Luxembourg. I'm suprised the French were slow to mobilise.

In 1914, is there been anyway the German plan (Schlieffen) could've worked?

>>2592628
I'm probably not the one to ask but
>didn't the french expect war
yeah but if i recall correctly they were slow to mobilise completely, i dunno why. I know the Prussians had 400,000 mobilised troops to France's 200,000, so the odds were already against them

I dunno about the schlieffen plan working

>>2592639
Any idea on why the French were unable to mobilise? After all, before this point the French were considered one of the strongest European nations. After the Franco-Prussian war they were a second-tier nation in terms of military strength. Perhaps they were overconfident and believe the Bavarians would side with them?

>>2592648
New to the thread, but because the Prussians had actually developed a general staff. You had real, experience (really, their best) military professionals studying all the stuff that happens off the battlefield and developing practical theories as to how to best implement things like rapid mobilizations and supplying their troops. The French were still just kind of muddling through.

>And another thing, why was Germany able to subdue France in 1870 without crossing into Belgium but needed to invade Belgium to circumnavigate the French army in 1914?

Armies were much smaller in 1870, and with more primitive things like firearms and especially artillery, conventional formations were far tighter. It meant that your army could more effectively concentrate over a narrow area, wheras later developments both technological and social forced you to spread out. By the time of WW1, Germany had a significant manpower advantage early on, but couldn't effectively use it if they only attacked along the common border, which by that point was very well fortified to boot.

So they attempted to extend the length of the front by opening up Belgium, which plays into the hands of the army that is both bigger and faster moving, advantages the Germans held.

By WW2, things had changed drastically again, and you had the ability for short term bursts of speed that were simply impossible in either WW1 or the Franco-Prussian war, and once again, the French were behind the learning curve. Something like Sedan in WW1 would have been serious, but not devastating; there was no way for an advancing force to move rapidly enough to get that sort of envelopment. With the advent of mechanized forces, you could.

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322KB, 556x610px

>>2592690
Very helpful response, thanks.

Do you think the Shlieffen plan was viable? Was it flawed in underestimating the strength of the Allies or did the Germans not carry it out properly?

>>2592733
>viable schlieffen plan
>trenches, guns and railways
pick one and only one

>>2592733
>Do you think the Shlieffen plan was viable? Was it flawed in underestimating the strength of the Allies or did the Germans not carry it out properly?

If you're talking about the Schlieffen plan as conceived of by Schlieffen, with the strong left flank circling around Paris and attacking from the northwest, no, it was insane and stupid. It's not even underestimating the Allies; armies at the time with horse drawn logistics and carrying heavy artillery simply can't move as fast as the plan calls for, even if they're completely unopposed, which they won't be. The hybrid plan by Moltke could maybe have worked, with its shorter pushes, but even then, it was super-optimistic and yes, flawed by underestimating Allied strength.

And looking back in hindsight, we have a more fundamental flaw; if you accept the premise that a war with either France or Russia effectively means war with both, then you want to knock out the weaker one quickly and focus on the stronger one with both hands. France was viewed as the weaker of the two, which turned out not to be the case, the Germans simultaneously underestimated France, probably because of the 1870 war, and overestimated Russia.

>>2592578

1870 : Germans
1914 : UK stopped Germans
1940 : UK wasn't here so french Runaway

>>2593220
This.

Frogs can't defend their own country without British aid.

>>2592648
Initially, Nappy 3 wanted to reform the army to get closer to a Prussian system, but failed to do so as the bill was slowed down a lot in the parliement, and then too hastily declared war in 1870 when his army wasnt even ready to fight. If he had waited a year he might have had a better chance.

>>2593220
>1914 : UK stopped Germans

kek, the BEF was practically nonexistent compared to the French army during the Schlieffen plan. Also it's a myth that the BEF infiltrated the gap between Kluck's and Bulow's army, that was a French cavalry division.

>>2592775

It seems as though your research has been minimal. The main reason why the plan failed was because of the delusional Motke's failure to follow through with the plan. The essential ingredient for success of the plan was to "keep the left flank strong" (-literally Schlieffen's last words). Motlke assigned two divisions to go over to the Eastern front to defend against faster than expected Russian mobilization right when they where needed most. Then, he kept assigning the armies to the right side to "finish off" the Entente armies rather than to sweep around and attain Paris which was the essential part of the success of the plan. In the first battle of the Marne the eiffel tower was in sight. Victory was at least possible.

>France was viewed as the weaker of the two

Lmao are you shitting me right now? Russia was considered the backwater rubble of Europe, they didn't even expect them to be able to mobilize within six weeks. Compare that with the forts like douaumont along the French line. The only thing the Russians had going for them was there man power - men who's nation didn't have the capability to even provide all of them weapons or clothing. There are so many things wrong with that statement I'm not sure where to start.

>>2592578
The short answer is that between the Franco-Prussian War and WWI stationary weapons (heavy artillery, barbed wire, land mines, heavy machine guns, etc.) had become far more effective, but mobile weapons hadn't changed much or weren't invented yet. There were no tanks until 1916, aircraft was still poorly understood, no paratroopers, etc.

>>2593249

can't sink their own navies without it either :^)

>>2593630
>It seems as though your research has been minimal. The main reason why the plan failed was because of the delusional Motke's failure to follow through with the plan. The essential ingredient for success of the plan was to "keep the left flank strong" (-literally Schlieffen's last words).

No, Moltke saved what was an unworkable mess of nonsense into something that at least had a chance of working out. The Germans, as it was, with a much slower advance allowing the logistics to catch up, and moving a shorter distance, were still feeling the rear-guard pinch at the Marne. You want to run almost twice as far in a third of the time? You actually think this is a possibility?

>Lmao are you shitting me right now?

Yes, I and most modern historians about geopolitics have no fucking clue what we're on about. You can start with something simple, like this.

https://www.amazon.com/Catastrophe-1914-Europe-Goes-War/dp/0307743837

Or this

https://books.google.com/books?id=cbNo8-V7rSYC&pg=PT161&lpg=PT161&dq=Germany+worried+about+growing+Russian+strength&source=bl&ots=jGoml_QwJq&sig=Ey40FU7BCQjznW56e13W2qwFEFk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjpkbXBsoHTAhVQfiYKHYcZAx8Q6AEIHzAB#v=onepage&q=Germany%20worried%20about%20growing%20Russian%20strength&f=false

Or anything else really.

>>2592578
>Can someone briefly explain to me why the first German invasion of France (1870) was successful, the second one failed (1914) and the third one was successful (1940)?
Because warfare was different in each of these era

>And another thing, why was Germany able to subdue France in 1870 without crossing into Belgium but needed to invade Belgium to circumnavigate the French army in 1914?
For the reason stated above
In WW1, fortifications were very dangerous, and the French-German border was fortified

>I get that the British contribution to the defense of France was important
It wasnt

>but they also contributed in 1940 and that didn't go so well
British land army has always been shit
It was basically a non-factor

>>2593630
>The main reason why the plan failed was because of the delusional Motke's failure to follow through with the plan.
It should also be considered that the Bavarians didn't read the manual (or at least didn't follow it). The plan was for the Bavarian armies to fall back and bait the French advance. However, the Bavarians brought the French advance to a halt which gave Joffre the time to relocate troops on time who otherwise would have been too far away.

>>2593903
>British land army has always been shit
>It was basically a non-factor
Britain had a small but competent force, composed of professional soldiers rather than conscripts. At the end of WW1 they had the largest land army in the world. The British contribution was absolutely significant, most importantly when it came to artillery support.