The greatest strategist that ever live?
>Napoleon did not stay still. The French Emperor decided to set a psychological trap in order to lure the Allies out. Days before any fighting, Napoleon had been giving the impression that his army was weak and that he desired a negotiated peace.About 53,000 French troops—including Soult, Lannes and Murat's forces—were assigned to take Austerlitz and the Olmutz road, occupying the enemy's attention. The Allied forces, numbering about 89,000, seemed far superior and would be tempted to attack the outnumbered French army. However, the Allies did not know that Bernadotte, Mortier and Davout were already within the supported distance, and could be called in by forced marches from Iglau and Vienna respectively, raising the French number to 75,000 troops.
>Napoleon's lure did not stop at that. On 25 November, General Savary was sent to the Allied headquarters at Olmutz to deliver Napoleon's message expressing his desire to avoid a battle, while secretly examining the Allied forces' situation. As expected, the overture was seen as a sign of weakness. When Francis I offered an armistice on the 27th, Napoleon accepted enthusiastically. On the same day, Napoleon ordered Soult to abandon both Austerlitz and the Pratzen Heights and, while doing so, to create an impression of chaos during the retreat that would induce the enemy to occupy the Heights.
>The next day (28 November), the French Emperor requested a personal interview with Alexander I and received a visit from the Tsar's most impetuous aide, Count Dolgorouki. The meeting was another part of the trap, as Napoleon intentionally expressed anxiety and hesitation to his opponents. Dolgorouki reported to the Tsar an additional indication of French weakness.
>Napoleon was hoping that the Allied forces would attack, and to encourage them, he deliberately weakened his right flank.
>>1813347
All he needed to defeat 35,000 turks was 300 good men
>From 6am to 4pm the French withstood repeated Ottoman charges. They suffered few casualties and easily held their square, but as the day wore on their ammunition ran low and the men suffered from lack of water and hunger. The Ottomans suffered substantial losses, but they could easily replace their casualties and keep up with good supplies and strength to continue repeated strikes throughout the day.
>Just when all seemed to be lost, and Kléber prepared for a last-ditch breakout towards the Jordan, some soldiers claimed to have briefly seen a military force advancing from the north. Kléber tried to verify their report, which could be a relief column under Napoleon, but he saw nothing but the open desert and a monstrous enemy force.
>However a moment later Kléber saw the relief column; at the first moment Kléber had looked, the relief column under the personal command of Napoleon Bonaparte had marched right into a dip. Although Kléber saw and his men began to feel relief, their opponent still had many times more men than Napoleon and Kléber together.
>Napoleon found himself between the Ottomans and their camp; he decided to distract them by detaching 300 men to pillage and destroy the Ottoman camp. This succeeded far more than Napoleon could have imagined: upon seeing the destruction of their belongings, the Ottomans assumed they were surrounded. In response, the Ottoman army began to retreat to the south and across the River Jordan. Kléber ordered his men to charge in a last effort for the day, and supported by the rest of the soldiers under Napoleon – who were relatively fresh - this charge transformed the Ottoman retreat into a general rout. Kléber’s men found their thirst replaced by an adrenaline rush, and the waters of the Jordan turned red with the blood of the Turks who were killed in the rout.
>>1813347
>he shouldn't have won
>he did anyway
Pretty much all of his campaigns. so yes, yes indeed.
He's easily in the top 5
Absolute madman
>>1813347
>The greatest strategist that ever live?
Probably.
Only chance for competition in the number one spot is Genghis Khan's main man Subutai.
...and Khalid ibn-al Walid, Mohammed's super general.
These dudes be 1, 2, 3 no matter how you rank them.
>>1814088
>No Hannibal
>No Belisarius
These 2 dudes are up there also
>>1814102
no russell crowe in gladiator.
>>1814102
>hannibal
His greatest feat was the crossing of the alps, and Cannae, after that it just went downhill
>>1813347
>"The greatest strategist that ever lived"
>gets completely cucked by based Kutuzov
>loses 2/3 of his army while inflicting less than half as many casualties on the enemy
>falls completely for the b8 and stretches his army out over scorched earth without sufficient supplies
>routed by a counterattack after invading and loses most of his army on the march back
>so completely cucked by Kutuzov that his army is forever crippled and he loses the following war and is forced to fuck off to some island in nowhere despite having half of Europe behind him before then
No.
>>1816031
>loses 2/3 of his army while inflicting less than half as many casualties on the enemy
Depends of what you consider as "the enemy"
Do the hundreds thousands of Russian peasants who died of starvation to enforce the scorched earth policy count?
>>1815351
If anything id put it the other way around. He's strategy was sound (and the only realistic way of defeating Rome and her allies). Tactically he was overly reliant on his superior cavalry and as soon as he lost that edge got BTFO
>>1816070
>Implying they weren't class enemies
Oh wait, wrong autocrat
>>1813383
Damn
>>1813347
>Napoleon asked Soult: “How long do your troops need to get to the top of the Pratzen?” Soult is said to have replied that he required no more than twenty minutes (6). Napoleon replied: “Very well. We'll wait another quarter of an hour.” Fifteen minutes later, he said: “Go.”
EE HAN TIMING
>>1814102
>Hannibal
>>1815351
>Although Hannibal was one of the best tacticians, you have to admit he was pretty poor at grand strategy
Well, that rules out Napoleon, as well.