Why did the Wehrmacht get wrecked so hard during Operation Bagration?

>>1712000
Multiple factors

>>1712000

Because they were behind by just about every metric at that point.

The Soviets had a huge air advantage, permitting them to both bomb Wehrmacht positions and avoid bombing of their own, and also providing enormous reconaissance advantages.

They had more fuel and more motorized forces, which allowed them to maneuver more fully, something that their intelligence advantages, not just in aerial recon, but in far better signint, let them identify weak points and move towards them.

They had more and better artillery, they had ironed out the worst of their tactical deficiencies, and Heer quality had been declining for some time with the losses earlier in the war being made up with rawer recruits and people who previously weren't in the physical fitness requirements.

It's like asking why the Poles got wrecked so hard in September of 1939. They were outweighed and outclassed, simple as that.

>>1712010
Part of it also had to do with intelligence. IIRC Hitler sent like half of army group centers tanks and 2/3rds of its artillery south in preparation for a soviet attack there.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/connor.pdf
Here's an American analysis of Bagration.

the avarage wehmarcht infantry division had no hope to stand against russian mechanized and armored divisions by 1944

after kursk, every single time, a defensive line was formed and every time it was broken through, it could only be stopped by german panzergroups counterattacking

why?
lack of manpower
lack of equipment
lack of mobility, this was the most severe of all

germans could not mechanize their infantry, their artillery and trail was towed by horses

this means they could not effectively disengage from an attacking armored group, they could not avoid locked up in pockets
if they tried to flee disorganized, they risked being overrun and literally trampled by the soviet armored columns

entire divisions lost with all their equipment and most importantly, men taken POW

The German Army was crushed at Kursk.

This all really goes back to Stalingrad though. 600,000 men lost, and for what? That permanently tipped the balance in favor of the Russians. Then not long after Kursk is built up, it's a German attempt to regain lost imitative. They need to put the Soviets squarely on the defensive again. Instead, the opposite happens. Operation Citadel fails massively. Then the Soviets launch not one but two massive counterattacks which all but break the Germans, and which completely shattered their momentum. The Soviets recovered from their defensive stance due to delaying the Germans long enough to raise new divisions, get logistics going, and for Lend Lease to enter full swing. By 1944 you have fully equipped, completely fed, entirely motorized Russian divisions with fuel to spare and reserves in abundance facing Germans who are short on everything. They don't have enough trucks. Not enough tanks. Not enough shells. Not enough boots or food or fuel to keep their men fighting. Not enough hay for the horses.

They were a broken army, the Russians were both battle hardened, and now that the purges had been reversed, competently led.
When an unstoppable force meets a glass wall, the glass wall shatters.

>>1714073
I like your post. But at
>When an unstoppable force meets a glass wall, the glass wall shatters.
you went full autistic desu senpai.

I agree with your article.
I would like to add that the Soviets were once in favor after the battle of Moscow. But Stalin was a retard and became overconfident. This led ultimately to the battles of Rzhev, were the Soviets suffered heavy losses.

>>1712017
Yep, in addition to other things mentioned here.
It's also important to mention Belarus isn't really a great place for offensive, shitload of marshes and forests.
Plus Soviets attacked a prepared enemy.
So it's unfair to say it was all about material advantage, they did have material advantage but they used it well.

One thing to note is that Army group center had already beaten back 2 major Soviet offensives prior to Bagration. This probably played into the mind of Hitler and possibly the German high command while the Soviets would've learned from past mistakes.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_military_deception

Maskirovka was pretty neat

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They were not ready for that war.

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Because they were shit-tier anyway.

>>1714226
The Soviets only had the upper hand against out of position out of supply German units. The victories at Moscow were circumstance that unfolded at the tactical level, it was not some great pre planned assault.

The Soviets still lacked tactical flexibility, competent soldiers, competent leaders and a favorable situation in numbers in 42. The same was true in 43, leading to the Russians specifically to adopt a defensive posture for the Germans to break themselves upon. Which happened at Kursk.

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Bagration Operation was the logical end of war on Soviet territory. Wehrmacht had no forces arter Stalingrad (modern Volgograd) to enter deeper in Soviet Russia. They got wrecked so hard during Bagration Operation because they got wrecked down in Stalingrad.