https://www.crowdsupply.com/design- shift/orwl FBI BTFO

Cold Boot

Attacks: Cold boot attacks consist of removing the DRAM or power-cycling the machine in order to read the memory content. The DRAM is often chilled to slow down the loss of information that occurs when the cells are no longer refreshed.

Mitigations: The DRAM is soldered, and protected by the active clamshell mesh. Cooling down the secure microcontroller will trigger a tamper event, erasure of the encryption key, and system power down. Encryption keys are only stored in the main memory by the UEFI for an extremely short time before they are passed to the SED, and are securely memset’ed long before the OS is booted. When the machine is put in sleep mode while the user is away, the key is not stored in the main memory nor in the SED controller memory. To prevent other kinds of attacks on the memory content, the entire RAM is wiped before the OS is booted

>>59994636
didn't read

>>59994512
In case of emergency, throw computer in furnace

>>59994512
>modern CPU
>Intel Skylake
YOU FORGOT ABOUT THE IEM
IT'S RUINED
SOILED IT SOILED IT SOILED IT

>>59995588
They cover that

>>59995655
> In fact, the secure MCU actually mitigates some of the concerns around the Intel ME by controlling power to the Intel subsystem, thus guaranteeing the Intel ME is inactive when the Intel subsystem is shutdown.
So all this means is that it will only leak all your encryption key and other secrets while powered up.
>In this case, more actors means better behavior all around.
LOL!

Can't we just install gentoo on PS4

>>59995805
unfortunately there is currently no exploit to run unsigned code