Internet Voting

Riggins is always possible regardless of the method

>>58991916
Based on the fact that Trump won, I think electronic voting is just fine.

>>58991921
>Riggins is always possible
Right, so we should just go ahead and make it that much easier to rig on an even larger scale? That isn't even a half-baked point. I get the sense that you simply wanted to say something, and just typed the first thing that popped into your "brain." Think before you post, next time.

>>58991927
I'm not sure exactly what the implication you are trying to make is. I see 2 possibilities, so I will address each of those:

1. You support Trump, and think that electronic voting helped him win via some secret and unfair means. In that case, since you don't care about morals, let me make a practical argument: What happens when the time comes that a candidate you hate exploits the vulnerabilities of these electronic voting machines? I'd bet $500 cash that you wouldn't be so "fine" with it then. Don't think in the short term.

2. You think that the chances of Trump being given a fair chance by the political system were so slim, that his victory implies that electronic voting is not super vulnerable to being manipulated by those in power after all. Even if it were true for this election cycle, why do you assume that vulnerabilities will never be exploited? What if exploiters avoid the national elections out of fear of getting caught, due to all the attention surrounding the results, and instead target local or state elections instead? How can you dismiss these risks so readily?

>>58991927
Based on the fact all the shady shit the DNC did was exposed, I think electronic voting is a terrible idea.

Nobody in government is anywhere near competent to design a secure system to handle it, and anybody they outsource will put in minimum effort and get broken anyways. Aside from conflicts of interest cropping up.

>>58992139
Agreed, and that is even before you get to the political/human element of implementing these systems. It is totally plausible that somewhere along the way from the voter submitting their choice, and it being officially tallied, some bureaucrat decides to ask for some fudging of results into a plausible range (like maybe 2-5% above expected turnout for one party in a district, or a similar arrangement to up the numbers in a referendum).

Another consideration: Politicians and bureaus can easily argue for closed source software on the basis of "security," and none of their political bosses would see the problem, even if they themselves weren't in on fucking up the vote tally.

Social engineering pollworkers to make the results whatever the fuck you like (if you've ever been a pollworker yourself, you know just how fucking convoluted and full of security by obscurity the whole system is) is 1000x easier than any actual HAXING

>>58992249
>posting without taking the time to read either the OP or the replies.

One of the main problems with the concept of electronic/internet voting is that it makes it EASY for the pollworkers and other interests to fuck with the results, not simply "it makes it vulnerable to 300 pound hackers."

Please don't be lazy the next time you decide to "contribute" to a thread.

>>58992288
easier* sorry

>>58991916
>0. You can't trust counting the votes in a computer. The people who run the server might rig the software to lie. (This applies to all use of computers to count votes.)
This is why we need open source

>1. It is not good enough if the voting client software is secure. If your machine is a zombie, the botnet will choose your vote.
This is why we need open source

2. It is not good enough if the client computer is secure. Your boss could insist you vote while he watches.
Report your boss anonymously to the constabulary

>>58992288
you don't have any fucking clue how easy it already is. Try being a pollworker, and then tell me again that electronic/internet voting would be less secure. I think you'll find it quite difficult to say anything close to that with a straight face.

With electronic voting individuals have to be targeted, while with the current system, an entire polling place can be compromised *REALLY FUCKING EASILY*

>>58992425
Tallying needs to be done whether you use an electronic ballot or a paper ballot. Increasing the reliance on electronics does not solve this problem. What it does do is increase the centralization of the tallying process.

With pen and paper, you can have one polling station compromised. If one system is responsible for tallying the votes of a whole district or state, you now have to worry about that system, which is responsible for counting many more votes.

>>58992503
if that system is implemented with blockchain then none of this is even a slight issue, like, at all.

>>58991916
Rusky hax

>>58991916
>(This applies to all use of computers to count votes.)
Not true. The vote can be entered as an encrypted token. Differential privacy-preserving mathematics can easily be performed. The correct answer can then be derived only with the consent of K distinct entities.