Secure Voice Communication

No. Go in person you fat fuck

>>58601192
Yes. Encrypt voice before it touches the phone via a special microphone that scrambles the analog signal.

You also have to ensure the phone is in a soundproof box so that it doesn't use the external microphones to listen to what you are saying anyway.

>>58601192
Anything that goes to POTS is obviously doomed.

The RedPhone part of Signal does OK, as it uses ZRTP (good old PGPfone!), however the RedPhone part of the Signal server is not open-source. In general ZRTP is fine as long as you verify the key words out of band.

If you trust your server (and you should be running it yourself so you do), Mumble/murmur is actually encrypted somewhat better than ZRTP, uses Opus, and was a very early adopter of a strong AEAD (AES-OCB). So is WhatsApp (ironic, but this is an area that WA is better than Signal).

Metadata is always available and is probably always going to be available - voice is strongly affected by latency and so only low-latency mixnets can be used, which are subject to traffic correlation/confirmation attacks to some degree when faced with a global passive attacker like the NSA.

This is of course assuming your threat model is actually the NSA. It probably should be, because they are actually allowed to share unminimised data with the FBI, DEA, etc. now.

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>>58601200
This anon has the correct answer.

Watch some Casino for tips on secure communications and general problem solving. Local desert is handy.

Use Signal.