>>670727 meh....the Overland and Petersburg Campaign lasted 2 months less than Verdun and caused roughly 150,000 casualties, which is getting pretty WW1 level, especially when considering the number of men involved.
>>670849 You can't possibly make the argument that the Union was more effective than the Confederates. The Army of Northern Virginia was a much more efficient fighting force than anything the Union had
>>670841 maybe....the ANV could actually take the offensve in a meaningful way after Chancellorsville. Army of the Tennessee was so beat up after Chickamauga they had a real difficult time engaging the Union army in the open and when they did it usually lead to disaster.
>CSA killed a thousand more men every battle >They didn't blockade the USA's ports >They never crippled the USA's overland logistics >Never had any behind enemy lines as succesful as Grierson's Raid let alone Shermans March >They lost the war
I'm not sure where this meme about the CSA having a superior military started. On a guess though its probably south carolina.
>>670865 >ruined economy stops all dirty immigrants from coming to the south >niggers provide good music and good sports >reconstruction ends within decade because yankees can't handle the bantz >fast growing economy while rustbelt sucks
>>670923 But you said they were infinitely more effective. If that was the case, they could have just steamrolled on to Washington. Unless of course, they had generals who take way too many risks and piss-poor logistics.
Isnt the south where all those internet memes originate from? >americans are fat >be american get shot >dumb inbred rednecks >supersize me bacon hamburger >house sized pickup truck >american education >i dun need no teachin lady >police brutality
etc etc I mean, most americans would agree the south is the shithole of the country.
>>670659 >>671667 Proportionally the Federal and rebel losses at 2nd Bull Run were even.
The South was winning these tactical victories, but utterly losing the strategic battles and thus the war. Northern commanders in the first two years lost so many battles in the east (but not the west) because they were mostly political appointees. On the other hand, the Southern leadership was inclined to take risks and knew the land.
Physically, the men looked about equal to the generality of our own troops, and there were fewer boys among them. Their dress was a wretched mixture of all cuts and colors. There was not the slightest attempt at uniformity in this respect. Every man seemed to have put on whatever he could get hold of, without regard to shape or color. I noticed a pretty large sprinkling of blue pants among them, some of those, doubtless, that were left by Milroy at Winchester. Their shoes, as a general thing, were poor; some of the men were entirely barefooted. Their equipments were light, as compared with those of our men. They consisted of a thin woollen blanket, coiled up and slung from the shoulder in the form of a sash, a haversack swung from the opposite shoulder, and a cartridge-box. The whole cannot weigh more than twelve or fourteen pounds. Is it strange, then, that with such light loads, they should be able to make longer and more rapid marches than our men? The marching of the men was irregular and careless, their arms were rusty and ill kept. Their whole appearance was greatly inferior to that of our soldiers. There were not tents for the men, and but few for the officers... Everything that will trammel or impede the movement of the army is discarded, no matter what the consequences may be to the men... In speaking of our soldiers, the same officer remarked: 'They are too well fed, too well clothed, and have far too much to carry.' That our men are too well fed, I do not believe, neither that they are too well clothed; that they have too much to carry, I can very well believe, after witnessing the march of the Army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville. Each man had eight days' rations to carry, besides sixty rounds of ammunition, musket, woollen blanket, rubber blanket, overcoat, extra shirt, drawers, socks, and shelter tent, amounting in all to about sixty pounds. Think of men, and boys too, staggering along under such a load, at the rate of fifteen to twenty miles a day
>>672416 >reminder that Sherman had a nervous breakdown at the beginning of the war because he was so scared of the confederates >greatest "victory" came from fighting railroads and empty houses >never fought an army larger than his
>>672550 http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/legitimate-military-targets/ >Legitimate infrastructure targets include lines and means of communication, command, and control—railway lines, roads, bridges, tunnels, and canals—that are of fundamental military importance.
>>672560 >Happening to turn and look behind, as we stood there, I saw some blue-coats coming down the hill. … I hastened back to my frightened servants and told them that they had better hide, and then went back to the gate to claim protection and a guard. But like demons they rush in! My yards are full. …
>To my smoke-house, my dairy, pantry, kitchen, and cellar, like famished wolves they come, breaking locks and whatever is in their way. The thousand pounds of meat in my smoke-house is gone in a twinkling, my flour, my meat, my lard, butter, eggs, pickles of various kinds – both in vinegar and brine – wine, jars, and jugs are all gone. My eighteen fat turkeys, my hens, chickens, and fowls, my young pigs, are shot down in my yard and hunted as if they were rebels themselves. Utterly powerless I ran out and appealed to the guard.
>‘I cannot help you, Madam; it is orders.’ …
>As night drew its sable curtains around us, the heavens from every point were lit up with flames from burning buildings. … My Heavenly Father alone saved me from the destructive fire.
Sherman purposely targeted civilians, not just military infrastructure.
>>672576 >What distinguished Sherman from most other armies was the intentionality of his destruction. His actual orders were not far from the ordinary, but in his correspondence made his intentions clear. Although other armies wrought similar kinds of destruction, Sherman was different. He launched a campaign for the sole purpose of making war on civilians and turning them against the war. Where other generals tried to constrained the depredations of their men, Sherman encouraged them.
>>672459 I love that game. My favorite tactic as the Confederates is to take and hold McPhearson's ridge but preserve most of Heth's division, while going around Gettysburg with Rodes and Ewell so I can take Culp's and Cemetary hill while the Union is still trying to reinforce Seminary ridge. It's glorious.
150 years later why are so many white Southerners so quick to get agitated or angry over Sherman?
Sure he's a meme general that burned a lot of shit, but they (the Southerners) had long since lost the war in the western and eastern theatres by the time Sherman got to work making Georgia howl. Why not blame the Federal leaders who defeated their vaunted Confederates armies and menfolk?
>>672849 >Sure he's a meme general that burned a lot of shit, but they (the Southerners) had long since lost the war in the western and eastern theatres by the time Sherman got to work making Georgia howl. That's what makes it so horrible. His atrocities weren't even needed to win the war, but he did them anyway.
It takes a rarefied type of righteous ass whoopin to make the losers still cry about it near on 150 years later.
>Enslaves an entire race of human being to sustain an aristocracy >Gets pissed for generations about a couple burned cities
>Fires first >Claims the war was started by the people they were shelling
>Practically every article of secession directly cites slavery in the "reason for leaving like a bitch" box >"Naw you damn yankees, this war is about freedom"
>Best generals either die to friendly fire or suffer crushing defeats that force surrender >"No you don't get it, despite their abject failure they were secretly better than the dudes who assfucked them"
Southerners confirmed for shit tier rebel scum. I'd love to see the South rise again just to hear that pussified accent begging forgiveness after they take the yankee pen15 again.
>>673599 >he actually believes this stuff Kek, Yanks are so fucking deluded. Most of the US army nowadays are Southerners, and if you think the pussified Democrats would do shit you need to think again
>>670640 >>670642 >>670650 >>670659 >>670669 >>670676 >>670682 >>670699 >>670708 >>670727 >>670745 >>670754 I'm gonna stop tagging these insufferable posts. If it's possible for something to be more annoying than your dumbassery, it's the image in my head of your dirty fat ass laying in bed or sitting up, deciding it's a good time to hop on /his/ while you charge your shitty iPhone. I can't stand looking at your screenshots and seeing your battery level rise in each one. I hope to god your charger becomes halfway decent so you can drive yourself to a bar to get piss drunk and then get stabbed to death by a biker. Have a great day, scumbag.
>>673809 no, most higher up southerners knew they were going to lose thus the "lost cause" moniker. Jeff Davis just served as Secretary of War and knew the south couldn't win. but they fought anyways because >MUH HONOR
>>675531 >giving a late 20th century definition to a term that's been around since the 1870s
The only "lost cause cultural movement" that existed is in the heads of modern left wing academics. Holding your ancestors in a positive light isn't some mass conspiracy and the lost cause was a popular way to refer to the war by veterans. Go read Jeff Davis's writings, he knew they were fucked before the war which is why he was against secession. Same with vice president Stephens.
>>675606 >occupying an unfinished and unmanned fort Probably because it's their fucking fort Military forts don't belong to states they belong to the nation >occupying days after South Carolina voted to secede Probably because they want that fucking state back Y'know, the one that left illegally >occupying it without orders and under the cover of darkness I'll give you this one My guess is that giving the orders so everyone could hear them isn't strategically sound, in an already percarious scenario
What I love about this whole war, why the south got so butthurt about keeping their slaves (which cost just as much as a fucking labor force) because they needed to keep muh cotton
Nothing else (besides tuhbaccuh) was profitable. The only thing keeping the south from being a third world country was their fucking cash crops
This meme again? The supreme court never said it was unconstitutional until after the war. JQA and Jefferson both believed secession to be legal, and so did New England when they threatened it numerous times.
>is was all about slavery
If they wanted to keep their slaves so bad then they would've agreed with the corwin amendment and stayed in the Union. Hell, a good amount of southern unionists were planters who didn't want to lose their slaves.
>southern cotton was the only thing keeping the south profitable
It was also the only thing keeping the north industrializing. Muh Textiles
>>676767 They were selling it to the North. But they were also producing enough that they satisfied the Northern demand as well as that of the British and French. It wasn't until after the end of the Civil War and the collapse of Southern cotton production that the Brits started destroying Indian textile industries to get new cotton sources for their own industry.
>>676822 American cotton was always superior. Fun fact: Eqypt went bankrupt and got invaded because they borrowed so much money from Europe in order to develope cotton exports. They did this in a response to the Civil war and tried to supplant southern cotton but when the war ended and southern cotton flooded the market, Eqypt got btfo'd.
>>676732 Then why in did secessionist commissioners, the guys who were to convince other states to secede, use slavery in their rhetoric and almost nothing else? Why in the declarations for secession, is slavery the main issue? >>676764 False, tarrifs were at their lowest point ever since the 50s
>>677049 *In case the word "dominated" sends the wrong message, while yes the Republicans had a plurality or majority in both houses due to Southerners chimping out, before that the numbers were closer and the Democrats had a tradition of REEEEEEing so hard they got their precious compromises to continue slavery.
Frankly in hindsight wouldn't it have been smarter for the Southerners to wait until Lincoln tried to pass crippling new tariffs, and then if they DID somehow pass then secede over those? That way it looks like a taxation and representation issue rather than fighting for slavery?
That said, my purpose is to try to put to rest the continual reappearance of revisionist lies about the Confederacy and the Civil War -- i.e., "the war wasn't about slavery," "the issue was state's rights," "the Confederates were fighting for freedom/limited government," etc.
This bullshit is clearly and unequivocally contradicted by the historical record.
1. Declarations of Secession
Just as the Declaration of Independence gave the reasons for the American Revolution, the Southern Declarations of Secession gave the reasons behind the forming of the Confederacy. You will find little in this documents about "state's rights" -- other than those related to slavery -- or individual freedom -- except the right to own slaves. To the contrary, you will find consistent complaints about failures of the FEDERAL GOVERNMENT to FORCE new states to accept slavery or to REQUIRE free states to return slaves.
But let's let these fine documents speak for themselves: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_missec.asp
>Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery...
>...We affirm that these ends for which this Government was instituted have been defeated, and the Government itself has been made destructive of them by the action of the non-slaveholding States. Those States have assume the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions; and have denied the rights of property established in fifteen of the States and recognized by the Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted open establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is to disturb the peace and to eloign the property of the citizens of other States. They have encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain, have been incited by emissaries, books and pictures to servile insurrection.
>For twenty-five years this agitation has been steadily increasing, until it has now secured to its aid the power of the common Government. Observing the *forms* [emphasis in the original] of the Constitution, a sectional party has found within that Article establishing the Executive Department, the means of subverting the Constitution itself. A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States, whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to be entrusted with the administration of the common Government, because he has declared that that "Government cannot endure permanently half slave, half free," and that the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction.
>>677110 >We, therefore, the People of South Carolina, by our delegates in Convention assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, have solemnly declared that the Union heretofore existing between this State and the other States of North America, is dissolved, and that the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the world, as a separate and independent State; with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.
>The people of Georgia having dissolved their political connection with the Government of the United States of America, present to their confederates and the world the causes which have led to the separation. For the last ten years we have had numerous and serious causes of complaint against our non-slave-holding confederate States with reference to the subject of African slavery. ...
>We hold as undeniable truths that the governments of the various States, and of the confederacy itself, were established exclusively by the white race, for themselves and their posterity; that the African race had no agency in their establishment; that they were rightfully held and regarded as an inferior and dependent race, and in that condition only could their existence in this country be rendered beneficial or tolerable.
>>677117 >That in this free government *all white men are and of right ought to be entitled to equal civil and political rights* [emphasis in the original]; that the servitude of the African race, as existing in these States, is mutually beneficial to both bond and free, and is abundantly authorized and justified by the experience of mankind, and the revealed will of the Almighty Creator, as recognized by all Christian nations; while the destruction of the existing relations between the two races, as advocated by our sectional enemies, would bring inevitable calamities upon both and desolation upon the fifteen slave-holding states.
2. Constitution of the Confederate States of America
The CSA Constitution is nearly identitical to that of the the U.S. Constitution at the time of secession. Curiously, however, you will search in vain for any significant increase in the rights of states or individuals under the CSA Constitution. Four very, very minor differences are made regarding the powers of states -- the power to enter into treaties with other states to regulate waterways, the power to tax foreign and domestic ships that use their waterways, the power to impeach federally-appointed state officials, and the power to distribute "bills of credit." These are hardly major victories for state's rights. Furthermore, nothing in the CSA makes any provision for secession.
On the other hand, sweeping new powers are granted to the CSA federal government. Foremost, is that states are REQUIRED to allow slavery. And any new state joining the Confederacy is to be a SLAVE state. So much for state's rights on that issue. Four different clauses stop just short of making owning slaves mandatory.
>>677121 3. Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephen's Cornerstone Speech http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/cornerstone-speech/ ...
>But not to be tedious in enumerating the numerous changes for the better, allow me to allude to one other —though last, not least. The new constitution has put at rest, forever, all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution—African slavery as it exists amongst us—the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. Jefferson in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the "rock upon which the old Union would split." He was right. What was conjecture with him, is now a realized fact. But whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and stands, may be doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with, but the general opinion of the men of that day was that, somehow or other in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away. This idea, though not incorporated in the constitution, was the prevailing idea at that time. The constitution, it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the institution while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly urged against the constitutional guarantees thus secured, because of the common sentiment of the day. Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation, and the government built upon it fell when the "storm came and the wind blew."
>>677123 >Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. This truth has been slow in the process of its development, like all other truths in the various departments of science. It has been so even amongst us. Many who hear me, perhaps, can recollect well, that this truth was not generally admitted, even within their day. The errors of the past generation still clung to many as late as twenty years ago. Those at the North, who still cling to these errors, with a zeal above knowledge, we justly denominate fanatics. All fanaticism springs from an aberration of the mind—from a defect in reasoning. It is a species of insanity. One of the most striking characteristics of insanity, in many instances, is forming correct conclusions from fancied or erroneous premises; so with the anti-slavery fanatics. Their conclusions are right if their premises were. They assume that the negro is equal, and hence conclude that he is entitled to equal privileges and rights with the white man. If their premises were correct, their conclusions would be logical and just—but their premise being wrong, their whole argument fails. I recollect once of having heard a gentleman from one of the northern States, of great power and ability, announce in the House of Representatives, with imposing effect, that we of the South would be compelled, ultimately, to yield upon this subject of slavery, that it was as impossible to war successfully against a principle in politics, as it was in physics or mechanics. That the principle would ultimately prevail.
>>677126 >That we, in maintaining slavery as it exists with us, were warring against a principle, a principle founded in nature, the principle of the equality of men. The reply I made to him was, that upon his own grounds, we should, ultimately, succeed, and that he and his associates, in this crusade against our institutions, would ultimately fail. The truth announced, that it was as impossible to war successfully against a principle in politics as it was in physics and mechanics, I admitted; but told him that it was he, and those acting with him, who were warring against a principle. They were attempting to make things equal which the Creator had made unequal.
>In the conflict thus far, success has been on our side, complete throughout the length and breadth of the Confederate States. It is upon this, as I have stated, our social fabric is firmly planted; and I cannot permit myself to doubt the ultimate success of a full recognition of this principle throughout the civilized and enlightened world.
I'll note that Stephens is specific that "the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution" was the issue of slavery.
4. Statements by Confederate President Jefferson Davis
Jefferson Davis praised slavery as a worthy institution by which "a superior race" had transformed "brutal savages into docile, intelligent and civilized agricultural laborers." See, e.g., Message of Jefferson Davis to the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States of America, Montgomery, April 29, 1861.;
They pretty much forced the deep South's hand, because secession would never have been a serious threat again if they hadn't joined South Carolina. The Upper South really only seceded as a reaction to Lincoln's call for troops though, so he is partly to blame. Basically, everyone knew secession was retarded and poorly timed, but due to a variety of complicated circumstances the South was more or less forced into secession by the actions of a few over-angry reactionaries on both sides.
>>677130 Jefferson Davis' reply in the Senate to William H. Seward, February 29, 1860
>The condition of slavery with us is, in a word, Mr. President, nothing but the form of civil government instituted for a class of people not fit to govern themselves. It is exactly what in every State exists in some form or other. It is just that kind of control which is extended in every northern State over its convicts, its lunatics, its minors, its apprentices. It is but a form of civil government for those who by their nature are not fit to govern themselves. We recognize the fact of the inferiority stamped upon that race of men by the Creator, and from the cradle to the grave, our Government, as a civil institution, marks that inferiority.
5. Apostles of Disunion
I highly recommend reading "Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War" by Charles B. Dew.
Dew teaches history at Williams College in Massachusetts. But he is a son of the South with a family tree full of Rebel ancestors. Dew uses the words of real Confederates to rebut the neo-Confederates. The historian explained that after the Rebels lost the Civil War, many of their civilian and military leaders wrote their memoirs, in which they maintained "that slavery had absolutely nothing to do with the South's drive for independence." He added that their whitewash is being applied by white guy "neo-Confederate writers and partisans of the present day.
Dew focused his book on a group of state-appointed commissioners who made the rounds of the slave states in 1860 and early 1861. They preached the same racist line: the only way to keep Lincoln and the Yankee "Black Republicans" from destroying slavery and white supremacy was to start a new Southern nation.
>>677137 "Our fathers made this a government for the white man, rejecting the negro, as an ignorant, inferior, barbarian race, incapable of self-government, and not, therefore, entitled to be associated with the white man upon terms of civil, political or social equality," a Mississippi commissioner said.
Likewise, a Kentucky-born Alabama commissioner to Kentucky pleaded that secession was the only way the South could sustain "the heaven-ordained superiority of the white over the black race." Another Alabama ambassador said ideas that slavery was immoral and that God created all people the same were rooted in "an infidel theory [that] has corrupted the Northern heart."
Dew concluded, "By illuminating so clearly the racial content of the secession persuasion, the commissioners would seem to have laid to rest, once and for all, any notion that slavery had nothing to do with the coming of the Civil War."
6. Views of "ordinary soldiers"
John S. Mosby, A Confederate Soldier’s Thoughts on the Civil War, 1907:
>"The South went to war on account of slavery. South Carolina went to war – as she said in her  Secession proclamation – because slavery wd. not be secure under Lincoln. South Carolina ought to know what was the cause for her seceding."
Chandra Manning in her book What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0307264823/americanherit-20
>has looked at a remarkable wealth of letters, diaries, and regimental newspapers, assembling data on what 657 Union soldiers and 477 Confederate soldiers thought they were doing over the four years of combat, rather than what some of them wrote in hazy, embittered, or sentimental retrospect. ....
>>677142 >The conclusion is that the Americans who fought the Civil War overwhelmingly thought they were fighting about slavery, and that we should take their word for it.
>It is perhaps not surprising that in 1864 the black men of the Fourteenth Rhode Island Heavy Artillery reminded one another that “upon your prowess, discipline, and character; depend the destinies of four millions of people.” It may be more surprising to find a white Union soldier writing in 1862 that “the fact that slavery is the sole undeniable cause of this infamous rebellion, that it is a war of, by, and for Slavery, is as plain as the noon-day sun.” That same year a soldier on the other side, in Morgan’s Confederate Brigade, wrote that “any man who pretends to believe that this is not a war for the emancipation of the blacks . . . is either a fool or a liar.” Manning can and does multiply these examples, and she finds that they vastly outweigh the evidence for any other dominant motive among the combatants.
I could go on and on and on and on, but have already written more than is necessary to prove my point.
Can we now here no more disingenuous defenses of the Confederacy?
>>676982 >use slavery in their rhetoric and almost nothing else?
You obviously haven't read very many secessionist documents. The south didn't see abolition as a moral issue but was certain notherners were just using it to subjugate the south. They perceived the north as ignoring the constitution in order to increase their power. Their was sectarian fighting from the moment Washington left office, slavery just happened to be the argument during the 1850s. Lincoln was the deciding factor because he was the first truly sectarian president. As Andrew said all the way back in the 1830s during the Nullification crisis.
>"the tariff was only a pretext, and disunion and southern confederacy the real object. The next pretext will be the negro, or slavery question."
>>677215 Jefferson, Madison, and Washington all saw blacks as inferior. Jefferson going as far to say they could never live in a society alongside whites. They were all slave owners and never attempted to end slavery. Near the end of their lives, Madison and Jefferson were outraged by congress trying to stop the expansion of slavery, they both saw the expansion of slavery as necessary to help the nation and dilute the concentration of slaves in the east. Jefferson was certain that freeing slaves would cause a national catastrophe on the scale of Haiti, he also time and again referred to himself as a Virginian first and American second and the South to be his "country". I love how revisionists can peg slavery to the confederates but will go to extreme lengths to apologize for the founding fathers. The Confederacy was 100% closer to what Jefferson and Madison envisioned for America than Lincoln's America. The truth hurts I know.
>>677244 >Jefferson was certain that freeing slaves would cause a national catastrophe on the scale of Haiti, he also time and again referred to himself as a Virginian first and American second and the South to be his "country".
Well fuck me, I thought I had a decent understanding of the man.
>haiti I'd probably be concerned about that too. Any writings on the reactions to the Haiti situation by other powers of the time?
>Jefferson, Madison, Washington That's 3/7. What about the others?
>>677259 well pretty much all southern founding fathers were either pro-slavery or would repeatedly make apologies for it. People forget how important the Old South was to the founding of the nation, which is why the free states never questioned slavery until the Missouri question arose. The only reason they have been redeemed is because their importance to the nation's founding and attempts of the north to take away the Confederacy's legitimacy by whitewashing their ancestors. The public speeches by Lincoln that Jefferson or Madison would have agreed with him are laughable.
>That's 3/7. What about the others?
Literally anyone from the south, Pickney, Monroe, Sumter (ironic I now). Only southerner I can think that was an open abolitionist was John Jay.
>>677244 >Jefferson were outraged by congress trying to stop the expansion of slavery
>In his writings on American grievances justifying the Revolution, he attacked the British for sponsoring the slave trade to the colonies. In 1778, with Jefferson's leadership, slave importation was banned in Virginia. It was one of the first jurisdictions in the world to ban the slave trade. Jefferson was a lifelong advocate of ending the trade and as President led the effort to criminalize the international slave trade that passed Congress and he signed on March 2, 1807 > In 1784 Jefferson proposed federal legislation banning slavery in the New Territories of the North and South after 1800, which failed to pass Congress by one vote. >In April 1820 Jefferson wrote to John Holmes concerning slavery: “there is not a man on earth who would sacrifice more than I would, to relieve us from this heavy reproach [slavery]... we have the wolf by the ear, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other." >In 1824 Jefferson proposed an overall emancipation plan that would free slaves born after a certain date.
I don't get why Confederate apologists lie when we all have the truth at our fingertips.
>>677364 I'm a Southerner and I used to believe the Lost Cause myth, so I can see why folks choose to pick the history they believe. There's always a new generation brought up to buy into the Cause because it's preferable to accepting your ancestors were losers in a bad cause fought to advance the aims of the planter aristocracy.
Frankly it's just as pathetic as the hardcore African nationalists that spout the "We wuz kings" meme.
Given 90% of Southern whites were poor and only stood to gain with the end of slavery, there's literally not reason for your average Southerner to buy into the myth of "muh States' Rights" when it was just the right to own slaves for the rich that was at risk.
>>677361 > In 1784 Jefferson proposed federal legislation banning slavery in the New Territories of the North and South after 1800, which failed to pass Congress by one vote.
then why didn't he ban Slavery in the Louisiana territory?
>Writing to John Holmes Wow, pretending to care about slaves while writing to a pro abolitionist New Englander? what a surprise. Let's see what he wrote to his friend Gallatin.
>"but nothing has ever presented so threatening an aspect as what is called the Missouri question. the Federalists compleatly put down, and despairing of ever rising again under the old division of whig and tory, devised a new one, of slave-holding, & non-slave-holding states, which, while it had a semblance of being Moral, was at the same time Geographical, and calculated to give them ascendancy by debauching their old opponents to a coalition with them. Moral the question certainly is not, because the removal of slaves from one state to another, no more than their removal from one county to another, would never make a slave of one human being who would not be so without it. indeed if there were any morality in the question, it is on the other side; because by spreading them over a larger surface, their happiness would be increased, & the burthen of their future liberation lightened by bringing a greater number of shoulders under it."
>In 1824 Jefferson proposed an overall emancipation plan that would free slaves born after a certain date. Yeah jefferson proposed a lot of shit, but he believed one thing for sure. The federal government shouldn't get involved in southern slavery. If slavery was to end it should be on the south's own decision.
Thomas Jefferson never freed his slave, he worked them to the bone for his entire life and even bought more. He left them to his grandson and closest heir.
>>677493 >by banning the international slave trade in the United States
Southerners agreed with this, the CSA also banned the international slave trade. Less slave imports, the value of slaves increase.
Because he never wanted to take away someone's property without their consent. If supported the expansion of slavery after 1800 once those territories became inhabited, try and argue yourself out of that one.
>working to end slavery >literally couldn't figure out how to free his own slaves
>>670820 >Union outnumbered >Battle basically starts with a Union Division haplessly blundering into an entire Confederate Corps >Confederates somehow manage to suffer more casualties and have the Army of Tennessee's fighting effectiveness permanently crippled >Considered a disaster for the Union, and a total triumph for the Confederacy
Those Confederate generals in the Western Theater really did suck ass, didn't they? (I'm looking at you, Braxton Bragg)
>>677586 To be fair, "suck ass" is a bit too strong. They just had none of the advantages of the Confederate commanders in the east. Virginia was a narrower front easier to defend, and the Army of the Potomac was under such critical strains to also defend DC that they suffered under political interference and appointees.
The Western theatre Union commanders were granted a freer hand and it showed. Add to that the extreme territory needing to be covered (all of Tennessee and the length of the Mississippi river) and the difficulties of the Confederate army doing anything more than holding its own in the West become clear.
Frankly the rebels did well enough holding Vicksburg till 1864 and Atlanta till 1864. With their coast under blockade and invasion (people usually seem to forget New Orleans fell in 1862) the war was always a lost cause, but the Confederates at least showed they could try.
Maybe if they'd won an overwhelming victory at Shiloh they could have upset the Union timetable in the West by 6 months to a year.
As a Virginian, I've had to swallow this sort of crap my whole life. However, there are compelling explanations for the myth. They might be worth considering. Note that this applies only to the Army of Northern Virginia and the fighting in and around that vicinity.
Confederate strategy throughout the war focused very heavily upon the protection of the (second) capital of the Confederacy, Richmond. Furthermore, Lee's status as a commander quickly grew to near-legendary status. It didn't hurt that he visited the President and the war offices quite often due to his proximity to the capital. The Army of Northern Virginia was accorded the highest priority as far as supply and manpower went.
The result, as Douglas Southall Freeman makes clear, is that Lee had first pick among available generals. Everyone wanted to serve under Lee. Furthermore, Lee had a habit of "promoting elsewhere," or encouraging such promotion, those generals who failed to meet his standards. There is a long and somewhat ignominious list of those generals, too.
Attrition in the ANV was high. Of Lee's Lieutenant Generals only one, "Fightin' Dick" Anderson, escaped death or severe injury during the course of the war. The talent pool never ran completely dry, and very good, very young generals had the chance to excercise high command. For example, John B. Gordon ended the war commanding II Corps. He was thirty-three years old.
A side effect of the high turnover was the opportunity for a large number generals to distinguish themselves.
>>677624 Then, there is the curious habit of certain people tending to forget the little things that lost the Confederates the war. "Old Bald Head" Ewell operated seamlessly and with amazing battlefield finesse when working alongside Jackson in the Valley Campaign. However, after he lost a leg, he appears to have become increasingly indecisive, notably making a very costly, possibly war-losing, mistake on the first day at Gettysburg. A.P. Hill saved the day at Antietam Creek, but as a Corps commander he was often accused of dilatoriness and disorganization.
And, of course, being a Confederate general in Virginia got you all kinds of glory, because they were defending the capital of the nation against desperate odds.
There was really only one way to win a large victory on the open battlefield, and that was to tenaciously defend while preparing a flanking counterattack. This the Army of Northern Virginia did time after time, at Antietam, Chancellorsville, Second Manassas, the Wilderness, etc. For whatever reason, Northern generals in Virginia rarely had the chance to do the same.
The most important thing to remember is that all the glory in the world couldn't stop a gritty, prototypical modern general. Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan proved that. That those geniuses sometimes fail to be accorded the same flashy adulation that Lee, Jackson, and Stuart regularly receive is probably due in part to their no-nonsense approach to fighting. Hey, they won. That's what counts.
I think that it's worth pointing out that there is only one high-ranking Virginia general who never lost an engagement when commanding independently during the Civil War. That was George H. Thomas, who fought for the Union, and whose statue should have a place of honor along Monument Ave. in Richmond. Not only did he never lose, he was one of the few fighting for the right side.
>>677624 Lee was not a genius. He showed that he had flaws at Gettysburg, where against the better opinion of Longstreet he charged the Union lines. You can't discount Jackson, though. He was a tactical genius, as is evidenced by his Shenandoah Campaign. After Jacksons death, the only really meaningful major battle that Lee won was at Cold Harbor where he was able to utilize Longstreets defensive ability.
>>677607 Yeah, no. Braxton Bragg was terrible. Chickamauga was far from his worst performance. In terms of raw "fucking your own side" I'd have to go with the Battle of Stones River (or Murfreesboro)
>Western Theater >Back East, the Union Army is BTFO at Fredericksburg. Yankee morale is low, Lincoln is practically panicking, the whole East is falling apart. >Union attempts to seize the initiative by attacking a major railway station in Tennessee at Murfreesboro >Be Braxton Bragg >You hate Kentuckians >Your attempt to "liberate" Kentucky a few years earlier ended in more or less failure. The Kentuckians didn't really care for the War either way. >Blame your subordinate General Breckinridge for not helping >Breckinridge is a Kentuckian. >Shortly before the battle a Kentuckian soldier leaves his post briefly to help his widowed mother get a crop harvested in time so she can comfortably survive the winter. >He gets caught and found guilty of desertion >You order him executed >On Christmas >Because you hate Kentuckians. >Your army hates you and morale is destroyed >The Union Army is a few miles away >Battle is mostly a stalemate >You decide to end the battle... in the enemy's favor >Not by withdrawing mind you >Order Breckinridge and the remaining Kentuckians in your army on a suicidal frontal assault on a fortified enemy position >Massive casualties >Battle lost >Breckinridge and remaining Kentuckians hate you forever >The rest of the Army is horrified. >News of victory calms Lincoln's nerves and convinces the Northern Public not all is lost. >Great going Bragg.
In and of itself, the assertion that the North only won because of superior resources and manpower is accurate. The American Civil War was truly a total war, in which whomever could replace men and material the most efficiently and for the longest stretch of time would win. Barring a failure of will in the north to prosecute the war, a military victory for the CSA was realistically impossible.
Needless to say, however, it does not follow from this that the southern armies were better led. The CSA had certain advantages that help to explain the seeming abundance of improbable southern victories in the war's first two years. (1) They were generally on the defensive, both strategically and tactically. Given Civil War-era tactical doctrine, this was preferable to the offense in most regards. (2) They were fighting on known ground, whereas the Union armies were relatively ignorant of the terrain. When Southern armies ventured north, they were usually defeated. (3) They had the benefit of interior lines. While coming up with supplies in the first place may have been more difficult for the south, moving them (and troops) around was frequently easier for them than for the north. (4) In the eastern theater, where Lee's Army achieved the south's most salient victories, the terrain is dominated by several east-west rivers that are a constant impediment to the attacker (in this case, the Union). In the west, where the rivers ran primarily north-south (thereby providing a valuable means of transportation of both men and material to an attacker), the north fared considerably better.
>>677744 Then again, one would be hard-pressed to prove that the north didn't have a glut of losers in high command positions. Halleck? Banks? Butler? All without a redeeming quality (militarily speaking). McClellan was a mixed bag; an excellent tactician and a walking boon to morale, he was hampered by a pathological, irrational, and counter-factual fear of superior Confederate numbers, causing him to be unbearably slow and indecisive. Longstreet would insist after the war that McClellan could have "taken Lee's army and everything in it" at Antietam had he not held two whole corps in reserve. A cursory examination of the battle bears this out.
I maintain that the south's surprising victories in the early part of the war were (A) heavily influenced by the four inherent advantages mentioned above and (B) largely an accident of superior organization in one specific theater. The Army of Northern Virginia was organized into just two (and, after Chancelorsville, three) corps. To command these corps, the thoroughly competent Lee chose the thoroughly competent Longstreet and the thoroughly brilliant Jackson. Lee could afford to trust his subordinates to carry out vague orders to the best of their ability and understanding of the battlefield. The Army of the Potomac, in contrast, had a constantly changing structure and command heirarchy that featured up to and including a dozen corps. By all indicators, finding competent corp commanders was incredibly difficult. Lee had only to find two. McClellan et al had to find a dozen; add to this a few unfortunate (mostly political) appointemts, as well as the inherent difficulty of managing so large a bureaucracy (particularly in the abscence of electricity), and you begin to get a sense of what The Army of the Potomac had to overcome, all while destroying an enemy army, invading a large nation, and finally conquering it. That they eventually did all of this is a testament to their ultimate competency.
>>677748 Of course, in the west, (the meddlings of Halleck and the incompetency of Rosecrans aside) the southern generals were no macth for Grant, Sherman, and Thomas. Anyone who argues that southern generals were "better" than Union generals ought to take a long, hard look at Braxton Bragg.
Finally, even if we allow that the CSA Army and corps command was superior in the eastern theater to USA army and corps command, that has to be tempered by all other levels of military leadership. Lincoln was far preferable to Davis (yes, this mattered). More importantly, I would argue that Confederate military talent was relatively front-loaded. That is, the average competency of commanders below all but the highest of levels were not as skilled as their superiors, and that the CSA had a very difficult time finding young talent to replace losses among generals. Many southern generals proved to be increasingly incompetent with each successive promotion. John Bell Hood was an excellent division commander, a barely adequate corps commander, and a horrible army commander. Ewell and A.P. Hill made very good division commanders, but fared merely adequately in their first battle as corps commanders (Gettysburg), at least as compared to the standards set by Jackson.
The Union, by contrast, had several very young, very intelligent officers in surprisingly high level positions by the end of the war. Towards the end, they had weeded out the better part of their deadwood in division and corps level command. The ascendency of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade and Hancock (to name a few) was the death knell for the CSA. Lincoln, at long last, had found men who would fight (and well).
-- Much of the (perceived) CSA superiority had to do with terrain and other factors beyond anyone's control. -- If there was a southern leadership advantage, it was exclusively in the east. -- If there was this advantage, it was primarily an advantage of only a handful of men over another handful. -- If there was then this advantage, it was temporary. -- Regardless, the North had a demonstrable advantage in the west (which was, strategically, more important than the east). -- Regardless, mean competency for generals of all stripes favored the Union by the end of the war (though this is admittedly hard to measure due to increasingly poor supply for the CSA).
Conclusion: On balance, over time, on average, a marginal-moderate Union advantage in competency of military leadership.
Here's something neat about the clash of personalities in the Confederate armies:
>Major General A.P. Hill, one of Virginia’s favorite sons, was also known for his fiery temper. One historian calls him probably the most contentious of the Army of Northern Virginia’s officers. Hill quarreled with every officer he served under. After the Seven Days’ Battles, he engaged in a war of newspaper releases with Maj. Gen. James Longstreet over who deserved the most credit for the successfully completed campaign. After several volleys in the Richmond Whig and Richmond Examiner, Hill cut off all communications with Longstreet’s headquarters and demanded to be relieved from serving under Longstreet.
>For his part, Longstreet heartily endorsed the request, adding a sardonic note that it was necessary to exchange the troops or to exchange the commander. When commanding General Robert E. Lee delayed taking action, the feud only grew worse. After Hill’s refusal to forward even routine reports to headquarters, Longstreet placed him under arrest and confined him to quarters. Hill took the next step, issuing a challenge to his commanding officer to duel. The two men began making arrangements to settle their differences on the field of honor.
>The possibility of losing one or both of his finest commanders finally moved Lee to take action. He restored Hill to his command, then transferred his division to Stonewall Jackson’s corps in the Shenandoah Valley. The friendship between Hill and Longstreet was shattered beyond repair, and their relations henceforward were no better than coldly courteous. Lee had merely rearranged his problems, not solved them. Within a week, Hill and Jackson were squabbling, this time over Jackson’s uncommunicative command style and their differing interpretations of military protocol. That feud soon surpassed the Longstreet-Hill feud.
>>677808 >On the march into Maryland in the late summer of 1862, Jackson finally grew so exasperated with Hill’s failure to follow his prescribed marching orders that he rode to the head of Hill’s division and began personally issuing orders to Hill’s brigadiers.. At this moment, Hill galloped up and addressed Jackson in high dudgeon: General Jackson, you have assumed command of my division, here is my sword; I have no use for it. Jackson calmly replied, Keep your sword, General Hill, but consider yourself under arrest for neglect of duty.
>For the rest of the advance, Hill was ordered to march in the rear of his division. Jackson’s charges against Hill were not for insubordination, as one might expect, but for allowing his command to straggle, a fine distinction, perhaps, that was lost on Hill.
>Although Hill was restored to command before the campaign was over, and later fought magnificently, he did not forget or forgive. He preferred charges of his own against Jackson. The charges and countercharges persuaded Lee to step in again, this time to call a peace conference of the principals in order to defuse what was tepidly building toward an explosion that would have been extremely damaging to the Confederacy. The peace conference settled nothing, and the charges were still pending when Jackson was killed at Chancellorsville the next spring.
>Jackson himself was a legendary feudist, even more obstreperous than Hill, if such a thing could be. At one time or another, he placed Turner Ashby, Richard B. Garnett and Hill all under arrest and ordered their courts- martial`and this was a man who died before the war was half over. On another occasion, he placed five of A.P. Hill’s colonels under arrest for letting the men use a fence for firewood. Jackson was chronically unable to get along with subordinates, in contrast to Hill, who was chronically unable to get along with superiors.
>>677812 >In the summer of 1861, Jackson began court-martial proceedings against a number of his officers. He blamed Garnett, commander of Jackson’s old Stonewall Brigade, for the defeat at Kernstown, and that was just the beginning. Other officers were brought up on charges ranging from insubordination to cowardice under fire. Jackson pressed so many charges that, at one point, all of his subordinate officers were on courtmartial duty.
>Garnett’s court-martial for unauthorized retreat began in August 1862, but was never settled because the war intervened. Jackson was killed at Chancellorsville, and there are those who say that Garnett went to his death at Gettysburg a few months later in Pickett’s Charge glad for the opportunity to vindicate his besmirched honor.
>As for Ashby, he was also reprimanded by Jackson after the Battle of Kernstown for the undisciplined state of his cavalry. The proud Ashby briefly considered challenging Jackson to a duel, but shooting the sanctimonious Stonewall did not seem sufficient to assuage his wounded pride. Instead, he announced his intention to leave the army. When word of this got out, his troopers announced they would follow Ashby out of the army rather than serve under anyone else. Faced with a mutiny of major proportions, Jackson backed down for the first and last time in his life. He restored Ashby to full command.
>Jackson even quarreled with the sainted Lee on one occasion. In December 1862, he reacted angrily to Lee’s request that he transfer some of his artillery to other commands not so well equipped. Lee did not force the issue. It had been conjectured that the subsequent lack of communication between Lee and Jackson during the Seven Days’ Battles was at least partly because the two proud leaders felt a sense of rivalry and bent over backward to avoid stepping on each other’s toes.
>>677800 Honestly, the whole idea to invade Pennsylvania was incredibly stupid. Just what were Lee's strategic goals exactly? Ultimately, he wanted to put a lot of pressure on Washington D.C. in an effort to get the Union to the Peace Table. The previous attempt at doing so through Maryland failed, so Lee decided to go further around via Pennsylvania.
Alright. But how exactly was that supposed to work out? It appears that Lee's strategy mostly consisted of: Lure the Union Army into battle, beat them like a red-headed stepchild using my superior tactical brilliance, and then see what opportunities were available. He definitely seemed to be taking a very "make it up as you go along" approach in Pennsylvania. That doesn't really explain why he screwed up at Gettysburg so much, but it does explain that it probably didn't really matter. Even if he had won at Gettysburg, what would he have realistically been able to do? Where would he have gone from there? What offensive operations were still available to him at that point?
>>677819 It was an act of desperation, not stupidity. I mean we may decry it as stupid in hindsight but options were limited. Following the victory at Chancellorsville the ANV had reinvigorated morale and more supplies, and Lee pulled in troops everywhere he could to enlarge it to a size it had never had before iirc, 75,000 men.
With the West set to be lost, the country under blockade and New Orleans fallen, staying on the defensive in the East could only guarantee a gradual defeat.
Rationally, he had to destroy the Army of the Potomac to upset the balance of power. From there seizing Philadelphia to arrest the flow of supplies from the north, as well as raiding or seizing Baltimore, would be necessary. Perhaps even assaulting DC itself.
Ideally he needed to either cow the Federal government into surrender with the loss of their field army and the capital being cut off from the rest of the country, as well as provide enough of an impetus for Britain and France to intervene.
Was it possible? Obviously we'll never know but riding high on the last couple victories there was a slim likelihood it could happen. And it was literally all the rebels had left to cling to for hope. Lincoln wasn't going to give in any other way.
Just my opinion but Lee's plans worked so much better with Jackson involved that I suspect had Jackson not died the rebels may have won in that campaign.
>>677839 Well, it was still stupid, it's just that it was stupidity brought about by desperation. Which is to say that it is understandable, but still flawed. At that point, the Confederacy should have been more willing to go to the Peace Table. But then, the same pride that led them to war in the first place would not have allowed it. It's pretty much the very definition of Tragedy: Men brought to ruin by their own personal failings and the circumstances said failings engender.
>>677839 But if he seized Philadelphia, wouldn't he be at risk of being cut off himself? Or was he just going to raid Philadelphia, Sherman style, and hope the Union would be slow to repair the damage? Because I don't see how the South could realistically hold Philadelphia for more than a couple weeks at most. Or Baltimore, for that matter. At least by losing Gettysburg, Lee had the ability to escape back South. Desperation can reduce even a genius to poor planning.
>>677852 They'd tried to send peace commissioners before but Lincoln wouldn't meet with them for anything but surrender since he didn't recognize their secession.
I don't want to be cast in the role of defending Lee, but I feel I must stress that calling his campaign "stupid" is really simplistic and does the strategic situation he found himself in a disservice. Like with Revolutionary France in 1796 or even Napoleon in 1815, attack was the only option.
We can easily call it stupid with the benefit of hindsight but Napoleon had contemporaries that said the same of his Italian offensives against the Austrians before his victories.
>>677857 If the Army of the Potomac is theoretically destroyed, there isn't much of anything that can push Lee out of Philadelphia. Besides which, he would be able to loot it of all the war supplies stockpiled by the Federal forces AND maybe even force the city to ransom itself (pay him off to not get the Sherman treatment). At the same time, Philadelphia was a hub for travel in the east. Occupied, DC is cut off and Baltimore is threatened.
Now this could just prolong the war to ultimately the same conclusion, but the bet would be powers within Britain's parliament seeing this as an opportunity to undercut the young American republic and so side with the Southern rebels. Likewise Napoleon III's France might extend recognition and offers of mediation in exchange for the Confederacy recognizing French interests in Latin America.
So much of this is really guesswork. In any case with a decisive victory Lee would be able to move back into Virginia at his own pace because nothing would be fast enough or large enough to stop him.
>>677872 But that assumes he destroys the Army of the Potomac outright. What if he routs them from the field but they manage to make it back to Washington, like in all of Lee's earlier victories. At which point, marching on Philadelphia with what remained of the Army of the Potomac at his back would have been very risky. I guess Lee was hoping to do even better than he did in previous battles.
>>677884 He had to. I don't see a Confederate victory coming with anything less than an utterly decisive battle against the Army of the Potomac. Had he pinned them against a river or some other natural obstacle, perhaps. I recall reading the Susquehanna River was his goal, so maybe that was it. Outmaneuver an unimaginative foe to fight with his back to a river (Harrisburg maybe? Or even near Philadelphia) and be destroyed by Jackson's cunning.
However even if the Army of the Potomac escaped into DC, sacking Philadelphia would leave the army bereft of supplies and immobile for months. Pure speculation on my part but with such a demoralizing defeat on their own territory, Lee could have attempted an assault on the capital. Its routine garrison appears to have been 10-20,000 men, usually walking wounded convalescing. Coming right on the heels of a nasty loss on Union territory, and with Lee and Jackson reaching fearfully legendary status among Union troops, the rebels could have had a powerful morale advantage.
>As serious as the situation was in the Army of Northern Virginia, it was nothing compared to the situation in the Western armies. The surrender of Fort Donelson offers a case study in how to lose a campaign through jealousy and infighting. The Confederates began the campaign for the Tennessee River at a disadvantage because they were attempting to fight with a divided command. Brigadier General John Floyd, a former secretary of war, was the senior officer at Fort Donelson in February 1862, when Union forces under U.S. Grant initially besieged the fort. However, when Brig. Gen. Gideon Pillow arrived from Columbus, Ky., he immediately assumed command with no other authority than his own presumptuousness. Simon B. Buckner’s arrival on the night of February 11, 1862, put a third brigadier on the scene. From that point on, there was a definite lack of cooperation among the Confederate high command responsible for holding Fort Donelson.
>Pillow and Buckner were already enemies from before the war, when Buckner had blocked Pillow’s ambition to become a US. senator from Tennessee. Old insults were not easily forgotten, even in the face of a common enemy, and their mutual hostility was hardly kept under wraps. The fact that Pillow was a take- charge kind of person, in a situation calling for tact and diplomacy, did not help. The 55-year-old Floyd might have served as a counterweight to the other two, but he was totally under Pillow’s influence despite his own impressive credentials.
>While the three generals struggled to mount an effective defense of the vital fort, Grant tightened the noose. By February 15, a mood of defeatism had infected the Confederate side. That night there occurred one of the most amazing examples of a cumulative collapse of will in the annals of American warfare. The three generals held a council of war to decide on a course of action. Should they fight, retreat or surrender? Floyd and Pillow decided to surrender.
>>677909 >Having decided the fort could not be held, Pillow and Floyd then refused to surrender it personally to Grant. They feared they might be confined in a Yankee prison for the duration of the war, or worse, hanged as traitors. They turned the onerous task over to Buckner in the following famous exchange:
>Floyd: I turn the command over, sir.
>Pillow: I pass it.
>Buckner: I assume it.
>Several ironies resulted from this military fiasco. Although President Davis initially relieved Floyd and Pillow from command, the Southern press at first hailed them as heroes for refusing to surrender and castigated Buckner for turning over the keys to the fort and the Tennessee River. Pillow later was restored to command. Meanwhile, Buckner, arguably the best officer of the three, was marched off to a Northern prisoner- of war camp.
>>677898 So I guess the strategy was to beat the Union at Gettysburg, forcing the Army of the Potomac to withdraw, and then pin them to a natural obstacle where retreat would be cut off, then beat them again, forcing their complete surrender. Then, go on a total rampage in order to break the North's resolve. I don't see it ultimately working, but I guess it was better than... defend until the other guy wins?
>>677934 That's why I'm curious as to his actions at Gettysburg, since it wasn't an advantageous place to do battle. But there were comparisons to the 2nd Bull Run on the first day, so perhaps he thought that with 2-3 Union corps already knocked out that this would be the big shot.
Ideally I think the idea was to crush them in a single decisive battle, but two would be good enough. Longstreet rode along to remind Lee that they "must keep the army intact" to stand a chance. Lee's extreme aggression (somewhat out of character for him. Maybe compensating for Jackson's absence?) at Gettysburg almost undid that but Providence seemingly intervened and gave them a rainstorm to retreat under the cover of following the battle. Enough of an army left to fight defensively for two more years anyway.
It's a terribly fascinating rebellion to read about. I only wish people 150 years later didn't get emotionally involved in defending the morality of it.
>>677967 >since it wasn't an advantageous place to do battle
You know, I've always been bothered by that. Part of being a tactical genius is carefully choosing the location of your battles. That was one of the defining features of Hannibal Barca's command style during the Second Punic War (Lee reminds me a lot of Hannibal: Tactical genius/decent strategist commanding the main army of a nation to the South fighting an enemy in the North who has an advantage in numbers, industry, and raw discipline, but has somewhat unimaginative commanders (at first anyway), and some political problems. Really, the American Civil War has a lot of parallels with the Second Punic War (it also has a lot of differences, of course. The Carthaginians started with a much stronger Navy, and the Mediterranean Sea separated both nations, etc. etc.).
Where was I, oh yes, choosing your battles. After the North took the good terrain on the first day of battle, Lee should have been willing to move his army elsewhere and not fight an often literally uphill battle. After he failed to lure the Union Army out of its effective defensive positions, he should have definitely called it quits. Instead, Pickett's Charge. It's not like Gettysburg was strategically critical or anything.
>>677989 Not that Lee's mistakes are above acknowledgment, but I think it truly was his subordinates that ultimately lost the battle before him. Three divisions forcing the issue on day one, A.P. Hill claiming to be sick, Ewell becoming indecisive, Stuart being entirely absent and allowing the encounter to occur at all.
I think Jackson's death set them on a downward spiral. Hill and Ewell were very talented division commanders, but not corps commanders. Heth, who instigated the fight, was known as a superb brigade commander but was thrust into a division command for the campaign.
Had Stuart's cavalry been shielding them, and had Jackson been present on day 1 instead of the argumentative Hill and frozen Ewell, things may likely would have been very different on the campaign.
I will note that day 1 also saw the mortal wounding of Dorsey Pender, who stands out in my memory as a young division commander particularly noted for being extremely talented. A man anticipated to climb the ranks and make a name for himself. Like so many other young, gifted officers and men at Gettysburg in that army, his death was utterly in vain. Sad to think about.
>>678008 While I don't really blame Lee for the failure's on the first day of battle (which ended up setting the stage for the other two days), I do find fault with his decision to continue. The North had the terrain advantage. If I recall, Lee's main strategy in the second day was to lure the Union out of their favorable position and defeat them on more favorable ground. I imagine that Sickles moving his corps forward (out of fear Lee would set up his artillery in the Peach Garden) may have convinced Lee his strategy was starting to work. Which may have convinced him to keep trying to crack the nut in front of him. If so, General Sickles may have been quite the under appreciated asset for the Union in that battle.
>>670661 A drunk and a lunatic kicked your ass. Also, your false president was busy centralizing your traitor government far more rapidly than the real government ever did. Admit it, the South is an embarrassing footnote in US history
>>678008 Lee's greatest problem at Gettysburg is that his opponents didn't fuck up like they had at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.
Lee's mistakes are understated and his greatest moments are overstated, in the case of the latter they often depended on the incompetence of his Union opposite. Exactly what led him to get overconfident at Gettysburg.
>>678616 >If any State in the Union will declare that it prefers separation with the first alternative, to a continuance in union without it, I have no hesitation in saying, “let us separate.” - Thomas Jefferson to William Crawford 1816
n.nn.no i.it can't be true
>We hesitate not to say that annexation of Texas, effected by any act or proceeding of the Federal Government, or any of its departments, would be identical with dissolution. It would be a violation of our national compact, its objects, designs, and the great elementary principles with entered into its formation, of a character so deep and fundamental, and would be an attempt to authorize an institution and a power of a nature so unjust in themselves, so injurious to the interests and abhorrent to the feelings of the people of the Free States, as, in our opinion, not only inevitably to result in a dissolution of the Union, but fully to justify it; and we not only assert that the people of the Free States ‘ought not to submit to it,’ but we say, with confidence, they would not submit to it - John Quincy Adams
>>679170 lol are you the same shitposter that got BTFO earlier and just kept dropping arguments and trying to make new ones?
Have a little courage m8. Even the rebels lasted 4 years before folding.
And at least include the whole quote: >"The alternatives between which we are to choose [are fairly stated]: 1, licentious commerce and gambling speculations for a few, with eternal war for the many; or, 2, restricted commerce, peace and steady occupations for all. If any State in the Union will declare that it prefers separation with the first alternative to a continuance in union without it, I have no hesitation in saying 'let us separate.' I would rather the States should withdraw which are for unlimited commerce and war, and confederate with those alone which are for peace and agriculture. I know that every nation in Europe would join in sincere amity with the latter and hold the former at arm's length by jealousies, prohibitions, restrictions, vexations and war." --Thomas Jefferson to William H. Crawford, 1816. ME 15:29
You'll note that like in real life, the secessionists he's fine with leaving are the troublemakers eager to war and hoard resources. Jefferson had no time for losers chimping out.
>>678945 Not only that, but Sickles' movements also ended up throwing Longstreet completely off guard, causing him to briefly abandon a planned joint attack on part of the Union line. That delay may have saved the Union as well. Sickles' "screw up" seemed to be an unexpected boon for the North.
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