Imagine if you could take one man, kill him, then take his clone,

>>19005101
Nope. They are the same people but they are not the same. The original will always be dead, its not like he wakes up in another body. The clone having his memories does not make him him.

Soma the video game explained this concept quite nicely

>>19005101

Continuity of consciousness is the only thing that matters

For everyone else he is. That's why the singularity and teleportation are scary to me, if I am destroyed and copied, I could die and no one would notice as there would be an exact replica of me, and he would even claim and be conviced to be me.
Unless the concept of being is prepared for such case and my being is linked to my personality and memories in which case, if your case were to happen, the man might be himself. But we will never know until we are submitted to that ourselves

>>19005128
But the clone would completely feel like it was him, so what is the difference? He has his memories, he has his mind, so what is the difference? What is "you" if it isn't your mind? Not only that, but he has a carbon copy of his body, so while I agree body and mind are one, he would have the same body.

Most theorised teleportation concepts centre around the idea that the machine would be able to disintegrate you, and then build your entire body back together perfectly on the other side of the teleport. By your logic, wouldn't this mean that you were actually killed, and when you were built it was essentially a different person?

>>19005159
Thats my point. There would be no way to prove it until you try it yourself. The clone would be convinced he's you

>>19005157
But if we are to believe that we don't have a soul, at least of a kind that the Abrahamic religions talk about, then surely what we are is our consciousness, our memories, our mind.

>>19005159
>But the clone would completely feel like it was him,he has his mind, so what is the difference?

I think you may be looking too into it, it may be actually very simple.
The difference is that the clone is not the original, so the clone is not 'you'. Someone having your memories and your appearance and your personality doesn't make 'you'.

Most theorised teleportation concepts centre around the idea that the machine would be able to disintegrate you, and then build your entire body back together perfectly on the other side of the teleport. By your logic, wouldn't this mean that you were actually killed, and when you were built it was essentially a different person?

>Interesting. This is the first I've heard of this. I've thought about it and concluded that yes, you would be dead and the new 'you' isn't you. That is my opinion.

He would be a copy of the original. Take your hd out of a computer and put it in the same model, still not the same computer

>>19005181
But the question is what is "you"?

>>19005169
For every measurement we are the same. But lets say I copy my mind and memories, and put them in a clone, will I be both? Will I wake up in his body if I die?
We cant see this from the outside because the clone will believe he is you

>>19005180
>I think you may be looking too into it, it may be actually very simple.
The difference is that the clone is not the original, so the clone is not 'you'. Someone having your memories and your appearance and your personality doesn't make 'you'.

>Interesting. This is the first I've heard of this. I've thought about it and concluded that yes, you would be dead and the new 'you' isn't you. That is my opinion.

Then what is "you"?

>>19005186
I think this thought experiment raises the point that what is "you" is very ambiguous, and that your concrete idea of self is a complete illusion.

>>19005185
Consciously everything with your mind would. It's egocentric to think if there were two versions of your conscious running around that there's only one (you).
However, as they experience different things they create two new beings different from the original.

>>19005185
From when we are born we change all (or most) of our cells, memories and thoughts. Yet we are considered to be the same. I think there is a difference between the ego and the identity and I have suffered episodes when they are separared (look in a mirror for too long)
If you take a car, and you replace every piece, one at the time, would it be the same car?

>>19005101
DOES ANYBODY HERE WANT SUCH A THING TO HAPPEN TO THEM AT ALL???
THIS IS NOT THE STUFF PEOPLE SHOULD STRIVE FOR... I DON'T THINK ANY HUMAN WANTS THIS FOR THEMSELVES... WHY WOULD HUMANITY STRIVE TO ACHIEVE SUCH A THING?

>>19005195
>However, as they experience different things they create two new beings different from the original.

That's the first interesting countering point I've heard raised in this thread, and it is a very interesting one.

But if you only have one clone of the dead one, then as far as the clone is concerned, he is the original, and he has simply died and been resurrected. There are no experiences to differ from, because the original is dead, nothing. And if death really is nothing then no time has passed between the original dying and the clone waking up as the original. And if it is nothing then it is not a barrier, and consciousness has simply continued.

>>19005101

Yes, provided that the consciousness has changed, it is really him.

Humans already consider themselves to be a mix of hardware and software: biology and psychology. Does the hardware matter that much?

>>19005235
>>19005235
Has death occurred for the original though? Is the original now simply experiencing nothing? One cannot experience nothing of course, but is the original dead, even if you can still call his clone him?

>>19005245

First, let's set aside the concept of what makes me, "me".

If you know me pretty well, you probably know inconsequtial things like how short I like my shorts and when I would use nicotine. What you don't know is last week I met a guy named Ellen (yes a man) Musky.

He invited me to his mansion and offered me the opportunity of a lifetime: wear his ugly headset for a couple hours while he downloads a couple dozen terabytes of data, and he'd pay me a huge sum of money. The entire time I'm focused on how rich I'm gonna be.

You receive a phone call from me while you're walking, being my friend and all. I tell you all about how I'm going to take you on a vacation when I leave the mansion because I'm rich now.

At this moment, you see me on the street with no phone in my hand and hang up.

The entire contents of my brain are on Ellen Musky's PC. He downloads it onto an exact physical copy of myself named Dingo.

If my girlfriend breaks up with me and I decide to change for the better, Dingo isn't affected. He's gaining his own memories.

How different is Dingo from me? Aren't we the same? What if I never met you, but Dingo does. Would you say the original me isn't real?

>>19005282
I think what this highlights is that the "self" doesn't really exist, and the word has a very ambiguous meaning.

>>19005630
Exactly. Basically self and you are bullshit. Its a bullshit. After all, does philosophy bake bread?

>>19005630
Yes it does
Have you ever experienced disociation? Look in a mirror, look at yourself, think of your name, for several minutes, if you are lucky/unlucky you will feel your ego disattach from your person. Interesting experience

>>19005101
We're a bunch of memories.