Just read that it is not known for certain how quickly you stop

>>9137289
Completely depends. Pain is an emotion. Many people who are shot go unconscious fairly quickly from the shock, and if you're not conscious then you're not feeling pain.

>>9137289
Qualia aren't real in the first place. Pain is a behavior.

>>9137330
i want to agree, but please explain

>>9137348
He's saying that consciousness doesn't exist.

>>9137348
Put together a list of all the objectively verifiable things a person does when they're "in pain."
Stuff that will be on your list:
>Writhing
>Shouting
>No longer attending to tasks other than addressing the reported source of "pain"
>Reporting that they're in pain if others are around
>Physiological events that aren't necessarily obvious without diagnostic tools like increased blood pressure
I'm saying all those things are the entirety of what "pain" is. You might be compelled to argue that you know for sure you're "really feeling something," to which I would respond that the behavior of being compelled to report this is just another part of the pain behavior package.

>>9137352
Not exactly. I would say that "consciousness" is a pretty muddled term that means many different things depending on who you're asking. And I'd also point out there are real things that happen physiologically and behaviorally when people report these "conscious experiences." It's just that the physiology and behavior are what's really going on, not some ghostly dualist hard problem bullshit.

>>9137380
Something is in pain if and only if it is experiencing pain.

Experience is conscious experience.

>>9137376
Nociception is objective. In that sense pain can be a 'behavior' if you mean a relatively hard-coded interpretation of it.

>>9137386
Your argument is the same as saying:
>It's only a sunrise if the sun is rising over Earth. Therefore geocentrism is correct.
Just because we have language that falls victim to a mistaken worldview doesn't mean that's an argument in favor of that worldview. My argument is that there isn't any literal non-physical "experience" thing in the first place, so of course the word "experience" isn't going to have a definition that agrees with that premise of it not really existing.

>>9137399
>Nociception is objective.
In terms of physiology and behavior.
>In that sense pain can be a 'behavior' if you mean a relatively hard-coded interpretation of it.
I think you missed my mention of physiology / my mention of increased blood pressure. Those things aren't behaviors but they aren't qualia either.

>>9137412
If I am not conscious—if I am a p-zombie—I cannot experience pain even if my brain displays all the physical signs of it. It would be strictly physical with nothing actually in pain.

This is why it is an important ethical question if a computer that passes the Turing test is conscious. If the computer says, "I am in great pain. Please turn me off and never turn me on again," is it just following a program and not actually experiencing pain, or is it actually conscious and in pain?

>>9137423
>If I am not conscious—if I am a p-zombie—I cannot experience pain even if my brain displays all the physical signs of it. It would be strictly physical with nothing actually in pain.
My point is it's already strictly physical. What you believe is pain is strictly physical, including your compulsion to report it isn't physical.

>>9137427
So every thing is conscious? Or are only brains conscious for some inexplicable reason?

Covering your ears and saying "consciousness is strictly physical" is tenable only if states of conscious experiences and physical properties are two sides of the same coin whence one may be discarded, but this position entails that every thing is conscious.

>>9137436
"Conscious" isn't a very clear term for this sort of discussion. Non-physical "qualia" are what I'm arguing aren't real things.
Here's a alternative attempt at summarizing this position:
The actual "hard problem" is that people overrate the literal validity of what they're neurologically compelled to believe. You would have no way of ever knowing the difference between if your brain was just making you believe you "see colors" or "hear sound" while also making you behave in certain special ways around these abstract fictions vs. if your brain was somehow presenting you with literal non-physical phenomena. If you believe you would have a way of knowing the difference, you're underrating how capable the brain is when it comes to making you believe in untrue things. And if you instead accept you wouldn't know the difference, then why bother taking the explanation that involves magical phenomena somehow outside the realm of physical reality when you can just go with the explanation that accounts for the same situation and doesn't involve physics defying magic?
I really don't see how anyone could honestly claim they would be able to know if their brain made them believe and behave around an abstract fiction that wasn't literally real vs. if they were having actual magical non-physical "experiences." Even if you very much believe what happens to you is the latter and not the former, you still can't say you would have any way of knowing the difference if the former were to start happening to you a couple minutes after reading this post, or if it started happening to you a three years ago,or if it was just the way things have always been. And if you can't ever really tell the difference, then there's no good reason to not to prefer the explanation that accounts for everything using the standard framework of physical reality.

>>9137564
All I know is that I am conscious, ergo consciousness exists.

If you are saying that the fact that consciousness cannot ever fit into a scientific understanding of reality entails that consciousness is not worth considering, then that is a fine position. But it remains that I am conscious, ergo consciousness exists.

>>9137612
>All I know is that I am conscious, ergo consciousness exists.
You *believe* that. Nobody really takes Descartes seriously anymore, calling someone else's position "Cartesian dualism" is considered an insult.

>>9137623
I consciously experience my believing I am conscious, ergo I am conscious.

>>9137636
You *believe* that. Ad infinitum, no amount of layers of meta-claims you can present will ever be beyond the realm of belief.

>>9137623
By the way, I am not a dualist. I am a monist.

>>9137641
Does consciousness exist? Y/N

>>9137646
>Does consciousness exist? Y/N
"Consciousness" isn't a clear term in the context of what we're discussing. So I can't give you a Y or an N because the premise it does have a specific agreed upon meaning is something I'd disagree with. That's why I'm trying to keep it clear that I'm talking about the non-physical "qualia" concept. I believe in something I might refer to as "consciousness," but it's almost definitely not the same thing as what you're thinking of it as.