>naturalism holds that there is no intention in physical objects

Anyone?

>>9100816
>naturalism holds that there is no intention in physical objects (and more but let's leave it there for now)
False. Naturalism holds that everything originates with natural causes. If intelligence arises from non-intelligence than everything originates without intention but certain physical objects are eventually created with intention.

>>information involves inferring, which is inherently goal-directed
False. Information exists regardless of conscious observers.

>>9100816
Naturalism is pretty stupid when you think about it. It's amazing that it has so many fans.

Information is not inferring.
If I'm looking at two rRNA sequences and they are only 30% similar, I can infer that these two species are not closely related.

The sequences themselves are the information though.

>>9101369
>Naturalism holds that everything originates with natural causes

The denial of goal-directedness in nature is part of metaphysical naturalism. Goal-direction is the basis of intent. There is no paying mind to teleology anymore.

>If intelligence arises from non-intelligence than everything originates without intention but certain physical objects are eventually created with intention.

How do you explain the "arising" of goal-directed causality rather non-goal-directed causality? I don't see how "intentional states that can be reduced to non-intentional elements" is internally coherent at all.

>False. Information exists regardless of conscious observers.


>False. Information exists regardless of conscious observers.

I'm sorry, I refer to "information" in regards to the mind. Not information in a biological sense as >>9101424 does.

>>9101473
>The denial of goal-directedness in nature is part of metaphysical naturalism.
In nature yes, not in physical objects. Simply because we have found no intelligence in the laws that describe physics. Tell me when we find it.

>How do you explain the "arising" of goal-directed causality rather non-goal-directed causality?
I don't see a relevant difference. Causality from a rock falling due to wind is the same causality as a rock falling due to me tossing it. The only difference is what is throwing the rock.

>I don't see how "intentional states that can be reduced to non-intentional elements" is internally coherent at all.
That's because you started with the assumption that intent is special or magical. It's not. It's just another emergent characteristic. There are a lot of emergent characteristics.

>I'm sorry, I refer to "information" in regards to the mind.
Then you're begging the question.

>>9101473
>How do you explain the "arising" of goal-directed causality rather non-goal-directed causality?
Darwinian evolution.
>I don't see how "intentional states that can be reduced to non-intentional elements" is internally coherent at all.
My intentions can be reduced to the firing of individual neurons which don't have intentions.

>>9101773
>In nature yes, not in physical objects.
This seems to be a distinction without a difference to me. Correct me if I'm wrong.


>I don't see a relevant difference.

When you have an object that is conceptually made up of smaller parts acting due to physical laws and their mechanics then it seems like a massive jump to say the object can ever be with intention rather and not just another object with no will but what the make up of it bring about for it.

And I don't get the value of your example. Yes, the difference is what is moving the rock. What could be different is the wind moving the rock and you deliberately intending to move the rock. There we have something seemingly unintentional and something obviously intentional occurring.

>That's because you started with the assumption that intent is special or magical. It's just another emergent characteristic. There are a lot of emergent characteristics.

Please don't try to mischaractize what I said. I said that intention is readily apparent in common experience and that intention in physical objects is rejected in naturalism. "Special or magic" is your own addition to this discussion.

You considering it an emergent characteristic without explaining how is beginning the question.

>begging the question.

How? The OP has the premise that information involves inferring. I then explain that I mean information in relation to the mind, not in a sense akin genomes or RNA. Again, this references common experience just like my comment about intention. The poster >>9101424 speaks of gathering information via inferring right here.

>>9101779
>How do you explain the "arising" of goal-directed causality rather non-goal-directed causality?
>Darwinian evolution.
That's too vague to be useful.

>My intentions can be reduced to the firing of individual neurons which don't have intentions.

I'm sure you can prove some god exists too but simply saying you can do something doesn't contend the incoherence comment.

>>9101853
>That's too vague to be useful.
I don't know what more you want. Living organisms are the only entities in the universe capable of taking goal-directed action, and they came about through abiogenesis and darwinian evolution.
>I'm sure you can prove some god exists too but simply saying you can do something doesn't contend the incoherence comment.
Do you suppose a neuron has intentionality then, when it fires its output in response to some of its inputs?

>>9101930
>I don't know what more you want.
A discussion of it ontologically.

>Do you suppose a neuron has intentionality then

I don't suppose intentionality in nature. I state that intentionality is readily apparent in mental states and asked how to make sense of it together with physicalism and naturalism.

>>9101853
>This seems to be a distinction without a difference to me.
Artificial objects can have intent. Natural objects don't.

>When you have an object that is conceptually made up of smaller parts acting due to physical laws and their mechanics then it seems like a massive jump to say the object can ever be with intention rather and not just another object with no will but what the make up of it bring about for it.
Atoms don't have cup holders, yet cars do even though they are made of atoms. Imagine that.

>There we have something seemingly unintentional and something obviously intentional occurring.
Yes that's the point.

>Please don't try to mischaractize what I said.
I'm explaining the implicit assumption which leads to your question. The assumption that intelligence is not emergent and is inherent, special, paranormal.

>I said that intention is readily apparent in common experience and that intention in physical objects is rejected in naturalism.
It's not rejected in physical objects, it's reflected in objects that have no intelligence behind them. Show me the intelligence behind fundamental physical laws.

>You considering it an emergent characteristic without explaining how is beginning the question.
No it's not. Until you show me intelligence in physical laws I can't assume that there is. The burden of proof is on you. I don't need to explain how pencils are made in order to reject the idea that pencils are fundamental to our universe.

>The OP has the premise that information involves inferring.
Which is false since it assumes information is dependent on the mind when it is not. For example, no mind is necessary when a particle's waveform collapses due to information being captured.

>>9100816
See
>>9101369
You are right about naturalism.
OP obviously didn't mean information alone, he meant meaning(sensu semiotics)

Alright op
This is biosemiotics, living systems are mechanisms that give meaning to information based on the relationship of the information being interpreted to the living system interpreting it. Here meaning isn't inherent to information, it is a synthetic product of sign logic inherent to living systems.

this is interesting actually

>>9103340
>Artificial objects can have intent. Natural objects don't.

This seems to imply natural ends relate to the means in which something came about, which has no relation to natural intent at all

that said
>op
>tries to get /sci/ involved with the philosophy of science
>not /his/

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>>9105225
>This seems to imply natural ends relate to the means in which something came about, which has no relation to natural intent at all
Intention(meaning) is the product of downward causation from life. The process of making-meaning from inherently meaningless information(semiosis) is itself realized from meaningless information that is given meaning by the sign logic of living systems(biosemiotics). In this way meaning is entirely synthetic despite being realized from 'organic' means.

>that said
>op
>tries to get /sci/ involved with the philosophy of science
>not /his/
And he done good. Not only is his too dumb to answer this(I rarely browse /his/ :^} ) but this is definitely a question for science.
See pic related, it's why you read the see also. From Wikipedias entry on "naturalization of intentionality".
I recon the reason for scientists being so stubborn in acccepting meaning as an object of inquiry in the natural sciences is a hidden, and systematic dogma of epistemological presumptions that are left over from the supposedly defunct Cartesian dualism.

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>>9105271
I figure I should give you some sources and influences, otherwise I might aswell be a pleb.
>I recon the reason for scientists being so stubborn in acccepting meaning as an object of inquiry in the natural sciences is a hidden, and systematic dogma of epistemological presumptions that are left over from the supposedly defunct Cartesian dualism.
I get this idea from here
http://www.springer.com/us/book/9781402096495#aboutBook
>when there is no 'export citation' option
I lost my illegal copy; So if any of you college retards with institutional access want to help me out I would be thankful, So i don't remember the page but is like the first thing he talks about of history.
As far as the main points of my post go the book is a good place to start, this is specific
Biosemiotics and constructivism
http://rdcu.be/uZEC

Functional information: towards a synthesis of biosemiotics and cybernetics
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3285384/