Can someone explain why the "consciousness causes collapse"

>>8946721
AFAIK, your reasonable choices to solve the measurement problem are:

Everett, aka manyworlds, which depends on decoherence.

Bohmian mechanics.

Spontaneous collapse theories, like GRW.

I don't take seriously that conscious observers play any special role in physics, and neither do most physicists.

>>8946723
>I don't take seriously that conscious observers play any special role in physics, and neither do most physicists.

Why? Is it "metaphysical prejudice" (as Stapp puts it)? Or do you think there something inherently wrong with the theory?

>>8946729
Everything that I know about reality, based on overwhelming evidence, is that materialism is true, and consciousness is a result of physical processes. We can argue about that if you want, but that's my position, which means that I'm going to look for alternative explanations before throwing out materialism altogether.

>>8946732
I appreciate your response. It seems you do hold to a "metaphysical prejudice," which is to say your objection to the theory is based on a commitment to materialism - rather than whether or not the theory best fits the data.

>>8946721
https://youtu.be/8ORLN_KwAgs?t=1m40s

>>8946740
>I appreciate your response. It seems you do hold to a "metaphysical prejudice," which is to say your objection to the theory is based on a commitment to materialism - rather than whether or not the theory best fits the data.

I really wish to clarify: My metaphysical commitment is based on empirical evidence. So, to clarify your position, I do take the "theory" that best fits the evidence. I just happen to take into account all of that other evidence from neuroscience which shows that materialism is true, and seemingly you want to ignore this other evidence for the purpose of this conversation. Again, I try to take into account all of the available evidence.

>>8946746
>I just happen to take into account all of that other evidence from neuroscience which shows that materialism is true, and seemingly you want to ignore this other evidence for the purpose of this conversation.

I am unaware of such evidence. Jerome Feldman on the neural binding problem wrote - “There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, highresolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al., 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins, 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry.”

Moreover, Wilder Penfield's experiments showed that “There is no place in the cerebral cortex where an electrical stimulation will cause a patient to decide.” He argued the mind was not in the brain chemistry and could not be explained by it.

Of course it may be that consciousness can be reduced to the brain, and that we just don't understand how. But based on current knowledge, I see no reason for refuting interpretations of QM based on the fact that they exclude materialism.

>>8946779
>I am unaware of such evidence. Jerome Feldman on the neural binding problem wrote - “There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, highresolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al., 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins, 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry.”
That excerpt seems like a trivial example of the homunculus fallacy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument
Those authors need to read some Dennett.

I can take away your ability to do basic arithmetic by destroying a certain part of your brain. I can destroy your ability to generate grammatical English by destroying a certain part of your brain (while leaving your ability to parse English unaffected). I can destroy your ability to parse grammatical English by destroying a certain part of your brain (while leaving your ability to generate grammatical English unaffected). I can destroy your ability to create long-term memories by destroying a certain part of your brain. I can destroy your ability to recognize faces by destroying a certain part of your brain. I can greatly increase the chances that you will become a habitual gambler by giving you certain drugs that affect your brain. Everything that is you, is just a function of your brain, and we know that when your brain loses that function, then you lose that function. Ergo, when the entire brain goes, so do you. Ergo, materialism is true.

> But based on current knowledge, I see no reason for refuting interpretations of QM based on the fact that they exclude materialism.

It's well past time for all serious persons to accept the truth of materialism. We have so much evidence today, that it's perverse to deny the truth of materialism.

Your thoughts and actions can even change your subatomic structure.

Everything is energy - reality is just a more solid and detailed dream supported by universal laws.

Don't worry OP these dogmas will soon fall.

>>8946741
If you are implying that the delayed choice quantum eraser experiments refute CCCT, this has actually been attempted and subsequently refuted. For all practical purposes, CCCT is non-falsifiable.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.00614.pdf

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8KB, 328x215px

>>8946741
Time is just an illusion, not an intrinsic

>>8946721
>>8946787
So let me see it I'm following this conversation correctly. Are you implying that the universe does not actually exist, as evidence that we can't electronically interpret what we see by examining the brain? Or simply that no observation can be relied upon as a factor of the brain's non-specific means of creating consciousness?

>>8946784
>Everything is energy - reality is just a more solid and detailed dream supported by universal laws.
so then what happens after we die?

>>8946802
The universe contains on, without you. You cease to exist.

>>8946803
will the universe end eventually?

will entropy eventually take over and nothing will exist?

also why does the universe exist in the first place?

>>8946810
>will the universe end eventually?
>will entropy eventually take over and nothing will exist?
For all intents and purposes, seemingly yes, give or take Boltzman brains which for aesthetic and philosophical reasons I believe won't happen.

> also why does the universe exist in the first place?
No idea.

>>8946802
You go on exploring other facets of the dreamworld

Here's some anecdotal evidence:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnXxC-nVsJY

It's mostly not beneficial to remember anything tho.

>>8946813
>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnXxC-nVsJY
this is a joke right?

this is /x/ tier shit

>>8946783
Chalmers and Nagel have argued that Dennett's argument misses the point by merely re-defining consciousness as an external property and ignoring the subjective aspect completely. His approach essentially involves denying that consciousness exists, which to me seems extremely counter-intuitive as it is basic to our conception of minds and persons.

I'd even cheekily quote Sam Harris here "To say that consciousness may only seem to exist is to admit its existence in full—for if things seem any way at all, that is consciousness. Even if I happen to be a brain in a vat at this moment—all my memories are false; all my perceptions are of a world that does not exist—the fact that I am having an experience is indisputable (to me, at least). This is all that is required for me (or any other conscious being) to fully establish the reality of consciousness. Consciousness is the one thing in this universe that cannot be an illusion."

>>8946833
>Chalmers and Nagel have argued that Dennett's argument misses the point by merely re-defining consciousness as an external property and ignoring the subjective aspect completely. His approach essentially involves denying that consciousness exists, which to me seems extremely counter-intuitive as it is basic to our conception of minds and persons.
Dennett likes to talk about the interesting questions.

Chalmer's so-called hard problem of consciousness isn't very interesting. It's not interesting precisely because it was carefully crafted to be unanswerable.

It's like asking "how do magnets work?".
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MO0r930Sn_8

I don't claim to have an answer to the question "how do magnets work?". I also don't claim to have an answer to the question "how does the brain generate conscious first-person experience?". I do claim to know that magnets do work, and I do claim to know that the brain does generate conscious first-person experience. It's a common misunderstanding of science. One does not need to know the mechanism to know that A causes B. That's what Feynman is trying to illustrate in the video. It's also what Hume tried to explain in his essay on "constant conjunction".

>>8946795
So let me see it I'm following this conversation correctly. Are you implying that the universe does not actually exist, as evidence that we can't electronically interpret what we see by examining the brain? Or simply that no observation can be relied upon as a factor of the brain's non-specific means of creating consciousness?

I am simply restating von Neumann’s idea that a "measurement" in QM is the result of the interaction of a (conscious) mind with matter.

That paper puts it nicely:

"So, von Neumann argued further, pointing out that if we started with a superposition, the interaction of S with a measurement apparatus M would result in a superposition. But we could think of another apparatus M0 that measures M and S, and we’d still have a superposition, and keeping doing this indefinitely, ever adding more measurement apparatuses. We can even consider our eyes as a photodetector that measures this chain of measurement apparatuses, and we have no reason to assume, according to von Neumann, that we would not have a superposition. We can keep on going, including not only our eyes, but our optical nerves, up until we get to the brain, and we are left with a brain/measurement apparatus/system that is still in a superposition. That is intriguing, and since we never actually observe a superposition, this chain needs to stop somewhere. According to von Neumann there is only one step when we know for sure that we do not have a superposition: when we gain conscious knowledge of the measurement apparatus, i.e. when matter interacts with the mind. That is because we are never aware of observing any quantum superposition. He then proposed that the interaction between mind and matter causes matter to evolve probabilistically, according to Born’s rule, and non-linearly. In other words, the mind causes the collapse of the wave function."

>>8946840
It isn't just that you don't know the mechanism by which the brain generates conscious first-person experience, research has shown that "there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry."

This isn't an example of the homunculus fallacy, it's saying we've mapped the structure of the visual system (for example) in detail and it does not appear to be there.

To me, the logical response to these findings would be to conclude that the reason for there is "overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, highresolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience," is because what we subjectively experience isn't entirely caused by the brain.

The problem for the dualist is the interaction problem. Clearly if you hack away bits of the brain, this impact the mind. And concentrating the mind, can change brain chemistry.

Monistic idealism offers an escape from the problems of materialism and dualism by suggesting that mind is the fundamental substance, not matter.

This also accommodates the "consciousness causes collapse" interpretation of quantum physics, which is much simpler than Everettian, Bohmian or GRW theories, once you relieve yourself of your commitment to materialism.

>>8946873
Karl Pribram's holonomic theory provides some interesting answers to brain function.

>>8946873
>"there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry."

No no. What you just cited earlier was that there is no area of the brain that has a full representation of a "picture" that is your current field of view. To which I say: No surprise. There is no Cartesian theatre.

>This isn't an example of the homunculus fallacy, it's saying we've mapped the structure of the visual system (for example) in detail and it does not appear to be there.

Yes it is. It's exactly that.

>>8946873
Also, I forgot to mention the other argument.

If materialism is false, that means that there are some particles in the human brain which don't obey standard physics. There must be some electrons, protons, or neutrons, that experience a force that is present only in the human brain. This is a testable prediction. Guess what happened every time in the past when someone made such a similar supernatural prediction? It failed, miserably.

>>8946873
>Monistic idealism offers an escape from the problems of materialism and dualism by suggesting that mind is the fundamental substance, not matter.
Idealism also makes no fucking sense, given what we know: Changes to the brain change the mind.

> is because what we subjectively experience isn't entirely caused by the brain.

Wishful thinking.

To explain my earlier position:

> overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, highresolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience

On materialism, we might expect that there is no such thing. If there was such a thing, then that would be the screen of the Cartesian theatre. The existence of such a thing would be surprised - e.g. make no sense - on materialism. On materialism, as Dennett argues, we need to show how cognition happens without a cartesian theatre.

On the contrary, we know that we perceive that we have a high fidelity image via vision, but it's an illusion created by the brain. We only have a high quality image at the spot directly where we look. The rest is much inferior. Further, we also have blind spots, literal blind spots, where the optic nerve goes in front of the retina in one spot. Our brain hides from our immediate perception these blind spots.

What the materialistic approach suggests is that this visual information will be broken down into manageable, abstract chunks, as soon as possible. From a computing perspective, having a full high resolution image encoded in the brain somewhere isn't useful. It doesn't do anything. You need to analyze and break down the image to do something. Instead, on materialism, we should expect something very different than the existence of the Cartesian screen of the Cartesian theatre.

>>8946873
>The problem for the dualist is the interaction problem. Clearly if you hack away bits of the brain, this impact the mind. And concentrating the mind, can change brain chemistry.

I already made this point, but I want to make it more explicit. This is also a problem on idealism.

If normal physics is enough to explain cognition, then materialism works. However, you say that materialism doesn't work, and normal physics is insufficient to explain cognition. Presumably you can act on your choices, which means that there must be information flow from your mind to your brain, so your brain and body can act on your choices. That means you still have the same interaction problem. You still have the testable prediction that if we look at the brain, we should expect to see something other than standard physics. This is a testable prediction, and for obvious reasons, it's almost certainly wrong, and therefore dualism and idealism are almost certainly wrong.

>>8947692
Lurker here. Enjoying the debate.

>Changes to the brain change the mind.
But not necessarily on a permanent basis. Recovery rates for hemispherectomy, for example, are startlingly high.

Clearly consciousness depends on the cerebral wetware to function, but it isn't clear that consciousness is inherent in the wetware. It displays a resilience that belies materialistic assumptions.