If the universe is deterministic, why is precognition considered

>>8943390
>If the universe is deterministic
Well, is it?

>>8943426
I don't know. I can't find any statement that it completely is. When I look it up I just find that it's either debated or might be once we learn more, but might not be as well.

Or something like it is macroscopically which means it must be on a quantum scale too?

>>8943390
To predict the events of the universe with 100% certainty, you'd need to simulate a universe. The smallest possible simulation of a given object is that object (simulating a quark in reality uses more that a single molecule, but let's give benefit of the doubt and say you can break physics).

File: 800px-DeterminismXFreeWill.jpg (55KB, 800x560px) Image search: [Google]

55KB, 800x560px

>>8943390
>precognition considered pseudoscience
because there is no known mechanism - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precognition#Scientific_reception
that together with no successful results puts the idea in the pseudoscience camp.
Determinism itself is an interesting part of philosophy with varieties including "scientific determinism" but as far as I see it that does not help, as people debate all four possible cases, see pic.

>>8943617
what is laplace's daemon

>>8943390
Goodhart's Law applies to the future as well. If you observe the future, you will have changed the future because the information of future occurrences changes present action. "Minority Report" covered this.

>>8943390
Maybe. I would not say that the future is truly set in stone, only that it's predictable. Of course this only applies to life itself, as choice is not really in play when it everything else.

You might can eat at a restraint of your choosing and decide what to order. Things like that are subject to what you like and if you are in the mood to try anything new. There is choice and chance there but it's limited by the menu, cash, and your personal tastes and desires. A comet getting pulled into Jupiter's gravity and burning up does not have that luxury

I apologize for the food analogy.

>>8943940
>restraint

Oh lord. Food analogies must destroy my command of the English language.

>>8943662
I dreamt about the future a couple of times. Not in symbols, but as in the actual, literal thing that was going to happen. At least 3-4 weeks before it comes to pass, but sometimes a two or three years beforehand.

The thing is, you can't really recognize that what you're dreaming about is in fact the future. Great you're laughing with some dude you don't know in some foreign room, that smells of popcorns and there's loud music outside. A weird dream but okay, it's not something that makes you question anything, so you ignore it in the morning, right?
But then 2 years later... you're in the same situation, hearing the same music,which by now you realize is a pop song, smell the popcorn when all the pieces of the "puzzle" suddenly fall together: shit I dreamt about my dorm and roomie.

I'm not sure how it works exactly. I get the feeling like my brain..or whatever it is that is doing this "scans" forth regularly. For whatever reason I cannot fathom, perhaps to check for trouble ahead and such. It bugs me a lot, because without context these dreams seem like ordinary dreams at first. Without the knowledge of the future though, images and sensations of it are just that: meaningless and way too easy to overlook.
Maybe I'm wrong, but my vote goes for predeterminism. The future doesn't appear to change, even after years of decisions, strokes of luck and misfortune. Everything plays out as I dreamt about it.

>>8943390
Using determinism and (limited, imperfect) data to predict the future isn't pseudoscience. It's just regular-ass science. If you toss a rock off a cliff, I can predict how long it'll take to hit the ground, and probably get closer to the true value than by timing it with a stopwatch and my regular-ass reflexes.

Also what >>8943617 said. We can trade certainty for efficiency with physical laws and modelling, which works great until it doesn't (what if the rock hits a bird on the way down?)

Also what the fuck is "free will"? Why am I not choosing to do something if you could predict that choice given perfect knowledge of my mind (and nothing less), but if everything I do is determined by quantum uncertainty, somehow that makes my will again? I don't feel like I'm making "more of" a choice if I just roll dice instead of deciding for myself. And a PERFECT simulation of me is basically another instance of me (pace >>8943617 again), and I don't see how imperfect simulations with imperfect prediction powers argue against free will ("Do you want to eat this cookie, or hit yourself in the head with this hammer? I bet I can predict which!" "FUCK YOU I HAVE FREE WILL [clunk]")