Why do materialists say that a clone/remake of your brain wouldn't

I believe it's because the brain isn't just about the structure but the connections between the structures. Plus the fact that if this were the case you would have to wonder, if someone recreated your brain while you were alive - would it still be you?
Consciousness is weird and confusing

>>8406071
A clone or a remake is NOT the original. It's a copy of the original.

No matter what you do, it will always be a copy. Copied memories, copied looks, copied abilities, copied thought process and emotions, all identical to the Original, but because it wasn't first it is not the Original.

A copy will always be inferior to the original due it not being first.

>>8406086

>I believe it's because the brain isn't just about the structure but the connections between the structures

OP's post:

>'remake your brain, all the way down to the atomic level, '

>>8406090

>'It is inferior because I say it is'

>>8406071
First post already asked this question, but allow me to repeat it:

>Say we have that technology today
>Someone makes perfect copy of your body
>You are your copy are still alive

What happens? Are you simultaneously in 2 bodies?

>>8406098
It's that it's inferior. This is all just semantics, and once we precisely define our terms, the solution to this problem becomes trivial. If personal identity is simply define on the basis of identical physiology (including brain structure), and hence identical memories, experience, etc., then the would be identical. However if we require spatiotemporal continuity (which we should if were not retarded), then they're simply different people with identical memories, personalities, physiology, etc.

The reason I say that wee need to include spatiotemporal identity as a criterion of identity, and not just identitcality of physical properties and structure is because if we don't, then there is only one electron, one proton, one neutron, one helium atom, etc. in the entire universe. Atomic and subatomic particle are all physically and structurally identical to particles of the same type. Therefore if we ignore their world-line when specifying there identity, then all particles of the same type are literally the same particle - which is retarded.

>>8406119
*its not that it's "inferior".

>>8406090

But the original is a product of the structure, so the copy should also produce whatever makes the original "itself".

If "you" are a product of a physical structure, no reason to believe that it wouldnt be possible to recreate "you", unless theres some kind of non-physical piece of us I would suppose

>>8406130

To add on, the current "you" and the remade "you" should be the same thing, since you have the same structural origin. Even if its a copy, its a very good copy with the exact same brain structure and genes.

i dont know good question

>>8406071
You can recreate the brain at any one instant, but any amount of time after that it becomes different. Your consciousness won't teleport into the new brain. It would be a new consciousness. If you were an emotionless robot you would be okay with being killed and letting your clone live on, but our consciousness will resist that.

>>8406143

Isn't our consciousness changing all the time though? We go forward in time, so rebuilding our brain would just be like a respawn, and from there we continue going forward in time. Saying that time acts against our existence in that sense isn't fair since time ALWAYS acts on us, changing us.

The "you" from five minutes ago isn't dead or non-existent, it is just current "you", past "you" didn't get destroyed, it just changed into current "you"

Creating an identical copy a thousand years later is as impossible as creating a 5 sided triangle. This is because some of the attributes of the object, mainly position and age, must be different to the original object.
This means that there isn't a problem, as the premise of two identical but distinct objects is logically impossible

>>8406150

Position wouldn't matter, since we change our position all the time but are still the same person. If you mean the forces that act on us, we are bonbarded by radiation everyday, gravity forces itself on us all time, etc.

As for age, I imagine that if your 17-year old brain was recreated, it would be your current consciousness without memories from the years between 17 and now

Is memory and input from others the only signs a conscious entity has that it is the same consciousness as it was prior to any lapse in consciousness ie; sleep?

>>8406149
So you would be okay getting cloned and then killed? Would you say bye to your clone first?

>>8406071
It all depends on how you define "you".
For me everything that is intelligent and has all my memories and personality is myself. So If you duplicated someone, there would be two same people. However they would start to differ after time of course, and who is you and who isn't stop making sense.

>>8406090
Terms "clone" and "original" are only related to technology used. If you deconstructed someone atom per atom and then constructed him back somewhere else(teleportation) but in two places simultaneously. There would be no "first" and "second" one.
>A copy will always be inferior to the original due it not being first.
[citation needed]

>>8406112
The concept of "you" loses sense in that case. There will be two humans, with identical body and memories. They both will behave in a way it would be expected. They won't have telepathy or other shit like that, and they will slowly start to differ.

>>8406180
I would be ok with it.

>>8406090

your body replaces molecules on a constant basis.

an original body never remains so as long as it lives.

there is no difference except how quickly it happens.

>>8406183
>I would be okay with it
Do you think you consciousness will jump over to the clone when you die? Cuz it won't. You would just be dead.

>>8406186
Not really. Your neurons cells in brain are never replaced.

>>8406191
It already jumps every time I wake up.

>>8406191

define consciousness for me. i think we're not talking about the same thing here.

>>8406197

>Not really. Your neurons cells in brain are never replaced.

never is a strong word.
they might not be commonly replaced, but they do go through various changes, which basically amounts to a replacement.

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>>8406167

Bingo. Don't question what the clone doesn't have, question what you think we have. "Self" isn't a real / physical thing. It's a convenience of language informed by memory and social feedback. There is absolutely nothing "you" could ever carry over to a clone to make it start being "you" because there was never anything like that in play in "your" current existence in the first place.

>>8406199
What do YOU think will be your personal experience when they kill you, and will it be different than dying in general?

>>8406197
>It already jumps every time I wake up.
But it conveniently jumps back into your own physical brain. How about when you die?

>>8406205
Yes, but dead ones stay in brain and doesn't change, do they?

>>8406210
>What do YOU think will be your personal experience when they kill you, and will it be different than dying in general?
They won't kill you alive, it wouldn't make sense. You won't be able to experience your death because your old body will be unconscious.

>But it conveniently jumps back into your own physical brain. How about when you die?
It doesn't "leave" and "jumps back". Consciousness is a result of working, conscious brain. It appears when you wake up and disappears when you go to sleep or die. If you were put into narcosis, killed and reconstructed somewhere else and woken up, it would be no different from normal narcosis from your perspective.

once the split happens, which domino line is the "real"one?

same principle.

Why are people talking about clones?

Clone =\= remake

Clones and remakes have their different problems.

Clones imply the same consciousness in two different areas, a big difference from reviving a consciousness

>>8406217
There is no "real" and "fake". You have two people, with same memories and personality until that one point. Then they start to differ.
They still share same DNA, name and everything, but they both have their own brains and their own consciousness.

>>8406220
Consciousness is just something brain creates, part of it's activities. There cannot be one consciousness in two brains, it doesn't make any sense.

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Quick question, and sorry for any dumb shit as I am lay as fuck. How much of consciousness is based on the synthesized proteins that make up our memories/other neurochemicals and how much of it is energetic activity. Hypothetically, could a human brain function again if you somehow "depleted" its bioelectricity (assuming you could) and jump started it again or is that something that shouldn't be removed/turned off? Or do I have the wrong idea of what bioelectricity is?

>>8406238
We (human race) still don't know.

>>8406222

Not in two brains simultaneously, but perhaps when one is rebuilt after the other is gone.

>>8406238
qualia is a product of the chemical and physical processes that occur in your brain. hence why when you take drugs your perception of reality changes. To answer your questions, its all based on the chemical exchanges and interactions of proteins and things that cross the blood-brain barrier. If you deplete 'bioelectricity' in the brain, you would not be conscious.

>>8406222
>Consciousness is just something brain creates, part of it's activities. There cannot be one consciousness in two brains, it doesn't make any sense.

Yes. Two identical human beings placed in identical universes should (theoretically) produce the same individual but the question remains of whether the brain and its consciousness in its entirety can be duplicated in the same universe. This would essentially create a copy who thinks exactly the same as you do up to a divergent point (The point when he wakes up and simply occupies a different space to you)

>>8406248
The reason why I asked is because the desire to extend your life may be entirely related to simply prolonging the sense of consciousness. If consciousness is not just a product but finite (Think the flame on a candle) is there any way to keep it running while transferring it to a new brain? Thats the question I think people want answered. Is it just selfish delusion? Assuming you could create a perfect copy of yourself in an instant, wouldnt the benefits of extended life only rest with another person who just happens to look like you?

>>8406265
Okay, that makes sense, but assuming you reintroduced that bioelectricity, would you still be the same person? Is this in any way related to how neural noise affects us?

>press button to create a second brain somewhere

>brain gets created and starts working

>I'm still me and it isn't the same entity as me


if anon in britbongistan is playing a game on his GTX 970, that doesn't mean I am too, despite our videocards being identical.

>>8406302

Gaming cards aren't aware

>>8406167

What about subjectivity? We receive and store data, but we also interpret that data

the way i see it right now is that your consciousness has a linearity: moment follows moment follows moment. If you were to end that continuity ie destroy my brain and the consciousness it creates, the continuity is ended for good. if you then recreate somehow my brain with everything in the same place it wouldn't be "me", it would be an exact copy of "me". I would be dead and experiencing nothing while my copy would continue.

>>8406311
This is why the subject of consciousness is so difficult to describe. Our brains are capable of parsing many forms of information, well done and poorly. Output is generated in an interaction of different factors such as memory and neural noise in relation to the input. All of which were created as output from previous inputs and so on.

That said and while it is amazing how much information we can process, our brains essentially do not know how they themselves work. We can learn through being taught its functions but we can never epistemologically or logically understand what is going on when our own neurons are firing. Also, our attention largely goes in one direction from stimuli to stimuli and EVERYTHING we perceive is entirely in relation to our own welfare. The (dare I say it) illusion of consciousness is just a result of a very very complex system patting itself on the back. Its difficult to grasp and goes against everything we know.

>>8406333

The dilemma here is that your consciousness, what makes you "you" is, according to materialism, an entirely physical process. So if we manage to create a replica with accurate detail, then it should be able to make "you", a physical byproduct of a very specific arrangement of neurons, return

So it seems like either way, theres an "afterlife", whether it is a religious one or secular one

>>8406336

Even if it is an illusion, theres no reason to believe that this "illusion of self" isn't able to return once we rebuild whatever it was that created that illusion. Unless, of course, there is some invisible, non-measureable and non-physical part of "you" (whether you call it an essence, soul, etc.)

>>8406345
That's interesting but i still don't think your experience would suddenly start again in a replica brain long after your death. I guess i view the world through a materialistic lens. Your brain creates contentiousness through natural mechanical processes, if the machine breaks the consciousness ends. I do see where you are coming from though and i will have to think on it. Thanks anon

>>8406282
When bioelectricity stops, its assumed you are dead. or brain dead.At this point it isn't possible to come back alive, or to be introduced back to its previous state. When someone 'dies' or their heart stops beating, there's still electrical and chemical processes occuring in the brain. When you are brain dead, your brain has severe limited function or none. So if you 'reintroduce' bioelectricity, i dont think it would be possible, because you'd be brain dead. If anyone else knows more about this please let me know. Also, i don't think it would be related to neural noise considering the person would be brain dead.

>>8406353

No worries

Think of it as a hard drive. Even though you can destroy it, the data is recoverable through digital forensics. That data is able to exist, even if you smash the hard drive. It can be accessed through some other computer

Consciousness isn't that easy to explain, but its the best analogy I can make

>>8406071
Because, from the moment of the creation of the clone, the clone and original begin to diverge in similarity, each is necessarily going to have different experiences which immediately turn them into different, albeit extremely similar, beings.

>>8406353
but that's the same data on the same hard drive though. if we are doing analogies then think of a cd player with a cd in it. You press play and let the cd run for 30 seconds. you then destroy the cd player. you go and buy a new one from the store and a new cd. same brand of cd player, same edition of cd. you then fast forward the NEW cd to 30 seconds and press play. It would appear that the continuity of the 2 min track has continued again, but it hasn't. you have to account for the hours of blank time between the first cd being destroyed and the second one beginning. it isn't the same cd or player, they are just new copies.

>>8406345.
It is an entirely physical process, but the illusion or the phenomena of consciousness is, i suppose instanced to your brain. Its only self preserving and self appreciative when it itself is aware of its own existence. One instance for one brain. There is no sharing consciousness because there is no means to. The idea that most folks have about life after death is an understandably selfish and solipsistic one but it doesn't result in two "you"s. To the new copy of you, they will have a new instance and will feel all of the benefits of the illusion, truly feeling that they have extended their life, but you will not.


I'm not disagreeing with you here as its a very odd subject with very liberal phrasing

>>8406349
>Even if it is an illusion, theres no reason to believe that this "illusion of self" isn't able to return once we rebuild whatever it was that created that illusion.

Precisely, but - an illusion to a mind. What happens when you make two copies? Do they share thoughts? No, they shouldn't do.

>Unless, of course, there is some invisible, non-measureable and non-physical part of "you" (whether you call it an essence, soul, etc.)

I was wondering about that. Excluding the anomalous and unknown it doesn't seem like there is according to >>8406360

Makes you think. Sleep almost seems like a short, close to death state.

>Make clone
>Put clone in another room
>Can you see what the clone sees?

>>8406376

hes not talking about a clone, hes talking about a remake of your brain after your death

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>>8406183
But it's not you. The moment that clone comes into existence, it diverges from the path of you. The very next nano second, your brains are already different in direction, and inevitably, choices. The divergence means that your cloned brain was identical to yours for no more than a fraction of a nano second before something went a different way than yours.

Consider the human subconscious has thousands of thoughts and possibilities going through it every second. If you revisited a point in time when you did one particular thing--would it mean you would do the same exact particular thing again? Every moment has thousands of choices and possibilities.

The cloned brain might have the same preset factory settings, but after that, it's an individual entity that is no longer you and may become entirely different.

See; Bioshock Infinite for example of divergent personalities.

>>8406214
>If you were put into narcosis, killed and reconstructed somewhere else and woken up, it would be no different from normal narcosis from your perspective.
No, when you are killed, you will experience death permanently. The reconstructed brain will be a new consciousness, although an exact copy, and nobody else would know the difference, including the new consciousness. You personally will not wake up in that brain, you will not experience that happening.

>>8406360
Oh and sorry, I think I jumped ahead when referring to neural noise or I didn't explain myself very well but your answer explains it for me regardless. I was more concerned with NN in relation to the active physical processes going on in our brain. I was wondering how much its related to our active consciousness and if the removal of said physical processes would be just as bad as the removal of individual parts of the brain.

I wondered if there was perhaps a central crux which existed within these physical processes that would provide a valid counterargument to the idea of consciousness as an illusion. Many people I debate on free will often cite neural noise as a kind of quantum factory of self.

>>8406387

isnt self-awareness also a result of physical processes too?

if materialism is right, then every single thought process, including the ones you think are unique to you, should be replicable

The clone is a copy of you, not a definition of you.

Is it suicide when your clone kills you?

>>8406424

clones imply a divergence

remakes imply a continuation

If i end as soon as the clone begins, then it is me legally. It will just have a consciousness and I dont have.

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>>8406408
True.
However with that definition every day you are new "you", different from old one.
It all boils down to how we define "you".

>>8406411
>No, when you are killed, you will experience death permanently.
You cannot experience anything when you are unconscious.
>The reconstructed brain will be a new consciousness, although an exact copy, and nobody else would know the difference, including the new consciousness.
Consciousness do not go to sleep and wake up. Consciousness is an effect of working, conscious brain. The moment you go to sleep, your brain stops conscious process and it appears again when brain wakes up.
>You personally will not wake up in that brain, you will not experience that happening.
How do I personally choose what brain to wake up in? Where am I when I'm sleeping? If my body is moved somewhere else while I'm sleeping, will I wake up in the same body again? What if I had Clinical death? What if someone slice my brain and then put it together? What if someone take every atom from my brain and rebuild it somewhere else, or take every atom and replace it with another, or take every atom, convert it into information and build it again somewhere else?
Where is the line when I personally can wake up in the brain or "get lost" and new consciousness appear the same as mine?

>>8406428
Define suicide
>inb4 when you kill yourself
Define "you" then. If the clone is you then it's suicide.

>>8406422

Wrong. Most of the ideas people have about "self" / "consciousness" don't correspond to brain processes because they don't really exist except as spooks of language. The cognitive dissonance between believing we must have magic "self" modules vs. the understanding a clone wouldn't just "become you" is causing people here to assume the clone must just be missing the magic "self" module. In reality, it doesn't have it because "you" never had it to begin with.

>>8406430
How else will a replica of my brain be made so perfect that it complies to your thought experiment?

Or is this one of those "a ship has a thousand parts and you replace a part once a day.... in 1000 days is it still the same ship" episodes?

>>8406435
I would say at its most basic definition, 'you' are the combined atoms of your current brain mass and chemical composition. So if those atoms were taken and put back together elsewhere, it would still be you. If they were however, cloned or replicated, they would no longer be 'you'. The 'you' is simply the current mass that's slowly aging and will eventually start rotting when you die.

And yes it's true, the 'you' that is currently alive is changing every day and is a new entity moment-to-moment, but that is your continuity as a 'you'. If that continuity is disrupted, you are dead. Even if it is repaired, and with different parts to fix the ones that were gone--the you that is the natural continuity of your conscious progression is gone forever. If your clone or repaired brain has everything exactly the same as it was, it's still a different entity.

Forged memories may appear real, but in the end you're a hacked-together copy of the original, with some original parts added into it.

Therefor I would argue that 'you' as an individual are simply a continuity of a certain set of cells and brain matter, and once that is cloned, it is another set entirely different than you.

>>8406418
Neural noise is a byproduct of the processes of the brain. This can range from synapses interacting, ions being released by cells, molecular structures within the brain activating or moving. Neural noise is needed though, as it apparently enhances non-linear neural networks within the brain. Normally, in an electrical setting, noise of any kind would create poor performance, but in the case of the brain's neural network, it enhances communication with the rest of the neurons in the network. A specific example of this is with action potentials, it has been observed that neural noise allows action potentials between unique neurons to be normalized, or synchronized, allowing for smoother processing or electric flow.
I personally think there is a relationship between neural noise and consciousness as we know it. However, I think it can be explained through physical processes. Neural noise has physical explanations and physical links to processing abilities of the brain.

According to Davis and Grant in https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25248666 It's been observed that individuals with autism have less developed or active neural noise networks. Interesting to see that one physical outcome (the gene expression that caused individuals to have autism) led to another (the brain formation and its neural network).
In conclusion, the removal of a part of a brain, the removal a certain specific process or simply the altering of genes (like in autism) can trigger a difference in the active consciousness in an individual, as the brain structure is different, resulting in a different neural noise field.
As for your central crux, I cannot identify one, although I want to. So I am unable to identify a counterargument for the idea of consciousness being an illusion, despite me wanting to find one as well.

>>8406071
And what if it wasn't done in a hundred years, but right now? Would you be the clone or the original? :^)

>>8406422
Yes, its all replicable, at least hypothetically.

But the idea of the nature of consciousness as an illusion essentially assumes that its fooling you, so to speak.
Ie: its fooling you into thinking that it is unique to you because of the way your brain processes information.

You as an individual consciousness cannot exist out of your current state of function.

If your brain stops, you stop. If hypothetically you could restart a brain, you as you currently are would be dead and gone. This is not as significant as we think. We do this partially every time we go to sleep, we do this slowly and constantly as we learn and develop and change as people. The "you" that exists now is just riding off the surge of your actions and existence. Its a facade that gives you perspective in life. It is a phenomena in of itself.

I hope I'm making sense here, its getting late.

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Is nobody reading the part about a remake?

Pic related is the difference between a remake and a clone. We got through the clone, so now we can focus on the remake

>>8406440

I don't see the reasoning behind attacking the thought experiment itself. I'm sure that more advanced neuroimaging will happen one day (fMRI is a shitty method anyways), so will advanced 3D bioprinting (whether you think its a meme or not)

>>8406119
is comparing human identity the same as comparing the 'identity' of atoms? it seems like you have a point I'm not sure. I guess if you're reducing human identity to atoms then yeah you're right. but what this thread seems to be asking is what is human identity and I don't think we know that

>>8406519
You can't replicate a dead brain. It would have to be an earlier version. What's the difference if you are still alive or not when it gets reconstructed?

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>>8406519

Your idea about a remake isn't valid because:

>>8406437

The things you think you can remake aren't real to begin with. Continuity of "self" is a convenient fiction informed by memories and social feedback. There is nothing in your brain that actually makes "you" from t turn into "you" from t+1. The different moments are next to each other in the temporal dimension, but that doesn't confer contiunuity of identity any more than sitting in a chair would make the chair become "you."

>>8406519
What if after death you create simultaneously two replicas?
Which one is clone and which one is you?

>>8406489
Cheers anon. That's a pretty comprehensive explanation. And I agree about the physical explanation of things, though It tends to get rather messy when dealing with quantum mechanics.

I cant help but feel like I'm wasting my time when dealing with people who treat randomness as literal magic.

I think i recall one of the commonalities of autism and other spectrum disorders is well developed pattern recognition and right brained thought processes (Though it would be a very big stretch of conjecture to claim a relation between this and NN).

It could be interesting to see where the interdependencies lie in the brain's development in relation to what you described.

>>8406086
>not just about the structures
>but the connection between the structures

So basically you are saying its about the structure rather than the structure?
Gotcha senpai, flawless thinking right there

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>>8406565
Several aspects I failed to mention were chaos theory and quantum mechanics. The former has a definite and observed impact on the existing neural network, and attributes to its existence. As for quantum mechanics, I cannot say much because I don't understand the math or much of the intricacies involved with it. I do know that there are multiple theories revolving quantum consciousness, citing that quantum interactions are responsible for the unexplained aspects of the human mind and how it handles and differentiates qualia. It's an entirely different ball park but thank you for bringing it up, because it is an important aspect of it all.

Individuals on the autism spectrum indeed can focus on patterns or have a focus in the right hemisphere of the brain. Some are savants and others have asberger's, etc. I could see that maybe the neural noise field would be different (like in the link where they found them to be less active), but what I fail to see is why would a less active field translate to a better analysis of patterns or abstract reasoning.

ITT: Baby's first Theseus ship.

>>8406586
Don't we replace every part in our body several times during our lifetime anyway?

>>8406632

Most of it. The conclusion definitely applies to us: continuity of "self" isn't a real thing.

>why wouldn't it be considered "you"?
Suppose this copy is made while I'm still alive.

Can I control the copy? can I perceive what the copy perceives?
No. I can't.
Hence not the same object, just an identical object.

>>8406651

>Can I control
>believing in free will
>believing in an "I"

Stop questioning what the clone is "missing" and start question whether these things are anything "you" actually had to begin with.

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This isn't science, this is a pseudo-intellectual philosophy jerk off thread

>>8406666
>missing
I am saying we're separate entities. not a connected one, hence, identical, but not the same.

Free will has nothing to do with this.

>>8406071
It wouldn't be you for yourself because you are trapped inside this one brain.
It would only be you for others who wouldn't notice a thing

>>8406678

> not smart enough to talk about consciousness
> dismiss everything as pseudo-X

i think its you who needs to fuck off buddy

>>8406694

You said you couldn't control it which inplies you think you can control the original body.

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>>8406090
This.

It's basic logic.

Create a copy of something, then take a red pen and draw on one of them. The drawing will not magically appear on the other.

This is because a copy is an equal entity, but not the same entity. It becomes a separate object as soon as it is created. The same thing would happen to a clone of your conscious mind. The second it awoke it would be experiencing a separate event from what you are experiencing, and would thus immediately be a separate entity that is not you.

It really isn't a difficult concept to comprehend. This is day one philosophy and reasoning for plebs level stuff.

>>8406715
Of course you control your original body, you dingus.
A decision can be your own although it is determined ;^)

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There is no self. The self is an illusion. Buddha discovered this thousands of years ago, and science is just catching up now.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatta

>>8406707
>implying you have to be smart to discuss something unfalsifiable
I mean like whoa dude if you got cloned would you be like yourself still n shit? Or would you be like a totally new person man... like what even is the self anyways man... it's all just like where does the mind end and the body begin bro, shit is like mind blowing when you really sit down and think about it man, like a total headtrip

Pass the bong bro

>>8406742

> this is an unknown topic so pls stop talking about it

Are you the kind of fag that also thinks zero isn't a number?

>>8406700

What exactly is trapped in my brain? Any sense of individuality is just a byproduct of physical processes within structures, isn't it?

The difference between copied CDs, drawings and etc. is that they are not self-aware, but a consciousness is

>>8406197
The brain cells themselves don't get replaced, but the matter that makes them up does

>>8406981
Not the dead ones.

>>8406071
yes, correct

Unless it can recreate your body it won't be the same.

> All sense of "self", consciousness, subjectivity is simply a product of the physical brain and its processes
> An exact replica cannot give rise to those things even though it is an accurate match down to the atomic level

pick one m8s

do you respected 4 chan comunity know how a logarithmic funtion behave (i know as the inverse of th exponencial) but i need to transforn the trascendent first so anyone know how it would behave wuthout knowing tre exp Funt?

The hard truth is that "you" die every fraction of a second and are replaced by a clone with the same memories that thinks it's you but then that also dies. You are already the clone and the you from one second ago already died and didn't wake up when that one neuron formed a new synapse to the neuron next it after after NMDA reinforcement. You will die and be copied billions of times in your life

>>8406071
Assuming you can replicate it instantly and at the same time you take your brain composition data, it will be you for a brief moment, then physically speaking you will experience different influences so it will stop being you.
Or you see it the philosophical way and you assume you ar you and it is a copy of you which is compatible with the upper argument.

>>8407366

> die every fraction of a second

I haven't died, I'm just going forward in time

>>8406519
Like I said, a clone or replica does not contain the defining self. It is just an accurate representation of what was.

The "you" that you experience is not able to be disconnected without experiencing death.

The "you," you think you are is not just physical. It is constructed by your decisions and society.

A replica could never be "you" or make your decisions once you are no longer able to make decisions, or completely be "you."

This is similar to the legal use of insanity as a defense. When you are no longer able to makes decisions like the normal "you" does, then are you responsible for those decisions?

>>8407378
How do you know?
Are you just going to tell me "because I have memories from some time ago that were totally not programmed into my brain!"?

>>8406518
This is so well put.. to me, this is the most logical explanation and perfectly complements worldviews through the ages that we are all just energy, a "shared consciousness", reincarnation etc. (Not saying they are all fundamentally the same or scientifically sound, just that the basic principles go hand in hand.

Define "you"

>>8407396

what do you think?

whats your theory on consciousness then?

and dont tell me that the past doesnt exist

>>8406071
It wouldn't be the real you because the physical processes that make you up would already be diverged from the original the instant you start creating the copy, so it'd be a slightly different parallel you.

Let's take a city. Now duplicate that city in every aspect except the people who would live in that city.

Would the new duplicate city inhabitant population function the same as the original city?

You're brain is more of a city like structure, and the active "electricity" the people.

Just because you can clone the structure, doesn't mean you create the same connections.

I would not be surprised if this boiled down to something similar to a boot sequence for a simple computer, or is as complex as active currents creating connections and information not able to be stored by the structure.

im sorry for being a brainlet, but why is a remake different than the original?

if the "real me", or "illusion", or whatever makes up "me" can be replicated, why cant the "real me" also be replicated?

>>8406071
Because it's highly expected that the universe doesn't have this kind of equivalence relation.

>>8406539
> There is nothing in your brain that actually makes "you" from t turn into "you" from t+1.
Electromagnetic waves?

>>8408400

There is no "you" in electromagnetism. Stop trying to find it, it isn't a real thing.

>>8408449
>There is no "you" in electromagnetism.
citation needed
>it isn't a real thing.
citation needed

>>8408452

Burden of proof is on you if you want to turn this into a citation thing, you're the one making positive claims.

>>8408452

http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/web%20publishing/TreatiseI.iv.vi.htm

>>8408474

> Published 1739, almost 300 fucking years ago
> Long before major developments in electromagnetism

>>8408456
It's not about being positive, it's about assertiveness, you've made two assertive statements for no apparent reason, so I asked for any evidence or clues that could support it.

>>8406071
>Why do materialists say that a clone/remake of your brain wouldn't be "you", if "you" are a result of a physical process?
we dont know enough about the brain, it could go either way.

thats the real answer now stop shitposting.

>>8406071
It would be you in a biological and assuming that it did have your memories and personality,etc it would even be you from a nearly objective standpoint but it would not be you in a very personal pov, basically it would not be the same iteration of you that you are now.

>>8408480

Please explain specifically how any parts of his arguments have been invalidated by the existence of electromagnetism.

>>8406090
>A copy will always be inferior to the original due it not being first.

evolution proves you wrong.

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>>8406071
A copy of something is not the original.

It's that simple.

It's particularly problematic of the original and the copy exist at the same time - as simple possession becomes an issue. (eg. "Who gets to fuck Sally?")

There's, similarly, tons of perfectly identical objects in the universe - they are not all the same object.

Doesn't matter how accurate the copy is. A book with the works of Shakespeare may contain all the information of the original works, but only one of them is going to snag you millions of bucks.

you guys solved my existential crisis but gave me a cloning crisis

>>8408452

Siddhārtha Gautama figured out there was no such thing as self a couple thousand years ago. Just meditate for a while on what things are "you" or "yours" and see if there's really any "you" that can be pointed to.

>>8406183
>If you deconstructed someone atom per atom and then constructed him back somewhere else(teleportation) but in two places simultaneously. There would be no "first" and "second" one.
Yes there would you mong. The one that got deconstructed is the first one and the one that got reconstructed is the second one.

>>8408745

He said the reconstruction would be in two places simultaneously. So there isn't "one that got reconstructed," there are two.

>>8406119
>spatiotemporal identity
meaningless babbling, try again

> "You" are an illusion caused by a material brain, as said by materialists
> "You" are just a basic physical process, as said by materialists
> Any sense of individualism or self awareness is also a physical process, as said by materialists
> Therefore all of that can be theoretically remade, possibly a guarantee based on the direction techbology is going, as said by materialists
> But there is only one you and an essence to you, as an individual, that is non-replicable, as said by dualis-umm, materialists

I don't know man, everyone who says that it wouldn't be you sounds like they're close to saying some spiritual stuff

>>8406112
As soon as the two "you"s begin having different chemical reactions and movements within themselves (as in literally the moment they were created, as being in different places they would begin to experience different sensations in all their senses, among other things) they become different consciousnesses

>>8406071
1) If two things occupy the same space in the same way, (at the same time), then they are the same thing, ie, there is no way to show that they are in fact two different things unless they diverge in some way from one another in the way they occupy space, what space they occupy, or what time they occupy space at.

2) The only way for two things to have exactly the same perceptual inputs is if they exist in the same way, at the same place, at the same time.

3) The moment something is copied and begins to perceive the world, the copy is no longer a copy, since, given the same brain, two different sets of inputs will necessarily change the brain in ways unique from one another. A true copy is only a copy for the smallest possible amount of time after it is copied. Then it ceases to be a copy as its distinct interpretations change it from the original.

Since two things, even if they are copies, cannot be the same thing unless they occupy the same space at the same time, and since perception of an individual depends on its brain being in a place at a time, anything else which is a reconstruction of that brain but which does not exist at the same place at the same time as the original will have a unique perception.

>>8406112

No, there can only be one you.

I think the remake question is more interesting than the clone one, because technically there are no simultaneous "you's"

>>8406071
Although, one object can inherit the structure and behavior of another object, the two distinct objects cannot be the same object. Just think of twins. They might be exact copies of each other, but they are separate people, right? Or would you say they are the same person? I wouldn't...

>>8406071
Is Brain structure solely physical?

I mean, I'd make it akin to a hard drive. 2 HDDs may have the same manufacturer, model, disk size... But what makes them unique are what is stored and what's paged.


That could be a shitty analogy.

Nobody is born with intelligence and knowledge, it is built up through years of experiences. How those experiences are queued up determines personality.

For instance, someone who lost their virginity at a very young age (13) may have a different view of sex than a 20 something year old.

But I'm only assuming that memories, themselves, are not physical.

>>8406336
>created
everytime

>>8406071
when i die, i'll ask my inmortal robot, pandimensional clone to be the fucking best.
for us.

>>8408799

What's with that last line? It wouldn't be "you" because there's no such thing in physical reality in the first place. The clone and the original body are equally without any magical continuity of "self" module. Memories are real, and they inform the *belief* in continuity of "self." But that belief doesn't correspond to any actual "self" continuity mechanism in reality.

>>8408868

And the entire argument revolves on how those beliefs and "illusion of self" (if it is self) are simply physical processes. Theres literally nothing that you can say about an individual that isn't physical, in the materialist view. Whether it is an illusion, mistake, projection, "you" are "you" "you" are still a physical process

>>8408915

>those beliefs and "illusion of self" (if it is self) are simply physical processes

The clone would share in the original's false belief that there's such a thing as continuity of "self" from moment to moment, yes. What's your point? Neither the original nor the clone have continuity of "self" in reality. The clone wouldn't be the same "you" as the original, but the original isn't the same "you" as the original from five minutes earlier either.

>Whether it is an illusion, mistake, projection, "you" are "you" "you" are still a physical process

No, it makes a big difference whether it's treated as a real thing or not. A belief in something isn't the same thing as that actual something. Just because everything is physical doesn't mean every belief has a subject which is physical. In this case the subject of the belief is not physical. It does not have any real structure corresponding to it.

>>8406071
if i was to clone your hand, cut your original hand off, and then attach the new hand do you have the old hand?

>>8406071
So say the brain is replicated (using completely different atoms to do so, but we'll gloss over that for now) at an exact moment in your life. This moment, right now.

...okay, now it's a few moments later, and the two brains have probably not had the exact same forces acting on them and so now have slightly different structures.

And now it's a few moments later and the two brains are even more different.

And...

>>8406071
The moment the clone is created it starts getting exposed to different things than you, which makes them a different person therefore not you.

>>8408942

What I will say is that aren't we experiencing different forces all the time? Radiation, gravity (standing up vs. laying down), etc.?

>>8408942
>So say the brain is replicated (using completely different atoms to do so, but we'll gloss over that for now) at an exact moment in your life. This moment, right now.

that happens all the time, all life beings completely replicate every last single atom in them every few years. do you notice the conciousness change?

>>8406071
if you could upload all my past experiences into a new brain and put it into a clone once it woke up that clone would essentially be me

>>8409079
this is because we live in a society that is too much identifiestistic

it identifies too much with not identificatory terms

for example
´
people say "oh my city

SHUT UP YOUR IDIOT, ITS NOT YOUR CITY YOURE A YOU NOT A SKYRCRAPPER

therefore, only you is the one that the hard problem of conciousness will objectively literally digitally binaryly determine once its discovered

>>8409088
I kind of get what they are trying to say by " that's my city,town etc "

they have a strong connection to a particular city or whatever and identify themselves by that area

>>8409114
i kinda

HAHAHAHAHAHHAH A SUBJECTIVE IDIOT

YOU CAN DO SCIENCE

SCIENCE IS THE REALM OF THE OBJECTIVE
YES OR NO

yOU ARE OF THE REALM OF THE "OH MOMMY PRETTY PLEAS I LIKE HTAT FLOWER"

HAHA WEAK
HAHA INFERIOR
HAHA I WIN

DO NOT SCIENCE for all of us good

>>8409120

???

To my understanding (correct me if I'm wrong) memories are created by specific patterns made by the electrical currents running through the brain, so unless you ran the exact same patterns through the brain WITHOUT KILLING IT then no it won't be you it would only have your appearance and any neurological limitations you may have

>>8409088
>SHUT UP YOUR IDIOT, ITS NOT YOUR CITY YOURE A YOU NOT A SKYRCRAPPER

Yeah because skyscrapers own cities.

>>8409120
Holy fuck what a sperg lord.

>>8409120
>>>/plebbit/

>>8406149
>The "you" from five minutes ago isn't dead or non-existent
In that five minutes, my brain wasn't completely obliterated down to the atomic level and rebuilt, because I haven't done DMT in several years.

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>>8406112. I believe I can competently answer this. First physically you would have the same traits. I don't believe the cloned version would have you mental knowledge but let's assume it does. So you have a physical being that has you complete physical and mental capacities, but you can't clone the esoteric you the soul. There is an unexplained loss of mass at death so something besides breath , excrements, and resprayed moisture is leaving the body. This remaining unknown will be the difference. The soul the spirit whatever you wish to call it will be the very that that separates you from your clone. If the clone is fully functional then it must have its own spirit which would mean the following. That your clone would just be the same as having an identical twine physically the same but with some different desires and likes....

>>8406090
There is no such thing as "original"

Everything is just an evermorphing blob of "is."

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>>8409572

>In that five minutes, my brain wasn't completely obliterated down to the atomic level and rebuilt

Along the axis of time there are many brains / bodies located next to each other. What there isn't is a mechanism for continuity of "self." Just because I lay ten apples next to each other on a table doesn't mean all of those apples share in an identity. Just because the shape of the observable universe in space and time involves many human bodies next to each other in time doesn't mean those different body-moments share in an identity. Continuity of "self" is an abstract convenience we reference because the way the world is on our scale of reality body-moments can be grouped together and predictions can be made as to what the body-moments forward in the future area of the axis of time are likely to look like.

The clone / remake hypothetical confuses our intuition because it involves taking one of those body-moments and having it exist in the same time location as another body-moment. We're used to only having one body-moment per moment, so having two in the same moment makes expectations about the continuity of "self" idea break down. In actuality, the continuity of "self" idea has never had any real substance to it even in the mundane one body-moment per moment circumstances, but the clone / remake hypothetical makes the unreality of continuity of "self" more obvious.

>>8409755

> It's another "we die every 5 minutes" episode

OK, so if we die every 5 minutes (or whatever interval), as well as die in our sleep, then it shouldn't be too hard to revive us from the dead since we are revived all the time, whether its an illusion or not

can jotaro leave /sci/
look we all know you want to fuck dolphins dont post those pics everywhere

>>8409839
Maybe that's what happens when you die bruh

>>8406071
Because there's more to 'you' than your brain. Have you considered what role that epigenetics has to play in what makes you you, for example?

>>8409839

No, completely missing the point. There is no continuity of "self." Full stop. "You" don't exist for five minutes and then "die." There is never any "you" to begin with.

>we are revived all the time, whether its an illusion or not

No. Carrying over the "illusion" would mean carrying over a *belief* in continuity of "self," not carrying over continuity of "self." Nobody is "revived all the time" There was no "self" to begin with and there is nothing to be revived.

>>8410080

but if "self" is non-continuous, as in during deep sleep and unconsciousness, what makes you think we wont come back?

it would just be like deep sleep that lasts for a few centuries

the "belief in continuity of self" is still generated in our brain as a physical process

If that brain, that was a perfect replica of me was me, then in theory that should mean if you made a perfect replica of my brain while I was still alive there would be two me's. Does that sound like an intelligent thought to you?

>>8410623

the key to your statement is that the replica exists WHILE you are STILL alive

what happens when you die before the replica is made?

>>8406071
Consciousness cannot and will not be transferred so it isn't really "you"

wow, better philosophical discussion of identity and consciousness than anything on /his/

If a replicator made an exact copy of you, would it be you? You'd be looking at your copy and your copy would be looking at you, possibly shocked to realize it is the copy and it never witnessed all its memories.

I think we can conclude that unless your remake uses the original atoms in at least the sliver of your brain that is the neo-cortex, sans water and other circulating nutrients, then it is not you.

However this raises more questions like whether you are the person you were 5 minutes ago. What if instead of a copy it is you in the past?

>>8410080
Then why don't you eat a bunch of poison so there is more real food for the rest of us and you don't have to keep trying to figure out if you exist or not.

>>8410590
>generated in our brain as a physical process
If there is no you, how can you have a brain?

>>8406090
I was with you all the way up to the last line.

>>8410590

>but if "self" is non-continuous, as in during deep sleep and unconsciousness, what makes you think we wont come back?

There is no continuity of "self" in reality. There are brain-moments next to each other in space-time. The belief in continuity of "self" is informed by memory. So the clone would believe it had continuity of "self" with the source it was cloned from, just as a normal person would believe they had continuity of "self" with brain-moments from before a "deep sleep." Both the clone and the normal person would be wrong. There isn't anything more than the memories themselves. And memories don't make identity happen. Memories are just pieces of information. Reading a character's thoughts in a book doesn't make you that character. But we fall for something similar by believing we are the "self" character on the basis of reading memories. Multiple people can share in the same memory information at the same time, it doesn't make all those people a shared identity.

>the "belief in continuity of self" is still generated in our brain as a physical process

Yes, so what? The apparent implication this post was suggesting is that we can just take "self," rename it to "belief in self," and then it'll do all the things you think "self" does. This is completely wrong. It's not just a word game. Think about the difference between a thing vs. a mere belief in a thing. A belief in "self" is not in any way a carryover of "you." A mentally ill person could mistakenly believe they're "you," would that make them "you?" Of course it wouldn't. And the mere belief most sane people have in their own continuity of "self" is equally untrue. A clone sharing in this untrue belief wouldn't have any continuity with the original in reality because the original never had any continuity of "self" to begin with.

>>8406071
Even if you are a materialist, you'd be a dumbass not to recognize instancing.

Also the fact that all factors are different.
Simply by existing in a different position you have changed the nature of the object.
Its creation and various other factors

>>8411291

>trying to figure out

There wasn't any uncertainty in that post. It's pretty clear there isn't any physical analogue to the idea of continuity of "self" in reality. Nobody's "trying to figure out" anything. It's figured out. That's the way it is.

>Then why don't you eat a bunch of poison so there is more real food for the rest of us

Not falling for the continuity of "self" meme doesn't imply a lack of interest in pleasure or lack of aversion from pain / sickness / death.

>Why do materialists say that a clone/remake of your brain wouldn't be "you"
It wouldn't be composed of the same atoms as the "me" that is being remade. There's nothing special about these atoms but they're not the same and can't be "me" anymore than one object can be another object.

>>8411348
>physical analogue to the idea of continuity of "self" in reality.
Its called an individual, the unit.

> a lack of interest in pleasure or lack of aversion from pain / sickness / death.
Those can only be experienced from an individual perspective and you don't believe you have an individual self, so there is nothing to harm because you don't really exist and neither does the "poison" because there is no scientific physical analog to poison.

>>8411365

>Its called an individual, the unit.

"an individual, the unit" isn't the name of a physical analogue to "continuity of self" in reality. There is no physical mechanism that makes that alleged continuity happen.

>Those can only be experienced from an individual perspective

Prove it.

>there is nothing to harm because you don't really exist

No "you" =/= nothing.

>>8411371
How is the existence of and versatility of the physical unit not an indication that you can be assigned a unit roughly equal to everything contained in your skin and symbolized in your DNA?

>Prove it.
I don't need to prove it, the things you mentioned are sensory phenomenon that are only qualitative descriptors with perspective limitation built into the definition and context of the words.

>you
There is no you, so you can't validly apply logical symbols by your understanding of you and the rules of logic.

>>8411363
This guy understands.
You can't replicate matter down to half-life and quantum entangle a full brain in the exact same environment.
Just by having the brain interact with different matter, even if it is just two feet away from the original ensures that you won't necessarily see the same thing being displayed.
We see this occuring at quantum level, just imagine macro-scale.
Also entropy and irreversible loss of information would make it hard for you to get there in the first place.

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> there are people, right now, on this thread, that think they arent "real"

So does that mean there's an afterlife for you guys? You know, if the afterlife isn't real, and you aren't real, then it goes like clockwork or some 2deep4u shit

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>ITT: People who have no idea what the fuck they're talking about
>"You die every second, imprints in your brain form an illusion!"
>"If you cloned yourself you'd still be you in a different body!"
>My fucking face when reading this absolute drivel

Anyone who says they have the answer is fucking retarded. Especially people who boil it down to "we're just atoms smashing into eachother man" *hits bong* memesters. People who actually live life don't question the subjectivity, objectivity, or reality of conciousness; they live it. All this other horseshit is tears in rain.

>>8411409
Its such an easy thought process.

Why deal with the reality if being a human being when you can say some horseshit like conciousness doesnt exist, even though you have to be concious to write that out.

>People with trauma of some kind dont have an identity, its just a brain wrinkle that reminds them something bad happend
>t. A person who has never had a trauma

>Love is just a release of chemicals
>t. Someone who has never felt love

>>8411409
If life isn't real how can anything come after it?

>>8406071
based on your assumption, we are all the same person acting differently based on brain structure. As a genelogical, neurological standpoint the only change would be enviourmental; or you assumes that you are only this person, that would mean every second you think would technically be another "you". Also short sentences are for people lacking of mentalt fortitude, creating mental incoherencive. Aka short sentences are for stupid people.

>>8411422
>even though you have to be concious to write that out.
It's consciousness just not consciousness as you think of it which is necessarily a metaphysical thing and that it isn't god given doesn't really have any bearing on our(or atleast "my") experiencing of "reality".
It's just hubris on your part to think anyone who can see love in the abstract as "just" a chemical reaction is someone who mustn't have experienced "real, true" love like you have.

>>8411452
It's just as hubristic to say you fully understand something because you can see it under a microscope as well

>>8411470
Good thing i never said or implied that.

I think this question is out of the paradigm of this board. You're asking a philosophical question of what is and isn't consciousness. One day science may need to ask and answer this very question, but it isn't today, and won't be tomorrow.

>>8406071
>materialists say you idealists
>are fucking retarded
Prove them wrong
Protip: you can't

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>>8411570

> he still thinks idealism is the only opposition materialists face

>>8411277

/his/ cant into basic neuroscience, thats why

>>8406149
Building a new hard drive doesn't fill the thing with content of similar hard drives, your copied brain will have none of your memories or experience, so if you did die the next day your copy wouldn't even know how to weild a weapon to avenge yoou.

>>8413337
>>>/r/eddit

Basically this whole entire argument is is based on poor understanding of human cognitive process, specifically compartmentalization, and limits of human language. Basically no one here can give a good definition of "you".

>>8414208

Either way, "you" are a byproduct of physical activity in your brain, so if the specific little pieces that make up whatever system that "you" arise from can be replicated, then "you" should be able to be replicated again sometime in the future too

>>8415083

>Either way
>then "you" should be able to be replicated again sometime in the future too

No. What you think is possible isn't because you believe in a definition of "you" that isn't true. There never was any continuity of "self" to begin with. "It" can't be remade because "it" never existed. What would be remade is a belief in "self." Which isn't any more noteworthy than any other belief. You're conflating belief with reality. Believing you're a millionaire won't put a million dollars in your bank account. Believing in a "self" isn't the same thing as having one. Believing there is continuity of "self" isn't interchangeable with actually having that continuity. No one has ever had that continuity, and neither will the remake.

>>8415109

> "you" never existed

what the fuck do people mean by this? this keeps on popping up in the thread, and i dont know if its just some fucking meme or something "insightful"

>>8415198

>what the fuck do people mean by this?

There is such a thing as a body. There is such a thing as a brain. There are such things as cognitive functions. There is no such thing as continuity of "self."

>i dont know if its just some fucking meme or something "insightful"

Neither, it's just what's true and what isn't about physical reality. The real thing is there are memories and social feedback and they inform a belief in continuity of the linguistic fiction of "self." But there is absolutely nothing physical that corresponds to this believed continuity. No magic device in the brain ties together one moment to the next and makes it all into a unified identity. Both the beliefs this identity would be missing in a perfect remake and wouldn't be missing in a perfect remake are premised on a bad question that assumes the physical reality of something that is actually a behavioral abstraction. It'd be like if you tried looking for the number 5 or the value of a "dollar" as actual objects in physical reality. You're totally mistaking the category these "things" belong to.

>>8406071

i feel like you can easily demonstrate that it isnt you.

by standing in a room, and having someone build that exact brain thats identical to yours. yes it might be the same as you but you are here and it is there. it wont have your consciousness. if you got shot, it would carry on without you. if it got shot you would be unaffected. maybe you can say these two clones are exactly the same but it wouldnt be your personal experience or sense of self which is how i think we definen you.

fuck you OP for talking about clones, because now everyone is talking about clones instead of the "remake" of "you", which is more interesting

>>8415217
>"Identity isnt real it's just atoms, WAKE UP SHEEPLE" the post

Is everyone on this board this stupid? I'm entirely bewildered at how someone could come to this kind of a conclusion and spout it so proudly

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>>8415427

Come back when you have an argument, dualism-kun.

>Why do materialists say contradictory things all the time

Materialism is a meme.

>>8415726
Argument.
1. Perception.
2. We live in holographic spacetime. We don`t have better description.
So. If thats true, we never see the world we perceive. Its called measurement problem. So you can talk what-if but you are unable to get out of it[means all you see is not the statistical function, but materialized reality], except you have higher understandings about process of perception or practics prooving othervise.

>>8415991

this

> No such thing as essence/soul/powerwords, everything about you is reducible to physical entities and process
> Remake those processes and entities!!! It won't be you, because, you know, you cant reproduce individuals, because ummm, you just cant

>>8406071
You are the consciousness of yourself. Even if a living being is exactly cloned as you, YOU wouldn't be the new body as you'll be conscious that the other you is there, but you won't be able to make choices for the new clone of you (you might have the same choices at first, but will depart as environmental factors change both).

Think of this: how you achieved consciousness of your current "You" and not from other living being? Are the other living beings conscious (this supports the theory of "you are the universe and the only living being")? Or are you all living beings at the same time, but in different time laps? In this case, you become your clone once your current and original self dies and loses consciousness.

>>8413452

t. /his/

>>8406071

the only people who deny this are people who misinterpret positivism to mean that because subjectivity can only be "reported," an identical report indicates an identical subject.

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>Everything you are is simply atoms
>You can clone your brain and be alive again as you
>People on a science board actually truly believe this

Quite a few people said in this thread that you die every moment of time and you don't truly have a self. I can almost come to terms with this concept, the only thing that perplexes me is why in any given moment am I experiencing from the perspective of this body and not someone elses? Also, how does conciousness get allocated in the first place? what was my experience before birth and what happened so that I ended up experiencing a reality from this mind? I know no one can answer these for certain but I can't figure out how I might explain these ideas away.

>>8406071
you wouldnt have to clone it on a quatum level for it to be exactly the same, which is simply not possible (not saying concsiousness is a quantum property or anything, but the random nature of particles has an effect on all physical proceses around them)

>>8406071
Have you ever played the Metal Gear: Solid series?

Liquid Snake isn't Big Boss.

>>8416366
We're simply just a software inside a biological hardware - if you clone that software in similar hardware it will believe it's unique and that it's a person = it's the software duty to do so.

>>8416388
The same force is behind the motion of everything, but the human body is only measuring that force at the points where it interacts with the body most of the time. Familiarity with anything reveals the presence of the force within it and causes it to appear "connected" to everything the specific body also has force awareness of. Likewise, awareness of the force itself allows humans to "cheat" and gain familiarity of objects without conventional interaction.

>>8416430
Sure, but even though the clone will have your memories and will behave like you, you'd still be dead

>>8416388
Because its a horseshit idea and borders on the metaphysical. You die every second? How can you align with this and not align with something like a soul?

>>8416430
>Conciousness is software
>You can upload it into another brain

>>8416388
youre making a fallacy as if conscious experience is detached form the physical world. you are asking non-questions.

>>8406090
>A copy will always be inferior to the original due it not being first.
This is the most retarded shit I heard

>>8416430
no, we are our hardware. theres no separation.

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> There are no such things as souls or an afterlife!!!
> But yeah man, you die every second, no such thing as "you"

Modern "skepticism" in a nutshell

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>>8416564
they are trying to bypass the problem of mapping internally consistent discrete categories onto continuous dimensions. they are just using innapropriate language.

>>8416571

but its still easy to plain out say that "we" are products of physical processes that occur between physical bodies (neurons), and that these processes and physical bodies change as time goes by

change isnt the same as death. by saying that, its easy to prove OP correct, since we seem to be conscious at the current moment, and then that moment passes and we would become conscious in some future moment

by saying that, materialists unironically side with dualists in the sense that death doesnt end consciousness, and consciousness technically survives death since death is equal to time for them

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>>8406071
>>8406071
>Why do materialists say that a clone/remake of your brain wouldn't be "you", if "you" are a result of a physical process?

You just killed all the materialists with one single good question.

>>8416614
The thing that causes the sensation of "we" is a currently unknown universal force. The idea that it comes from within the body raises the question of why. If it was internal in origin, it would serve no purpose.

>>8416614
ha i was kinda bullshitting abit im so high i dont even remember what this thread i about

>>8416631
it doesnt need a why, it just is. there is no mysterious force. we are our brains.

>>8416690
>There's nothing to know, MAN, everything just IS.

>>8416690
>"I don't feel like a human being, so why should anyone else" the post

WERE JUST PINK AND SPONGEY WAKE UP SHEEPLE

>>8416616

This

Physicalists and Materialists hate it when they are told that if their explanation is simple enough to be described as a process, then it is simple enough to replicate.

> but dude like you have like a physical-based sense of "yourself" that isnt actually physical because you aren't actually real so even though "you" are physical, there can only ever be one you thus that means you are special but you arent actually special because you cant transfer between physical brains and how can mirrors be real if our eyes arent real

>>8416694
>>8416699

you all deeply confuse me

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>>8406071
It would be a perfect replication of you/me and not actually you/me.

Everyone could see there are now two where before there was only one, and it is obvious one is the original and one is new.

YOU would not experience anything through this new copy of yourself, it would have its own experience and have its own thoughts separate from you.

So it is obvious to conclude this is not you, it is a copy who will live its own life separate from you.

I don't see why people have such a problem with the idea of ESP. The alternative is believing in a bunch of self-contradictory models, or pretending that no issue exists in the first place.

>>8416831
I do not reject the idea.

>>8416831
Esp? Explain

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>>8416831

>tfw when people use acronyms no one knows when they know they only going to have to explain it later.

So the soul exists. If "me" is the product of the brain. A same brain should product the same "me".

>>8416868
The core idea of extra sensory perception is that everything in the universe shares the same "animating force", and that the anomaly of human perception is caused by them having the very limited ability to sense that force in its pure form. So the sense of "self acting" is really the sense of "universe acting". From there, the idea is that you can briefly raise that sense through intense focus and gain information through unconventional means.

>>8416788

>you aren't actually real so even though "you" are physical, there can only ever be one you

No, you're misunderstanding the concept of no continuity of "self." It is not a matter of:
>there can only ever be one you
It's that there never was any "you" to begin with. There is no magical force that binds together each moment of a brain's processes into a single identity. That's the root of the misunderstandings here. There's an implication materialism doesn't make sense because if it were true then one could remake a person and there would be continuity of "self" between the original and the remake. In reality that question is nonsense because it assumes there's such a thing as continuity of "self" in the original when there isn't. The question confuses people's intuitions because:
A) Most people believe in continuity of "self" as a real thing in everyday life.
B) Most people can tell being teleported into the future just because someone remade your body doesn't make sense.
So the cognitive dissonance between A and B make people assume something's missing in the remake even though it's perfect and contains everything physical there is about the original. All of this stop looking like a contradiction if the assumption of continuity of "self" as a real / physical thing even in the original's day to day living is examined closer. Nature has no need to construct "self" binding magic that makes "experiences" in one moment share in identity with "experiences" from other moments. All that's required are memories. Each moment of a given person has memories with information from the previous moments. From that information, a continuity of "self" is inferred, not as a real / physical thing but as a useful fiction. The remake would also believe in it, but that's not the same as saying it (or the original, or anyone else ever) actually has continuity of "self" in physical reality.

>>8416892

are you stupid?

you dont see a car, manufacture another one exaclty the same and say they are the same... they are two different entities.

can you not see how its possible to have two different people that are exactly the same?

>>8416915
You keep spouting this bit at this point its nothing more than personal belief. Unless you have proof, data, numbers, etc. youre nothing more than someone else pompously throwing an opinion around

>>8416948

Burden of proof is on you to identify the physical thing you believe makes continuity of "self" happen.

>>8416831

what you say makes no sense. get out. just go. please. just go.


>tfw when /sci/ is full of DUMB FUCKS.

>>8416954
Classic deflection.

The fact that I'm alive with a self contained set of preferences, stylistic choices, beliefs, and an identity favors there being a self over whatever the fuck it is youre saying. It's "hits bong" tier tripe to say that you dont really exist and that being is an illusion when youre existing and being to make that statement.

>>8416954
urrrrrrghhhhhhhhh hmmmmmmmm

>tfw brain.

>>8416915
The self is the some of its parts, its not an illusion or a beliefe system. If my memories, actions, beliefs, upringing all make up "me" when put together, then I myself am real by virtue of being the unified thing. A car isnt a farce because its made of wheels, metal and an airbag, those things make the car. Other thigs lend to the self, but this sci fi tier horseshit about dying every second and the brain playing tricks is cancerous for a science board.

>>8416933

If you manufacture a replica of a car, the two cars should have the same performance.

If the condition are the same, the results are the same.


This kind of reasoning does not work with humans. Hence the conclusion that the human is not just a biological machine.

>are you stupid?

>>8416966

>deflection

It's not anyone's job to prove a negative. Burden of proof is on people seeking to argue something does exist, not on those denying it.

>The fact that I'm alive with a self contained set of preferences, stylistic choices, beliefs, and an identity favors there being a self over whatever the fuck it is youre saying.

Well first of all, citing "identity" as evidence of "self" is retarded. They're the same idea. Secondly, the rest of that "evidence" doesn't argue for a real / physical "self." They argue for the same thing my posts have, that "self" isn't a real / physical mechanism but instead a convenient fiction inferred from things like memory. It's an abstraction spoken / behaved around, not a real thing in itself. Here are some real things that the brain does, with the evidence for each being the corresponding neurological condition where each thing stops working:

1) Memories are real (Korsakoff's syndrome is an inability to form memories)
2) Language comprehension is real (Aphasia is an inability to comprehend or use language)
3) The processing of sensory input is real (Agnosia is an inability to process sensory information).

There is no such neurological condition for the inability to have continuity of "self." This is because continuity of "self" isn't a real thing the brain does. At best, psychiatric conditions could be identified where people have distress over *beliefs* about "self" and its continuity. Which is exactly what these posts have been arguing in favor of: it's not a real / physical thing; it's just a belief. Carrying over beliefs in a remake won't make the original "self" teleport to the future, and in fact the original never moved from one moment to the next in the first place. The idea of something connecting each moment of a brain's activity to every other moment in a person's life is an idea, not a reality.

>>8406071
It won't be you because you were created in a specific space and time and there were a really big chain of event's that led to your birth and then development. The copy is a copy because it was created later than you.

>>8416978

>The self is the some of its parts, its not an illusion or a beliefe system. If my memories, actions, beliefs, upringing all make up "me" when put together, then I myself am real by virtue of being the unified thing. A car isnt a farce because its made of wheels, metal and an airbag, those things make the car.

No auto repair shop is going to ever find a problem in the "unification" of your car. Similarly no physical thing in the brain is ever going to be identified as responsible for continuity of "self." You're conflating physical things with abstractions, which is the same problem for almost every other wrong post in this thread.

>>8417002
Agree to disagree. Saying identity is a false belief is something I can't get behind.

>>8416991
what are you talking about. what is it that doesnt exactly work with humans?

it would theoretically work with humans. same conditions, same outcomes. two humans. yes they maybe exactly the same, same thoughts. but it doesnt stop there being two humans. yes they are the same "you" in physical description, but they arent the same subjective you, the experience. that is completely plausible. it would be the same as having identical twins brought up in two different universes with exactly the same experiences. yes they would be exactly the same but they arent eachother are they?

>>8417015
Totally missed the point. Parts make a car, no one disputes that cars are a false concept. Memories, upbringing, etc make up the self. We're literally experiencing it as we type this

>>8417028
Debates is a better word than dispute but still.

>>8417015
>>8417002

cant even follow whos on whos side or what the sides are

>>8417028

>Parts make a car, no one disputes that cars are a false concept.

It depends entirely on what the context and meaning of "false concept" is. In the context of an auto repair shop, the "unification" of your car definitely doesn't exist. No "unification" of a car will ever be broken or subsequently repaired. Similarly, in the context of physical reality, the continuity of "self" definitely doesn't exist. No continuity of 'self" will ever be diseased or subsequently treated by a neurologist. These are abstractions, not physical things. That's the problem with the confusion in this thread. People are inferring materialism is wrong because an abstraction mistaken as a physical thing wouldn't exist in a physical remake. Gilbert Ryle spends a lot of his book Concept of Mind going over this problem:

http://s-f-walker.org.uk/pubsebooks/pdfs/Gilbert_Ryle_The_Concept_of_Mind.pdf

>A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks ‘But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your University.’

>>8416978
Something isn't real just because languages have a word for it.

>>8417047
>What is multiple personality disorder

>>8417059

>multiple personality disorder

First of all, you picked one of the most controversial, least well established psychiatric condition there is (real name is dissociative identity disorder, and it has a history of being doubted as a legitimate condition). Secondly, see:

>>8417002

>There is no such neurological condition for the inability to have continuity of "self." This is because continuity of "self" isn't a real thing the brain does. At best, psychiatric conditions could be identified where people have distress over *beliefs* about "self" and its continuity. Which is exactly what these posts have been arguing in favor of: it's not a real / physical thing; it's just a belief.

>>8417065
So admit this then. You dont really exist, all of your dreams and hopes and wants and good times and bad times and nostalgia and all that shit isnt real. Otherwise, I'm not fucking interested. Admit to me you dont exist and youre just a bunch of worthless atoms and I'll agree with you.

>>8416473
Well it's not software in computer science terms - it's just produced by the brain, tied to it - brain is damaged so is consciousness.

>>8416503
Who implied there's any separation - but you could have a machine hardware to simulate exactly the same that our biological one does.

>>8417069

>You dont really exist, all of your dreams and hopes and wants and good times and bad times and nostalgia and all that shit isnt real.
>you dont exist

You're not wrong, senpai. Until:

>youre just a bunch of worthless atoms

No, "you" isn't a bunch of atoms. "You" is an abstraction. The brain is a bunch of atoms. Memories are patterns of the brain's electro-chemical activity. "You" / continuity of "self" in contrast with *both* the brain and memories falls into neither category. Probably no one will seriously argue "you" is a physical structure like the brain. But what also shouldn't be argued is that continuity of "self" is a pattern of electro-chemical activity like memories are. Because continuity of "self" isn't even that. It's a useful abstracton / idea / fiction that isn't true in reality. There is no brain function responsible for making each moment connected to / identified with the next. The abstraction of continuity is a story we tell ourselves to have an alternative way of speaking and behaving about the world than what strict literal accuracy would afford us. Same thing with numbers or monetary value. These "things" aren't things at all; they're very useful pretenses.

>>8417107
What an arrogant dick. You reading a book on the mind doesnt make you right

>>8417107
im confused here because your sense of self is determined by your brain. we can sense the states of our own body and of the outside world and there is a boundary between them and that is encoded by the brain and when you disrupt parts of the brain, you disrupt a sense of self like in schizophrenia for example. i think our brain does actively create a sense of self. "you" is the brain or defined by certain parts of it or networks in it.

im not exactly sure what is meant by continuity of self

>>8417148

Not an argument.

>>8417153

>im confused here because your sense of self is determined by your brain.
>sense of self
>im not exactly sure what is meant by continuity of self

Short answer is belief vs. reality. Your brain does generate a "sense of self." As in a belief. But what this belief is a belief of isn't physically real. This is why nobody expects to be teleported into the future when a physically identical remake is put together. The remake would have that belief, but wouldn't have the reality of what that belief refers to. The part that a lot of people aren't recognizing is that the original itself doesn't have the reality of what that belief refers to. None of us do.

>>8417175
But I don't believe that I exist, I'm literally experiencing it. If I stop "believing" I'm not going to dissapear now am I?

>>8417175
what do you mean by belief though. or not physical. it is physical if its encoded in the neural activity of your brain :s beliefs are encoded physically in your brain.

i dont expect to jump forward if another remake was made either. id just think as there would be a remake and the remake would have a remake sense of self, not yours.

you dont necessarily have to have the reality of what the "belief" would refer to either just as memories dont. we can have confabulated memories. but doesnt mean they still arent physical.

>>8417218

>If I stop "believing" I'm not going to dissapear now am I?

You're trying to make it seem like the belief in "you" is just another way of referring to "you." It's not. There is no "you." There is a belief in "you." The thing the belief refers to isn't real. If you don't participate in this belief, what goes away is the belief. "You" don't "disappear" because "you" never were there in the first place.

Let's go back to the neurology / psychiatry examples. A psychiatrist could treat an issue you have with your *beliefs* in "self." If you report that you feel like you have multiple personalities, they might give you a psychiatric diagnosis. This is, again, all about *belief*, not reality. No one believes there's something physically wrong in your brain that has caused your "self" to stop functioning properly. The problem is that you've begun to believe something abnormal and unhealthy.

>>8417231

>what do you mean by belief though. or not physical. it is physical if its encoded in the neural activity of your brain :s beliefs are encoded physically in your brain.

A child's belief in Santa Claus is encoded in their brain. That belief in Santa Claus isn't the same thing as the reality of Santa Claus. Belief in "self" isn't the same thing as a reality of "self."

>>8417243
But you dont make sense, still 17 posts later. If I dont believe in it, I still feel it. I am it. Your circular logic is just confusing at this point

>>8417250

>If I dont believe in it, I still feel it.

You believe you feel "it."

>>8417245
What then is the reality of self? Disregard the bullshit about cloning. What is the reality right now in this moment according to you?

>>8417252
No I literally feel it fampai. I have no idea how youre not supposed to feel being alive

>>8417255

>What is the reality right now in this moment according to you?

There is a body. There is a brain. There are brain processes including memory formation and recall. There are thoughts. There are emotions. There are habits. There are beliefs. There is no continuity of "self." There is a belief in continuity of "self," but the thing that belief refers to doesn't have any sort of existence as a physical thing like the brain does, nor does it have any sort of physical process based existence like memories do. The belief is based on memories.

>>8417267
And continuity of self then? Youve yet to explain what that is

>>8417270

It is a fictional convenience like numbers or monetary value. It doesn't really exist at all except as an imaginary reference point to speak and behave around.

>>8417274
So identity is false then? That's what you believe?

>>8417277

It's not any more real than numbers or monetary value are. It has the exact same categorical status as them. If you told me you couldn't find the number 8 inside an octopus or the $5 inside a five dollar footlong sub from Subway, I would tell you you're looking for things that aren't actually there in physical reality.

>>8417286
So then, my aptly named anonymous friend, how does one as sad as you live life with no identity? Do you tell people this when they call your name, warn them before hand?

>>8417245
but there are neurological injuries and disorders that can interrupt your sense of self and consciousness.

the "belief" is still encoded in your brain. all experience is. theres no real distinction between reality and belief. your body and mind cannot have direct contact with the causes of the world, only sensory input. and all experience including "beliefs" require input. those inputs between "belief" and reality are functionally the same and infact the most modern perspective they definitely are the same and infact all of the brains experiences can be cast as predictive "beliefs" and that there is an inherent ambiguity in sensory input which is many to one so there is not even an objective inference or interpretation of stimuli necessarily. its probabilistic. and thats why we have visual and auditory illusions or why schizophrenics have weird experiences. theres even a phrase, the fantastic organ for the brain which creates reality rather than passively experiences it.

>>8417290

>how does one as sad as you live life with no identity?

You're confusing categories. Go back and read these:

>>8417274
>>8417286

Just because I wouldn't look for the $5 inside a five dollar footlong sub from Subway doesn't mean I don't understand how to take a five dollar bill and exchange it for a sub. I can use the pronouns that refer to a "self" like the first word in this sentence and I can interact with other people while referring to their selves and my self without needing to believe any of that self referencing has the physical status of a rock or even the physical process status of the brain activity that allows for memories to exist.

>>8417296

>theres no real distinction between reality and belief.

There definitely is a distinction between reality and belief. Just because you believe you have multiple sclerosis doesn't mean you have multiple sclerosis.

>>8417304

no, i know there is in the objective physical world out there a distinction between reality and belief. but im saying, in terms of the neuronal states of your brain, there is no distinction because they functionally rely on the same inputs and the neurons still fire. and if your belief of self is encoded in your brain... then isnt that a physical self.

>>8417300
>Acts as though he has a self
>Claims to not havs a self

>>8417323

Go back and read these:

>>8417274
>>8417286

>>8417319

Belief and reality are still distinct even in the context of "neuronal states of your brain." Memories are a good example of something real that exist as brain processes. Continuity of "self" doesn't exist in the way memories do. Belief in continuity of "self" does. It's like the distinction between belief in numbers and numbers as a real thing. Belief in numbers exists in the brain. Numbers as a real thing don't exist anywhere.

>>8417330
memories arent as real as you think they are. its well known episodic memory is not a one-to-one mapping of reality. they are constructions influenced by prior predictions that are well known to be inconsistent and unreliable.

new models in neuroscience have that your sense of self, your episodic memories, your perception of the environment are all produced through the same hierarchical generative models in your brain that differ on levels of abstraction and information integration. you also have memories which can be thought to be not real like general memories.


the self does exist as brain processes. it has to otherwise you wouldnt feel it. all experience has neural correlates and we feel a sense of ownership, agency and self. it does exist through the brain. your sense of self.

i dont really see why physical reality outside makes that much of a difference. its abit arbitrary in terms of discriminating betwen brain processes especially as we dont have direct contact with the outside world.

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> mfw materialists STILL keep pushing the "we die every second" meme
> mfw they unironically are supporting what dualists say and they dont even know it

>>8417274
>>8417286

Numbers are used for measurements, there are 7 days in a week, 4 weeks in a month, and so on, while consciousness isn't something we use as a unit, nor can we quantitatively measure it.

If you have a clone that is alive in the present, you will not experience both bodies because the brains are not connected.

If we preserved your dead body until we can bring you back to life, then it would be you.

If your brain gets obliterated but everything about it was recorded and written down and then reconstructed using material-sources not directly from the original brain, it would not be you, but a perfect clone to the outside observer.

Consider your body a car. The driver is *you-you* but the body, memories, brainconnections are all just the car or what *people's-idea-of-you*. There can very well be 2 identical cars, and they can even be driven the same way, but the *driver* behind them will be different. If your body dies, aka the car stops running, but it stays intact, theres a chance you can be brought back to life. If your car gets disassembled and reassembled but you, the driver, have gone somewhere else, the reassembled "you" will have a different *driver* although no outside observer would know.

Consciousness is whack, and it's driven humankind to philosophy, religion, and to the sciences. Depending on where you *give up*, will be who you become. We are all philosopher's, but it's your choice in taking the red pill or the blue pill.

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you can't make a direct copy because at the exact moment you think you're done you have added elements to your own brain's structure that aren't in the copy, which would make it different.

prove me wrong RIGHT now.

>>8406086

I want everyone who enters this thread to read this post because it's the average /sci/entific illiterate. they come to this board because they think having "science & math" in their web history makes them look smarter but in reality they just have no idea what the fuck they are talking about and want to tell everybody the truths of the universe.

>Ctrl+F "no-cloning theorem"
>no results

>>8417844

the fact that you can't build a device that replicates an arbitrary quantum system is irrelevant to the philosophical question that if you did, would an exact replica of you be "you"

>>8417847
It is plenty relevant. This is /sci/, not /lit/, and OP's question sits on a readily disproved premise. How do you scientifically argue over something you know that can never be tested, and admits no mathematical formalization whatsoever?
At least string theory is backed up by nice maths. This kind of questions, on the other hand, is a pointless exercise in babby-tier pseudo-philosophy.

>>8417430
>Numbers are used for measurements, there are 7 days in a week, 4 weeks in a month, and so on
Literally social constructs
>while consciousness isn't something we use as a unit, nor can we quantitatively measure it.
Yet

>>8417679

where do science people give up?

>>8417430

>we die every second

You keep approaching the idea with your original bad dualist assumptions. It's not that we die every second. It's that there is no magical process that turns all those separate moments into one unified "self." Imagine a long line of rocks laid out next to each other. Nothing makes those rocks share in an identity except their nearness to each other and similar form to one another. It's the same along the temporal axis for people. A long line of body-moments are lined up, and each body-moment has a sense of continuity with others in the line. In reality, there is no continuity. A clone or remake would have the same belief in continuity, and neither the clone / remake nor the original would be any different in their lacj of actual continuity.

Think of it like RAM, when the power goes of so does the data... memory is still phisically the same but "you" just got blue screened

>>8417856

> you guys have to wait for technology to develop before talking about it
> pls stop talking about this

>>8418152

What units would be assigned to consciousness? Liters? Meters? Celsius?

>>8418301

How can you dismiss dualism when you adopt some view that states that there are mutliple body-moments that we jump from and to as time goes by?

>>8418302

The data still would work on the "remake" even if it was bluescreened

>>8419286

>there are mutliple body-moments that we jump from and to as time goes by

No, you brainlet. If you're looking at body-moments laid out next to one another along the temporal axis there is no "jumping." You keep on trying to insert your original bad assumptions about dualism and "self" continuity into the explanation that shows why those things aren't there. The continuity of "self" is inferred from memories and nothing is "jumping" between those different moments. They're all just there laid out next to each other and memories and thoughts form a story about them being the same when they aren't. This is why the remake wouldn't be any more or less valid than any of the original bodies in time. They're all equally not sharing in an identity. The remake won't make the "consciousness" of any of the originals teleport to the future just as none of the originals make the "consciousness" of the preceding moments teleport forward.

See:

>>8409755

The belief in continuity of "self" is a fictional abstraction of the real nearness and similarity along the temporal axis that we infer meaning from and make predictions based on. This is very similar to the fictional abstraction of numbers. Three rocks and three days have nothing physically real to do with one another, but we abstract out a fictional meaning that we can use to infer meaning and make predictions in ways we wouldn't have access to were we limited to strict literal discernment of the world.

>>8419286
> What units would be assigned to consciousness? Liters? Meters? Celsius?
You can just make up units for any new concept. The closest to brain activity is probably teraflops, but that doesn't measure realistic capabilities of AI either. Consciousness is a physical process, plain and simple. We just haven't discovered how the brain works yet.

>>8419377

> body-moments laid out next to one another along the temporal axis

how do the future body-moments exist then? what medium are these "body-moments" in, because you make it seem like they are stops in a train route.

and there still seems to be the issue of being revived in the future, since it would just be a gap in these "body-moments"

>>8419399

>how do the future body-moments exist then?

The same as the present and past body-moments exist. Past, present, and future are all relative to which body-moment's perspective you're talking about. You believe your "now" is a special "now," the "real now," but the mediocrity principle that the mainstream cosmology model (Lambda-CDM) is premised on states:

>If an item is drawn at random from one of several sets or categories, it's likelier to come from the most numerous category than from any one of the less numerous categories

And this means just as we have no reason to believe the Earth occupies a central position in the universe, we also have no reason to believe our relative "now" occupies a central position in time. Every "now" including the "now" of velociraptors in the Crestaceous Period and the hypothetical "now" of the Alpha Centauri colonists in the year 500,000 is equally valid to "our" own.

>what medium are these "body-moments" in, because you make it seem like they are stops in a train route.

There is no medium. They're just part of the overall shape of our observable universe's space-time. Nothing can move between them because motion would require time and we're looking at time as part of a shape in this view of things. The illusions of movement and causality would exist as abstractions of qualities that nearby and structurally similar shapes would share in. Without the temporal axis, we see this as laws of physics, where you can predict results based on the same sorts of input. With the temporal axis as part of the picture, we can see the reason these laws seem to exist is that the observable universe is filled with self-similar shape patterns.

>>8418302
But "you" existed as a couple voltages (electricity) in a certain combination. When the power went out and the "Ram" cleared the storage, the voltages went elsewhere. "YOU" may never end up back in the same state, but that doesn't mean "you" dont exist. Where did you go? Can you be retrieved?

>>8418169
Science people give up when:
Take the red pill,
you stay in wonderland
and
I show you
>how deep the rabbit hole goes

>>8406090
Fuck you Gilgamesh

File: the-thing3.jpg (728KB, 1431x807px) Image search: [Google]

728KB, 1431x807px

It may look and act like you, but it's not you.

See also: movie related.

>>8420227
Define "you"

But srsly, each one will be thinking the same thing. That it is the true "you". The clone will have effectively lived an entire lifetime identical to yours. Consciousness itself has the "you" and self-identity as absolute truth, as part of the whole illusion. No matter what, your consciousness will tell you your existence is validated.

> all these tard anons think the copy of you is "you" 100%

I bet you also think identical twins can hop into each others bodies and have first person view after doing so

>>8420374
If the clone is created artificially as an exact copy of you at a moment in time, the clone will in fact "hop" into that body from where you are at the time. The clone will be you as if you had "hopped" into that body from yours. It would recall that it had been where you were standing a moment before and have existed and lived as long as you have. His consciousness has been created artificially but it is just as real to him as yours.

>>8420374

If you are a product of physical processes, then the copy should be a continuation if you are already dead, because the "illusion of you" would be able to spring up from the remake

>>8420424

If you're saying the "you" is an illusion (and I would personally agree it is) then nothing is actually being continued.

>>8420389
It is still a copy that is not even "me" even if it has my latest minute memory. Anything the clone is experiencing or is going to experience after its creation I am not going to experience it myself as I am not in that clone's body. The clone at best is just simulating what I would do or experience if I were to be in that clone's position

>>8420424
So you are implying reincarnation is real?

>>8420448
To everyone else, the clone is you. If you were already dead, people will say you were resurrected. Would you reconstruct a dead loved one if they could manufacture a perfect clone from a time before death. You don't even have to tell the clone it ever died. In fact, you might be a clone.

>>8420451

I don't know if thats what what I said could be interpreted as. Reincarnation implies "you" were remade, it technically wouldn't be reincarnation if "you" didn't pass on to some other life form. Survival of consciousness after death is more along what I would suppose happens if you can be remade. Somebody has been saying that there are "body moments", and we go along them so there should be no reason to think that death is just a larger gap in between two body moments that the end of the line

If so, then it seems like there could be an afterlife, whether religious or secular.

>>8420613

than the end of the line*

>>8406071
Depends on your definition of 'you'. If the information pattern is 'you', then it is definitely you, just like a copy of an MP3 is the same song.

But if 'you' includes the medium - then it's not you, just like you can have two copies of the same MP3 file.

Keep in mind once the copy is complete, it's no longer 'you' because immediately the experiences differ. So it's kind of a moot point.

>>8419286
>> you guys have to wait for technology to develop before talking about it
>> pls stop talking about this
t. nigger who ignores the most basic principles of QM. I bet you also believe that the only reason we don't have superluminal travel yet is because "we have to wait for technology to develop".

>>8420976

its a thought experiment you idiot

lets say that >you< can suck 99 cocks at the same time

you cant actually suck 99 cocks at the same time because they all wont fit, but that doesnt excuse the thought experiment's original premise that you are a faggot

anybody will say that you are a faggot (which is true), but hardly anyone will point out "hurr 99 cocks r 2 big"

>>8406308

so how would these two brains connect through space to share experience (if that's what you're claiming)?

>>8421232
Ok, actually made me giggle, you false-analogy–loving faggot. Go on, philosophize to your heart's content. I won't stop you.