Brain uploading is the Great Filter, you cannot pass it without

>>7643600
>you
Replace this word with "clone" "identical child" or "knockoff" and your post becomes coherent.

You are you. And it is it. Any other definition of "I" results in disjointed ideas.

The first generation of brain uploads would be designed by meat brains, they would try to replicate meat stuff like emotions and individuality, but the computer brains would quickly realize there's no point to these limitations and would redesign themselves to be a single hivemind processing unit.
So basically humanity would be dead anyway.

>>7643609
Then we are back to the classic Theseus' paradox.
What makes "you" you? The cells in your body are being constantly replaced by newer ones.
Maybe the constant flow of electrical impulses and memories are your identity, but that can be carried over too.

>>7643609
There's no continuity to consciousness. From one moment to the next the new you is a 'clone' to use your own terminology. An upload would just cause a fork and generate two clones instead of one.

If an upload is just a "knockoff" "clone" that you care nothing about at all you can just go ahead and kill yourself right now because your future self is equally much "knockoff" and "clone" as an upload would be.

>>7643611
>The first generation of brain uploads would be designed by meat brains, they would try to replicate meat stuff like emotions and individuality

Upload != AI.

An upload emulates the brain in every aspect, it's just running on different hardware.

>>7643616
I don't think Thesues' paradox is a paradox at all. It's easily reconciled by dropping the concept of intrinsic identity and realizing the function of memory in human perception.

I do agree it hits a paradox though, it's just based around our lack of understanding about time. Consciousness cannot be comprehended without also understanding time. Why am I me, in the way I experience me as me? I don't know. I don't even know if time is linear, nor granular. I just don't know, but using what is known, it's heavily weighted against this duplication being anything other than a clone. Even if the body, and the material world itself, is just a proxy for something else that transcends our universe, there's nothing to suggest it could be forced to transfer.

>>7643618
That doesn't make any sense.

Two things are omnipresent, yourself and your environment. But that's all. There's never another you. If you duplicate an exact copy of yourself, it still hasn't changed. There's just another thing standing there now, something that looks and acts like you.

If you ask it from another angle, for example cutting the brain in half (somehow keeping the brainstem intact), which one are you? That's much more meaningful. In that case I'd have to say you die entirely, a true death, and two new things come into "existence" in your place. Even if only in a purely mechanical, functional sense.

>>7643621
What is the difference?
An uploaded brain would still be AI by definition but with organic "flaws" being simulated, the first generation of AI would see no point in these flaws in the same way we see no point in staying organic which was my point to begin with.

>>7643634
>That doesn't make any sense.
It makes perfect sense.

>Two things are omnipresent, yourself and your environment.
You are not omnipresent. During sleep and other states of unconsciousness You don't exist. You are generated by the brain, which is a part of the environment and can go through persistent changes. But you are not the brain itself.

Without the active generation of a new You based on the structures of the brain there will be no You. If we sedate you and hook up your brain to probes wires and stimulators that block and alter memory and personality we can wake up an entirely different You depending on what stimulation the computers decide to apply. We are not actually manipulating an old and persistent You, we're creating a new one in each and every instance.

> for example cutting the brain in half (somehow keeping the brainstem intact), which one are you?
Simple, there's 2 new Yous instead of one new You. Brain function alterting and splitting is entirely compatible with the new-You thesis, it's only under the continuous consciousness model that is ever is a problem, which makes Occams Razor support the nonpersistent You model.

>>7643616
Mind upload is swampman, and >>7643609 is 100% correct.
Brain computerisation is theseus' ship, and the only way to switch to a more durable substrate than meat without dying in the process.

>>7643662
>During sleep and other states of unconsciousness You don't exist
Yeah because mri of sleeping faggots show no activity, and lucid dreaming is /x/ territory, right ?
You a philosophy major ?

>>7643662
>During sleep and other states of unconsciousness You don't exist.
That hinges on how you define "I". I very much exist when I'm asleep, I'm just in a different state and functioning differently. Or, as you put, "I" am being generated differently by the underlying machinery involved. But it's a part of a greater spectrum of me's I can be. A me itself can be viewed as entirely separate from state or mood as well, but it's all part of one whole.

>But you are not the brain itself.
Impossible to meaningfully evaluate. I'm not fond of speaking in isms, but dualism is one thing that will likely never truly be resolved.

>We are not actually manipulating an old and persistent You, we're creating a new one in each and every instance.
This assumes time is granular and can be viewed in "instances". I'm apt to think it is, however. This really revolves around a core disagreement about what "identity" is. There's nothing to really say, because it can't be addressed either way. Functionally, with what we know about time and consciousness, the path of least resistance is that identity can and does persistently exist. It's arbitrarily imposed by our faculties based on stored information.

Whether consciousness is persistent or every instance is a death and rebirth, makes little difference. They both say the same thing in a different way.

>>7643635
Emotions and individuality are not flaws.

Emotions are high level drives that involves quite complex information processing.

Individuality is a diversification strategy that ensures not all eggs are in the same basket.

An AI that rejects emotions would be useful as a tool but wouldn't last long on its own. AIs that reject individuality might as well commit mass suicide and be replaced by robotic actuators slaved to a single unit, becuase they're all going to be thinking the same thing anyway.

What Uploads would do isn't to remove a human traits but to append additional functions and alterations to enhance the best parts of human traits and suppress the worst parts.

Emotional moderation to not succumb to rage, hedonism or ideological biases would just mean they're cool headed humans.

Collectivism links where innate expertise can be directly utilized by another individual wouldn't destroy invidiuality, it would instead allow each individual to access the best and most unique traits of everyone else, allowing for an extreme level of cooperation.

Because it's all digital recombinant individuals could also be made. Expertise could be accumulated and combined with a self-sacrificing person that genuinely enjoy helping others and society. Newly uploaded persons could also be introduced to upload-land with direct mind links which would enormously reduce social friction.

So while mankind fights over resources and bickers in the outside world the uploads would form a stable Utopia of highly competent persons.

>>7643668
>Yeah because mri of sleeping faggots show no activity

activity != consciousness.

Also, fMRI measures blood flow to brain parts, not activity. That would be EEG, but if I put a shotgun in your mouth and pull the trigger I'll still see remnant EEG activity for a while after everyone agrees that you're certainly completely fucking dead.

If you insist though: With enough general anesthesia(which blocks the ion channels and prevents electrical activity) you'll get a flatline EEG, equivalent to a braindead person.

But I guess being a retarded fucking moron like yourself still insist that a You exists in the shadow realm while that happens because you're unredeemable dualist.

>>7643690
The dualist here is the one suggesting spawning a clone somehow equals immortality.

You're the process not the blueprint, deal with it.

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26KB, 519x526px

>>7643600
>human condition
Explain that first, you armchair philosopher faggot.

>>7643677
>I very much exist when I'm asleep
No you don't, your body and brain exists but your consciousness isn't there.

>I'm just in a different state and functioning differently
If I jump into an industrial waste grinder I'm still there in a different state and functioning differently.

>Impossible to meaningfully evaluate.
Possible to meaningfully evaluate. If I scoop your brain out of your head and put it in formaldehyde jar you're not going to be around even if your brain persists for a few hundred years, you are an active manifestation of a working brain.

>This assumes time is granular and can be viewed in "instances".
Percieved time is granular because the brain operates with spike based information transduction. No spikes, no you. If we supress neuron spiking your EEG flatlines instantly, your sensory information is blanked out, your thinking ceases and your muscles all go limp.

>Whether consciousness is persistent or every instance is a death and rebirth, makes little difference. They both say the same thing in a different way.
Because reality already exists it's obvious that whatever version you buy to describe reality isn't going to change reality itself, but the discrete one have better explanatory power and is simpler. Of course it says that you're not a special snowflake so it's obvious that people will raise objections because of that.

>>7643692
>The dualist here is the one suggesting spawning a clone somehow equals immortality.
That's yourself then as I've never said anything about immortality? Oh you tried to make a strawman?

I'm saying a clone is no different from business as usual, it's just as much you as you've ever been.

I never said anything about immortality. What the discrete version says about immortality is that it's nonissue because there's no persistent you to preserve. As you are generated de novo several times every second you're also constantly dying as many times every second. Whatever you that exists now is dead and gone when you've finished reading this sentence, if it somehow was persistent you could go back in time and stop reading the sentence, but instead you're just left with a shallow memory.

It's only persistent consciousness wankers like yourself that care about immortality and your magical dualist special snowflake soul. It's also why you'll stay human forever and contribute to the well deserved ruin of mankind.

>>7643694
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_condition
here you go you smug philosophy master faggot.

>>7643695
>No you don't, your body and brain exists but your consciousness isn't there.
It's just there in a different way. Dreams are an example of this. Being only half asleep is an example of this. But say there was a point when you really had no consciousness during sleep, what is it to be "truly asleep", then? Where does that state begin, and where does it end?

Likewise, even a brain (or object) that didn't actively store memories could be conscious.

>If I jump into an industrial waste grinder I'm still there in a different state and functioning differently.
Depends how you define I, and functioning. Your "I" is a macro construct. Seemingly it doesn't rely on the exact things composing it, so long as the functional characteristics of its parts are roughly intact the you continues to exist. Again, without knowing what consciousness is relative to time, we can't really resolve at what point of physical alteration you ought to call yourself a different you.

>you are an active manifestation of a working brain.
Yes.

>Percieved time is granular because the brain operates with spike based information transduction.
This ignores the actual processing occurring in individual cells.

It could be assumed that consciousness is not granular, even if the capacity to perceive change is. Though it would seem more likely a given frame of consciousness only really changes with the state of the whole.

> No spikes, no you.
And?

>Because reality already exists it's obvious that whatever version you buy to describe reality isn't going to change reality itself
Yep, it changes little. Though that isn't quite what I meant.

What we're really talking about is time. Many people seem to frame this in terms of identity, thinking that if time is can be viewed as many discrete states then persistent identity doesn't exist. The inverse is equally as irrelevant.

>>7643707
It's because of suicidal mouthbreathers like you that mind upload is being prioritised over brain computerisation.

If i see mind upload is my only shot, i'll take it. But i'm not the one kidding myself in thinking that's anything but the equivalent of having a child.

>>7643722
>Can't deal with truth and reality
>Ad hominem strawman

Cute. It's like I'm in elementary school again.

>>7643727
>a simulated instance is me
>i'm going to kill my "old body" once uploaded
>i'm not a retarded mouthbreather
t:retarded mouthbreather