Here is a fun little thought that keeps me amused, at least for

I'd choose family and not tell anybody. They wouldn't know, they would just be happy.

Can you make a clone of me so my mom wouldn't be sad when I'm gone?

>>35567127
She'd be sad you aren't gone desu

but does this clone have a soul or is it just a soulless automaton? this is important

>>35567222
>he unironically believes in souls
kek

>>35567222

He does, if you want to and believe in such things.
Just a new one.
If not, he has a conciousness, is self aware just like us but again, a new one.

The catch is the dead, the original one's soul or conciousness doesn't come back. He stays dead.

>>35566402
There was an episide of Black Mirror kinda like this

To share my own thought on this, yes I would do it. I would "bring back" my dad. Even if I knew it's not the original, I would't care as he is identical in every way. For me and for everyone else, it would be as he never died.

But this raises moral questions. Is such a thing right? What if the clone learns that he is indeed a clone? What would he do? Accept it? Or have an existential crisis, get furious or something?

>>35566402
>it won't be the same consciousness. Soul, if you will. It will have a new one.
In real life every tiny bit of everyone can be replaced with an identical bit and it won't make any difference. This is not just theory. In fact it literally happens all the time and nobody minds.
So why do you claim your duplicant would have a 'different soul' as you put it?
Obviously you are implying that the soul is not part of a person's material complexion. What do you think it is then? And why do you think it won't be recreated by recreating the person's material parts?
Or maybe it wouldn't? Maybe the result would be a vegetable bound to mahines or limited to primary functions but not actually reassembling the person it is supposed to? Maybe the original 'soul', a person's essence so to speak, is needed after all and can not be replaced or rebuild by rebuilding their parts?

I know that I am stressing your theoretical experiment too much there. But then again isn't that part of the answer: Do I accept or believe that your copy won't be the exact same thing as the original? This would be the first condition to create a problem with your hypothetical method.

>>35567563

Say you die.
YOU, your consciousness, your cells, your atoms die. They make a perfect copy of you. I don't believe that you would experience it, come back, be reincarnated. Could one say that you truly died though? Now that's a philosophical question.

I'd say that I'd want at least a few more of myself. Maybe five so each one would just have to work one day a week

>>35567726
Can enslaving one of your clones be considered a crime?

>>35567657
I guess that what I'm saying is that it isn't all that unlikely this more or less is happening all the time.
Cells reproduce, cells die, parts get lost, others are being created.
So why am I considered the same being even if parts of me died often enough to have a couple of dead bodys already?
I think it is because it is just normal. That is just the way things are. This is continuity.

>>35568167
Or is the supposed difference that in the regular scenario I am being recreated by myself while in the hypothetical one an external mechanism is used to create a whole copy?
Then I would assume it's just a matter of what's normal, what we are used to.

>>35568167

Hmm.
This really made me think, not the fucking meme, seriously.
That is true, we are being "recycled" all the time.
Yet we think we are the same.
Could it be that we're dying all the time and just memories makes us "feel" like we are one person and continue living?

Now I've gone and fucking scared myself.