Can somebody please explain compatibilism simply? Maybe I'm

it's an argument over the definition of "freedom" and
"causation"
Read Ayer "freedom and neccissity"
The compatablist says that our actions are inevitable but we're not under constraint so we're free.
"How can we think a man free other than the power to do what he will"- Locke
>>9919125

Compatabilism isn't just one set of ideas, it's any belief that says free will + determinism can work together.

For example, the idea that the external factors in making a decision are deterministic, but the internal factors that stem from your consciousness are made freely. This would be a compatabilist belief.

At the end OP, it's mostly a question of definitions. I think the problem you're having is not realising that compatabilists may have a differing definition of free will and determinism than you do, which is why to you it seems illogical but for them is a coherent belief.

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>>9919219
So what compatibilists are saying is that a person has free will to react to an event, but because events are deterministic, the person was always going to choose to react that way and never would have chosen a different reaction?

Am I understanding correctly

If that's the case then isn't free will kind of a moot point since they were always going to make that "choice"? What relevance does free will really have if the choice was inevitable anyway?

>>9919241
>If that's the case then isn't free will kind of a moot point since they were always going to make that "choice"? What relevance does free will really have if the choice was inevitable anyway?
so we can justify punishing people for their misdeeds. the choice might be inevitable, but if you're the last link in the causal chain that made it happen, then you're responsible.

also
>PAP: A person is morally responsible for what she does do only if she can do otherwise.
>Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones's plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot Smith [let's say a brain implant that can change someones course of action if it doesn't conform to expectations -- me]. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never intervened.
>In this example, Jones shot Smith on his own, and did so unencumbered — did so freely. But, given Black's presence in the scenario, Jones could not have done otherwise than shoot Smith. Hence, we have a counterexample to PAP.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#ChaPriAltPos

>>9919241
the point of compatibilism is as far as I know to make the discussion moot.

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>>9919125

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>>9919528
>>9919534
What is the mechanism of free will? How does it work?

>>9919125

The actions might be all prescribed but so complex that can be 'viewed' right or wrong without knowing the true answer and still fall under determinism because system is so complex that we fail to understand the pattern thus never knowing the true right answer. We can understand the rules to the universe but the underlying mechanics are still beyond our grasp and basically guess work upon guess work.

Like looking inside a black hole kind of thing. The answer exists we just can't get to it. So we ultimately don't know.

>>9919656

After writing this I realized the perfect analogy for compatibilism. Schrodinger's Cat.

>>9919125
>How can both determinism and free will exist? How do they not contradict each other?
"Strong" free will as in the notion that our choices are completely unaffected by causality has always been complete nonsense, but there are many concepts of "weak" free will that don't conflict with determinism.

>>9919656
>We can't know what our choices are going to be so let's just say we have free will and leave it at that
We also can't know what the weather is going to be like tomorrow, so we might as well say that the weather has free will too.

>If that's the case then isn't free will kind of a moot point since they were always going to make that "choice"? What relevance does free will really have if the choice was inevitable anyway?
What matters is that the choice was freely willed. Our choices are determined, but they are determined by who we are, not by abstract notions of atoms and neurons as most determinists claim.

>>9919125

How can something be a particle and wave?!?!

How can someone not be a witch and still float?!?!

check out:
Free Will Revisited: A Conversation with Daniel Dennett

And always start with lived experience.

>>9919830
>Our choices are determined, but they are determined by who we are, not by abstract notions of atoms and neurons as most determinists claim
What are we then, if not a collection of atoms?

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>>9919528
So if it were possible to travel back in time and observe this scenario multiple times, there would be some in which Jones chooses to shoot Smith, and some in which he chooses not to shoot him?

If it was always meant to be one outcome or the other then it sounds pretty determi istic.

>>9919798
>"weak" free will
Please explain.

>>9919911
>What are we then, if not a collection of atoms?
You are thinking one-directionally. If we are our atoms then our atoms are us. Assuming physicalism, we are our atoms and we are ourselves, just as our atoms are themselves but are also us.
People who say that our atoms are what make our choices for us only believe so because they buy into reductionism, the idea that the most "basic" levels of reality are somehow more real than higher ones; that the higher levels are somehow "caused" by lower ones.
If one rejects this idea it becomes clear that, if we truly are "just" our atoms, then saying "our atoms make our choices for us" is exactly equal to saying "we make our own choices". Both are completely accurate, as the two outlooks are simply different manifestations of the same phenomenon.

>>9919923
>>"weak" free will
>Please explain.
I don't see what needs to be explained. I simply mean definitions of free will that are compatible with determinism.

>>9919946
>I simply mean definitions of free will that are compatible with determinism.
Well what are these definitions then?

>>9919929
To further elaborate, the notion that our atoms are what decide our choices for us is nonsensical because it is mixing up levels of reality. The reality of atoms and the reality of us human beings are, as I said, different manifestations of the same phenomena; they're two sides of the same coin. Neither one causes the other to exist, just as neither side of a causes the other side to exist. Atoms cannot cause choices because choices don't exist on the same plane of reality as atoms do. The movement of atoms can cause movement in other atoms, but cannot cause choices to be made.
>>9919951
>Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer famously said "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."
This is basically the same as my own definition of free will, but there are others.

>>9919971
*neither side of a coin causes

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>>9919971
>The movement of atoms can cause movement in other atoms, but cannot cause choices to be made.
Ok so what causes choices to be made then? Is there a physical explanation for it? Is it some kind of soul? This is what I'm getting at.

>Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained.
I think this is missing the point. I'm not talking about whether you are physically restrained. I'm talking about the choice that you make in your mind to do something. Where does that come from? What are "you" and how do you manipulate physical reality like this?

>>9920016
>Ok so what causes choices to be made then?
As I understand it, a choice is our reaction to a situation in which our desires conflict with the actual state of the world, or rather, with our perception of it. They're attempts to change the world into something more to our liking.

>>9920059
You've defined what a choice is but not how it happens. What are "you" and how do you decide whether or not something is to your liking? That's what I'm trying to get at here.