How does Husserl's later "constitutive" faculty

>>9897223
>Husserl was a naive Fregean/Platonic realist about entities
Where exactly did you read this?
>the difference between Husserl's constitutive faculty and Heidegger's disclosure
I rarely read philosophy in English so I'm not certain what you mean with these terms, if you're thinking of intentionality then there is virtually no difference (and in principle there cannot be any difference).

>>9897324
>Where exactly did you read this?

One of Dermot Moran's books. I'm reading both his general history of phenomenology and his Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology, so I can't remember which. But one of the questions that bothered me while reading, because I've never known the answer myself and he never answered it directly for several chapters, is whether Brentano, Frege, Russell, and others were as naive as they seem about logical realism. But Moran says pretty clearly, Logical Investigations era Husserl believed that metaphysical realities like the law of gravity were out there waiting to be grasped, whether any human has ever grasped them or not.

I don't mind that kind of realism in principle, like I'm not denying that gravity really exists in some sense of existence. But if he means that all human minds would grasp the truth of gravity in the same way, I start to get worried, because that implies not just that conceptual resources are identical across people and cultures, but that there is only one true form of conceptual adequacy to the real world. I don't mind that kind of naive epistemology in Einstein or even Mach, but in phenomenology it's pretty weird.

However, turns out he repudiated it later, according to Moran.

>if you're thinking of intentionality then there is virtually no difference
No I mean the disclosure of new ontological truth, as opposed to new ontical truth. The disclosure of new conditions of possibility (Bedingungen der Möglichkeit) altogether.

>>9897375
It is important to keep in mind that Husserl had kept changing his views as his philosophy developed. Generally speaking (if I remember correctly), his small book called "The idea of phenomenology" (I'm not sure if this translation is correct) is considered the turning point from early to late Husserl.
>but if he means that all human minds would grasp the truth of gravity in the same way, I start to get worried because that implies... that there is only one true form of conceptual adequacy to the world
But that is exactly what he means. The best example being how he attempts to prove the existence of other people after performing the Cartesian reduction (and consequently abandoning all knowledge). The gist of his argument is that I (in the 1st person) necessarily assume the existence of others on the basis of an analogy, i.e that there have to exist other conscious beings. In addition, after deriving others so to speak Husserl concludes that we all share the same world - the world that is available to me from the 1st person perspective.
>i mean the disclosure of new ontological truth
Husserl didn't write anything regarding ontology (as far as I know) - his phenomenology is entirely epistemological. I've read a clever thought in an introduction to S&Z that Heidegger's contribution to the Husserl's project is that he filled a void in Husserl's phenomenology by coming up with a phenomenological ontology, whereas Husserl was concerned exclusively with epistemology.

>>9897223
Husserl - human projective apparatus onto things

Heideger - things projective apparatus onto humans

The thing things, the world worlds, the nothing noths

re: "The disclosure of new conditions of possibility"

this is basically the project he left to future thinkers

he tried via his readings of presocratics and poetry

>>9897664
This is a very naive and bad post.
>Husserl - human projective apparatus onto things
Fundamental misunderstanding of Husserl; according to him the questions such as whether the outside world exists or doesn't exist and if it exists how does it exist are completely irrelevant. He "packs" the entire world into the consciousness of the individual - that is Husserl's starting point that you reach by following the procedure called "Cartesian meditations". There is nothing that humans "project onto things", the individual/Ego/consciousness create the entire world.

Please refrain from posting when it is obvious that you have no idea what you are talking about, and the "I know it all" attitude that your post reeks off is harming a potentially decent thread.

>>9897223
>I've only read some of Husserl's early stuff where he is clearly a naive Fregean/Platonic realist about entities and states of affairs in the world, like scientific laws and observations of gravity, which put me off big time

What's actually wrong with this? Why would anyone be an antirealist about anything?

>>9897811
>Please refrain from posting when it is obvious that you have no idea what you are talking about

Fuck off faggot he can say whatever the fuck he wants bitch ass nigger bleeding pussy dagger sucking faggot cunt

>>9897581
Really? I'm not too far into his actual work like I said, but wow, I'd be surprised if he doesn't account for aletheia at all, like, there's nothing in Husserl that is even roughly analogous (if, say, differently emphasized) to Heidegger's idea of world-disclosure.

I just assumed he must have learned this shit after his encounter with Dilthey in his middle/late period, and surely after reading Heidegger? So his account of transcendental constitution, even later on, doesn't account for relativism or the possibility of "many different adequacies?"

I don't mean to source-check you but if you have any recommending reading on this, specifically, I'd appreciate it. Like I said, it took hours of reading Moran before he openly said "early Husserl was a logical realist" and I could finally set aside that question.

>>9897881
I don't know about Husserl but I'm certainly not an extreme relativist, or some kind of arch-noumenalist or Fichtean who thinks the real world doesn't exist at all. I think it does exist, but we have to clarify our way of accessing it in order to understand what it is, and what consciousness is.

Presumably, vastly different minds would access the enduring truth of the real, external world in ways that could still be very different from how we access it. And different ways might have different conceptual dead-ends or blind spots. That's what interests me, and why I want a more scientific, more openly transcendental approach to hermeneutic phenomenology, less existentialist and less ethically oriented.

>>9897223
If we're talking about Heidegger of Sein und Zeit (so before 'die Kehre' in the 30s) then the main difference is that Heidegger was more existential in his approach: the key to Being lies in "die Wahrheit der Existenz". A transcendental idealist philosophy like that of the later Husserl teaches a pure transcendental ego, detached from the world. For Heidegger this objectifies and isolates elements which belong together in one structure. The 'I' only has meaning in existence, and only then can it be open to Being, so that disclosure can happen.

>>9897951
>That's what interests me, and why I want a more scientific, more openly transcendental approach to hermeneutic phenomenology

Check out Merleau-Ponty and Alva Nöe.

>>9897223
>>9897375
>>9897951
maybe if you stopped being so dogmatically relativistic you would be able to appreciate different philosophical perspectives -- all your posts boil down to "Husserl didn't take the hermeneutical turn, but how can that be the case, assuming he isn't a fucking retard?"

>>9897581
>Husserl didn't write anything regarding ontology

What can you possibly mean by this. Transcendental Idealism is an ontological position, through and through.

>>9898114
best post

>>9898043
Thank you, that has helped me quite a bit.

>>9898057
MP is really my ultimate goal in reading all this stuff. I'll check out Alva as well, though I've actually been warned strongly away from analytic phenomenology. I read a really good article in some Husserl/phenomenology essay anthology

>>9898114
But that's exactly why I'm continuing to read Husserl and ask about it. My reflexive, natural assumption, that non-fideist logical realism is impossible for any serious and intelligent person post-Kant, is leading to confusion; it's leading to confusion because those assumptions about what should be the case and what the world is telling is actually the case are differing; and as a result I reflexively, naturally assume that whatever the answer is, it's beyond my ability to answer without reading more and opening my mind to other ways of seeing.

The entire point of putting my biases upfront is so that other people can see the mistakes I'm making and say things like
>That's a common mistake, and you should read ...
>I made the mistake you are making, myself, and it's a result of the flawed presupposition that ...
etc. Why else would I be doing it? If I were dogmatic I'd reflexively assume the other guy is patently wrong.

>>9898444
oops forgot to finish that second quote:

I read a really good article in some Husserl/phenomenology essay anthology by a French historian of the human sciences on analytic, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence efforts to assimilate phenomenological critiques of their philosophies of mind. The prognosis wasn't very good for the 80s and 90s, but apparently in the last 5-10 years some new major attempts have been made at assimilating the critiques at a more than surface level. Plus, it's bad to get stuck in a self-referential prison of jargon, so I really should try fresh analytic perspectives.