I just read "What Is Metaphysics?" What the fuck

Continentals.

>>9760355
Us vs Them branilet.

>>9760310
The axioms you believe/know to be true, but can't proof.

Here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jt-4hV6Rf1k

also start with the Greeks

read hume and kant, then read husserl, then read heidegger so you understand the terms. there is a different linguistic context in phenomenology discussion, and far from nonsense it's probably the most based field of philosophical thought there is(as in literally based in reality as we can grasp it).

>>9760355
thinking there is a dichotomy between continental and analytic philosophy reflects an embarrassing lack of knowledge of the field. analytic philosophy is a method that when applied to much of "continental" philosophy(which is a region) either shits on it or reinforces it. in the case of phenomenologists, they are largely reinforced by analytic methods that they employ themselves.

>>9760545
I'm more confused over why the "nothing" reveals itself in the face of anxiety.

So wait, what is Heidegger's final goal? Like, what would a society with proper, non-metaphysical access to Being look like? What is a life lived in that society supposed to be like?

>>9760863
"Nothing" is "no-thing," i.e., it doesn't come before you already "as" an entity. Fear is fear OF something, of an entity, but anxiety is a kind of general stance, it's an ATTITUDE, toward Being in general.

>>9760892
It makes sense, but it seems silly that that should be the ONLY instance when the nothing reveals itself. Good example, but solely?

>>9760863
>I'm more confused over why the "nothing" reveals itself in the face of anxiety.
first of all, angst is a better approximation to the kind of anxiety that he is referring to, though desu I think recalling Heidegger's philosophy helps me overcome both in a productive/pragmatic way (but now I'm going off tangent)

second of all, anxiety is a state of mind where the structural relationships of Dasein towards the world break down, meaning that the way equipment (stuff you use) are no longer intelligible the way they used to be. the breakdown of these relationships help you to recognize "nothing" as in the way you're normally accustomed to see the world has vanished, and yet it has been replaced with some sort of peculiar, uncomfortable, and yet enlightening insight into all the different possibilities that are available to you in a particular world that are otherwise undisclosed.

>>9760892
I don't think his goals lay within laying groundwork for society at all but in trying to grasp existence from the first-person perspective, more of an individual-focused philosopher like many phenomenologists and existentialists. I don't think a society comprised of people who grasped being in the way he's described it would be very functional, but that goes for most german philosophers. they geared things towards people that are capable of managing and controlling their environments and other people through understanding them literally as opposed to figuratively or ideally. the senses of "pragmatism" or other ideals that drive society from within like a religion would dissolve, and you'd end up with a bunch of bums in ruins who would end up raising the next generation with lies to serve their interests and then end up back where we all started.

pretty hypothetical but that's how I imagine it going down. society in it's current form without reliable automation relies on a livestock caste of people who hold to faith that what they are doing is correct and ideal, that it makes them look good(turning a wheel at a factory to support a family so their son can turn the wheel later and daughter have more kids to keep the wheel turning). have a bunch of people sitting around rejecting materialism doesn't lay bricks.

It certainly isn't metaphysics

File: fundamentals of metaphysics.jpg (11KB, 230x353px) Image search: [Google]

11KB, 230x353px

it's a random speech

you wanted to read fundamentals of metaphysics instead

>>9760545
Can you specify which Hume, Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger texts to start with specifically? Not him but I'd like to start my journey into philosophy/metaphysics and it would be helpful to have an understanding of the terminology, as you say.

>>9760310
This is Heideggar.

>>9761686
....
Anon...

>>9761482
Not your interlocutor, but this should do:
-Hume: Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
-Kant: Critique of Pure Reason
-Husserl: Paris Lectures/Cartesian Meditations
-Heidegger: Being and Time

You don't need prerequisites with Heidegger, at least if you want to read Being and Time. He gives you a systematic approach to his philosophy, keeps repeating himself so you get used to the system, and any references he makes to outside knowledge he has a good habit of citing well and summarizing effectively. The only thing you need to tackle Heidegger is the patience to keep track with vocabulary, good reading comprehension skills. and a passion for philosophy. It's ironically better to probably start as a fresh philosophy student because you won't be clouded by prior philosophical dogmas.

>>9760310

"Highly eccentric in its terminology, his philosophy is extremely obscure. One cannot help suspecting that language is here running riot. An interesting point in his speculations is the insistence that nothingness is something positive. As with much else in Existentialism, this is a psychological observation made to pass for logic." - Russell

>>9762780
Russel was a cuckold
No joke

>>9762828

Not an argument.

>>9762832
Actually it's a perfectly relevant ad hominem. Being a cuckold invalidates anything you have to say about everything. And no, /lit/, I'm not joking. Stop letting your girlfriends sleep around.

>>9760892
>"what ontic politics does Heidegger hold as an endgoal of his philosophy?"
>misunderstanding Heidegger this bad

>>9760921
I don't agree with your reading of das Nichts as a new 'peculiar feeling' that makes itself known as the familiarity/zuhandenheit of equipment/Zeuge slips away in anxiety. This is a very ontic reading of Heidegger.

Rather, the nothing is a layer or component to the very Event/Ereignis of Seyn, wherein beings arive in their Being. When the zuhandenheit of beings/zeuge slips away in anxiety, we recognize another layer to the very fabric of the ontological moment that is before (yet within) any particular ap-propiation of being as 'something', and marks the very disclosure of the ontological in its play with itself as enacted ontically.

I don't remember if it's the added fore- or afterword by H himself, but he discusses the Ereignis concept in relation to the rectorate speech within some editions of Was Ist Metaphysik? itself.

>>9761482
Hume is pretty easy to understand. Kant takes a while, and you should read about him a lot before you read the CPR directly. Husserl you can safely leave until much later, and Heidegger you're best off reading about before you read him directly, like Kant.

All of them are doing epistemology (or "transcendental philosophy"), or ontology, often with a mind to dismantling traditional metaphysics. Epistemology studies the conditions and nature of knowledge. Epistemology can be anything from "How do we know what we know?" and "What is knowing, in general?" to more specific and parochial problems, like talking casually about the epistemology of a specific scientific field or inquiry.

Transcendental (or critical) philosophy is a form of epistemology, in the larger sense, founded in Kant's effort to radically clarify the goals and tools of philosophy by putting them on a more "critical," self-conscious footing. The reason why Hume is relatively easy to read is because with a little common sense you can read him, enjoyably, and more or less understand him. Same with Descartes. But this ease is actually deceptive, even bad, because when we rely on "common sense" like this, we can't really be sure whether we are being sufficiently critical. Common sense, on closer examination, is loaded with all kinds of weird assumptions about knowledge and the world, assumptions which are maybe vital for our minds to work properly, but which we also need to be very careful about simply taking for granted.

For example, it might be necessary for us to assume that the world is divided into discrete objects (like chairs, or people), or that it has necessary laws (like causality), but we should carefully ask ourselves: Are these objects, laws, and rules for identifying both, actually inherent IN the world? Or are they in our minds? On careful examination, we find that our consciousness necessarily intuits the world in the conditioning forms of space and time. But are space and time IN the world, or are they merely how we receive the world?

This is Kant's move toward the critical stance. Traditional metaphysics since the Greeks had been caught up in all kinds of errors by assuming that our minds simply conform to reality, or that reality conforms to the categories and concepts of our minds. By being aware of how our minds work, and the limitations and necessities of our knowledge of the world, we can (or so Kant is claiming) be much more rigorous and scientific about our thinking. There are all kinds of strange problems that arise in thinking this way, but fundamentally, all post-Kantian thought has been transcendental in some degree or another. Even people who want to go back to pre-critical metaphysics are at least obliged to explain how the hell they intend to do that, in reference to transcendental philosophy.

>>9763178
Heidegger is similarly transcendental. He would probably deny it, but it's reasonably well-agreed that he's a transcendental philosopher. Basically, Heidegger pushes the problem even further (something Hegel also tried to do), by saying that the "knowing subject, with rules of thought vs. an external world," critical stance of Kant still assumes too much, that in fact it continues the much deeper mistake of Western metaphysics, of speaking of "Being" (of "what there is for us") as if it is inherently parcelled into "beings," entities, before a subject, even (or especially) a transcendental subject, which is itself a kind of entity.

Kant realised part of the problem of this Western metaphysics by realising that beings don't exist out in the world, that we are the ones who take Being and harden it and cut it up into beings. But in doing so, Kant doesn't go far enough, to realise that even his way of speaking of this process PRESUPPOSES that there are certain beings, certain KINDS of beings. It still tries to "pin down" the flux of Being into knowable little units, for us to be able to pick up, safely, and hold onto, for us to be able to say "I've subdued this little chunk of Being, I've fixed it in place, I understand and comprehend it, I've dominated it for eternity, it's now (in some sense) mine." The critical stance ends up being just a much more rigorous expression of the subject as a special kind of Being-enslaving object. Nietzsche (to Heidegger at least) pushes this one step farther by realising that the nature of this process is a kind of flux of intentional (valuational), affective states and desires, "legislating" to Being chaotically and perspectivally, rather than in an orderly fashion as in Kant (a holdover of Kant's Enlightenment and Christian values). But even Nietzsche gets stuck. He pushes the ancient metaphysical worldview of the West to its furthest breaking point, still without breaking it. At the end of the day, he retains the knowing subject, and simply radicalises the chaos and flux of Being that happens "before" that subject. He still can't understand Being as pure "happening."

There are all sorts of problems with this too. Heidegger doesn't really push the problem of transcendental philosophy any further, and in fact he restates much of what was already in Nietzsche (while pretending Nietzsche said the opposite). He clearly doesn't intend to be transcendental, but he's still operating in a transcendental framework. And his praxis is mostly unsatisfying.

>>9763169
Meant to say that the nothing marks the undisclosure of the ontological in its play with itself disclosed/enacted ontically, if that makes sense. t.eurofag with shitty english.

>>9763201
that was pretty interesting to read anon
what would you say would be the correct way to break western metaphysics, was it what husserl intended to do with phenomenology, deantrophocentrizing it?

>>9760545
>analytic philosophy is a method that when applied to much of "continental" philosophy(which is a region) either shits on it or reinforces it. in the case of phenomenologists, they are largely reinforced by analytic methods that they employ themselves.

Care to provide evidence of this?

>>9760863
All of your emotions color how much and which parts of each being are available to you. When you're anxious, your brain is freaking out, examining all possibilities of the things you're interacting with.

This kind of obsessive looking into various beings' potential existence and that existence's possible affect on your being allow you to actually see more stuff, including the outline of the nothing,

Remember a shiny, sunny day before /r9k/, then think of one after.

>>9763132
But really being a cuck is essentially asserting or taking pleasure in a lack of self, which Russell does by putting logic before everything else, including himself.

He's essentially a Christian who has slammed "logic" into the God slot.