what differentiates berkeleys subjective idealism/immaterialism

>>9105853
C'mon, OP, this is an easy one. Think of it this way: what is the source of ideas in Berkeley's idealism as opposed to the source in solipsism?

After you answer that, consider this: is Berkeley attacking the existence of minds, or solely mind-independent objects? The difference should be clear now.

>>9105853

esse his cleft chin percipi

Solipsism doesn't even mean anything. It's mainly used as an insult by STEMlords. Had it not been their go-to non-argument, it would be even more obscure than ideas like anal breathing.

Subjective Idealism is Gnosticism with training wheels.

>>9105853
God hangs the chaos of the world together.

But all this is typical pre-Kantian stuff. You don't get to say what exists, and if you say 'this exists', it's simply meaningless, you are only saying: 'I have a relation to this, which must exist' at the level of your subjective position. Berkeley didn't like the concept of substance so he elaborated a sophism which replaces the role of substance with God.

>>9105853
Berkeley's ideas opose the objects in solpsism.

Berkeley thesis goes no further than the denying of external matter, things still exists very much like they exist for the average joe, but with the condition that perceived objects are subsumed in the totality of possible perceptions of the "object" ("object" because the totality of its possible perceptions IS the object).

There are obviously thing whose existence we infer because our scientific model implies the existence of certain facts in order to make the current state of affairs possible. Here Berkeley as a thelogist relies in God, and makes everything perceived by God. That's a old common theologist claim: what God see is what exist. I do not need to exist since everything is already perceived by God.