Here's a though experiment, /lit/:
A mathematician proves that a universal Turing machine is unable to simulate consciousness. The proof is airtight, peer reviewed, and formally verified.
What implications would this have for philosophy?
>>9011614
YOU ARE NOT YOUR BROWSING HISTORY
I just pooprd in my pants
POOPYPANTS hahaha
>>9011614
he's not a mathematician he's a robot
>>9011614
You should submit this thought experiment to samual harris for peer review
I mean there is still an epistemological problem.
it would refute functionalism and that's about it. that would be interesting since functionalism is currently the most popular view in the philosophy of mind but it's by no means the only viable view
It would have no effect
Business as usual
The Lucas-Penrose argument would be proven correct. Basically just a death blow to physicalists/materialists everywhere (the majority of philosophers today).
>>9011701
there are non-computational versions of materialism though (like the identity theory, for example)
>>9011614
Nothing significant not already implied by an adequate formalisation of consciousness.
>>9011614
You can't fucking "simulate" consciousness. A consciousness is knowable only to itself.