What does Nagel refer to when he mentions the first kind of way

File: Some more of morality by Nagel for context.png (79KB, 976x451px) Image search: [Google]

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Here is some more for context.

>>8667341
What do you want to know exactly?

File: First Kind of Morality, without reason.png (75KB, 988x542px) Image search: [Google]

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>>8667341
>>8667351
Holy shit, I put in the wrong image, my bad.

The OP was meant to refer to THIS image.

The description of the idea he outlines under the title of "First", I'd like to know what it is conventionally called in academic circles, a quick name that people use to refer to it? So I can read more about it?

>>8667373
It's difficult to derive any sort of established ethical system from just that. But at least you can rule out any sort of relativism, which is already a good chunk.

It would be much easier if he said why the same things are right and wrong for everybody, then it would be much easier to identify the ethical system he is refering to. But as it stands, I can't really say what ethics he is refering to.

I think he's just trying to be general as possible, for the purposes of his book, which is an introduction. Several ethical system would fall under the category of what he described. If could elaborate more on what you're looking for then maybe i can help you.

>>8667373
The combination of moral universalism and motivational externalism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/#IntVExt - see especially 3.2)

>>8667388
>If could elaborate more on what you're looking for then maybe i can help you.

So, I actually don't conceive of right and wrong as much as I do "good" and "bad" (note that given that I conceive of these things as objective and not relative, the third type is eliminated) but more importantly, what I conceive of is a sense of "good" and "bad" in addition to NO sense of a kind of "obligation" or "reason to do good".

To me personally, the statement "One should do X because is good" (i.e. X is good is a sufficient condition for one being obligated to do X) doesn't have much meaning since I don't see any meaning in saying that one "should" do something or "has a reason to do something, be it an obligation" if one does not in fact FEEL the obligation, therefore type 2 is also not what I hold.

To elaborate on how I form conceptions of good and bad, although I don't know how relevant this is, I feel them based in a utilitarian standard, a short addition needs to be made here in that I don't conceive of good and bad as two objective independent things but rather I perceive prospective actions as both "more good" or "less bad" than another. Therefore, I don't feel the need to define a sort of "absolute zero" of happiness, such that anything that causes more happiness than that level in aggregate is good and anything that does less is bad.

>>8667412
That is still very broad. But take a look at the ethical systems that fall under consequentialism, what you're looking for is probably in there.

>>8667425
If i got it right, you're looking for an ethical system that holds objective moral values (X is good) but doesn't hold the imperativeness of duty in regards to that moral value (Y should do X).

That is very strange, I'm having a hard time identifying an ethical system that is like that.

>>8667469
Yet to investigate the other replies (thanks for them though) but, right, I can see why it is strange because most people only ever conceive of moral values BECAUSE they imply an imperative of duty.

This is why I was surprised to see Nagel explicitly describe something similar to what I was inclined toward (moral rights and wrongs without an imperative of duty, or a reason to do right and wrong) in his first point.