>The world doesn't exist without a knowing subject What

He's saying that beeing yourself gives you a sense of reality. Without the self there is no reality

>>8508764
He means that when you'll die you'll take the world with you.

You have to be a male to understand.

It's the same old platonic bullshit that perceives reality as inherently mental. Instead of the eminently commonsensical position that sees reality as mind-independent - and as an object that enables human subjects to construct models about it and further their understanding - idealists equate the subject and object, the perceiving mind and the reality it perceives. According to hegelian voodoo dialectic, what's out there is only the absolute mind experiencing itself and coming to understand itself in the totality of being.

>>8508764
he means a tree cant be BTFO without someone having an experience and concept of BTFOness

there's no tree, no BTFOness, these things are assigned conceptually by sensators, without saïd differentiation there are no things

>>8508912
>eminently commonsensical position that sees reality as mind-independent
Wew lad, do you even realise observation literally alters matter?

I'm not sure of the exact context of the quote but you're basically right. Kantian idealism often says "nature" or "the world" when it means the world for us, the world that is intuited or represented by us. For Schopenhauer the world as Will does exist independently of "us" as Thing-in-Itself.

tldr: You are right. He's just using "world" to mean the world we perceive, the world for-us, the world of representation. Unless there's some subtle nuance of context where he's saying that the Will inherently tends toward representation or something, but I don't even think that's the case in Schopenhauer? Intellectualised Will, like the self-awareness taken for granted by Fichte and Hegel, is the exception and not the rule for Schopenhauer.

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>>8508764

> From what I understood, he claims that the world we perceive is a representation and exists only in our head. Remove the head and there's no more representation anymore

He often says this, but such wording can be misleading because it emphasizes the objective aspect of consciousness, as if the representation of the physical world is caused by the brain; but more strictly speaking, your subjective consciousness of objects *is* your brain (and body, in organic union); it is the subjective side, while the objective side of the same knowledge is your neurological/biological organism. They are subjective and objective correlates of one another, and mutually presuppose one another; causality, like all other forms of the principle of sufficient reason, does not connect subject and object, but rather only connects objects. The subject of knowing, and the object(s) of knowledge, are equally phenomenal; they are equally manifestations of the thing-in-itself, and only together constitute the world-as-representation.

There's more - I'll return.

While trying to understand how causality is purely subjective, I came up with a metaphore:

The Will, the unique Thing-in-itself is like a twisted torus composed of many fibres interlaced with each other. Each slice of the torus (cutting from the middle to the exterior) is a moment, and time makes us spin around the torus. In this way, the next slice is not *caused* by the last, but we see a clear pattern, we see how they both perfectly fit together and any other slice would be terribly out of place.

What do you think?

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>>8508764

>Does he simply restrict "the world" to meaning a representation of the Will?

I think he can be vague on this point - what exactly is "The World as Will"? I think, most consistently, the concept of a "world" in Schopenhauer's system must involve the form of time, if not also space; especially following Kant, "the world" is the domain of experience, it's "nature," the physical universe. The question is whether there can be any other "world" in the strict sense of the term - and here Schopenhauer can make a move that Kant can't*; for Schopenhauer, the double knowledge that each individual has of their own body - knowledge through both spatial perception AND embodied knowledge through inner sense - gives that individual a key to discover a parallel world. This is the inner world of natural beings, that each of us as individuals know as our own states of will, the impulse and puller that manifests in space as an individual physical object. Each thing in nature has its own inner will, and together all individuals constitute a world of connected wills, though not a world spread out in space and not a world of public experience; each knower knows only its own inner will, as privately as any other inner experience - but we can rationally infer the existence of this world-as-will by reflecting philosophically on the great continuum of physical beings in the world-as-representation.

Otherwise, if it's insisted that "world" can only mean spatial representation, or that the above interpretation of a "world" of individuated wills is a misunderstanding of Schopenhauer, then there is no "World as Will" period, and we have to read Schopenhauer's full title as meaning "the world of spatial representation as manifestation of the will-in-itself." The thing-in-itself, the metaphysically one Will, cannot be called a "world," for at least two reasons: 1) the thing-in-itself is independent of the principle of individuation, so space and time form no part of it; and 2) it is even independent of the differentiation between subject and object. Since the opposition of subject and object is the basic form of all consciousness, the thing-in-itself is in no way an "object" or "known," nor does it "know" anything.

*(Kant didn't explore the possibility of a merely temporal "world" of individuated wills - if anything, Kant would have to call it a "nature" of individuated wills, since for Kant the term "world" implies mathematical, thus spatial, magnitudes - and in this respect Schopenhauer believed he made an advance past Kant, which he may have. But interestingly, Kant did argue for the importance of the concept of an "intelligible world," which would be neither spatial nor temporal, but would involve our immortal intellects in rational moral community with one another - an aspect of Kant's philosophy that Schopenhauer acknowledged but sharply criticized, since Schopenhauer's system doesn't allow for noumenal individuation or intelligence.)

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>>8508764

>It seems to me that the Will *forms* "the world", but is only seen as representation.

What do you mean by "forms?" Very tricky with Schopenhauer, because he makes it a mission to restrict all kinds of form to the domain of phenomena - and this is bound up with his denial of any *connection* between the will-in-itself and the world-as-representation.

>>8508772

>He means that when you'll die you'll take the world with you.

When you die you take *your* world with you. There is still the plurality of intellects with their unique individual representations in intersubjective agreement - this phenomenal complex of subjects/objects being *the* world.

> idealists equate the subject and object

Schopenhauer argues at length for their elemental distinction and interdependence. Does he commit fallacies?

> According to hegelian voodoo dialectic, what's out there is only the absolute mind experiencing itself and coming to understand itself in the totality of being.

Schopenhauer would gleefully join you in pissing on reams of Hegel, of course.

>>8508954

>For Schopenhauer the world as Will does exist independently of "us" as Thing-in-Itself.

The will-in-itself definitely is independent of any individual, but it can't properly be called a "world."

> Unless there's some subtle nuance of context where he's saying that the Will inherently tends toward representation or something, but I don't even think that's the case in Schopenhauer?

He comes close; he says that the world-as-representation is "sure" to the will-in-itself. That is, for the will-in-itself to be(-in-itself) is for it to manifest as the world-as-representation. It's not that the will-in-itself develops into the world-as-representation; the will-in-itself cannot be involved in a temporal process, cannot change into the physical universe. Rather, the physical universe *is* the will-in-itself; the world of phenomena *is* the noumenon. The relation between representation and thing-in-itself is one of identity - not of causality as naive realism assumes, and not one of logical ground/consequence as Kant held. The will-in-itself and the empirical world are one and the same being, though conceived from different sides - much as your individual human body *is* your inwardly sensed willing, though known in an alternate way ("causality known from within"), and much as your individual inner will *is* ultimately identical to your individual subjective conscious self ("the knot of the world"). The nature of this identity - how, that is, one fundamental being can objectify into a representational world at all - will forever be unknowable. Schopenhauer says that even if some super-intelligence attempted to unravel the mystery to us, we would be helpless to understand any of it.

>>8508764
i'd say your pretty much spot on OP