So how come despite having more tanks and a larger airforce the

They used their tanks in ridiculously poor ways, and their entire top brass / procurement was a special kind of beaurocratic hell. Any modern general with hindsight could push Germany's shit to the Rhine in days. Except you. Waiting is the worst thing they could do.

>>34893554
If they'd just manned the Maginot line and the forts along the Italian border with the minimum amount of troops then focused all their armor and everything else on the Belgian border the Germans would not have set foot on French soil.

>>34893651
Sitting still gives the Germans the initiative. Push the entire tank force through the Saarland in September 1939.

>>34893663
The French army was in no way ready to fight an offensive war, it was entirely defensive minded from the Generals, the Maginot line and the experiences of bloodbath offensives in WW1.

>>34893540
Institutional incompetence. Slow reaction times. Insufficient understanding of the realities and especially the speed of tank warfare, thus not expecting the ardennes breakthrough. Insufficient reserves. Inferior air power (plane models etc.) Inferior small unit tactics and training.
Basically
>>34893554
>>34893731
>Any modern general with hindsight could push Germany's shit to the Rhine in days
The problem wasn't just the high level decision making, it was the entire way the french army (the allied armies) was set up and worked that made it inferior, with a thousand little shortcomings adding to the picture.

>>34893540
The BEF was sub-par while Belgium neutrality hampered preparations. The Brits also held back the RAF (rightly) to defend the home islands. Let's also not forget the infamous Peace in Our Time too. Blaming the French 100% is just post Gulf War II neocon propaganda.

>>34894003

This is the point though, on paper, France should have been able to stand up to Germany (even without a sizeable British presence) far better than it did.

>>34893540

Bunch of reasons

- Institutionally backward command structure
- Incompetant generals
- Lack of flexibility and foresight
- Relied on obselete telephone for primary communications instead of radio
- Army was not mechanized
- Small numbers of very good equipment. Large numbers of outdated equipment. (Renaut FT's still in widespread use)
- Outdated doctrines (Lack of mobility, spread out support elements)
- Unmotivated populace
- Weak political stance
- Massive logistical nightmare due to lots of different types of equipment in use (Look at how many different tanks they had for example)
- Lack of initiative

>>34894003

Really the BEF only gets so much attention because it was the primary ally. They still only constituted 10% of the overall quantity. They had their own shortcomings, but they actually performed comparitively quite well, leading several counter attacks from their more flexible and rapid command structure, mostly due to radios and a mechanized force.

Just, as said, they only accounted for 10% of the force, and did still have several shortcomings. So when the French line was broken and they got surrounded, not much you really can do.

Belgium performed quite well for what it was.

"Peace FOR our time" (it's often misquoted) was Chamberlain at his absolute retarded, short sighted worst. Had it not been him in charge, the BEF might have been a fuckton larger than it was and capable of influencing a lot more up there.

>>34893540
For starters, check out The Chieftan's recent videos on French tanks (and their insistence on the horrid 1-man turret) and the days leading up to Dunkirk.

They were a mess strategically, operationally, and to a lesser extent tactically.

File: Potez 6311.jpg (285KB, 1306x902px) Image search: [Google]

285KB, 1306x902px

As far as the Air Forces went, the Armee de l'Air kept something like half its aircraft as a strategic reserve as a protection against strategic bombing. When Fall Gelb began, the combined Allied air forces (both Armee de l'Air and RAF) were about equal in number to the Luftwaffe opposing them.

A lot of the issue was quality, both in terms of aircraft and doctrine. The RAF component consisted of wholly inadequate aircraft:
>Hawker Hurricanes for fighter component
>Bristol Blenheims for bombing and reconnaissance
>Fairey Battle for tactical bombing
>Westland Lysanders for spotting, liaison, and bombing

The French had a series of modern fighters just entering service that were more competitive than the Hurricane, but their bombing forces were inadequate, and in many cases they were heavily reliant on American imports.

Couple that with an inadequate command structure that made it impossible for the Armee de l'Air to adequately counter the Luftwaffe, let alone support ground forces, and it's no surprise they didn't accomplish much.

>>34893540
Poor organizational structure.
Poor logistical structure.
Outright terrible political and high-level military command.

Depots in the south and west of France were full of equipment which was much needed on the frontlines, but was never even requisitioned up due to the poor logistic command.

>>34893540
Can anyone suggest a good book about the fall of France?

>>34896509
bump for this

>>34893540
Fun fact:

>French actually considered making a fortified line on the border of France and Belgium.
>Should war be declared, France would just button up and force the Germans to come through other poor invasion routes.
>Plan was canned as geopolitical and strategic considerations of such fortifications - By fortifying it like the Maginot Line, France would be essentially abandoning Belgium to the German invaders and telling them they were on their own.

>>34893651
>If they'd just manned the Maginot line and the forts along the Italian border with the minimum amount of troops then focused all their armor and everything else on the Belgian border the Germans would not have set foot on French soil.
But that's exactly what they did and what the purpose of the Maginot line was: holding a large frontline with a minimum of manpower.
French forces fought a war of movement in Belgium once they could actually cross the border, and it was more or less a balanced fight until the Ardennes breakthrough through a poorly defended area (commanded by an absolute ass of a general)

>>34893540
Read somewhere that the French had spread out all their armour to support infantry, where as the Germans massed their tanks and thus where able to punch through and exploit the holes with speed and cordination

>>34896874
The still should have fortified the Belgian border. Just do it Swiss style. Barn artillery and fortified house bunkers.

That would have surprised the hell out of the germans

>>34899178
>>34899178
There were fortifications at the Belgian border, you can still see some today. It was third rate compared to the Maginot line and hastily put together when Belgium declared neutrality.

You guys have some really good explanations, but you also forget that morale was quite low in the French Army.

Most of the mens fighting were sons of soldiers who fought during WW1, and they knew what kind of absolutely fucked up things they went through.
Burgers often forget how much France suffered during WW1. A good, sizeable portions of French Population died. No wonder people were reluctant about going to war against the same opponent in the 3rd time in less than a 100 year.

>>34896192

>Hurricane
>Inadequate

Otherwise, good points.