Putting aside the political justifications of the war, why did

bit of everything ,but jungles are essentially the perfect terrain for guerilla campaigns. Deserts are the worst (since air power anyhow)

US tactics for Iraq were likely pretty heavily affected by what they learned in Vietnam, so I'd say that helped them avoid taking as many casualties.

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>>31798584
I'd agree with that, but given that most casualties were inflicted on the US through conventional assets (artillery, close in mass assault, AAA), was the Jungle terrain the thing that allowed for such efficient application of those assets?

>>31798591
What were the primary lessons learned? How are those lessons applied now?

>>31798572
How many combatants have we actually faced in the desert wars?
I know that the average American solder in Vietnam saw 200+ days of combat out the year

Technology couldn't save people's asses like it can now. A flak jacket and a steel helmet are OK, but it's not Kevlar.
Medical science wasn't as good.
Combat was taking place in an extremely unhealthy environment with high levels of malaria and fungal infections in damp areas (where mud also got into wounds).
Troops weren't given time to acclimatize.
Training was inadequate.
US Tactics weren't the best. Small US units were strung out in areas seething with hostile forces and were allowed to be whittled down (eg hills outside Khe Sanh, where US battalions and companies went up against NVA regiments).
US doctrine emphasized positional warfare (ie defend this hill, take that hill) - without recognising that the NVA didn't care about positions as much as their ability to strike the Americans. Therefore the Americans would have to clear every position within firing distance of their bases to guarantee any degree of safety for those bases, leading to defending units being spread out and vulnerable.
US forces struggled to face up to a determined guerilla opponent that knew the terrain and often had significant popular support.
US Rules of Engagement hamstrung their forces' ability to pursue the war successfully. How do you beat an opponent with a massive logistical base that you can't touch?
The US underestimated the firepower they were going up against - the arrival of RPG-2/B-40/RPG-7 rockets let to a severe increase in losses amongst mechanized units, for example.
Concription undoubtedly added to the problem because of the unpopularity of the war.
The domestic media was dead against the war and twisted domestic perceptions, leading to embitterment and disengagement of serving troops and veterans.
The US was going through a period of intense cultural strain at the time, with the civil rights movement clashing with the new youth culture.
Drugs were endemic, both at home and in the forces.
The US forces couldn't trust their South Vietnamese allies.

>>31798617
Depends verily. I did the Afghanistan thing, never the Iraq desert thing. But from my experience, a tour can vary tremendously.

In Bagram? Literally in less danger than being in the US. The place almost never gets attacked and when it does, the CRAM systems shoot the fuck out of incoming rockets. People posted to Bagram are usually not leaving the wire, and if they do, it will be by air, which is not in danger.

On a big FOB? Still a fuckload of CRAM. Mild danger of green on blue or suicide trucks ramming the wall and/or insurgents suiciding by rushing our of trucks with AKs, but they get cut down right fucking quick. If you leave the wire from these outposts, you will be in more danger. Expect to get shot at and/or have IEDs waiting for you.

Insurgents generally can pull of decent complex ambushes and they know how to bait American/western forces in.

If you are on a Combat Outpost or similar small outpost, especially if it is remote enough to be connected to resupply by helicopter only, expect a lot more contact. Smaller outposts don't have active CRAMs, so insurgents will much more heavily hit them with indirect fire. Also, since the only response to their fire is either sending out infantry or waiting for helicopters, the insurgents know they have much longer windows of time to attack. Occasionally insurgents will attempt to overrun these outposts. They generally aren't successful, but every insurgent leader wants to make a name for himself by being the next leader of a Wanat battle. Outside the wire on these outposts, generally expect potshots or one IED at a minimum every time, and occasionally more deliberate attacks.


So, yeah. You can be anything from spending a year playing Xbox and drinking knockoff Starbucks in Bagram, to being in an outpost walking up and down mountainsides and having to secure airdropped food and ammo just to make it by. And everything in between.

>>31798730
I'd agree with all of this, but why are you neglecting to mention the gargantuan Huey losses, and the airmobile doctrines that led to said losses & accompanying casualties?

>>31798599
>I'd agree with that, but given that most casualties were inflicted on the US through conventional assets (artillery, close in mass assault, AAA), was the Jungle terrain the thing that allowed for such efficient application of those assets?
Of course. Jungle terrain negates the advantages of superior firepower because it conceals everything, halts mechanized units and slows down infantry. In open rolling temperate countryside and woodland (ie central Germany, the battle zone the US was prepared for), you can spot enemy positions much more easily and tanks and mechanized units can move with more freedom. Shoot-and-scoot tactics don't work so well and it's easier to work around enemy strong-points.

>>31798765
just because my knowledge base doesn't cover that so much. Airmobile doctrine was still in development in the 60s - for example, Vietnam was the birthplace of the helicopter gunship, but prior to the arrival of Cobras and other dedicated fire support choppers, Hueys and other transports were much more vulnerable.

>>31798572
MacNamara had the genius idea to draft in convicts, they could do a tour in exchange for getting out of their prison sentence.

Naturally this meant there were a shitload of people there, who had no business being there, and had no business fighting a modern war (raping and pillaging was considered passé and a faux pas by this point), people who were in prison for a reason, and should have stayed there.

>>31798753
Neat. I've always been interested in the effectiveness and applications of CRAM. It would be neat to see it used as a multirole base defense. Depress the barrel to deal with those pesky incoming bomb cars. Although that could take away from its counter mortar and artillery mission. Trade offs.

>>31798837
That would explain war crimes, but it wouldn't explain the excessive casualties.

>>31798851
CRAM is very effective against rocket and mortar fire.

As for ground threats, there are tons of watch towers with manned or remote machineguns, as well as armored vehicles arranged statically with manned turrets much of the time. Well enough firepower around a major FOB to blow threats away.

The suicide cars generally don't do a bumrush straight at the base. They will line up near the checkpoint that allows local trucks onto the "locals" area, or they will be disguised as resupply trucks. Once they are close to the base, they then punch it and go to their target as quickly as possible before the vehicle can get torn to shreds.

Seen it happen once with a tanker vehicle that attacked a bazaar, and seen it another time with a panel van that blew a hole in a smaller FOB wall, with a followup panel van that spilled out about 4 insurgents who ran into the base with AKs to shoot up the place for a few minutes before getting killed.

Direct attacks in Afghanistan were either extreme long range shoot and scoot, infiltration to accomplish close range suicide attacks, or infiltration/stealth to close range attacks attempting to overwhelm smaller bases (never FOBs or larger though).

>>31798912
Badly motivated soldiers have less competence, discapline and moral. This leads to worse performance in combat and therefore greater casualties.

>>31798572

There are so many differences it's not even funny.

>NVA was an actual army, like with tanks and planes and anti aircraft guns and such all brand spankin' new and being shipped in by the Chinese
>the best equipment our enemies now have are 30+ year old Russian mortars and artillery, no armor or air to speak of, and organization is barely beyond warband level

Not to mention there just aren't near as many mooslim baddies as there were NVA and Cong.

>>31798572
>10 year long war in an occupied territory vs harden veterans
>still dont lose that many
I want reddit to leave

>>31798954
What are you on about? The US lost more troops in Vietnam in one year than it has in both the Iraq and Afghan wars put together. It's reasonable to ask why that happened.

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>>31798572
Friendly fire.

>>31798954
50,000 is still a relatively large amount. Especially considering casualties since Vietnam.

I don't know that I buy the assertion at face value that the US took horrendous losses in Vietnam. 64k US and allied KIA 1965 to 1975.

I served I Iraq as a Infantryman vs forgien and homegrown jihadis and former regime loyalists.

In Vietnam we were at war with another nation state that had tanks, Air Force and of course guerilla NVA.

The Iraqi insurgents were small time in comparison.

ITT: OP makes up his own mind about this and only listens to people who directly confirm his assumptions

>>31798922
Interesting, thank you for your insight. Yeah I suppose a remote weapon system like an M2 could do the job just fine. I'm just thinking of a way to keep the base safe without having to have our boys stick their heads up and be vulnerable to pot shots or sniper fire

>>31798572
that's what happens be trying not to lose a war instead of trying to win a war. simple as that. you can't put the politics aside because that's what fucked it all up.

>>31798572
STDS from cheap local entertainment

>>31798986
The US on a per year basis took more casualties than it has in any conflict it has participated in since. It's reasonable to ask why.

Technology, bad tactics, conscription, and misuse of airmobile forces are explanations I've seen raised elsewhere, so they are all things I asked about.

What are your explanations for said casualties?

>>31798912
A bunch of chucklefucks who already were dumb enough to fuck up in life to go to prison, many who don't have a lot to live for.

Somebody post that "Why Arabs Lose Wars" essay, I'm on mobile.

To sum it up,

>terrible logistics, compounded by bad infrastructure
>terrible training, to the point where officers can't read their manuals to teach their soldiers because they're all illiterate
>graft, bribery, and self-interest above the interests of the group are rampant
>the self interest one is important, Arab soldiers often abandon their posts and flee from battle because they just don't give that much of a shit about the "cause" they're fighting for. It's just a paycheck and a free rifle.
>infighting and sectarianism are so strong that Arabs can basically only safely get along with people who are directly blood related to them
>equipment poorly maintained because again, no training due to illiteracy and maintenance equipment or even the materiel itself was stolen and sold

These are just a few of the many many reasons Arabs suck at war

we were using conscripts
we were in a jungle
no armor
gooks were battle hardened from fighting for their entire adult lives, whereas sand folk weren't
worse medicine
close range ambush tactics were used against US in Vietnam because jungle, not possible in deserts where there's little cover and lots of US CAS/artillery ready to get you when you're a mile out with one radio call

>>31798966

Opponent
Iraq: 99% insurgents with 1% Iranian SF. Small arms, IEDs, manpack mortars and rockets. Minimal logistics support from foreigners wahabists.


Vietnam: Conventitional NVA forces, imsurfent Viet Cong. Back by nation states ChiComs and USSR. Artillery, armor, air. Huge logistics support.

Body Armor
Iraq: NIJ IV plates and soft armor + Kevlar helmets.

Vietnam: steel pot and flak.

30+ yrs of medical and emergency medsurg. If you got hit in Baghdad you would be stabilized in a state of the art Hospital in German in under 12 hrs.

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>>31799045
>Arabs
>On a thread about Vietnam casualties and doctrine

>>31799134

Yeah, the point being that casualties were much higher in Vietnam in large part due to the fact that the NVA and Vietcong were a far more capable, numerous, and better-equipped force than the shitty Arab tribes we fight now.

>>31798912
Mmmm rape pussy....

Goddamn I love me some war crimes.

Vietnam two, when?

>>31798572

>Was it the technology of the time? Bad US tactics? Conscription? Misuse of helicopter forces?

The biggest factor was that the Vietnam War was heavily restricted by politics, since American civilian leadership was concerned with possibility of the Soviet Union or Chinese entering the conflict. The American Military could never really wipe the North Vietnamese out and were sucked into an indecisive conflict that inevitably resulted in attrition. While Iraq and Afghanistan have also been drawn out, it's not for lack of trying- the NVA had substantially more manpower and infrastructure than the Taliban or Iraqis.

Technology and training have both improved since the conflict, and generally the gap between the North Vietnamese and American Military was much closer than Iraqis vs. Coalition, but this is neither as important as the above, nor really an excuse anyways (since experience in Vietnam informed later technology and tactics, especially with something like use of helicopters).

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>>31799046

>we were using conscripts

>There were 8,744,000 servicemembers between 1964 and 1975, of whom 3,403,000 were deployed to Southeast Asia.[52] From a pool of approximately 27 million, the draft raised 2,215,000 men for military service (in the United States, Vietnam, West Germany, and elsewhere) during the Vietnam era. The draft has also been credited with "encouraging" many of the 8.7 million "volunteers" to join rather than risk being drafted.[citation needed] The majority of servicemen deployed to Vietnam were volunteers.[53]

There weren't THAT many losses though, even though this is depicted in media very often and the numbers are larger than in current, modern wars.

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Guerilla warfare is incredible tasking on the human psyche. Despite the popular notion, the Vietnam force was the most educated and fit the American military has ever been. However, the military with the individual rotational policy, created isolated psychopaths where personnel only cared about getting home in one peace.

Contrasts that today with today's military, the military while still more educated than the American public, is not as educated and draws a large majority of its personnel from the South, where the military serviced is revered and honored. Now, units train, deploy, and readjust as a cohesive unit with multiple safety nets and support programs along the way.

>>31799038
>Technology, bad tactics, conscription, and misuse of airmobile forces

All of the above. Look at the availability and sophistication of night vision devices during both conflicts, for example. Drones and intelligence gathering, also.

Tactics weren't so much bad as inappropriate. And implementing change was harder then than it is now. A lot of the senior brass had learned their craft in WW2, and were geared toward something similar against the Soviets. They were trying to force the conflict into the form that they wanted it to have, which is what the French also did.

Conscription directly affects motivation and morale of the troops. Iirc, it was also only for a 2 year enlistment. About the time a conscript gets enough experience to be useful, it's time for him to DEROS.

Airmobile was being made up as we went along. Totally new concept. It wasn't so much misuse as it was learning how to do it in a combat environment. I'd be very interested in seeing any studies the Army did of possible Airmobile uses in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict.