Why General MacArthur Was Really Fired: The US couldnt win against

That has nothing to do with MacArthur trying to override the President in using nukes against China who we were not at war with, to assist in a conflict in Korea which was also not a war

File: 26_35_47b9e3ade06dedb.jpg (48KB, 250x349px) Image search: [Google]

48KB, 250x349px

>>31732730
>Bradley knew that this alarming estimate might sound defeatist, but he thought the senators needed to hear it. He insisted that the exchange be deleted before the transcript was released to the newspapers and published the next day.

>How many submarines did the Russians have in the vicinity of Korea? asked Byrd.

>“Approximately 85,” Bradley said.

>“If they went into action, could we then still evacuate our troops?”

>“Yes, to a certain extent because we have considerable naval forces there who could help us.”

>But it wouldn’t be easy, Byrd sensed. “It would be a very serious situation?”

>“It would be a very serious situation,” Bradley confirmed.

>Byrd asked about the broader consequences of Russian intervention. “What other areas in Asia is Russia likely to take over if there is war in Asia?”

>“Through the use of the Chinese they have the possibility of and even capability of taking over Indochina, Siam, Burma and maybe eventually India,” Bradley

File: 26_35_42a2e0c75591a52.jpg (51KB, 580x393px) Image search: [Google]

51KB, 580x393px

>>31732758
>Other excised testimony revealed a fundamental reason for the administration’s reluctance to escalate in northeast Asia: There was precious little for the United States to escalate with. American air power, in particular, was stretched very thin. Hoyt Vandenberg, the Air Force chief of staff, told the committee that Korea was already claiming a large part of America’s available air strength. “The Air Force part that is engaged in Korea is roughly 85 percent—80 to 85 percent—of the tactical capacity of the United States,” he said. “The strategic portion, which is used tactically, is roughly between one-fourth and one-fifth. The air defense forces are, I would judge, about 20 percent.”

>Many Americans, and much of the world, imagined the United States had boundless military capacity. MacArthur had suggested as much, regarding air power, when he had told the committee that the U.S. Air Force could take on China without diminishing America’s capacity to check the Soviets.

>Vandenberg wasn’t going to disabuse America’s enemies of such notions, but he needed for the senators to hear, behind closed doors, that this was far from the case. “I am sure Admiral Davis will take this off the record,” Vandenberg said, referring to the officer overseeing the excisions, who did indeed take his remarks off the record. “The air force of the United States, as I have said, is really a shoestring air force.” Vandenberg had used the phrase in open testimony; now he provided details. One small, intrinsically insignificant country—Korea—was absorbing an alarming portion of America’s air resources. “These groups that we have over there now doing this tactical job are really about a fourth of our total effort that we could muster today.” To escalate against China, even if only from the air, would be reckless in the extreme. “Four times that amount of groups in that area over that vast expanse of China would be a drop in the bucket.”

File: Chinese PVA close combat against US tank.jpg (37KB, 300x249px) Image search: [Google]

37KB, 300x249px

>>31732769
>Omar Bradley responded that George was quite mistaken—and, by implication, that MacArthur was quite misleading. The Chinese were not fighting all out, not by a great deal. “They have not used air against our front line troops, against our lines of communication in Korea, our ports; they have not used air against our bases in Japan or against our naval air forces.” China’s restraint in these areas had been crucial to the survival of American and U.N. forces in Korea. On balance, Bradley said, the limited nature of the war benefited the United States at least as much as it did the Chinese. “We are fighting under rather favorable rules for ourselves.”

>Vandenberg amplified this point. “You made the statement, as I recall it, that we were operating against the Chinese in a limited fashion, and that the Chinese were operating against us in an unlimited fashion,” the air chief said to Republican Harry Cain of Washington.

>“Yes, sir,” Cain replied.

>“I would like to point out that that operates just as much a limitation, so far, for the Chinese as it has for the United Nations troops in that our main base of supply is the Japanese islands. The port of Pusan is very important to us.”

>“It is indeed.”

>“Our naval forces are operating on the flanks allowing us naval gunfire support, carrier aircraft strikes, and the landing of such formations as the Inchon landing, all without the Chinese air force projecting itself into the area,” Vandenberg said. “Therefore, the sanctuary business, as it is called, is operating on both sides, and is not completely a limited war on our part.”

>>31732757
The US was not at war with China or North Korea in the early 1950's
Recheck your history book, dumbass. China dumped 1 million troops into North Korea to oppose the South Korean/American push into NoKo.

File: PVA troops planning a night attack.jpg (101KB, 496x436px) Image search: [Google]

101KB, 496x436px

>>31732780
>George Marshall, the secretary of defense and a five-star general himself, made the same argument. Marshall, insisting on “the greatest concern for confidentiality,” said he had asked the joint chiefs just hours before: “What happens to the Army if we do bomb, and what happens to our Army if we don’t bomb in that way.” The chiefs’ conclusion: “Their general view was that the loss of advantage with our troops on the ground was actually more than equaled by the advantages which we were deriving from not exposing our vulnerability to air attacks.”

>In other words—and this was Marshall’s crucial point, as it had been Vandenberg’s—the limitations on the fighting in Korea, so loudly assailed by MacArthur and his supporters, in fact favored the American side.

>Marshall elaborated. “I am referring to the air fields, which we have very few of with the length of runway required, and wing-tip to wing-tip of planes, which are very vulnerable. I am referring to the fact that our transportation runs without regard to visibility, whereas theirs”—China’s—“has to be handled only at night, and if the weather is fair, that is illuminated and is subject to destruction.” China’s decision to yield the air was what allowed America to remain in Korea. “We can move reserves with practically no restriction at all, and they have the greatest difficulty in relation to that. If bombing starts, we have a great many conditions that will be far less advantageous to us.”

File: PVA assault.jpg>.jpg (28KB, 450x334px) Image search: [Google]

28KB, 450x334px

>>31732793
>Joe Collins, the army chief of staff, explained how Communist restraint had prevented an utter American debacle. Referring to the moment MacArthur had initially sought permission to bomb into China, Collins said, “When the first recommendations came in to bomb across the frontier, our troops were separated in Korea. The Tenth Corps was operating from the base at Hungnam, and our other forces were operating from bases at Pusan and Inchon. As soon as the Chinese attack began we were very much concerned about the fact that we would have to get that Tenth Corps out; and had we permitted the bombing north of the Yalu, we were dreadfully afraid that that might be the thing that would release the Russian planes, and additionally, have them give additional assistance to the Chinese, and might well have subjected the Tenth Corps to bombardment and possibly submarine attack during the perilous evacuation from Hungnam. Troops evacuating from a port of that character, in commercial ships, are terribly subject to air and underwater attack; and in my judgment, it would be a much too risky procedure.”

>Collins wasn’t quite so blunt as to say it, but his message was clear: Far from complaining about the limited nature of the war, MacArthur should have been grateful for it.

File: 26_35_3eb8946a52c317c.jpg (65KB, 580x405px) Image search: [Google]

65KB, 580x405px

>>31732801
>The committee members were sobered, if not stunned, by the chiefs’ and Marshall’s testimony. Americans tended to believe that, having won World War II, the American military could dispatch China with one hand and whack Russia with the other. The secret testimony of Marshall and the chiefs made patent that America’s military had its hands full already.

>Other testimony deleted from the published transcript severely undercut the idea that Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists would be of any help in a larger war. MacArthur had repeatedly urged that the United States accept Chiang’s offer to join the fighting against China. Marshall and the others roundly rejected it. The committee inquired. Chiang’s forces had proven inept in their fight against the Chinese Communists, and several of the senators wanted to know if they could be expected to improve. Democrat Russell Long of Louisiana put the question directly to Marshall: “Do you have any indication that the Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa [now Taiwan] could be depended upon to fight more fiercely than they did when they were fighting on the Chinese mainland?”

>“Well, whatever reply I would make to that I would want off the record,” Marshall answered.

>“I would like my question also to be off the record,” Long added.

>>31732786
>When you fail to greentext and people think you're stupid instead of quoting someone else that was implying something stupid

File: 26_35_fc6faa92c45adf2.jpg (62KB, 580x427px) Image search: [Google]

62KB, 580x427px

>>31732815
>Marshall explained that the Pentagon had sent a reconnaissance team to Formosa to determine the readiness and improvability of the Chinese Nationalists, and it had yet to report back. But he wasn’t at all hopeful. He particularly worried about Communist infiltration of the Nationalists. “What we have feared all the time was a boring from within,” he said. Marshall noted that similar infiltration by German agents and sympathizers had debilitated the French army in 1940; in the present case the possibility of infiltration rendered any reliance on the Nationalists extremely dubious. The Nationalists had abandoned a great deal of American weaponry in losing the mainland to the Communists; Marshall couldn’t see risking more.

>The problem with the Nationalists started at the top, Marshall and the chiefs declared confidentially. “The trouble of it is Chiang is not accepted by a large part of the Chinese,” Omar Bradley said. “Chiang has had a big chance to win in China and he did not do it.” There was little reason to think he would do better if given a second chance. “From a military point of view, in my own opinion I don’t think he would have too much success in leading the Chinese now. It is true some of them are getting tired of the Communists and might be more loyal to him now than they were before, but in my opinion he is not in position to rally the Chinese against the Communists even if we could get him ashore.”

>A turn to Chiang’s army, as MacArthur and others recommended, would not bolster American security, but weaken it. “Their leadership is poor, their equipment is poor, and their training is poor.”

It seems it was less about china and everything about the USSR.

tl;dr:

- America had all the advantage against China, but still lost
- China fought extremely restrained and didnt attack US assets outside of the Korean peninsula or even ships
- USSR had vast reserves ready and could have prevented even a successful american evacuation in case of escalation
- US air-power was on a shoestring and not as awesome as people thought it was
- MacArthur was an idiot who couldnt handle the truth

>>31732857
China/NK sunk many ships though.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_US_Navy_ships_sunk_or_damaged_in_action_during_the_Korean_conflict

the reason they didnt outright attack was because they couldn't without getting shreked.

>>31732892
Attack naval assets*

>>31732857
>- America had all the advantage against China, but still lost.

Except numbers, nor did anyone "lose".

This isn't news at all. Did anyone seriously think USA could fend off China AND the USSR if the Korean War became an existential threat to them? Two very powerful states and massive army would never let such a thing happen.

File: alien.jpg (105KB, 461x403px) Image search: [Google]

105KB, 461x403px

> The first fourth column.

>>31732857
>- America had all the advantage against China, but still lost
>- China fought extremely restrained and didnt attack US assets outside of the Korean peninsula or even ships
>- USSR had vast reserves ready and could have prevented even a successful american evacuation in case of escalation
>- US air-power was on a shoestring and not as awesome as people thought it was
>- MacArthur was an idiot who couldnt handle the truth
Read again. The article wasn't about USA not being able to handle China. It was about American fearing a war with China would trigger a war with the Soviets.

>>31733093
The US had all hands full fighting the Chinese, even though the Chinese fought with both arms tied behind their backs really (only using infantry and only attacking UN frontline troops, not even conducting strategic/interdiction attacks on supply and naval assets). And because of this. the threat of the USSR looms even larger.

>>31733222
>The US had all hands full fighting the Chinese, even though the Chinese fought with both arms tied behind their backs really (only using infantry and only attacking UN frontline troops, not even conducting strategic/interdiction attacks on supply and naval assets). And because of this. the threat of the USSR looms even larger.
The article doesn't say USA had their hands tied with China. It clearly stated that were USA to use its full capacity against China (and 1/4 of its air force), it would not have enough strength to wage war with the Soviets. It says waging a limited war benefited USA the most and is grateful for the Chinese agreeing with American terms. Don't make up words.

>>31733353
>(and 1/4 of its air force)
*and not 1/4 of its air force

>>31733222
The US wasn't using its hands either, and that was the problem. Keeping it limited suited the US as with the investment they made in forces, that was the best solution. The US could have put more in, but didn't for various reasons.

>>31733222
Well for one, there was no Chinese Navy to speak of (relative to the US Navy at the time), so it's not like they could have attacked Naval units even if they wanted to.

>>31732730
why all the hate on the great american general douglas macarthur?
this man was more /k/ than any of you fuckin' hacks could EVER even conceive.
he won SEVEN silver stars for personal bravery in world war one (you know the one where if you crawl out of your trench, you're fuckin' dead).