Was the static, stalemated nature of WW1 trench warfare inevitable

>>3162960
>Was the static, stalemated nature of WW1 trench warfare inevitable given the technology and logistics of the time
You can add in Stormtrooper tactics but that's about it. Primarily yes.

The war was only static in theaters where an unbroken line of men could be assembled between two impassable obstacles. The war in the Eastern Europe was fluid with huge tracts of land being traded in engagements. Same with the war in the Middle East. In the vast interior of Germany's African colonies it was guerilla tactics that reigned.

The western front was the exception, not the rule.

>>3162980
I don't know, even the naval theater tended to be a see-saw. You had battles like Jutland where there was no agreement on who actually won.

>>3162996
All the naval battles were hardly like Jutland

>>3163014
Of course, but the naval theater wasn't all that dynamic in general.

>>3162980
The 'Guerilla tactics ' in Africa really weren't. There was just one side denying the other a decisive battle. Mostly the defensive nature of the machine gun and the limits of logistics reigned supreme. The Germans would use their logistical advantage to fall back faster then the British could advance, then they'd set up a set piece defensive line, usually using a ridgebor river, set up machine gun and artillery emplacements, dig trenches, and would concentrate their local forces using all the same infantry tactics as on the western front. Then, an advancing British force would realize the Germans had stopped retreating, when they got shot to shit by a larger well entrenched enemy force. They'd then be pinned down, and call up for reinforcements and artillery to break the defensive line, except by the time their logistics had set up for an offensive, the Germans would start retreating again.

"Inevitable" is not a good word but in generic terms, yes, the situation in 1914-1915 was the result of what they had and could do.

But from 1916 onwards you have developments in small unit tactics (on both sides, the German "stormtrooper" approach was not unique in the execution, rather in the personnel makeup of the assault elements), set piece attacks, artillery coordination and already you see a very different form of war, albeit not yet particularly dynamic.

That changes around 1916-1917 when you have a completely different beast altogether. The war was dynamic by that point with defense in depth replacing trench systems, widespread bite and hold attacks especially by the allies, even more developed set piece assaults, combined arms, also the squad begins to shine through as the smallest tactical element.

It is important to note that while the first months (after the initial German decision to dig in, that is) might have been the stereotypical "static, stalemated" warfare with a nigh unchanged frontline, 1916 onwards you can't describe the situation as such. It was not "fast moving" by any means (that would slowly start to come in 1917-1918) but it was not static. The frontline would no longer be dominated by two opposing trench systems, it would become much more granular and indeed dynamic. Just without heavy motorization and the sheer scale of conflict you would see it at the lower levels as opposed to grand operational maneuvers typical of e.g. WW2 mechanized formations.

In terms of speed, tactics, "fluidity" or "being dynamic", a localized ~divisional clash in 1917 on the Western Front would not really be different from a WW2 engagement where units with a comparable TOEE would meet (i.e. infantry-artillery formations with limited or no mechanized support).

In order for the nature of the Western front to be different, you would have to apply the experience and developments from about two years of war before you accrued them. I.e. have a time machine.

>>3162996
Jutland was objectively a British victory. A Pyrrhic victory perhaps due to higher losses but the German fleet failed to break the blockade and wouldn't sail out as a united force for the rest of the war.

>>3163086
>logistical advantage

What did they mean by this?

>>3163110
Not him but the Germans in Africa were pretty inventive with their ability to create ad-hoc equipment like a quinine substitute using only local supplies

>>3163110
>>3163110
Well, the Germans had their rail lines in tact for most of the war, and the advancing South Africans and British didn't bother repairing or expanding the system the Germans tore up as they left until General Smuts left (because he insisted he wrapped the whole thing up by 1916), so that was a big part of it.

Then of course, the Germans were retreating on interior lines, so the further the front moved, the shorter their supply lines were, while the longer the British lines were.

The Germans treated their porters better (mainly because they had a finite supply of them) so their system of porters wasn't held down by constant illness snd hospital towns piling up wherever they went.

And lastly, because the Germans sourced their supplies from a friendly population, they brought their supplies up from a wide variety of points throughout the colony. The British had no such system or cooperation set up and pulled all their supplies in a single line from Tanga.

>>3163086
Fair enough but my point was the African theater was anything but static.