Why are Arab armies historically so bad? Do Arabs not have the

>>3154304
they all want to die honorably

>>3154304
It wasn't a fair fight considering Israel was funded by almost the entire west.

>>3154322
and Egypt was armed and trained by the soviet union

http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars

>>3154304

they lack any sort of cohesion. These are all shitty dictators who are scared of being overthrown, so they divide up military leaders to fight among each other in fear that a general will unite them all in a coup against them. So when a war with a foreign country actually does break out, these guys are all thinking about themselves rather than the army as a whole, and are weak and break.

>>3154334
Still doesn't equal it. An equal fight would have resulted like the Soviet-Afghan war.

>>3154322
The only modern weapons the Israeli's were getting was from France, one of their most common tanks was a modified Sherman facing T-55 ffs.

>>3154369
>Egypt and Jordan and Syria
>Invaded by numerous neighbours, Egypt themselves being an Arab giant with a far bigger landmass and population than all of historical palestine
>Unfair for Israel

>>3154399
Woops
I mean
>implying it was unfair for the Arabs
Not israel haha

>>3154369
are you seriously comparing arabs and afghans

>>3154304
Israel had a "professional" army, even though it hadn't been existing for a long time, but it did have a standard command and leadership, The armies of arabs, on the other hand, were still much clan and family based and there had been disputes and possibly rivalry betweeen the tribes, complicating the cohesion of attacks.

>>3154304
They are extremely tribal

One of the reasons the Saudis "flourished" is because the guy had over a 100 fucking sons and spread them out, imagine all the marriage power plays. Now there are so many different generations of sauds running parallel for the "prince" titles and other positions

Because Pan-Arabism is a joke.

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http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars

The article is good but this is the most important part

>Arab junior officers are well trained on the technical aspects of their weapons and tactical know-how, but not in leadership, a subject given little attention. For example, as General Sa'd ash-Shazli, the Egyptian chief of staff, noted in his assessment of the army he inherited prior to the 1973 war, they were not trained to seize the initiative or volunteer original concepts or new ideas.20 Indeed, leadership may be the greatest weakness of Arab training systems. This problem results from two main factors: a highly accentuated class system bordering on a caste system, and lack of a non-commissioned-officer development program.
>Most Arab officers treat enlisted soldiers like sub-humans. When the winds in Egypt one day carried biting sand particles from the desert during a demonstration for visiting U.S. dignitaries, I watched as a contingent of soldiers marched in and formed a single rank to shield the Americans; Egyptian soldiers, in other words, are used on occasion as nothing more than a windbreak. The idea of taking care of one's men is found only among the most elite units in the Egyptian military. On a typical weekend, officers in units stationed outside Cairo will get in their cars and drive off to their homes, leaving the enlisted men to fend for themselves by trekking across the desert to a highway and flagging down busses or trucks to get to the Cairo rail system. Garrison cantonments have no amenities for soldiers. The same situation, in various degrees, exists elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking countries—less so in Jordan, even more so in Iraq and Syria.

cont'd

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>>3157524
>The social and professional gap between officers and enlisted men is present in all armies, but in the United States and other Western forces, the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps bridges it. Indeed, a professional NCO corps has been critical for the American military to work at its best; as the primary trainers in a professional army, NCOs are critical to training programs and to the enlisted men's sense of unit esprit. Most of the Arab world either has no NCO corps or it is non-functional, severely handicapping the military's effectiveness. With some exceptions, NCOs are considered in the same low category as enlisted men and so do not serve as a bridge between enlisted men and officers. Officers instruct but the wide social gap between enlisted man and officer tends to make the learning process perfunctory, formalized, and ineffective. The show-and-tell aspects of training are frequently missing because officers refuse to get their hands dirty and prefer to ignore the more practical aspects of their subject matter, believing this below their social station. A dramatic example of this occurred during the Gulf war when a severe windstorm blew down the tents of Iraqi officer prisoners of war. For three days they stayed in the wind and rain rather than be observed by enlisted prisoners in a nearby camp working with their hands.

tl;dr NCOs are vital in any military, I can personally attest to this

>t. /k/ommando

>>3157527
fug, forgot the last part

>The military price for this is very high. Without the cohesion supplied by NCOs, units tend to disintegrate in the stress of combat. This is primarily a function of the fact that the enlisted soldiers simply do not trust their officers. Once officers depart the training areas, training begins to fall apart as soldiers begin drifting off. An Egyptian officer once explained to me that the Egyptian army's catastrophic defeat in 1967 resulted from a lack of cohesion within units. The situation, he said, had only marginally improved in 1973. Iraqi prisoners in 1991 showed a remarkable fear and enmity toward their officers.

>>3154322
Having superior funding and allies is indeed a fair advantage, anon.

>>3154304
>lack of strong discipline or loyalty to state because of tribal ties

>dictators purposely make their army command structures confusing to help them keep power

>Arabs are not fighting an existential fight and are thus not willing to expend the resources needed to win

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"So long as the Arabs fight tribe against tribe, so long will they be a little people, a silly people, greedy, barbarous, and cruel."

>>3154304
They were good until around the 9th century.

Also they have good military equipments but no knowledge to work with them
Arab tank crews knows no tactic except driving forward and maybe shooting at something

>>3154417
The Arabian countries were more powerful but the Afghans had much worser living conditions for the Soviet's to charge through in their favor tbf.

>>3157546
The state is bullshit. Why should someone be loyal to a state mostly conceived by wannabe Westeners who themselves inherited a country of borders drawn by France and the UK?

Except for Egypt, Jordan and Syria wouldn't exist if it wasn't for the French and British.

>>3157708
Arabs of the "Gulf" can't be a "big people" since the desert doesn't support large settlements. It's only with recent technological advances that large scale desalination for cities is now possible. Look at the population of Saudi Arabia. It's 20 million citizens. UAE has 1 million citizens.

And the rest of that quote may be movie worthy but it doesn't hold much truth. Everyone is greedy and cruel. Look at WW2 which would have happened not too long after WW1.

>>3156357
Egypt and Syria barely had any tribes in their military. There are not tribal.