After realising simply asking "why" and challenging

>>2774672
Game theory is effectively rationalist morality. Is that what you're looking for?

>>2774702
It still doesn't seem to refute radical skepticism. A priori knowledge or morals are still dependent upon one's own perception, and if one cannot prove they exist then neither can their perceptions be proven.

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>>2774746
>>2774672
1. All evaluative reasoning both that considered "moral" and that considered "amoral" is the choosing between alternatives.

2. All evaluative reasoning ultimately derives from a formal or informal hierarchy of values, or value-set.

3. All Value-Sets ultimately reduce to a series of stated axioms, the rejection of which by an act of will destroys the value-set. If you don't care about pleasure, utilitarianism means nothing to you. If you don't care about eudaimonia, virtue ethics means nothing. And so on. In short, all moral philosophies are merely the working out of certain axiomatic premises, a priori assumed values at the base of the structure.

This is the "problem" of moral skepticism properly defined. The only solution to this problem would be if all values were ultimately reducible to a series of values build into the structure of consciousness itself. That is to say, to prove that all consciousnesses [human and otherwise] actually desire the same fundamental things, and only the means differ.

Many ethicists try and prove this, very badly, when you corner them and try and get them to justify their axioms. But usually they don't do this in a formal sense, an appeal to universal values implicit in consciousness. Instead they simply call you evil or dumb and imply you already agree with them, and are just pretending otherwise to be stubborn.

In absence of such a proof however, a kind of root of will itself, all value-sets are based on the purely subjective desires of particular agents.

>>2774795
>1. All evaluative reasoning both that considered "moral" and that considered "amoral" is the choosing between alternatives.
>2. All evaluative reasoning ultimately derives from a formal or informal hierarchy of values, or value-set.
This implies that two alternatives equal in value cannot exist. e.g 1+1=2, 3-1=2, or perhaps more loosely the choice of which religion's god to follow.
In this case there is no hierarchy in values, so there is no value-set?
>3. All Value-Sets ultimately reduce to a series of stated axioms, the rejection of which by an act of will destroys the value-set
>all moral philosophies are merely the working out of certain axiomatic premises, a priori assumed values at the base of the structure.
If a moral philosophy is a value-set founded on axioms, then would you assert a different explanation for moral dilemmas that do not involve value-sets?

>The only solution to this problem would be if all values were ultimately reducible to a series of values build into the structure of consciousness itself. That is to say, to prove that all consciousnesses [human and otherwise] actually desire the same fundamental things, and only the means differ.
This assumes that consciousness exists, for which there is no proof, ultimately meaning it is not a logical solution. The only solution to THIS problem is proof of existence or a logical reason why proof of existence needn't be provided to provide a basis for belief beyond convenient axioms.

>>2774672
>but you can't prove you're "willing" nor "acting"
What do you mean?
In the case of Nietzsche he deconstructs the society and tries to explain it from a phsychological perspective, he doesn't give any sort of moral code