Could the Germans have succeeded at Kursk if they had attacked

>>2580519
No, the Soviets already had massive defenses. The delay actually increased the probability of success but the operation was never that great to begin with. Tank autism is only a minor role

even if they win the kursk battle, meaning they encircle the soviet forces, they were cronically undermanned meaning the encircling divisions could get easily trapped in the event of soviet attacks on the flanks or worst case, soviets divisions can break through to safety

they simply did not have enough men anymore to have both the panzer and infantry divisions at full strenght which is cruical to hold ground

this notion comes up all the time in german memoirs, how their platoons/divisions etc were undermanned, how it is impossible to make use of a local breakthrough because theres no infantry/infantry division to keep the gain so the panzers can keep rolling

almost all of the infantry divisions were classified as "fully capable of defense" which is almost the lowest rank in their combat capabality system

>>2580532
>No, the Soviets already had massive defenses. The delay actually increased the probability of success but the operation was never that great to begin with.
The keys to Soviet victory during Kursk were the thousands of miles of fortifications built, and the overall depth of their elastic defence. Most of the fortifications were built from April to July, in which 4200 km of trenches and 500 km of antitank defenses were built by civilian labourers. Furthermore during this period 64 340 antipersonnel mines were laid, as well as 69 688 antitank mines in the primary defensive belt alone. Finally the delay gave the Soviets time to prepare a proper communications network, which was always a weak point of the Soviet forces. Thousands of miles of wire and roads were built to increase communication and allow for transport of reserves. The Germans had managed to smash through the initial Soviet defensive lines in Barbarossa and the Blau Offensive, it is not a stretch to say they could have done much better, if not succeeded in closing the 160 mile encirclement at Kursk. Not that this would have changed the outcome of the war, but operational success was definitely plausible in March or early May.

>>2580594
its not the "fortifications" its the thousands of anti tank guns, artillery and mortars pointing at the german lines

earlier operations were impossible since german divisions had to be refitted
i mean, this is "if they pushed moscow they could have won" arguement all over again

you cant push anything with your divisions down to 33% of its strenght while the enemy just keep reinforcing theirs

>>2580578
>no capitals
>no periods
>cronically
>strenght
>cruical
>capabality

Ignoring all your mistakes, Kursk was never intended to be a turning point in the war. The strategic aims were to deliver a strong blow in early '43 to stall the Russian recovery from their '42 losses, and to straighten out the line. The latter objective actually would decrease the stress on German divisions because they would not be defending as wide of a front.

>>2580611
that was harkov
now go educate yourself and fuck off retarded anglo

>>2580604
>"fortifications"
Why are you quoting this like it's the wrong term? I'm not the one refusing to use punctuation and misspelling simple words like strength.
>you cant push anything with your divisions down to 33% of its strenght while the enemy just keep reinforcing theirs
German forces actually fought at a larger disadvantage the longer they waited. The Russians were pushing out 2000 tanks a month while the Germans were pushing out less than a 1000, never minding the thousands of Jeeps and Tanks being sent over by lend lease. Guderian and Kluge were the only generals asking for a delay of Citadel, Guderian only because he was in charge of the Panzer program, and was not concerned with Soviet defensive and arms buildup in the pocket. Manstein, Model, Hoth and Kempf all realized that the longer they waited the less chance they had at victory. By July even Guderian was against the attack realizing how fucked they were against a 300 km elastic defense network of mines, communications wires, trenches and artillery. Finally, infantry was not crucial to holding ground at all. Most frontline accounts at Kursk show that Soviet infantry would fallback the moment their last antitank gun was destroyed.

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>>2580657
Yes the Battle of "harkov" was intended to strike a blow to the Soviets to prevent a large scale offensive and straightening out the front. The Battle of Kursk also had this objective albeit on a much larger scale.
>now go educate yourself and fuck off retarded anglo
I'm citing figures from Glantz and House's history of the battle, but I'll be sure to take in to account the opinion of a Wikipedia scholar who is too retarded to use spell check.

What was the state of German Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions after 3rd Harkov? Were they even capable of a large push, especially with the weak infantry divisions guarding the flanks (Little Saturn anyone)?

>>2580718
I've been looking through my books and the internet but most numbers I find only show German Panzer divisional strength at the start of Citadel in July.The only concrete numbers I could find were on the II SS Panzer Corps, which was at an estimated 66% combat strength on March 17th. I'm not sure if that can be used as an indicator of strength of the rest of the Corps in Army Group South though, as SS Panzer Corps usually saw harsher fighting than the Wehrmacht Panzer Corps. Another point to consider is that by mid-April Manstein felt Army Group South was ready to immediately attack, but Kluge refused because he said Army Group Center did not have the fighting strength. Now whether this is an indicator that either Army Group was actually was or wasn't ready for the attack, or just a clash of each General's plans for the timeframe of Citadel is up for debate unless someone else has access to a source that can prove it.

>>2580666
because it is, there were no concrete bunkers
i dont give a shit about your shit language so keep yapping about it

>le tanks vs tanks meme
>lend lease

americans should be banned from here
infantry is holding the flanks in the event of a breakthrough, otherwise those are exposed to enemy counterattacks, also occupying towns/villages/strongpoints, this is why you need the infantry

mobile warfare of late ww2 is alot more than numbers put against eachother

>>2580696
you havent read any works about eastern front, 99% of anglo authors are utter garbage, seeing
a, they cant access russian archives
b, they are heavily biased
c, le popular history meme

>>2580718
they always suffer heavy losses (divisions with less than 10 tanks and so on)
but they are quickly withdrawn from frontline (replaced by an infantry div usually) and refitted

its not impossible they could be ready by april but they usually spend a month or 2 as reserve while being refitted
>>2580880
>66%
thats the personell, i dont have anything about equipment though
generally speaking a percentage of that would get the division a rating moderately fit for offense, which means yes for offensive operations

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>>2581075
>Americans need to be banned for posting facts

>all authors are shit so heres my world war 2 fanfiction which is how it really happened

Feel free to stop making a fool of yourself at any time. You are either baiting really poorly or so fucking deluded that it isn't even funny. Do you even have a single fact to support any of the shit you spew?

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>>2581075
>because it is, there were no concrete bunkers
Fortifications don't have to be concrete, a trench is considered a fortification.

>lend lease is a meme
400 000 Jeeps, 7000 tanks, 5000 other armoured vehicles, 11 000 aircraft, and 1.75 million tons of food is hardly a meme. A major reason why Soviet reserves and supplies could move so smoothly throughout the Kursk pocket was because they were using American vehicles for transport, while the Germans mostly relied on trains.

>mobile warfare of late ww2 is a lot more than numbers put against each other
Yeah like the massive defensive network of trenches, tank killzones and mines that the Soviets constructed? Oh wait you already were arguing that those fortifications were irrelevant in this post >>2580604
Congratulations on contradicting your own arguments.

>you havent read any works about eastern front
see pic related.

>99% of anglo authors are utter garbage
Then post some sources that are better. You probably won't though because you're pulling all these facts out of your High School history course, but hey muh great patriotic war right?