I don't really understand the japanese strategy in WW2.

>>1636794
>Let's have many half-assed theaters!
t. Ministry of the Army.

>>1636794
probably because it was really an alliance between manchuria (army) and japan (navy)
nips gave yanks an excuse to their pacific but god forbid china ever gets the power to collect on its debt owed

>>1636794
I don't really know what their end goal was but I assume it was control oil fields + use chinks as slaves

>>1636794
They had a lot of people to fight and not a lot of resources to fight them with. They did pretty damn well all things considered

>>1636816
placate the yellow river then expand in all directions

>>1636794
Their strategy was largely about controlling key resources in the region, namely oil, and creating a strong defensive perimeter around the home islands. Indonesian oil fields were always a key target in the Pacific strategy and the Philippines and South East Asia were largely invaded and occupied in order to secure the Japanese position on Borneo and the Dutch East Indies. Aside from that they kind of went full retard by Spring 1942 with expeditions into the Aleutians and India.

>>1636819
yet were totally beaten by centuries in their territorial ambitions by european (english) powers from the other side of the world.. hah

chaoticness=anarchism=greater gains

>>1636821
>oils muh grand strategy
>>t american

>>1636821
I can understand the japanese invasion of european colonies in the pacific, and I guess Pearl Harbor was inevitable even though it was a huge gamble. But what made them think the USA would back down ? Why Japan thought it could keep whole China under control ? I realize they underestimated the Chinese, but surely at some point they should have realized that the war was going nowhere.

>>1636831
You're retarded if you don't think oil played a central role in Japanese (and German) military planning and decision-making during the war.

>>1636850
A lot of Japanese leaders were so blinded by ideology and fanaticism that they believed their own bullshit and thought the gaijin were weak, materialistic cowards that stood no chance against superior Japanese fighting spirit.

>>1636860
It probably explains a lot, but the Japanese thought the war in China would last a couple of months. At some point, they should have understood they ouldn't completly subdue the entire country and withdraw. From what I understood, Japan thought the USSR was a bigger threat to their colonial empire.

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>>1636794
>but the way they handled the war it seems they had no idea of what they were doing.

That is how many lower japanese officers felt too.

Really, the Japanese high command were not the brightest of people. Japan won some battles because they prepared themselves for those exact battles. But once the actual war started and they had to improvise, they just couldn't. Strategy just wasn't their forté and they were playing catch up on all fronts.

>>1636888
Most of the IJA leadership during the 1930s certainly thought the Russians were the bigger threat and thought a "Strike North" policy was more sound. The IJN thought a "Strike South" policy was more sound and obviously they had an interest in using their naval power against the Europeans and America. Especially after losing decisively to the Soviets at Nomonhan in Manchuria though, Japanese strategies increasingly focused on conquering the Pacific and SEA.

>>1636911
>That is how many lower japanese officers felt too.
Any books on this? I would be really interested to learn how the lower rung of the Japanese military felt about their WW2 exploits

>>1636851
it played a part but im not the retard that made paper then pixels into a monetary policy enforced by assured nuclear armegeddon and carpet bombings. like the bullshit dont even have plastic billed notes what a joke

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>>1636827
>chaoticness=anarchism=greater gains
*blocks your path*

so that old fossil taught you the muchitsujo no jutsu chaos technique huh, let's put it to the test

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>>1636952

"Japanese Destroyer Captain" by Tameichi Hara

It's his memoires. He's not a suicidal fanatic like many paint the japanese officers and scorns the high command for what he views as ineptitude. He also explains why he thinks they were wrong in detail.

>>1637008
arent you dead yet?

>>1637011
NOICE quality /his/ tip anon thx

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>>1636794

Their goal was to become the great military power of Asia. To do that, they had to conquer China, so they nipped away at it for years, trying to digest the place. Then they ran into the seriously problem of supplies, made worse by the embargo by the West because of their militarism. So the navy (who were a separate, rival entity to the army) suggested a lightning blow to America. The plan was:

>Destroy the American fleet at Pearl Harbour
>Capture the Phillipines
>Cripple the other Western powers in the region
>Americans are pacifists who'll sue for peace in an instant

The first three went like a charm, however, America didn't surrender. Despite doing pretty much everything the plan called for, they had horrifically misjudged the American character, thinking their isolationism was a veil for cowardice. The Americans proceeded to turn on the factories and pulverised Japan to a crisp.

The Japanese plan was suicide from day one, based entirely on their quest to become one of the big boys of the world. They needed China to become a superpower, needed resources to keep China, defeat the West in the Pacific to get the resources, and defeat the West at home to get the Pacific. It was literally that hopeless, all chosen because of a retarded gamble on American's not sperging out once Pearl Harbour happened.

>>1636794
Resources was the ultimate goal, just the same as Germany's need to expansion into the oil field of Romania and the Caucasus and the farmlands of france.

In Japan's situation, they were under embargo by all the west for their campaigning in China, which was draining their resources fast to keep the campaign going.

so the Army and Navy had conflicting plans to relieve the resource drought. The Army devised Hokushin-ron, or the northern expansion doctrine, where Japan would push into the oil and iron rich Siberia within the Soviet Union, but with so many millions of soldiers tied down in China, Japan couldn't muster much for the invasion, and fought the Soviets at the battle of Khalkhin Gol, where Japan was soundly defeated and the doctrine was given up.

The Navy devised Nanshin-ron, or the Southern expansion doctrine, where they would seize the European colonies in Indochina, Burma, and the East Indies to get their oil, iron, and rubber.

But the Japanese knew that seizing these territories definitely meant war with the US, who was sitting in the Philippines. So Japan gambled on one quick knock-out blow against the US to remove their Pacific fleets from the playing field as long as possible, or best case scenario, intimidate the US to back down entirely. So Pear Harbor was carried out, which certainly hurt the US fleets, but didn't outright remove them from the playing field.

Japan went forward seizing the colonies, but the US was back in fighting shape within 7 months, where the Japanese high command was hoping they would be out of the picture for at least a full year.

>>1637011
>Hara was the only IJN destroyer captain at the start of World War II to survive the entire war and his memoirs serve as an important source for historians

Shit, they really did fight to the last man. Of course his account might not be typical because the guys that bought the propaganda all got killed kamikaze style

>>1637448
>made worse by the embargo by the West because of their militarism.

Wrong. It was not because of their militarism. It was because they signed an ally pact to join the Axis with Germany and Italy.

>>1637465
>>1637448
>>1637453


All three of you are wrong. If it was about China, or joining the Germans, or just general militarism, the freezing of assets and oil embargo would have come a hell of a lot earlier than August of 1941.

The actual cause for the trade restrictions was the invasion of Indo-China, at the time a French colony, but what with France being overrun by Germany at the time, not really one they could effectively control, so when Japan went in to "restore order" to the region, the French couldn't really do much about it.

It's one thing when Asians are fighting other Asians. But when they started shoehorning in on a European power, one that had been on good terms with the U.S. for a very long time, well, that's different now.

>>1636831
It's true though.
Japan had little natural resources at home, and was trying to secure a supply from other Asian countries. This caused us to start embargoing the oil we were selling to them at the time.

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It seemed to be a leap of faith by leaders more interested in appearances and short term political success. This is typical of authoritarian regimes, however it was especially true in Japan who had gained Korea, Manchuria and parts of China and believed further war would simply be an extension of this and necessary to protect the gains they had made so far.

Another factor might be Japan's wealth. Japan had greater wealth and more leg room for their prejudices and irrationality, pouring massive amounts of resources into giant battleships that barely had any strategic significance for example.

Also Japan had been largely democratic at one point and could easily return to it unless the military elite either gained victories or dragged Japan into a war where they apparently depended on the military for survival.

>>1637479
No, Asian fucking up Asians mattered to the US.

You do realize Chinkdom is one of the biggest markets for US at the time right?

You do realize the invasion of Indochina was an effort not just to fuck up France but halt all trade to China?

Happy VJ Day.

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>>1636794
their objection was unified east asia under japanese hegemony, that means getting rid of western colonialism

>>1637661

>No, Asian fucking up Asians mattered to the US.

I'm not saying it didn't, but it wasn't the cause for the embargo.

>You do realize Chinkdom is one of the biggest markets for US at the time right?

Actually it wasn't, Britain was first, France was second, and Japan itself was third. It however, was still a pretty big market, and the lobby of a collection of Christian organizations (mostly concerned with missionary work) were very powerful.

>You do realize the invasion of Indochina was an effort not just to fuck up France but halt all trade to China?

You realize that's completely wrong? Trade with China had already been almost entirely halted given that the Japanese controlled the entire coastline and the route up from Hanoi with their forces already in China, which is the direction they moved to take the capital from. The only stuff that was getting in was over the road through Burma up to Kunming, but Indo-China had nothing to do with that.

>>1637710
>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Events_leading_to_the_attack_on_Pearl_Harbor
> In 1940 Japan invaded French Indochina in an effort to embargo all imports into China, including war supplies purchased from the U.S. This move prompted the United States to embargo all oil exports...

Trade (and most importantly, american weapons) were still entering China from Indochina and British Burma.

When Indochina fell, the fact that British Burma was most likely next would spell disaster to China. Hence the bloody static war the Brits/Chinks and Nips fought there.

>>1637693
The only problem is they wanted to be just as bad as white colonialists, except Asian. Maybe even worse, because being Asian gave them entitlement to Asian colonies, so they thought they should be able to get away with even more.

>>1637693
this. I feel like we tend to villify japan for doing to asia what our allies(france and the uk) had been doing to africa and south asia for some time

>>1637453
Reminder that the Japanese were weeks away from releasing the bubonic plague in California before the war ended. How fucked would we have been?

>splitting up your forces so you can capture Papua New Guinea instead of rolling hard on the Americans at Midway

Terrible strategy. If not for the ineptness of kraut and nip commanders, the Allies may have actually had to fight hard.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomoyuki_Yamashita

Let's settle it once and for all, was he the sanest and most capable Japanese General?

>swarms through Malaysia unstopped
>captures Singapore will as little casualties as possible by giving generous surrender terms to Percival
>exiled to Manchuria because he refused to treat his captives as subhumans

>>1637865
vaccines for bubonic plague have been around since 1897, so after a few hundred deaths, treatment would be pretty commonplace after the government figures out what's going on.

>>1637782
>Maybe even worse, because being Asian gave them entitlement to Asian colonies, so they thought they should be able to get away with even more.

This is probably the truest statement I've ever read regarding Japanese imperialism.

>>1637890
Not a general, but Yamamoto is rightfully regarded as a brilliant admiral. A very tragic figure.

>>1637693
And getting your purdy yellow asses kicked in one mass national suicide.

>>1637906
Ah my bad!

And insanely tragic too in that he believed in what he was fighting for moreso than even other admirals did. There's an anecdote about him being scolded for addressing his captives as "citizens of the Japanese empire" which would have me believe that he never doubted his righteousness of fighting for a western-freed Asia.

>>1637693
what is the significance of A B C D in this picture

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>>1637782
its more complicated than that, there's definitely the imperial japan expanding their empire, but beside that there's a whole pan asianism movement that basically said "asia for asians" even kingdoms like thailand, burma as well as many nationalist movement throughout colonial south east asia at first support japanese invasion

>>1637890
He seems like a top bloke:

>On 23 February 1946, at Los Baños, Laguna Prison Camp, 30 miles (48 km) south of Manila, Yamashita was hanged. After climbing the thirteen steps leading to the gallows, he was asked if he had a final statement. To this Yamashita replied through a translator:[citation needed]

>As I said in the Manila Supreme Court that I have done with my all capacity, so I don't ashame in front of the gods for what I have done when I have died. But if you say to me 'you do not have any ability to command the Japanese Army' I should say nothing for it, because it is my own nature. Now, our war criminal trial going under your kindness and right. I know that all your American and American military affairs always has tolerant and rightful judgment. When I have been investigated in Manila court I have had a good treatment, kindful attitude from your good natured officers who protected me all the time. I never forget for what they have done for me even if I had died. I don't blame my executioner. I'll pray the gods bless them. Please send my thankful word to Col. Clarke and Lt. Col. Feldhaus, Lt. Col. Hendrix, Maj. Guy, Capt. Sandburg, Capt. Reel, at Manila court, and Col. Arnard. I thank you.

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>>1637981
this, many japanese generals supported my country independence movement, some of them even ended up becoming citizen and later fight the dutch KNIL forces

t. indonesian

>>1637950
>Ah my bad!

Sorry, my wording was wrong. Yamashita was definitely a general, I respect both him and Yamamoto.

And yeah, Yamamoto was based. Devoted to his nation and had a high degree of sophistication and charm. This might sound racist because ARR ROOK SAME, but Yamamoto and Zhou Enlai are very similar in some aspects.

>>1636794
>I don't really understand the japanese strategy in WW2
Neither did they. You have to understand that Japan practically blundered their way into war by backing themselves into an imaginary corner. Their whole cult of bushido they had going really fucked up their local commands, and well before war had even started the idea of "better to ask for forgiveness than permission" had permeated the Army.

Things like the invasions of Manchuria, the thousand or so border incidents with the Soviets, and the invasion of China were the result not of any directive from high command but some local commanders taking the initiative and then banking on high command being pressured into supporting them.

Just off the top of my head, in the years leading up to WW2, local IJA units had, without any official sanction:
>assassinated the leader of Manchuria
>invaded and occupied Manchuria
>participated in and escalated countless border incidents with China and the Soviets
>Started the Second Sino-Japanese War
>fought two major pitched battles against the Soviets, culminating in the near annihilation of the Kwantung Army

So Japan wasn't exactly planning these things so much as reluctantly going wherever ambitious officers dragged them. And because of the complicity of the Japanese media and the whole bushido meme, the Japanese government was effectively forced to go along, because the alternative was backing down.

They did manage to get the army under a bit more control after Khalkhin Gol, but even then you had the Army taking the initiative well before the government back home was ready. Though they dropped plans to fuck with Russia pretty fast, they just turned around and pushed further into China and occupied French Indochina. The West understandably responded with all their embargoes, and Japan's feeling that they could never back down meant that they were "forced" to go to war.

>>1636809
>but god forbid china ever gets the power to collect on its debt owed

They have it, but decide that WW3 isn't worth using it.

>>1638085

Not to mention that the primary mechanism they're using to control their currency values is holding U.S. debt, and liquidating that is going to make the Yuan shoot up like a rocket, effectively ending their manufacturing export competitiveness.

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>>1638066
>Opinions: the thread

>>1637693
Ahh yes because the Western colonialists did shit like Unit 731

>>1638025
>they supported our independence

To turn you into another colony. Just like Vietnam, Philippines, and Malaysia

>>1637971
American
British
Chinese
Dutch

>>1637971
Rejection of western writing systems?

I'm just guessing here

>>1637981
>>1638025

The Japs used "Asia for the Asians" as a front to expand their own empire and they thought of all other asians as subhumans.

Indigenous nationalists were useful as long as they agitated against Western colonialists but they would've become slave labour at best or exterminated at worst.

How the Americans allowed that little weasel Sukarno to become president of Indonesia is beyond me, though.

>>1638498
Japan occupied Indonesia until the very end of WWII. After the war many Japanese troops still joined the Indonesian revolutionaries, at least some of them legitimately believed in pan-Asianism.

>>1638066
>backing themselves into an imaginary corner
I get this impression as well.

On paper the Japanese industrial capacity was so far inferior to that of the US and Britain, that from day one of hostilities they were living on borrowed time.

Ministers and civil servants must have realised this gap in capacity, yet somehow the army got its way which seemed inevitably to lead to defeat.

>>1638549
>at least some of them legitimately believed in pan-Asianism.

Just like some Soviets believed in social equality and boosting the downtrodden.

Problem is that the IDEOLOGY is almost always not the POLICY.

Yeah. The average Jap was a good person. But the people in the government were power hungry imperialists who saw other Asians as subject races. This is all that matters.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Investigation_of_Global_Policy_with_the_Yamato_Race_as_Nucleus

If Japan wanted to save Asians, they would have given them independence instead of dissecting them alive and testing poison gas ob their villages.

>>1638553
>Ministers and civil servants must have realised this gap in capacity, yet somehow the army got its way which seemed inevitably to lead to defeat.
Actually that itself is an interesting thing - they had this mentality that things would always go their way, coupled with the idea that everyone else was out to get them.

Since they had their ports forced open by America in the 1850s, they felt (somewhat rightfully so at first) that the powers of the world were working against them. They modernized fast, saving them from the fate of China, but they were always considered outsiders among the great powers.

Meanwhile, they had a series of wars that gave them an absurd amount of confidence. Everyone expected Japan to get their shit slapped in the 1st Sino-Japanese War, and yet they won. However, they had most of their gains undone by Western intervention, which awarded much of the land won to Russia.

Several years later, they went to war with Russia, with the same result - nobody thought that some minor nation on the far side of the world could take on a great european empire, and yet Japan handily defeated the Russians. And again, you had the West intervene to prevent Japan from making the most of their victories.

Though Japan had joined the Entente side in WW1, they again felt slighted when they weren't given a place at the negotiating table with the same prominence of the rest of the Belligerents, and although the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 was really a good thing for Japan on a strategic scale, it still built upon the idea that the West was trying to keep Japan down.

So by the 30's you had this horrifically misguided victim complex ingrained into the Japanese collective consciousness coupled with a feeling that, regardless of how bad things looked, things would always come out good for Japan (just as it had against Russia and China).

>>1638648
I get that there was a popular sentiment of being the victim of Western machinations to keep Japan down, but among the lettered classes there must have been a realisation of a serious mismatch.

I mean all those bright chaps (who tend to be less affected but jingoism) in various government departments must have realised that Japan was blithely wandering down the road to destruction.

It's remarkable that those guys, who usually inform the course of a nation's direction were overridden by the obviously naive ambitions of the military.

>>1638855
>It's remarkable that those guys, who usually inform the course of a nation's direction were overridden by the obviously naive ambitions of the military.

It's not that remarkable. A similar event occurred in America with the neocons like Paul Wolfowitz being allowed to enact a foreign policy that nobody voted for. But that's all I'll say considering 25 year rule blah blah

This thread is indeed a quality /his discussion. Thanks for filling some gaps without the usual shitstorm.

Regarding the topic of earlier japanese wars , especially those against russia i am always amazed of how incompetent tsarist russia was. If the japanes took these as examples of european and american capability i can relate to their overestimation of their own skills.

Shouldnt be that hard though to realize if they had done their research better..

>>1638855
Pretty much everyone knew, but no one could publicly admit it for fear of losing face.

You saw this crop up on several levels too, not just on strategy. When they were wargaming Operation MI, one of the officers (I forget who) was asked what would happen if the US appeared on the flank (as they did). Instead of replying with "we'd be fucked" he said "we'll crush them!"

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>>1636794

Really, the only way Japan could have won was to not to invade China and then help Germany invade the Soviet Union.

Once the Soviets were out of the picture they could then focus on the Chinese or Americans.

Even then its questionable.

>>1639312
Everyone suggests this like it's perfectly reasonable for a nation to just stop persuing it's own goals in order to help out a state across the world that can offer them no help.

How come no one suggests Hitler should have declared war on China instead of fucking around with Austria?

>>1639312

>
Really, the only way Japan could have won was to not to invade China and then help Germany invade the Soviet Union.

>Once the Soviets were out of the picture they could then focus on the Chinese or Americans.


AHAHAAHAAHAHAAHAHAHAAHAHAHAHAHAHA

OK, for starters, if you don't have the occupation of China and the rather enormous primary resource extraction they get from that, Japan doens't have a war economy worth a damn.

Even if you did somehow find replacements in terms of coal, iron, hardwoods, food, etc., the Japanse got quite a bloody nose when they tried fighting the Russians from 36-39. Don't forget, troop levels increased in the Far East Command from Barbarossa to the end of 41, they didn't go down; you'd get some traction because the new units were mostly new guys wheras the more experienced troops were sent to fight the Germans, but really, your odds of making any headway are slight.

And even if you somehow did so, you've got the liiiitle problem that Vladivostok aside, you don't have anything actually valueable for about a thousand kilometers in any direction from Harbin, and you're fighting across some of the least developed and most hellish terrain on earth, where the Soviets can tear up the Trans-Siberian Railroad behind them as they fall back.


Even the notion that Japan could serve as a significant distraction to the Soviets is fanciful. At BEST, they'd eliminate Vladivostok as a Lend-Lease port (actually fairly simple) and force the rest of the aid going there to go elsewhere, probably to the Persian corridor.

>>1639325

Look. I know the Japanese would have gotten their shit kicked in by the Soviets. However, it would have been better the Germans when the pushed for Moscow in November in 41.

We all know the Soviets would have attacked eventually so might as well die trying.

>>1639332

>Look. I know the Japanese would have gotten their shit kicked in by the Soviets. However, it would have been better the Germans when the pushed for Moscow in November in 41.

Not really, no. Again, there were significant troops already there, so the possibility of the Japanese making headway is minimal even if they do attack. Lend-Lease hadn't really gotten going by this point, even Vladivostok's importance in the short term is minimal.

The only way it can possibly make an effect is if Stalin and the entire STAVKA are so stupid that they'd redirect troops from an existential threat on their main front to deal with a secondary front. That's just not going to happen.

>>1637448
>nipped away at it for years
heh

>>1639325
>the Soviets can tear up the Trans-Siberian Railroad behind them as they fall back.

That's why you need to lure some Czechs there, possibly under promises of Pilsner, and have them seize the railroad.

Duh.

>>1636794

most people are responding retardedly.

The strategy was to conquer the pacific, obviously. That would've succeeded if their bombing of pearl harbor worked the way as planned. What their goal was with pearl harbor was to reduce the US navy (which had dominated the pacific for a long time prior to WWII) so that the Japanese could have enough time to spread out, conquer all the islands, and fortify heavily. Once entrenched, it would take a very long time for anyone to force the Japanese out.

The issue was the US had all their aircraft carriers out on exercises during the Pearl Harbor bombing (the japanese believed they would have the day off because it was sunday), so no air craft carriers were sunk. Additionally, the US managed to raise several ships that were sunk on pearl harbor, something that was new in the era and the US was the best at doing.

Basically, the only reason the US could Island hop against the Japanese was because the Japanese did not have enough time to fortify their new holdings.

>>1639270
This. As an aside, I think one of the biggest misunderstandings people in the West have about East Asian society is the concept of "face". Not completely on how it works, but rather on its importance. If a Chinese official makes a deal with a businessman from the West that his superiors consider to be subpar, there has to be a way for him to save face.

>>1639388

>so that the Japanese could have enough time to spread out, conquer all the islands, and fortify heavily. Once entrenched, it would take a very long time for anyone to force the Japanese out.

The first time the U.S. attacked an island that was held by the Japanese at the beginning of the war was Tarawa, in 1944. That wasn't enough time to fortify properly? What exactly were all those beach defenses and coastal guns then?

>Once entrenched, it would take a very long time for anyone to force the Japanese out.

When you're being outbuilt by about 8:1, no, not really.

>The issue was the US had all their aircraft carriers out on exercises during the Pearl Harbor bombing (the japanese believed they would have the day off because it was sunday), so no air craft carriers were sunk.

And even if they both had been sunk, it's not like the other 5 were in any way touchable by the Pearl Harbor attacks, nor would that have stopped the construction of the Essex class vessels, which make the pre-war carriers largely academic when they come online.

>Additionally, the US managed to raise several ships that were sunk on pearl harbor, something that was new in the era and the US was the best at doing.

Yeah, it's not like the British raised the scuttled German High Seas fleet so they could use the scrap metal or anything!

>Basically, the only reason the US could Island hop against the Japanese was because the Japanese did not have enough time to fortify their new holdings.

You have no idea what you're talking about.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

>>1639388

>Soviets still attack Manchuria in 1945.

>Still lose.

>>1639421

you don't know that. The soviets would walk across an entire continent, after being in a brutal fight with the germans? They couldn't even take China after it willingly became communist.

>>1639407

>was Tarawa, in 1944. That wasn't enough time to fortify properly?

no, it wasn't. The Japanese needed more time, and would've got it if the pearl harbor attacked occured as planned.

>When you're being outbuilt by about 8:1, no, not really.

The US can barely hold anything outside of teh cities of fucking Afghanistan. Israel unloaded it's entire military into lebanon in 2006 and couldn't even get feet on the ground. Defense is much more advantageous than offense.

> it's not like the other 5 were in any way touchable by the Pearl Harbor attacks

You don't know that.

>it's not like the British raised the scuttled German High Seas fleet so they could use the scrap metal or anything!

I didn't say no one else could do it. I said Americans were the best at it.

and you link doesn't say shit about the topic at hand. just talks about the economy. If Japan managed to hold even half of what they took in the pacific, their economy would've been, at the very least, competitive. All those ports and raw materials from the conquered people mean nothing? it's the reason Japan tried to conquer those islands in the first place. They knew their economy was pushing them into a corner, and they needed more territories/ports/land/resources.

>>1639475

>The soviets would walk across an entire continent, after being in a brutal fight with the germans? They couldn't even take China after it willingly became communist.

Not even him, but they have something called a fucking railroad. They mustered up about 1.5 million troops to hit the Japanese with, and could have packed more. Not to mention the overwhelming advantages in armor, artillery, and airpower they enjoyed by then.

>no, it wasn't. The Japanese needed more time, and would've got it if the pearl harbor attacked occured as planned.

The longer you wait, the more the colossal industrial capacity makes itself felt. Sure, you dig in deeper in some islands. Meanwhile, America builds 8 more carriers, each one better than anything you've ever made. They build another ten thousand planes and just bomb you to smithereens, raise hundreds of thousands of more troops to pitch in the grinder.

>The US can barely hold anything outside of teh cities of fucking Afghanistan. Israel unloaded it's entire military into lebanon in 2006 and couldn't even get feet on the ground. Defense is much more advantageous than offense.

Comparing a limited war to a total war. You do realize why that's a terrible idea, don't you?

>You don't know that.

Yeah, I actually do, given that some were based in California, and the others in the East Coast, which is just a bit outside the Japanese reach.
1/2

>>1639475

>I didn't say no one else could do it. I said Americans were the best at it.

You also said it was new, which it most certainly was not.

>and you link doesn't say shit about the topic at hand. just talks about the economy.

It shows how vast the production disparity between the two powers was, and how it was increasing, not decreasing. Time is most definitely not on the Japanese side.

> If Japan managed to hold even half of what they took in the pacific, their economy would've been, at the very least, competitive.

No, it would not have, because you don't actually get a lot of resources, let alone finished products, off of a bunch of corall atolls, especially when U.S. submarines and naval bombers are sinking all of your transport ships.

I want to remind you that the U.S. built EIGHT TIMES as many aircraft carriers as the Japanese did. And that's with a huge amount of their shipbuilding capacity (and a tremendous amount of other crap) being geared towards the war in Europe, which was actually the priority. A pacific empire wouldn't make them anything close to competitive.

>All those ports and raw materials from the conquered people mean nothing? it's the reason Japan tried to conquer those islands in the first place.

No, it isn't. Most of those eastern islands? Was to push the perimiter of air raids back so that you couldn't see another doolittle raid. The only ones entered into for raw resources were China (if you count it) Indo-China, the NEI, and Malaya. Everything else was primarily for strategic mobility, not economic power.

File: puyi.jpg (20KB, 267x450px) Image search: [Google]

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What do you guys think of Puyi?

>>1637865
>nuke-cities
>japanese-have-plans-to-biologically-nuke-cities
>japanese-are-special

>>1639520
he was such a massive tool even Mao didn't feel the need to kill him

>>1639557
Yeah, i'm surprised Mao didn't kill him. I guess he was good for propaganda.

This thread has totally triggered my autism and made me obsessively read wikipedia articles about Japanese naval officers and military tactics and shit I never cared about before. Thanks anons

>>1637464

Not necessarily fighting to the last man as just losing excruciating losses at the end of the war.

>>1639731
you're welcome anon

What would've happened if Japan never joined the Axis and just kept conquering chunks of China?

>>1639902

More or less the same thing as real life, except U.S. entry into the ETO would probably be delayed for a couple of months while Roosevelt scrambles to get the votes in place.

>>1636794

What is it that you don't understand? Their strategy was absolutely coherent: grab the natural of resources of south asia and create a defense perimeter in the Pacific islands and then try to force the Chinks into Imperial submission.

Could it have worked? On its own, no. But what if the Germans had won at Stalingrad, succesfully occupied the Caucasus and force a deal on the Soviets, making the European theatre an exclusively Axis vs Angloamericans war? The USA wouldn't have been able to dedicate so much resources to breaking through the Japanese defense perimeter.

The japs also made huge strategic mistakes at the beggining of the war, like not taking Midway and not launching further air strikes over Pearl Harbour to annihiliate the military industrial infrastructure there as to incapacitate it as a naval base.

All this remains a very unlikely scenario as the Germans never really stood a chance to knock out the USSR. But for Japan there really was no alternative than war and hope for the best. What else could they do? Bow down to american demands, pull out of China and become a resourceless cucks at the mercy of the international geopolitics gameofUSA, USSR and the British Colonial Empire?

They had grown too big by then with their uncontested conquests in China, Formosa and Korea to accept a cuck status, furthermore when the whole japanese initial expansion was propped up by the angloamericans as means to counter russian and german influence in the region. By the 1930s the japs had already grown to big to accept the role of useful tools.

>>1637448

>The first three went like a charm, however, America didn't surrender. Despite doing pretty much everything the plan called for, they had horrifically misjudged the American character, thinking their isolationism was a veil for cowardice.

This is some historychannel tier propaganda

Wrong. The principal architect for the war against the Americans was Yamamoto who spent time in America, he understood well that Americans had little stomach for prolonged bloody conflicts and couldn't endure the societal hardships brought on by war. Throughout the war there were riots over material shortages which boiled over to race riots. There was huge public outrage over the casualties suffered in Tarawa which was accompanied with small scale rioting. The Japanese understood that if they defeated the Americans in several decisive battle they could force the US to sue peace, in this they were correct but it was a 50/50 gamble and ultimately they lost.

>>1640359

> But what if the Germans had won at Stalingrad, succesfully occupied the Caucasus and force a deal on the Soviets,

The first part of that statement does not imply the second. In fact, a victory at Stalingrad is a long way from actually occupying the Caucasus, which is itself a long way from knocking the Soviets out of the war.

>The USA wouldn't have been able to dedicate so much resources to breaking through the Japanese defense perimeter.

The U.S. as it was devoted roughly a quarter of their resources to knocking out the Japanese. And it's not like the big shipyards that were used to make the Essexes would easily be converted into something of use in the ETO.

>The japs also made huge strategic mistakes at the beggining of the war, like not taking Midway and not launching further air strikes over Pearl Harbour to annihiliate the military industrial infrastructure there as to incapacitate it as a naval base.

Do you have any idea how ridiculous that is? Do you know how hard the Anglo-Americans tried to knock out port facilities in France with sorties of hundreds of 4 engined bombers? And how that rarely worked? You really think a few hundred CVP could knock out the port itself? Especially when sooner or later the Americans start basing real, land based fighters on the island?

>>1640374
>Wrong. The principal architect for the war against the Americans was Yamamoto who spent time in America, he understood well that Americans had little stomach for prolonged bloody conflicts and couldn't endure the societal hardships brought on by war.

Except Yamomoto was the one warning the rest of the Japanese command that there would be no victory short of actually occupying the White House, which was something even they realized was never going to happen.

>Throughout the war there were riots over material shortages which boiled over to race riots.

No, there were riots over the population movements caused by the necessity to draft and industrialize, it wasn't over the shortage.

>There was huge public outrage over the casualties suffered in Tarawa which was accompanied with small scale rioting.

[citation needed]

>he Japanese understood that if they defeated the Americans in several decisive battle they could force the US to sue peace, in this they were correct but it was a 50/50 gamble and ultimately they lost.

You mean like the Phillipines? Funny how some rather large defeats didn't hamper the home front at all.

>>1640399
Losing the Philippines wouldn't be a fraction as bad as losing a huge naval battle like Midway after Pearl Harbor.

>>1637668
Underrated post.

>>1640413

Why, exactly? You lost a hell of a lot more servicemen in the Phillipines. And even if Midway was lost and say, another carrier or two sunk, it's not like you don't have over a dozen far more modern carriers in various stages of construction.

The former also involves wholesale loss of territory held by America before the war began and no clear timeline as to when they'll get it back.

>>1636816
The Japanese leadership embraced pan-Asianism through the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Basically Japan would boot out all western powers from Asia and construct a unified Asian empire led by the Japanese, who were entitled to rule over it because of their supposed innate superiority.

>>1640399

Looks like somebody got there WWII knowledge form the history channel and Hollywood movies because all of those points are wrong. I suggest actually reading a books from credible historians regarding the Pacific Theater instead of spewing myths and what you think might have actually happened.

>You mean like the Phillipines? Funny how some rather large defeats didn't hamper the home front at all.

The Philippines was not a decisive defeat, the US fully expected to lose the islands in case of war with Japan.

That's because the IJA was leading the war, which makes no sense because the entire outcome of the war was reliant on the navy, yet the navy usually got told to fuck off.

>>1640417
Because that would be solely a damage to American morale. While losing the Philippines was bad, reports of the Bataan Death March had the complete opposite effect and made America even more determined for revenge.

>>1636888
The belief that your side is going to steamroll the opponent side is a common one. Prior to world war one, everybody thought the war would be over in a few months and that it would be an easy victory.

Militarist style thinking distorts your perception of things.

>>1640421

I'm not seeing a citation.

>The Philippines was not a decisive defeat, the US fully expected to lose the islands in case of war with Japan.

So then what is a "decisive" defeat? How come none of the carriers that were sunk had any noticeable effect on U.S. war enthusiasm? You did know they lost quite a bit of those pre-war carriers, yes?

>>1640428

So again, what makes losing a carrier or two so bad? Why is the loss of the Philippines hardening American resolve but apparently the loss of a carrier battle (which had happened before, like at Coral Sea) suddenly going to make the Americans throw up their hands and say it's over?

>>1640438

>So then what is a "decisive" defeat?

A decisive battle is one that's regarded as a major turning point in a war. The fall of the Philippines was not one as it didn't greatly effect the US ability to conduct war in the Pacific.

> How come none of the carriers that were sunk had any noticeable effect on U.S. war enthusiasm? You did know they lost quite a bit of those pre-war carriers, yes?

Check your facts there were no carriers sunk in the Philippines during the invasion.

>>1640498
>A decisive battle is one that's regarded as a major turning point in a war.

So, the battle that causes the U.S. to give up is going to be the one that causes it to give up.

Let me ask this another way. Can you provide any metric whatsoever that would determine how you could possibly calculate a "decisive" defeat for the contexts of a U.S.-Japan war? How hard would Japan need to strike, and on what basis are you using to compute that?

>Check your facts there were no carriers sunk in the Philippines during the invasion.

No shit, and I wasn't implying that. But of the 7 pre-war carriers, the Ranger wasn't considered fit for service in the Pacific, and of the other six, you lost three of them, Lexington at Coral Sea, Yorktown at Midway, and the Wasp shortly thereafter by a submarine. That's a 50% loss rate of your primary striking arm, and yet America didn't knuckle under, and gave no indication they were close to doing so.

>>1640514
>>1640498


I'm sorry, I mis-remembered, the U.S. also lost the Hornet at Santa Cruz, so that makes it 66%, not 50%

>>1640514
>an you provide any metric whatsoever that would determine how you could possibly calculate a "decisive" defeat for the contexts of a U.S.-Japan war?
A battle which ensured Japanese Naval Supremacy throughout the pacific for medium range predictions.

>>1640539
>A battle which ensured Japanese Naval Supremacy throughout the pacific for medium range predictions.

No such battle existed, if you're defining "medium range" as within say, 3 years or so.

Japan could wipe out literally the entire pre-war fleet, and America would be able to replace it, and keep up with Japanese shipbuilding efforts besides, in that time period.

If we're talking fleet carriers? (We'll skip over CVL and CVE for the moment) The Japanese start with at least 6, depending on how you define "fleet carriers" for them, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, Hiryu, and then maybe the two Hiyo class (they could carry a decent number of planes, but were too slow to keep up with the others, so were often left out), and would go on to build 3 more, the Taiho, the Unryu, and the converted Shinano. All of these could carry at least 50 planes, which is my admittedly arbitrary distinction between a fleet and a light carrier: They were producing roughly 1 carrier a year.

The U.S., on the other hand, in addition to their 7 pre-war carriers, would build over the course of WW2, another 16. That isn't counting the ones that were partially completed and weren't finished by the time the war was ended, and also ignores the fact that those Essexes carried 91 planes apiece, whereas the Japanese ones weren't packing nearly that much, giving the Americans a qualitative edge.

Essex, Bunker Hill, Yorktown (2) Lexington (2) Intrepid, Wasp (2) Hornet (2) Franklin, Ticonderoga, Hancock, Bennington, Shangri-la, Bone Homme Richard, Randolph, Antietam.

Quite simply, no amount of battlefield success can possibly ensure Japanese naval superiority (let alone supremacy), in the face of having a production mismatch that bad.

>>1640514

>So, the battle that causes the U.S. to give up is going to be the one that causes it to give up.

No it's a battle that swings the war favorably to one side but it itself is not a determinant onto whom would be the final victor.

>Can you provide any metric whatsoever that would determine how you could possibly calculate a "decisive" defeat for the contexts of a U.S.-Japan war? How hard would Japan need to strike, and on what basis are you using to compute that?

To give an example Midway is considered a decisive battle because the Japanese had lost four carriers and most of their experienced pilots and carrier crews. Not only was the surface fleet severely impacted but it was a huge blow to the organizational capacity of the navy, reducing future operational capabilities.

>That's a 50% loss rate of your primary striking arm, and yet America didn't knuckle under, and gave no indication they were close to doing so.

That's what propaganda will have you believe. Towards the end of the war the American public was exhausted and ready for peace, as was the Japanese public but both nations governments were only willing to declare peace under strict conflicting terms.

>>1640577

You're ignoring the human aspect of war. Yes the Americans could outproduce the Japanese ten folds and had a better logistics trains, hell Brazil had a larger manufacturing capacity than Japan. But a nations ability to wage war is dependent on public values, societal and government structures. A nation cannot effectively wage war if the public is strongly against conflict.

>>1637011
Can't recommend this book enough.

>>1638085
They have it
have it
it
lol

>>1640700
>No it's a battle that swings the war favorably to one side but it itself is not a determinant onto whom would be the final victor.


And there is no "one battle that could swing the war favorably to one side" because Japan has no means of striking at the U.S. productive capacity, an enormous chunk of their shipbuilding being done on the East Coast, where they're never getting at it.

>To give an example Midway is considered a decisive battle because the Japanese had lost four carriers and most of their experienced pilots and carrier crews. Not only was the surface fleet severely impacted but it was a huge blow to the organizational capacity of the navy, reducing future operational capabilities.

And what? You don't think the loss of the Lexington, the Yorktown, the Wasp, and the Hornet didn't "severely impact the operational capabilities of the USN"? Why do you think they only started really taking to the offensive, attacking islands held by the Japanese at the start of the war, almost a year and a half after the "decisive battle" of Midway?

>That's what propaganda will have you believe. Towards the end of the war the American public was exhausted and ready for peace, as was the Japanese public but both nations governments were only willing to declare peace under strict conflicting terms.

And I've yet to see a source for that claim. And given that there was no slackening of production, no hesitation of committing troops to action, no WW1 style mutinies of troops, no mass starvation on the home front, you'll forgive me if I'm skeptical that the U.S. was anywhere close to tapping out.


1/2

>>1640700


>But a nations ability to wage war is dependent on public values, societal and government structures. A nation cannot effectively wage war if the public is strongly against conflict.

And you keep claiming that the U.S. was all but ready to give up almost before the war began. I'm certainly not seeing it. I'm definitely not seeing how losing a few carriers, with an average loss of 172.5 crewmembers per sinking, would kill the U.S. spirit for war, especially since losing the Phillipines and some 25,000 troops right then and there didn't.

2/2

>>1640577
>No such battle existed, if you're defining "medium range" as within say, 3 years or so.

>Japan could wipe out literally the entire pre-war fleet, and America would be able to replace it, and keep up with Japanese shipbuilding efforts besides, in that time period.
That is, of course, assuming that America simply works to protect it's fleet and avoid offensive operations for say, a year or so, not to mention issues of ensuring adequate human capital to operate the carriers at their best.

Given circumstances like that, it's plausible America would consider peace.

>>1637011

Oh fuck yeah it's Admiral Thrawn

>>1640767
>That is, of course, assuming that America simply works to protect it's fleet and avoid offensive operations for say, a year or so

How could it do offensive operations without any functioning carriers? They'd almost certainly stuff their remaining islands with land based planes and hunker down until they could put that production advantage into effect.

> not to mention issues of ensuring adequate human capital to operate the carriers at their best.

This doesn't seem to be a likely problem, given the enormous expansion the fleet had in actual history, almost tripling in size between 1938-1944.

>Given circumstances like that, it's plausible America would consider peace.

Again, I doubt it. You had vastly higher levels of commitment compared to say, Vietnam or Korea. Relying on American war weariness seems like a very bad bed, especially post Pearl Harbor. Maybe if things had started differently, say the Japanese called Roosevelt's bluff on the DEI and it was America declaring war over some Dutch colonies, but not like the way it went down historically.

>>1637011
Sadly, there were many who felt like him in the navy, but not many who survived to tell about it. He was the only one out of all the destroyers captains to survive through the entire war.

>>1640845
>How could it do offensive operations without any functioning carriers? They'd almost certainly stuff their remaining islands with land based planes and hunker down until they could put that production advantage into effect.
OK, so we're totally agreed on what the U.S. war effort looks like if they lose the fleet.

>his doesn't seem to be a likely problem, given the enormous expansion the fleet had in actual history, almost tripling in size between 1938-1944.
Yes, but that was without (major) interruptions in their human capital supply. It's relatively easy to expand a military many times over using a cadre system (one of the reasons Germany could expand it's military so quickly.) This is certainly an area the U.S. was way smarter than the Japanese with through the war: they constantly cycled back fighter aces and sailors as trainers, while the Japanese kept them all at the front lines. This meant after the Marianas they couldn't keep enough talented people at the front and around for training. If the fleet is lost, a rescue effort can't be mounted, and the U.S. loses a LOT of technical expertise all at once. That's not a trivial problem to overcome.

>Again, I doubt it. You had vastly higher levels of commitment compared to say, Vietnam or Korea. Relying on American war weariness seems like a very bad bet.
It's less relying on war weariness as preventing strategic initiative. That's what caused the U.S. to give up on Korea: the realization that there was no hope for a successful counteroffensive in the mid-term view. America with the fleet lost against Japan is in a position none of the allies were in during the war, except perhaps China: one where no strategic initiative is possible.

>>1637890
>Allies are so butthurt that a jap outsmarted them they decide to sentence him to death in a kangaroo court with no basis at all, thus creating a precedent on command responsibility that comes back to bite them on the ass in the Vietnam war

Like poetry.

>>1641012
>OK, so we're totally agreed on what the U.S. war effort looks like if they lose the fleet.

Sure, at least until they build another fleet.

>Yes, but that was without (major) interruptions in their human capital supply.

Except that sort of major interruption is unlikely in the extreme. The Lexington was the carrier sink that had the most loss of life, and that only killed 216 of the complement of 2,791, or about 7%. That's in a battle where the U.S. was driven from the local sea area as well. That's not to mention anyone in the Atlantic, far out of reach for the Japanese, who can be pressed into training duty.

> America with the fleet lost against Japan is in a position none of the allies were in during the war, except perhaps China: one where no strategic initiative is possible.

Except America joined the war with that sort of situation in Europe, and didn't show any sign of quitting; it took almost a year before they mounted any sort of offensive action at all, and Torch was in a tertiary front at that. And while I don't know nearly as much about Korea as I do about WW2, I was under the imrpession it was less "there's no offensive or decisive victory possible in the medium term" so much as it was that it was impossible to take the offensive footing without spending more in money and treasure than the U.S. government/populace was willing to commit for it, especially since the primary goal of the intervention, that of preserving SK, had already been achieved.

The backdrop for the Pacific war is completely different, so much so that even a conditional surrender was unacceptable to the American government, they wanted the Japanese broken and prostrate, and nothing less.

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>>1637906
Yamamoto is alright, but his idea for the I-400 class submarines was downright retarded

>hey let's move those thousands of tons of metal through literally half the world just to maybe drop a couple 500lbs bombs on american cities (and most likely kill everyone involved instead)

I understand the strategic and psychological interest here but honestly at this point in the was a couple extra aircraft carriers would've been a much better allocation of resources

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>>1641055

To be fair, he wasn't the only one who was hugely overestimating the impact of strategic bombing. Pic related swore that 750 tons of bombs delivered scattershot over German cities would force them to surrender, and he got pretty much the entire RAF built to his wishes in the interwar period.

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>>1641055
(That wasn't the pic I wanted to post)

>>1641055
The 1-400 class was never intended as some sort of long range aircraft carrier.

It's ability to launch seaplanes was so that it could operate independently at long range while providing their own reconnaissance. See, German U-Boats got their tips on where to attack using land based aircraft. That's completely impossible for most of the Pacific, and Indian ocean.

By being able to convoy raid so far , the I-400 forces a disproportionate response, the idea goes.

>Except America joined the war with that sort of situation in Europe, and didn't show any sign of quitting;
They didn't. The Soviets had already demonstrated their capacity for counteroffensives by august, and by December, were launching their first successful one with Operation Typhoon. The British had already showed they could take the offensive in Compass, and had total strategic freedom with their command of the Sea and Air. It was, from the Spring of 1940 onwards, the Germans who lacked strategic initiative and the ability to set the tempo of operations.

>And while I don't know nearly as much about Korea as I do about WW2, I was under the imrpession it was less "there's no offensive or decisive victory possible in the medium term" so much as it was that it was impossible to take the offensive footing without spending more in money and treasure than the U.S. government/populace was willing to commit for it,
Nope. There's only so much shit you can throw into the Korean Peninsula, and only so much frontage to engage the enemy with. The U.S. options were drop the bomb, expand the war in China, or wait years to make a move.

>>1641118
Shit, sorry I fucked up that post.

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>>1641118

You're wrong, those subs were very much intended for long range strategic bombings; some of the bombers they carried still exist in US museums. Are you sure you don't have them mixed up with other airplanes carrying submarines like the Surcouf?

>>1641135
That's not a strategic bomber.

>>1641118
>The Soviets had already demonstrated their capacity for counteroffensives by august,


If you're going to count Yelynya as counteroffensive capability, then even the destruction of every capital ship in the USN would still leave them with "counteroffensive" capability in the Pacific, given that Yelnya couldn't actually hold the territory they re-took. Even the most comprehensive of defeats still leaves raiding options open, with submarine and even cruiser if the US is feeling like taking a bit of risk.

>and by December, were launching their first successful one with Operation Typhoon.

Typhoon was the German offensive. The Soviet counterattack is Pжeвcкo-Bязeмcкaя cтpaтeгичecкaя нacтyпaтeльнaя oпepaция, literally "The Ryzev-Vyzama Strategic offensive operation."

>The British had already showed they could take the offensive in Compass,

Only to get thrown back with Sonnenblume and seesaw for two years against a force that they outnumbered almost 3:1 (although admittedly, they couldn't actually bring most of that force to bear due to the lack of railroads and other infrastructure in Libya) And operations in North Africa weren't going to put paid to Germany. At best, it was a way to put pressure on Italy, itself the retarded stepsibling, and even that was something of a tenuous link, as the ability to hop from North Africa to Italy proper was far from assured.

1/2 again.

>>1641118

>and had total strategic freedom with their command of the Sea and Air.

Not in the med, they didn't. What are you talking about? But pretty much all of this is irrelevant. The U.S. didn't make any strategic offensives in the ETO until November of 1942, and Torch itself almost got torpedoed before it started. There was no noticeable hurry to come to grips with the enemy, to force an end to the war sooner rather than later. I still find the claim that they would have given up had they not possessed the strategic initiative dubious, as even in the Pacific, they didn't have it at the very least for the first six months of the war, and even once they won advantage in the waters, they had to wait until they could both build up enough of a carrier force to overwhelm island air defenses, and create the landing craft necessary to actually invade and occupy islands, which wouldn't exist for years.

Again, that sort of stalemate didn't seem to bother them unduly, so I fail to see why another year or two longer would bring things crashing down.

>>1641151
>Not in the med, they didn't.
Yes, they did. The Reggia Marina bottled up pretty much instantly, and after Crete the German Paratroop force was broken. The Axis logistic supply situation in Africa was perpetually fucked, while the British had no such problem, controlling both the major ports and the routes leading to them.

>The U.S. didn't make any strategic offensives in the ETO until November of 1942, and Torch itself almost got torpedoed before it started. There was no noticeable hurry to come to grips with the enemy, to force an end to the war sooner rather than later.
That is exactly the point of having strategic initiative, the luxury to attack and force conflict when and where you wish.

>>1641177
>Yes, they did. The Reggia Marina bottled up pretty much instantly,

Which was never the real threat, that was from Luftflotte 2, which had unchallenged control over the skies (and thus the seas) of the central Med until 1943.

>and after Crete the German Paratroop force was broken.

So?


> The Axis logistic supply situation in Africa was perpetually fucked,

I would recommend this, actually. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf

The Axis logistical situation in NA was "fucked" primarily because Rommel decided to move away from his supply drops without any real means of dragging his stuff with him. The "useless" Regia Maria was still able to deliver on average a bit shy of 71,000 tons of supply a month from October 41-42, well after entry into the war. (For comparison, Rommel's final offensive into Egypt that led to his defeat of El Alamein was mostly run on about 5,000 tons of supplies captured from the British post Gazala)

>That is exactly the point of having strategic initiative, the luxury to attack and force conflict when and where you wish.

Then by that definition, the U.S. has strategic initiative, just not operational initiative, assuming they can guard their own islands with land based planes. The Japanese never showed any indication of being able to overcome those sorts of defenses and make opposed landings a la a reverse Tarawa, which leaves the U.S. free to attack at a time and place of their choosing, say, after they've built up another 15-20 carriers.

>>1641206
>The Japanese never showed any indication of being able to overcome those sorts of defenses and make opposed landings a la a reverse Tarawa
They don't have to. With total Naval Supremacy, they can treat any fortification they don't want to take like Rabaul. Isolate it, prevent it from being reinforced, and starve them out. Supplies won't be coming for a year, if they decide it's worth picking up.

>>1641225
>They don't have to.

Yes, they do. Planes kill ships a hell of a lot better than ships kill planes, which is the reason why carriers became the dominant arm in the Pacific theater.

The main reason the U.S. waited so long to begin serious offensive action against the Japanese wasn't that they were afraid of the IJN post Midway, it was that they needed to not only be able to beat whatever fleet was sent to defend the islands, but whatever air garrisons were on those islands, which usually took on the order of 600-1,000 CVP to be able to overwhelm defenses of that sort.

The Japanese never mustered up a carrier fleet of that magnitude, and thous, would have a lot of trouble approaching any U.S. held island in any sort of state of readiness.

>With total Naval Supremacy, they can treat any fortification they don't want to take like Rabaul. Isolate it, prevent it from being reinforced, and starve them out.

A blockade would have to be loose enough to stay out of operational range of the planes on said island, and that's not going to do much for your efficacy.

> Supplies won't be coming for a year, if they decide it's worth picking up.

Extremely unlikely.

>>1641250
>The Japanese never mustered up a carrier fleet of that magnitude, and thous, would have a lot of trouble approaching any U.S. held island in any sort of state of readiness
And I'm struggling to see how they would be in any state of readiness without food, spare parts, reinforcements, or spare planes.

>A blockade would have to be loose enough to stay out of operational range of the planes on said island, and that's not going to do much for your efficacy.
That's not true. Fleets operated within range of enemy ground bases all the time. Again Rabaul comes to mind, if that was the case, the U.S. wouldn't be able to operate a fleet around Gaudalcanal, or Port Moresby for the entire war. Oh yeah, and then there's the invasion of the Phillipines, which pretty much undermines the whole 'it's impossible for the entire IJN fleet to even get near a USAAF base' premise.

>Extremely unlikely.
So a carrier fleet can't make it through hostile waters, but unescorted merchant ships will?

>>1641328
>And I'm struggling to see how they would be in any state of readiness without food, spare parts, reinforcements, or spare planes.

You're assuming that the Japanese instantly blockade every American held island in the Pacific. The notion is nonsense. It's over 8,000 km from Sitka to Pago Pago, there's no way in hell they can cover all of that.

>That's not true. Fleets operated within range of enemy ground bases all the time.

You're talking a hell of a lot more than a patrol or trying to run a convoy through, you're talking about a dedicated blokcade, hanging around to intercept any sort of reinforcement or supply to the bases. That takes a lot of standing still where you can be shot at, and no, nobody did that unsupported by their own land based air until you had the colossal carrier force the U.S. assembled come 1944.

1/2

>>1641328

>Again Rabaul comes to mind, if that was the case, the U.S. wouldn't be able to operate a fleet around Gaudalcanal, or Port Moresby for the entire war. Oh yeah, and then there's the invasion of the Phillipines, which pretty much undermines the whole 'it's impossible for the entire IJN fleet to even get near a USAAF base' premise.

You do realize that the Philippines invasion was covered by Japanese land based forces in Hainan and what's now Taiwan, yes?

>Combined army and navy air strength allocated to support the landings was 541 aircraft. The 11th Kōkūkantai (Air Fleet) consisted of the 21st and 23rd Kōkūsentai (Air Flotillas), a combined strength of 156 G4M "Betty" and G3M "Nell" bombers, 107 A6M Zero fighters, plus seaplanes and reconnaissance planes.[9]:24 Most of these were based at Takao, and approximately a third were sent to Indochina in the last week of November to support operations in Malaya. The Ryujo provided an additional 16 fighters and 18 torpedo planes, and the surface ships had 68 seaplanes for search and observation, totaling 412 naval aircraft. The army's 5th Kikōshidan (Air Group) consisted of two fighter regiments, two light bomber regiments, and a heavy bomber regiment, totaling 192 aircraft: 76 Ki-21 "Sally", Ki-48 "Lily", and Ki-30 "Ann" bombers; 36 Ki-27 "Nate" fighters, and 19 Ki-15 "Babs" and Ki-36 "Ida" observation planes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines_Campaign_(1941%E2%80%9342)#Invasion_forces

>So a carrier fleet can't make it through hostile waters, but unescorted merchant ships will?

No, I'm saying that a carrier fleet, unsupported by its own land based airplanes, is going to have trouble maintaining a blockade in the face of hostile land based air.

Is this thread still up?

I'm bored of explaining why Japan did what it did (their strategy was retarded) so I'll leave you with this which sums up why the only way Japan could have won was to not play.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

>>1638447
if so why would they write rise of asia in the latin alphabet

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>>1642105

The Asiatic Co-Prosperity sphere struggled with a language under which to unify. In the end, and perhaps ironically, their congresses were held in english.

>>1636821
not oil, but they attacked the philippines because it was one of the countries hosting a western military presence, the airfields and the ports in the philippines would be a big strategical target to take out if they wished to conquer asia without american resistance.