>Battle of Dien Bien Phu What the fuck went wrong? (or right,

>>294788
The Viets managed to bring a lot of heavy artillery and AA guns.

The French fought like cornered beasts but it was hopeless for them.

the french strategy was pretty retarded, the pass was too close to the NVA supply lines and thus it only serced to concentrate not stretch their lines and manpower. Also they literally learned nothing from 5 years of Japanese tactics and russians and how manpower can make anything appear anywhere

>>294812
Did the french really think the Viet Minh could not into artillery? to the point where the french thought they were totally safe on the low ground when there were multiple hills surrounding their position?

>>294820
Lot of mistakes in the planning obviously.

They underestimated what the Viets could do and it bite them in the ass.

>>294815
>Also they literally learned nothing from 5 years of Japanese tactics and russians and how manpower can make anything appear anywhere

Actually, the stripping down of artillery pieces to carry them up mountains and the infantry doctrine of the NVA are Chinese tactics: CCP did that during their Long March.

>Chinese short attack — a combination of infiltration and the shock tactics employed by the PLA during the Korean War.
>A typical Chinese short attack was carried out at night by small fireteams on a narrow front against the weakest point in enemy defenses.[23] The Chinese assault team would crawl undetected within grenade range, then launch surprise attacks against the defenders in order to breach the defenses by relying on maximum shock and confusion.[23]
>If the initial shock failed to breach the defenses, additional fireteams would press on behind them and attack the same point until a breach was created.[23] Once penetration was achieved, the bulk of the Chinese forces would move into the enemy rear and attack from behind.[25] During the attacks, the Chinese assault teams would disperse while masking themselves using the terrain, and this made it difficult for UN defenders to target numerous Chinese troops.[7] Attacks by the successive Chinese fireteams were also carefully timed to minimize casualties.[26] Due to primitive communication systems and tight political controls within the Chinese army, short attacks were often repeated indefinitely until either the defenses were penetrated or the attacker's ammunition supply were exhausted, regardless of the chances of success or the human cost.
>US Army sources have claimed that the human wave attack tactic was adapted by the Viet Minh, and later by the Viet Cong and the Vietnam People's Army during the Indochina Wars on the advice of Chinese military advisers.

>Its over Anik An! I have the low ground!

What did they mean by this?

>>294841
Gave me a chuckle senpai.

File: 1448362132667.png (1MB, 1920x1080px) Image search: [Google]

1MB, 1920x1080px

>>294833
How many hordes in a Chinese platoon?

the topography is a ricebowl. Francos thought it was a legit idea to fortify on low ground surrounded by hills out of easy relief and supply.

That said, every time I try playing this scenario in TOAW III as viets I get my ass handed to me in unwinnable causality ratios. Giap was taking serious losses and had to entrench his way painfully to take those redoubts, so it just goes to show that French could have hypothetically won even in these circumstances if they'd been closer to supply

interesting to note a lot of the ffl at the time are ex waffen and wehrmacht

>>294833
sounds spooky af, i wouldn't want to be on the receiving end of that

>>294815
>the french strategy was pretty retarded
The french strategy was an attempt to repeat a strategy that previously worked marvelously.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_N%C3%A0_S%E1%BA%A3n