Once consciousness uploading gets perfected in the next couple of years, will most mtf transsexuals upload themselves into cute sex doll 2.0 robot bodies, or do you value meat flesh too much to trade it in for an artificial replacement?
What if it turns out when you regain consciousness that you have no control over the robot body and you're forced by remote control to perform lewd sex acts on a lonely virgin NEET manchild who purchases you from the robot sex trafficking store you were sent to?
>Regards, a lonely virign NEET manchild thinking about the future and shit
It'd be a different instance of your consciousness though, effectively a different person. You'd be dead and an exact duplicate conciousness would be in a robot body. It'd have to be my own brain plugged into a robot.
>the "it'd just be a copy" argument
Your own consciousness from one moment to the next doesn't have any absolute mechanism of identity preservation. An identical copy of your consciousness wouldn't be any less you than your consciousness five minutes from now is. We think of copies as less real only because we aren't used to having multiple instances of the same consciousness in different places yet. There's no reason to believe the physical material of a brain is any more capable of identity preservation than any other medium for consciousness would be.
>Once consciousness uploading gets perfected in the next couple of years
Even the best neurologists are just guessing at how the brain works and you think people are working on perfecting some sort of magic consciousness transfer? We don't even know what consciousness IS to begin with. It's not a tangible thing and as far as we know, it could just be a side effect of your brain functioning. You can't transfer these things. Reproducing an exact replica in a computer wouldn't be your consciousness anyway, it would just be someone else who thinks they're you. There's nothing to be perfected and even if there were they'd have to have been working on it for decades to begin with. If ever full prosthetic bodies exist (and they will), you'll have a squishy organic brain inside, at best with implants stuck on it to improve it (decades from now because we're nowhere near that sort of neurological expertise).
Are you kidding? You wouldn't be CONSCIOUS. It wouldn't be the same consciousness, just another instance that thought it was the same as yours. It doesn't matter if it can't realize it's just a copy, you won't be there to witness it since you'll be gone and will have a machine pretending to be you without knowing it. It is just a copy, don't kid yourself.
If I have sex with a sexbot does that count as losing my virginity?
>It wouldn't be the same consciousness, just another instance that thought it was the same as yours.
>It is just a copy
Instead of focusing on the lack of authenticity of a machine substrate's maintenance of someone's consciousness in preserving identity, I'm asking you to question the authenticity of your brain's maintenance of consciousness in preserving identity. What makes you think there even is something your brain is doing to make "you" now share an identity with "you" from ten years ago? Because if there isn't anything special it's doing to preserve identity, then a machine copy isn't any less "you" then the different copies of "you" carried by your brain from moment to moment.
>What makes you think there even is something your brain is doing to make "you" now share an identity with "you" from ten years ago?
It doesn't matter whether it does or not. It doesn't matter if th emachine copy is just as much "you" as you are, because you won't experience the machine's identity. It'll just be a machine that identifies as you, you won't be able to experience what the machine experiences. That's the whole point of "consciousness transfer" bullshit, not creating some machine clone of yourself, that's pointless.
Probably not, we're probably not going to be allowed to own sentient robots, and if I can't put a devotion programming on him I doubt he would fuck me.
>It doesn't matter whether it does or not.
It does matter. If there isn't anything real preserving identity from one point in time to the next in a regular person's brain then the whole idea of "true" identity preservation vs. "just a copy" is bullshit.
>the whole idea of "true" identity preservation vs. "just a copy" is bullshit.
That's not the fucking point. The point is YOU are ONE instance of a consciousness. Creating a new one WON'T be the same instance and therefore you WILL NOT experience it. I don't know how many other ways I can reword this so you can fucking get it, seriously what the hell this isn't a complex thing to understand.
>YOU are ONE instance of a consciousness
You have no reason to believe that. There isn't anything from moment to moment making what your brain is doing in the past the same "you" as what your brain is doing in the present. The reason it seems impossible to do what the brain is doing with a machine in preserving identity is that your idea of identity is an illusion with no actual corresponding brain mechanism in reality.
"You" now is already "just" a biological copy of "you" from an earlier point in time (plus or minus some changes since then). It seems impossible to pull off with an upload to an artificial host because your idea of identity in the natural hosting environment of the brain doesn't even exist to begin with.
>"You" now is already "just" a biological copy of "you" from an earlier point in time (plus or minus some changes since then). It seems impossible to pull off with an upload to an artificial host because your idea of identity in the natural hosting environment of the brain doesn't even exist to begin with.
What are you even trying to say?
The only thing one can guarantee in such a "transfer" is memory, in which case you must believe that someone who shoots the clone is hurting "you."
>What are you even trying to say?
What specifically about that sentence you quoted isn't clear to you?
>The only thing one can guarantee in such a "transfer" is memory, in which case you must believe that someone who shoots the clone is hurting "you."
Having two places running separate instances of one original person's consciousness is a new situation that we aren't used to yet, so some things we take for granted about how things work in a world where there aren't separate instances of a consciousness running in two places will no longer be true in the world where these things do happen. I alluded to that point here:
>We think of copies as less real only because we aren't used to having multiple instances of the same consciousness in different places yet.
So no, the body a consciousness was uploaded from wouldn't feel the pain of the body the consciousness was uploaded to if that second boy were injured. That doesn't make the upload any less real in preserving identity from the original body to the new body than your brain already does in preserving identity from an older moment to a newer moment. There is nothing special about the brain that makes it able to preserve identity in a way an upload to an artificial brain wouldn't be able to do.
You have two choices: 1) Claim there is a mechanism for preserving identity in the brain 2) Claim there isn't a mechanism for preserving identity in the brain. If you go with choice 1, then there isn't any reason why an artificial version of that mechanism can't be built, and if you go with choice 2, then there wasn't any real meaning to the concept of "identity" to begin with and a copy of consciousness to an external location is just as valid in carrying over identity as the brain's continuous copying of consciousness from moment to moment in the same location is.
>That doesn't make the upload any less real
No one cares about real, they care about perpetuating the "consciousness" whatever the fuck that means. Whether or not there even exists such a thing is not easily gotten a hold of, and the last part of your post is a gross simplification.
>There is nothing special about the brain that makes it able to preserve identity in a way an upload to an artificial brain wouldn't be able to do.
No one is arguing against this. Would the "transfer" itself even be possible is the question. Many futurists believe that uploading one's memories to another body is literal immortality.
>tfw your brain wouldn't fit in a girl-sized robot skull
No, that's not how this works. "uploads" are a pipe-dream. What you want is a full-body prosthesis connected to a hybrid brain. What >>5484425 said is absolutely correct. Any artificial brain that isn't also biological risks missing an important aspect.
But that being said, if you're a transexual and not a transhumanist I have to ask what's wrong with you. Why limit yourself to a single sex when you could change sex as easily as changing clothing? Why not inhabit a body that could have entirely custom sexual morpholohy, including things never before seen?
yeah some people are stupid anon. if you make a clone of yourself youre not expiriencing both bodies at once, it splits from there. I dont want a robot clone, I want brain implants to slowly be able to replace the organics until im full robo. then making with the sexy bodymods and xenomorphology as I feel like it, shapeshifter style
What you guys are forgetting is that people suffering with gender dysphoria have an aspect to their condition where their body feels wrong or alien to them. This is speculated to be due to a mismatch between the brain and the body due to some odd misshaping of the brain or neurological intersexuality.
It's very much possible that an operation this drastic would worsen or even cause dysphoria. Even in cis people. If the prevalent neurological theories on transsexualism and gender identity have truth to them transferring someone's brain to a body that isn't theirs could be extremely damaging.
I just want that kind of technology to exist in my life time so bad. I'd happily give up my flesh body to have a full prosthetic one that can be wired right into the web and still retain consciousness and control. This shit is so cash
> It's very much possible that an operation this drastic would worsen or even cause dysphoria.
Then why don't massive surgeries like the tiger man, the living barbie dall or face transplants don't cause dysphoria? I think there's something special about people with gender dysphoria or BIID that makes them insensitive to certain body types. We know that a nontrivial amount of 'normal 'people can adapt to (and even appreciate) massive body changes .When was the last time you heard of an amputee killing themselves over their fancy artisan leg prosthetic?
>Then why don't massive surgeries like the tiger man, the living barbie dall or face transplants don't cause dysphoria?
Sorry for mangling that so bad but you should know what I mean. Remove the second 'don't'
Let's say that your brain was replaced with a robotic one cell by cell. Every small amount of time, one microscopic part of your mind was recorded, digitally copied and replaced in your mind with that copy. Now, as you are not able to feel your brain, at what part do you as a conscious person stop being you if you never lose consciousness in the transfer?
Now, why is that different to you than it happening almost immediately, or across a medium of space into another body? Would you just feel more comfortable if you were digitized in your own flesh and THEN transferred? And why?
The examples you mentioned still have their bodies. And phantom pains are very common in amputees. Can you imagine that occurring for the entire body? In order to successfully implement a bio-mechanical body we'd have to figure out the mechanisms that cause body dysphoria and phantom pains, then find a way to somehow replicate the nervous system and connect it to the brain. Then there's the question of nutrients and blood flow in order to keep the brain alive. If people wanna eat we'll have to make an artificial digestive system.
Just my 2 cents. This is mostly speculation at the moment, but hopefully we'll one day have the knowledge to create this kind of tech.
Of course if somehow my brain could be transplanted into a good looking robot/ artificially made biological body I would take the opportunity.
But that kind of procedure isn't going to in its earliest stages until near the end of the century, at an optimistic estimate.
> Now, as you are not able to feel your brain, at what part do you as a conscious person stop being you if you never lose consciousness in the transfer?
Never, the stream of consciousness is never broken and the existing neural network is given time to assimilate the new neurons. This is the only viable way to get a mind into an artificial brain (assuming there isn't something important lost in the transition - like the fact that glial cells play a role in memory)
> Now, why is that different to you than it happening almost immediately, or across a medium of space into another body?
There would be latency involved, thus breaking the stream of consciousness. The minds would diverge in the process.
> The examples you mentioned still have their bodies.
True, but they are still extremely drastic. When dealing with something like dysphoria, we're dealing with the visual system's response to appearance. Beauty being skin deep and all.
> And phantom pains are very common in amputees
It tends to go away once you hook them up to an artificial nervous system. Phantom pain is more about a lack of feedback than disfigurement. We're discussing body horror and dysphoria here, not really phantom pain but either way it can be dealt with. My point is that 'normal' people will assimilate even drastic changes *over time*.
> Can you imagine that occurring for the entire body?
I can't imagine a transition into a full body prosthesis being a short-term operation. In practice, what will happen is people will start with prosthetic extremities and slowly move inwards. Slowly being the key here. Assuming the patient doesn't have any perceptual disorders like GID or BIID, doing it slowly should give their self image time to assimilate the changes. I doubt that anyone is going to chop their brains off in one operation kimiko-ross style and hope nothing goes wrong. That being said the brain-in-a-vat problem shows us that the brain doesn't care where inputs come from.
>Now, as you are not able to feel your brain, at what part do you as a conscious person stop being you if you never lose consciousness in the transfer?
^This is a good point.
I put together a crude MS Paint diagram of two models for what would happen to "you" if you were to undergo a "brain upload." In both models, the multiple brain pictures going from left to right represent the same brain at different moments in time.
MODEL A: There is a continuous line representing "you" as something that exists across multiple different moments of time running off of a biological brain. The brain activity is "uploaded" to an artificial brain towards the end of the timeline, but in this model, the artificial brain's resulting "you" is "just a copy." In contrast, the biological brain's "you" at the end of the timeline is "still you."
MODEL B: There is NO continuous line representing "you" as something that exists across multiple different moments of time running off of a biological brain. Instead, this model only acknowledges that the biological brain produces activity which can be considered a VERSION of you in each moment of time. As a consequence of no longer assuming continuity of identity over time, what we're left with at the end are two equally valid versions of you. Neither one can be considered more of a continuation of the T-1 moment's version of you than the other, and so if the biological brain were destroyed as part of the upload, the artificial brain's contents would not be any less valid to the constant ongoing versioning of you than your biological brain's contents would be if it hadn't been destroyed.
It's not that "brain uploads" are "just a copy" which don't carry over the true "you," but rather that your current brain's generation of activity you identify with over time is itself just an ongoing generation of versions. Identity over time does not even exist to begin with as something that an upload could either succeed or fail at preserving.