There is nothing "too valuable for combat" there is simply a level at which it would be used. Are you going to use your $8000 Cabot guns 1911 with chrome finish and mamoth Ivory grips as your EDC so it gets beat up daily? No. You are going to carry your $600-1200 gun for that. But of someone really really pisses you off and needs to die, then you bring your fancy gun
>>28590662 b-but muh kuznetsov is invincable toovarich no missiles ever hit because we jam them with same technology as that which sank the donald cook. russian ciws is 200% better in anyway then any weststern ciws. And if all fail we have lazer dazlers that blond any missile or aircraft that come close.
>>28590820 this is not true only nato carriers stand no chance when su-33 fire brahmos on them they stand no chance of stopping. while american harpoon and lrasm do nothing to kuznetsov with their shitty subsonic speed
>>28591014 Not that guy, but I'm interested in hearing the other side of the argument--is there any form of asymmetrical engagement that would be able to effectively exploit the weaknesses of a modern carrier group?
I know that hypersonic anti-ship missiles have a long ways to go before they become an actual threat due to how long their kill chain is, but what else is out there that we know of?
>>28592580 >Of course, getting missile platforms that close without detection is the problem...
How close can a modern submarine get before it stands a reasonable chance of being detected? Would a large number of attack submarines (let's say 15, for example) have a good chance of being able to disable a carrier without taking such heavy losses that it would be a phyrric victory?
>>28592465 Sneaky commandos with small missiles like pic related or just some mortars. They rent an apartment in Norfolk VA, set up on the roof top, and break all the fancy radars, catapults, f35s on deck, etc from a mile or two away.
>>28592948 I thought it was common knowledge actually. You should Google this topic, evidence is pretty damning for CSGs http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/sweden-has-a-sub-thats-so-deadly-the-us-navy-hired-it-t-1649695984
>>28593032 >>28593019 I had heard all the hubbub about Diesel Electric subs, but I figured that they were just another meme. Guess not, unless the carrier groups were operating under RoE that massively handicapped them.
Thanks for the links in any case, these were quite interesting. It makes me wonder what countermeasures the Navy is developing in response.
>>28593077 In their defense, that is exactly the case during the first half of the 20th. Everyone was busting ass to get a navy only to mothball it until jutland for fear of submarines. Navies pored over the results of the battle of port Arthur to find out how modern techs were doing. They regained use during the convoys and what not.
>>28594100 >Everyone was busting ass to get a navy only to mothball it until jutland for fear of submarines. Uh no, the RN was extremely willing to duke it out and had the entire continent on a lock down. The High Seas fleet meanwhile was 'mothballed' for fear of the RN, not submarines.
>>28594045 They stuck with the 16"/50 Mark 7 because it had similar penetration to the Japanese 18.1". A complete redesign of the gunhouses and turret architecture as well as designing a new gun along with introducing new ammunition to the supply chain would've been idiotic. The Montana's could have easily pulled the Yamato apart with their designed armament, no need to redesign to accommodate heavier guns for no damn reason.
>>28592930 >Excellent chance. Every time we do exercises with diesel electric subs carriers get killed. Especially the new super sneaky AIP subs.
The problem with attacking a carrier with submarines is that aircraft are, and have been, the most potent anti-submarine weapon since they were first used in that role in WWII, which makes carriers the most potent anti-submarine weapon you can ask for, with the possible exception of another submarine. Look at the JDS Kaga, and other ships of its ilk in service with many navies in the world, i.e. helicopter carriers. There are two main roles for a helicopter carrier:
1. Amphibious assault; i.e. attack choppers and transport choppers to put Marines and their supplies ashore. 2. Anti-submarine work.
That's right - submarine work. That's also the main reason every frigate and destroyer in the modern age carries at LEAST one helicopter, or two if they can manage - airpower is king against subs, because of how much distance they can cover. Cruisers in WWII carried at least two floatplanes who's primary jobs were scouting and ASW patrol - modern 'destroyers' are the same tonnage and fill the same role, and happen to have the same integral airpower.
Now a big, powerful fleet carrier has an escort group which carries choppers of their own (and the escort always includes an SSN, as well.) And then there's the airpower of the carrier itself, which just carries a shitload of choppers. Navy Luddites have been screaming blue murder over the retirement of the Viking (carrier-launched fixed-wing ASW plane) because of the severe reduction in range, but from what I can see, that was a money-saving measure on the Navy's part - the new P-8 Orion land-based patrol plane has an insane range and loiter time, and we have airbases literally all over the world - with tanker support from those same bases, there's no patch of ocean we can't have sanitized by P-8s within a reasonable timeframe.
>>28594238 Literally the same argument made since 19th century when it was torpedo boat spam vs. battleships. Asymmetrical warfare doesn't work at sea because there is nowhere to hide and the ocean is rather unforgiving on small vessels. Also small vessels have shit for endurance.
>>28593019 >I thought it was common knowledge actually. You should Google this topic, evidence is pretty damning for CSGs
Not really, bru. We're scheduling multiple exercises with our allies that operate (and sell) these modern ninja AIP diesel boats for the express purpose of learning how to find, fix and kill the little fuckers. Add to that the ton of Navy acquisitions developed in recent years with a focus on asymmetric littoral ops. For instance, one of the interim armament packages being discussed for the Littoral Combat Ship (it is literally called the Littoral Combat Ship, you might notice,) is a VLS mounting 48 or so fucking Hellfire-L missiles. Tiny little anti-tank missiles in a VLS - a miniaturized VLS for the express purpose of handing swarms of small boat attacks. This literally translates to "A ship/weapon system specifically designed for taking the Strait of Hormuz from Iran if they try to start shit." Then there's the Mark 54 air-dropped ASW torpedo, which has been optimized for shallow-water operation (and the new version of the Mk. 48 ADCAP also optimized for same.)
One reason the F-35 is being pushed so hard is because it combines superstealth with vastly superior range to the Super Hornet - the Navy wants the C model on their decks fucking yesterday for that exact reason. The Navy let integral tanker ability lapse for the same reason as integral fixed-wing ASW - the same shitload of bases worldwide that host long-legged P-8s also host KC-135s. But you want to be able to control the airspace those tankers will operate in, and you definitely want to have a long-range strike on the deck ready to go in case you find something that needs killing fucking yesterday. I see two things when looking at modern Navy acquisitions - perusal of regaining carrier standoff range lost with the retirement of several legacy airframes, (the F-35 serves as the A-6 *and* F-14 replacement, which is why the Navy has been apocalyptic at the program's delays,)...
>>28592465 At the low end of the spectrum, a swarm of suicide boats could be problematic. Start by swarming the escorts, one at a time. Figure each boat has 500 pounds of explosive, small arms, a couple of RPGs and some Strelas or comparable. Crew of 6 or thereabout. Swarm a Burke or Tico with 30 of them, from all points of the compass. Once 2 hits are achieved, the survivors withdraw.
Regroup, replace losses, go after the next escort. Sinking escorts isn't important, they just need to be damaged to the point of mission kill.
If you have enough speedboats and enthusiastic young men, attack multiple escorts simultaneously. You want to reserve a large part of your force for the carrier, though. You want to get at least 10 hits on that. There's no realistic chance of sinking a carrier this way, but you can do damage and possibly force a withdrawal.
... and a whole bunch of shit designed for fighting in shallow littoral waters *anyways.* I mean, we developed the Tomahawk missile specifically to avoid this problem - it has a 1,600 fucking mile range, for fucks sake, and most of the cells in our Arleigh-Burkes are loaded with them at any given time - but the thinking seems to be "fuck enemy area denial tactics." Getting our 80s carrier standoff strike range back; with A-6 tankers that can drag a whole flight of heavily-laden attack planes out to 800 frikkin miles and fuck up someone's day would be a big boon, but the Navy seems invested in having their way anywhere, anytime. And it makes sense - if the enemy increases the range of their carriers, just increase the range of your denial systems. Pound for pound it's easier to make diesel boats with bigger fuel tanks (or build forward refueling areas, like the Chinese are doing with their island construction,) than it is to significantly improve the weapons *and* planes of the carrier groups, which are hideously expensive procurement programs just to get off the ground.
Yeah, we're specifically training against these weapons, as well as spending millions in counters.
Probably not, but only because no captains would be that dumb.
'Watch the fuck out when you have two ships sailing side by side' is a lesson in sailing mankind learnt many, many, many centuries ago.
Ships are constantly being pushed on all sides by the sea. When they are side by side they are both shielding one another from the sea in that direction. Which means the sea pushes them closer and closer together. Which means ships that sail side by side crash.
>>28594374 Air power would tear them apart in open water, where a CSG would realistically be operating. Hell, Iran tried it back in Operation Praying Mantis and the whole swarm got chased away by 2 A-6s.
>>28593149 That's two of the primary LCS missions.
>>28593112 AIP and DE subs have to get very, very lucky with positioning to get position on a carrier group. They simply cannot travel fast enough underwater to "chase" one down. In exercises, you have set AOE boxes and even courses worked out, which vastly simplifies this problem. ANY sub can put fish on a carrier if it's lying dead quiet like a hole in the ocean across it's course. The trick is getting there far enough in advance that escorts don't hear you snorkeling/moving into position. In reality it requires a lot of subs in picket and you STILL have to get lucky. Even in this eventuality, though, the USN has now deployed anti-torpedo hard kill torpedoes (CAT) and torpedo warning systems (TWS) on the carriers to counter just such a perfect storm. See:
>>28594157 Not to mention the fact that at the time, the 16"/50s had a range which matched the visual/radar horizon for a battleship, and no one would be firing accurately OTH with ship VS ship naval gunnery for quite some time.
>>28594412 No No, I don't mean "Stay x amount of distance away from each other" i mean is there a Navy doctrine that states "There will never be this many carriers within this many nautical miles of each other" because of fear of a crippling strike.
>>28594249 I agree with you anon, but modern AIP DE subs are sneaky as fuck, and modern torpedoes are more lethal than ever. Who even knows how mine warfare has changed, but I wouldn't be surprised if people have supercavitating torpedoes that bury themselves in the sand for months at a time, waiting for an encrypted signal that sounds like a whale song or something.
Have our ASW and MCM capabilities improved proportionally?
>>28593944 >I can't be fucked to learn the military history lessons of WWII, much less understand the modern threat environment but I still need to open my cockholster and inflict my opinion on those around me
This. This is *exactly* the scenario that led to the creation of the LCS in the first place, and why the multiple successive fuckups of the defense industry to produce a suitable missile system for it has greatly, greatly stressed out the Navy. The current "swarm defense" armament plan is 48 Hellfires in a VLS plus twin 30mm cannons; an entire ship designed just to fend off that kind of an attack.
Of course the LCS is hideously fucking expensive for a corvette - easily the cost of a frigate - and that's a ton of money to spend on such a limited role, so the Navy tried to make the equipment modular, and we all know how well that fuckup turned out. Now people are reasonably pointing out that a ship with no serious anti-air defenses, in the age of mass anti-ship missile proliferation, is fucking retarded. Currently they mount a single SeaRAM launcher, which is a missile-based upgrade to CIWS - strictly point-defense. Very good point defense, but still something you should never have to fire if you can fucking help it. Thus the push is on to provide them with 1. anti-ship missiles of their own and 2. air defenses. 1. is pretty fucking simple - you could slap a Tomahawk/Naval Strike Missile box launcher on them tomorrow and pay some asshole in the defense industry too much for the software integration, and you'd pretty much be done. 2. is the sticking point. A Mark 56 VLS is small and light enough to cram in there pretty easily and could give the LCS 16 ESSMs (evolved Sea Sparrows) which is a pretty good short/medium range anti-air defense for a ship that size, but'd also require the installation of a few fire control radars and all the software integration, etc. The ESSM can be used in anti-surface mode, and the size of the warhead makes it pretty ideal for fragging boghammers - but it can only carry 16 of them, and the Navy sees itself needing rather more than 16.
But the critics are right; without the ESSM it's highly vulnerable.
>>28594238 Because literally EVERY conflict or patrol zone the USN is expected to operate in is a couple thousand miles from the US coast. The logistics of keeping these things supplied, much less repaired in rough seas, would be staggering.
The USN is built the way it is primarily because every time we need to reach out and touch someone it's literally on the other side of the world.
That's not even considering the myriad of tactical and strategic reasons these things suck in a conventional naval battle.
>>28594382 >Pound for pound it's easier to make diesel boats with bigger fuel tanks (or build forward refueling areas, like the Chinese are doing with their island construction,) than it is to significantly improve the weapons *and* planes of the carrier groups, which are hideously expensive procurement programs just to get off the ground. Except that you forget this simple fact: as the range radius increases, the area a diesel boat has to cover to find the carrier's location and course, sprint to and lie doggo on it and kill it also increases by a SQUARE of that radius. To retain the same denial capabilities with diesel boats (range, supply and very speed limited in non-permissive waters) you have to square the number of diesel boats you're operating. While on the surface it looks like you just need more fuel, the truth is you need more boats. A lot of them. THEN the acquisitions programs for adding that little bit more standoff range for carrier air wings look a hell of a lot cheaper for the counter they provide.
Frankly? Because missiles kind of suck. Missiles cannot really jink to dodge incoming fire (with the notable exception of the terminal maneuver most missiles use to dodge the last-ditch point-defense fire,) they cannot react to "pop-up" threats (i.e. a new ship revealing itself between the missile and intended target when it turns its radar on to start engaging the missiles,) and in general they're just... dumb. A piloted aircraft is a hell of a lot more effective, and it can add its own impressive range to the range of whatever weapon it launches. Plus, the plane and pilot actually come home, unlike the missile. The only cost you lose with the missile is whatever's needed to make a weapon with just enough standoff to keep the plane safe. Plus, even an impressively long-ranged missile often can't match the threat radius of missile-armed planes. For instance, the picture you posted - look at the size of the fucking missile bins on that motherfucker. Those are BIG fucking missiles, probably Granits - which they have to be, since they have to 1. have very long range and 2. carry a warhead big enough to mission-kill a carrier in one hit. Big missiles == less missiles on each missile boat == more missile boats. And you WILL need lots of missiles, because missiles are vulnerable. Back in The Day missiles were hard to shoot down just because they were small(ish) and fast - but they were pretty easy to spoof with primitive ECM and decoys. Nowadays the ECM and decoys don't have much of a chance, but defensive missiles are shit-fucking-hot. Go look up the promotional video for the LRASM - you'll note how much crazy stealthy clever shit it does; all to counter the problems I just listed. That's the next-generation. Maybe that will bring the balance back in favor of anti-ship missiles. But for the last several decades, if you could afford a fleet carrier and planes to put on it, it was hands-down better than missile boats.
>>28594433 >AIP and DE subs have to get very, very lucky with positioning to get position on a carrier group. They simply cannot travel fast enough underwater to "chase" one down. In exercises, you have set AOE boxes and even courses worked out, which vastly simplifies this problem. ANY sub can put fish on a carrier if it's lying dead quiet like a hole in the ocean across it's course. The trick is getting there far enough in advance that escorts don't hear you snorkeling/moving into position. In reality it requires a lot of subs in picket and you STILL have to get lucky. Even in this eventuality, though, the USN has now deployed anti-torpedo hard kill torpedoes (CAT) and torpedo warning systems (TWS) on the carriers to counter just such a perfect storm.
In other words modern diesel submarines have the exact same problem that WWII diesel submarines had. They can't go charging around, offensively prowling like an SSN can - and nobody, but nobody can build an SSN as quiet as ours, especially the new Virginia-class subs. Depending on who's guesstimate you believe, the Virginias are a shade quieter than some of those new diesel boats, due to the shrouded propulsors!
>>28594425 They have to be true jihadis for the tactic to work. That's also why they would have the Strelas or whatever, to hold off the air interdiction long enough for the boats to complete their runs.
It's not an elegant tactic, nor is it efficient. All it takes is one successful strike for it to become effective, though. The jihadi shitposting would be monumental, and every dingbat with a Costco kayak would be loading up on tannerite.
What >>28594157 said: mostly because of the development of the "super-heavy shell," which packed more AP power into the 16 inch diameter than anyone had expected possible.
>>28594454 >16"/50s had a range which matched the visual/radar horizon for a battleship,
Yep. In fact the radar horizon is a bit further than the visual horizon due to radio waves bending around the curvature of the earth a little bit (fucked if I can tell you the name of the effect, but it happens.) Their FC radar was also good enough that it could pick up the return of shell splashes; allowing the ship to range its own salvos even during total blind-fire.
>>28594546 The LCS does exactly what it needs to, or will. Just because you can't understand where it falls in the mission capability spectrum and how it counters the threat environment, you dismiss it. Congrats. You're too stupid/lazy to understand why it is essential.
>>28594567 The LCS does fill some OHP capability gap in the ASW arena. It'll be a primary counter for DE/AIP boats as an ASW picket, using hull sonar and the huge aviation facilities for the mission.
>>28594606 That's not the primary reason why VAs are so quiet while hunting/ASW. They can operate their reactors on natural circulation up to certain load levels (12+ knots in the case of VAs, perhaps as much as 18, depending on your source. the USN ain't saying), which completely removes one of the largest primary noise radiators in a nuke boat's sound profile: reactor coolant pumps. This makes it literally just as quiet as a diesel or AIP unless it is sprinting. This tech isn't new as it was on 688, Ohio and Seawolf class boats, but each class can go faster and faster on natural circulation as the reactors and propulsors/screws get better.
>>28594606 It's a basic problem for subs. They have a short engagement range and move slowly, very slowly when operating in the vicinity of ASW systems.
Carriers move very quickly. Far more quickly then a sub can without being easy to find, even when simply performing routine operations. If the carrier's course and timetable isn't known it's nearly impossible to intercept one with a sub.
A-FUCKING MEN, ANON, A-FUCKING MEN. That is exactly why the whole LCS debacle has pissed off the Navy so much. Then again, it's their own fucking fault for trying to fit a quart into a pint pot with the whole "mission module" thing - they were hoping they could have an anti-small boat weapon system installed on Monday, (for protecting Burkes that could cover the air threat just fine) and then switch to anti-air missile loadout by Wednesday (for independent long-range ASW patrol where they'd need to protect themselves.) Now they're stuck with one ship that ate up the budget for both roles, but now can only do one - and they've got to choose between them.
Right now they seem to intend to make the last 20 ships of the LCS class the "Small Surface Combatant" with anti-ship and anti-air missiles (and a bit bigger/longer to accommodate all that, to boot,) so literally making two separate ships for each role without having to design an entirely new vessel.
Not really. They ARE good ships - or will be, once they finish shaking out the usual bugs - but they lack sorely for a decent fucking weapon system. The only thing keeping them from being all they ought to be is the current ongoing clusterfuck - THAT is the embarrassment. Ever since they wised the fuck up and equipped the LCS with a towed sonar array, it's already a very good, small ASW platform - especially since it operates the same number of choppers as a Burke. (Two seahawks, or a seahawk and a drone. Technically you can operate all three at once, but only during operational 'lily-padding' and such.)
>>28594504 > type 53-65K torpedo enters USSR service in 1969 > countermeasures against it expected to attain IOC in 2018 I'd say the answer is more of a sheepish "umm... kinda, but not really" also picrelated exists
>>28594553 >Except that you forget this simple fact: as the range radius increases, the area a diesel boat has to cover to find the carrier's location and course, sprint to and lie doggo on it and kill it also increases by a SQUARE of that radius. To retain the same denial capabilities with diesel boats (range, supply and very speed limited in non-permissive waters) you have to square the number of diesel boats you're operating. While on the surface it looks like you just need more fuel, the truth is you need more boats. A lot of them. THEN the acquisitions programs for adding that little bit more standoff range for carrier air wings look a hell of a lot cheaper for the counter they provide.
That's... abso-fucking-lutely correct, thank you. This nicely illustrates why China is basing more of their area denial strategy around missiles (the anti-ship ballistic missiles being the best example.) However your point still stands there, too - it's relatively easy to find a surface battle group (even without satellites, in the event of a serious war most of them will be soft/hard killed pretty quick) with big planes mounting surface-search radars. They also have great range - 300nm or so for the radar and up to a thousand for the plane itself. Problem is, the fighters that would escort them usually don't - and the carrier group will pick up those radio emissions and send fighters to murder them before they get anywhere close enough to detect them. Then the range of the planes comes in. And the range at which you can start launching strikes of course multiplies the ocean box from which threats can emerge, forcing the enemy to devote more search planes, more escorts for the search planes, etc...
>>28594679 I'd love to see where you're getting your numbers. The Lafayettes are over 780m accounting for inflation. And they are actually LESS well armed than the NSM-equipped LCS ships coming, and have HALF the aviation facilities. Oh, and half the speed.
>>28594615 >anon, an LCS of either class costs about HALF what a Layfayette class Frigate costs. where are you getting your numbers?
Bitching whining articles on the internet, so they could quite easily be full of fucking shit.
Thing is - as >>28594743 points out - the LCS *as is* isn't far behind a lot of actual frigates in service, and it has yawing, lonely, unused tonnage and volume in its mission bays waiting for the military/industrial complex to unfuck themselves and put a fucking weapon or three in there. The point being that they could be *better* than most frigates in the world for *less* money, but right now they're *worse* for *more* all because of this ongoing retard clusterfuck slapfight fuckup.
Rarely in military matters is something so clear-cut. The difference between now and then - when they fucking give them a weapon it'll be like Jesus riding down from heaven on a Raptor dual-wielding golden deagles. Which just makes the wait for them to get to it all the more irritating.
>>28594728 I'm assuming that trained commandos with a plan could set up on a rooftop at 3am and fire before anybody notices/does anything about it. Then they peace out before a response can be organized.
Not real hard to imagine anon. I think American commandos could pull off something like this in a foreign country... Not much of a stretch to think it could happen here too.
>>28594788 >this is all well and good, but the ocean is only so big and the targets the US might want to hit using a CSG only so many
Exactly, that's why range is so important. The further away you can strike, the further the enemy has to patrol from those relatively few fixed points.
This is also why the Chinese strategy is called "area denial," basically, they know they can't fuck with us on blue water, but they figure with heavy investment they can make the much smaller area of the south china sea too dangerous to enter.
>>28594788 I think you still vastly underestimate how easy it is to hide a CSG even in a relatively small area like the East China Sea. The USN has been playing these games with the Soviets/Russians for 70 years. See:
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-031.htm http://www.informationdissemination.net/2014/10/deception-and-backfire-bomber.html (part 1 of 4. read 'em all, they're good).
Heh, nice links, thank you. I just got done playing a CMANO scenario (CSG versus China in the South China Sea) and it did prove surprisingly easy to hide my forces. It just consisted of shooting down any airborne sensor before it could get close enough to pick up my ships.
So if you can win the air battle (and being able to stand and deliver against ground bases, not just raid, is what really defines a carrier battle group,) you're pretty much golden.
>>28594794 >but right now they're *worse* for *more* Except that's not true. They have larger aviation facilities, better sensors and are faster than any existing frigate while being 1-2 thousand tons smaller displacement and costing less. Do your homework.
I do agree that the wait for them to get all up and be fully capable is irritating and I'm excited to see what the full capability mix will be, but this isn't anything new for both brand new hulls/systems coupled with a brand new mission/capability mix. There's a lot of shit to shake down.
>>28594776 How many spare Ageis radars do you think we have sitting around in a warehouse anon? How quickly can they be built? If you had a spare radar sitting on the dock, how long would it take to remove the damaged one and replace it?
If you kill a f35 on the ground/flight deck that's just as good as killing anywhere else.
>>28594797 Sure. Let me just magic those into Norfolk. Shit, into the states period. And at the end of the day, that's just ONE carrier that you executed a nuke strike to disable/destroy (along with a good portion of a harbor and residential area). Tell me, what happened the last two times the US ate surprise attacks? Think the anger and focus for retribution following Pearl Harbor with that added nuclear spicy meatball. It'd be the fucking crusades, new world style.
>>28594814 that's what I was getting at it's one thing to play fuck-fuck with submarines in the Atlantic and quite another to go into their lairs this is all wankery anyway as the naval superiority the US enjoys virtually guarantees that an all out war will be a nuclear war and any detected CSG will be a dead CSG twenty minutes and one very large warhead later
Why haven't we reexamined submersible aircraft carriers? They combine the survivability and stealth of a submarine with the long-range force projection of a carrier.
The sub carrier would surface, quickly launch a fleet of drone fighters, and then dive to avoid attack. The drones would be controlled by satellite, and would launch conventional anti- ship missile attacks. After attacking, the drones would be guided to an open area of the sea, where the sub carrier would be waiting to collect them.
>>28594825 Burger here, and while I think carriers are nowhere near as vulnerable as some in this thread suggest, a single modern Mk-48ADCAP sized heavy torpedo detonating under a Nimitz kill would absolutely mission kill it. Probably not sink it, but it would definitely be out of the fight and probably being towed back for emergency repairs.
>>28594904 I'm not sure if I'd call it a mission kill. The Mk 48 ADCAP is the second best thing to Jesus, but a carrier is a big bitch with a LOT of compartmentalization. I'd wager that you'd probably get a mobility kill, which MIGHT be a mission kill, but I'd wager you could probably still conduct flight ops off the deck. At least, with lower payloads. If you're not steaming into the wind it might be difficult to generate enough lift to get the planes skyward if they're fully laden.
>>28594867 Just how much shooting do you expect them to do before being engaged? Are you thinking they've somehow smuggled a dozen or more of the fucking things into the country?
Furthermore, Nimitzes and Fords aren't even AEGIS equipped. You're thinking of the AN/SPS-48E and AN/SPS-49(V)5 air search radars, not AN-SPY series popcorn cookers (which aren't even what the AEGIS system is, just one of the sensors for it).
>>28594904 >Burger here, and while I think carriers are nowhere near as vulnerable as some in this thread suggest, a single modern Mk-48ADCAP sized heavy torpedo detonating under a Nimitz kill would absolutely mission kill it.
Oh, no shit, if hit in the right place. I was referring to the man-portable missiles that guy was posting about. The only way a warhead that size could mission-kill a carrier is the way Clancy posited in Debt of Honor - direct hit to the propellers while they're running; throwing their balance out of whack and fucking up the shafts, wrenching turbines off their mounts, etc. A carrier that can't move fast enough can't launch strike aircraft...
... well, not with full fuel and weapon loads, anyhow.
>>28594872 >this is all wankery anyway as the naval superiority the US enjoys virtually guarantees that an all out war will be a nuclear war and any detected CSG will be a dead CSG twenty minutes and one very large warhead later An interesting supposition, considering the nuclear warhead and delivery system advantages the US enjoys. NUTS would dictate an immediate and symmetrical reprisal. What do you think the US would consider Tit-for-Tat for a nuke CSG? Hint: it wouldn't be peanuts.
Also, you assume that the nuke being fired has a good enough target track, short enough kill chain and enough saturation in numbers to overcome CSG defenses. That's a pretty big if.
>>28594922 Yes, because the Navy totally just lets random civilian boats near their docks, especially ones with giant torpedo tubes sticking out of them.
And what kind of launcher do expect to carry out the strikes with? The only ones portable enough to smuggle are unguided and inaccurate as hell at range, and guided launchers are either very rare or very large. Plus its a tactic that would work exactly once.
>>28594967 Then there is the TERN, which is a VTOL flying wing designed to take off from DDGs and LCSs. I mean, if you REALLY wanted to, you could create a design like this. I just don't think it's the greatest idea.
>>28594882 For the myriad of fucking reasons laid out in the last twelve "sub carrier" threads:
>can't actual conduct flight ops at flight ops speeds because bow wave and spray, even in calm seas >no significant storage capacity, even on something the size of a Typhoon and obviously no deck storage >massive, sucking, popping hull flow noise on any remotely operable flight deck design >slow and loud as shit to move that much mass through the water from a power plant/reactor standpoint >flight ops would keep it exposed on the surface for far too much of the time >cheap, easy dog meat for ANY SSN/SS enemy asset in the area
In short, for about the 12th time, fuck off already.
>>28594872 >it's one thing to play fuck-fuck with submarines in the Atlantic and quite another to go into their lairs
Which is exactly why the Navy is investing in new ASW tech, yeah. They're not unaware of the danger, and it seems that they feel they might not have the luxury of staying the fuck out of it.
>>28594867 Radar is a mission-kill for an escort ship, not so much for the carrier. Hell, the carrier's primary radar is an E-2 Hawkeye aircraft, which is hands-down superior to ANY surface radar due to being able to see sea-skimming missiles from hundreds of miles away.
>If you kill a f35 on the ground/flight deck that's just as good as killing anywhere else.
You'd have a much easier time gunning for them on an airbase - which is where Navy carrier wings go for training while the carrier is in dock.
>>28594882 >Why haven't we reexamined submersible aircraft carriers?
We already have them, anon. Check the attached image. That's a fucking Vertical Launching System on a submarine, bru. It launches cruise missiles that can hit land or sea targets. What is a cruise missile, but a plane and bomb united into one airframe? The Japanese submersible aircraft carrier was an early prototype of this system.
>>28594937 1. You're retarded if you think our borders are in any way secure. People drive 18 wheelers full of cocaine across the border daily. Not hard to imagine special ops guys smuggling in a few missiles.
2. Whatever man, you get my point. There is a whole lot of vulnerable, expensive shit in Norfolk. By the way name a US naval base, anywhere in the world - they are all shooting galleries for trained naval commandos.
>>28594961 > good enough target track for a 500 kt warhead? good enough is what, 2-4 km radius? > short kill chain Tupolev spots CSG, Tupolev broadcasts location, Akula fires Granats, Granats get to target on INS alone > saturation you have to spot and kill something like six to eight missiles flying on deck BEFORE they cross the horizon good luck
>>28594969 The beauty of abundant nuclear power, anon. It's a beautiful thing.
However, those air search and track radars are rarely lit off at full power in a real threat environment, as it's a huge unique signature neon sign screaming CARRIER RIGHT HERE to any EM collection mast in the hemisphere. That's the Burkes and Ticos' jobs.
>>28595018 >Which is exactly why the Navy is investing in new ASW tech, yeah. They're not unaware of the danger, and it seems that they feel they might not have the luxury of staying the fuck out of it. This is not a new capability for the USN. They've been sneaking into and playing around inside protected Russian/Soviet bays and harbors for decades. Read:
>>28595030 Do you not see me address that in my previous post? Let me lay it out more simply for you: It is technically possible to launch aircraft when not going into the wind. However, those aircraft can't be heavily laden down, as, like you said, they wouldn't have the amount of lift they'd normally have. If this weren't the case, it would be impossible to conduct flight operations in a sudden calm, which IS known to happen.
>>28595053 >People drive 18 wheelers full of cocaine across the border daily. Kek. You have an incredibly naive understanding of the drug trade and how it actually smuggles real weight.
>they are all shooting galleries for trained naval commandos. While there are threats and vulnerabilities that can be exploited, I think you're falling into the easy trap of thinking the USN/USMC has never considered such attacks as a possibility and have no defenses for them. For instance, C-RAMs are pretty much everywhere now, just as a starter.
>>28594667 Both valid points. But, Jihadi Joe is going to do his best with what he has. I was guessing a 500 pound payload, that would be the absolute top end. Halve that to increase range or speed. Then let's make it an EFP. One hit isn't crippling. Two or more are problematic if they happen roughly simultaneously, at locations at least half a ship length apart and near the waterline. Reason for that is, you've just engaged Repair 2 (fwd), Repair 3 (aft), and Repair 1 (topside) with separate problems. None of them is available to support the others. Also, depending on the location and penetration of the hits, you might also tie up Repair 5 (main prop) as well.
This is regarding attacks on the escorts, btw. The idea being to force a withdrawal or to get them tied up with self defense so that the main swarm has a shot at the carrier. Figure you have 200 speedboats. Dedicate 10% to each escort, the remainder go after the carrier. Remember, 1 hit on the carrier becomes a huge propaganda victory. Once that happens, you have a huge problem because now every jihadi in the world will be trying. Nuisance value has a quality all of its own.
>>28595055 >Tupolev spots CSG, Tupolev broadcasts location, Akula fires Granats, Granats get to target on INS alone There are several problems with this. First, the Bear not being shot down by carrier aircraft several hundred nmi away from the CSG. Second, actually finding said CSG. Third, the CSG not steaming in another direction after they detect incoming vampires.
>you have to spot and kill something like six to eight missiles flying on deck BEFORE they cross the horizon Which is the beauty of AEW aircraft, anon. Your radar horizon isn't 25 nmi out anymore. It's several hundred nmi, even assuming the AEW aircraft is literally right over the CSG.
Damn straight, anon. I referred only to surface ships - and even then, it's only regaining capability that was allowed to briefly lapse after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Our submarine forces have never, ever been neglected - not only are we cranking out Virginias right now, but we're already working on designing the successor class to the damn things!
It's odd how little people talk about US SSNs and how goddamned good they are in these threads - the fact that one escorts every CSG, alone, is a pretty strong answer to the "ninja diesel boat" fear.
>>28595055 >for a 500 kt warhead? good enough is what, 2-4 km radius? Much, much closer than that for an airburst, anon. See:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Crossroads#Test_Able >Gilda detonated 520 feet (158 m) above the target fleet, with a yield of 23 kilotons. Five ships were sunk. >The main cause of less-than-expected ship damage was that the bomb missed its aim point by 710 yards (649 m). The ship the bomb was aimed at failed to sink. >The battleship USS Nevada had been designated as the aim point for Able and was painted red, with white gun barrels and gunwales, to make her stand out in the central cluster of target ships. There were eight ships within 400 yards (366 m) of it. Had the bomb exploded over the Nevada as planned, at least nine ships, including two battleships and an aircraft carrier, would likely have sunk.
TLDR: the bomb missed by only 710 yards and failed to do even very significant damage to it. Radiated the fuck out of it, and would most likely have given radiation sickness to the whole crew and killed many outright, but did not sink it.
You want to sink ships with a nuke, underwater detonation is really the only way to be sure.
>>28595053 >2. Whatever man, you get my point. There is a whole lot of vulnerable, expensive shit in Norfolk. By the way name a US naval base, anywhere in the world - they are all shooting galleries for trained naval commandos.
What >>28595117 said. The C-RAM is a CIWS gun put on a trailer with specialized software for shooting down incoming artillery/mortar rounds. The Navy just announced a plan to put the RAM missiles (from the RAM/SeaRAM) system onto a similar installation for the same reason - same point defense, much longer range.
I did not, however, realize that the military was setting up C-RAMs around domestic military bases. That is... quite interesting, anon, thank you for that heads up.
>>28595154 >It's odd how little people talk about US SSNs and how goddamned good they are in these threads - the fact that one escorts every CSG, alone, is a pretty strong answer to the "ninja diesel boat" fear. There's not much to say. Not much is publicly known about SSNs other than they're fucking awesome. Some of us know quite a bit more than that, but comparatively speaking to their actual use, not really that much. SSN operations are probably the most difficult for those not involved to really understand them, in part due to how foreign it is, but partially because so much of that information is classified.
>>28595055 >Tupolev spots CSG At which point it is already 200nmi inside the F-35's combat air patrol radius, and 300nmi inside the kill radius for the AIM-120D, and has been on scope for the E-2D AWACS bird for over 200nmi, if not more. Good luck with that.
>Granats get to target on INS alone EW alone would make it nearly impossible to get a 1km CEP out of that, not to mention they'd be in range and under fire of SM-6, SM-2ER, ESSM and then Sea-RAM for 200+mi, adding missiles as the range decreases. It takes quite a few to saturate that volume of fire.
>you have to spot and kill something like six to eight missiles flying on deck BEFORE they cross the horizon That's what AWACS is specifically designed for, and the USN has done multiple successful intercept tests proving it works, even through ground clutter ashore.
>>28595055 >you have to spot and kill something like six to eight missiles flying on deck BEFORE they cross the horizon
As the other guy said, that's why we have the E-2 Hawkeye carrier-launched airborne AWACS plane. However that's not enough - you can vector fighters to intercept with air-to-air missiles, but what if you have a fuckton coming in fast? Worse, what if they're supersonic rape machines like the BrahMos?
That's exactly why the SM-6 was built - it's basically an extended-range SM-2 but with the active-radar terminal seeker of the AMRAAM on the end, so it can hunt down and kill shit even if the launching ship's illumination radars are below the horizon. This lets the battle group's missile defenses kill sea-skimmers hundreds of miles away.
Your points are valid, which is why the Navy has paid attention to them.
>>28595090 Don't forget that you need reactor power to run the cats, and if you're mobility killed from a keel detonation, you can bet that at least one of the reactors is in SCRAM lockdown and will be for at least a while.
It doesnt even have to go into combat , a single US Carrier with its air wing can effectively sink a whole enemy fleet with minimal losses + youd have to be stupid and have the balls of steel to attack a floating city with 5000 US servicemen.
>>28595186 >There's not much to say. Not much is publicly known about SSNs other than they're fucking awesome. Some of us know quite a bit more than that, but comparatively speaking to their actual use, not really that much. SSN operations are probably the most difficult for those not involved to really understand them, in part due to how foreign it is, but partially because so much of that information is classified.
True, that. Even I had a hard time really understanding modern submarine operations until I got some good simulators and did a lot of reading (and the best sims are built by the people who are the best at making educated guesstimates from what is publicly available info.) In many ways surface vs. sub is similar to how it was in WWII; just with a few new toys, but sub versus sub? That's some crazy shit mang.
>>28595165 Who in the world can execute a "massive initial counterforce hit" with nukes against the continental US and still have enough nukes left over for major harbors and dry docks, considering the drop in effectiveness of airburst against naval hulls? I'm not even sure Russia does anymore.
More importantly, who can do this and not shift US response from NUTS protocol to MAD protocol? No one. That's sheer insanity, and never an actual wartime option.
Dear anon: you took the bait. I forgive you, I almost took the bait myself. A lot of people seem to honestly not understand that carriers were vulnerable from the day they were first conceived of, were vulnerable in WWII, are still vulnerable, and that their value lies entirely in the massive range of their power projection - which is designed to keep them from harm entirely. People also seem to not realize that most ships in the modern US Navy fall into one of three categories:
1. Carriers.. 2. Ships that protect carriers.
The entire force is built around compensating for the vulnerability of carriers, and yet people still say "carriers are vulnerable." Well... no shit, you know?
>>28595190 You still have a very steep inverse square energy output to shockwave damage curve to overcome with an airburst against ships, anon. You'd still need a minimum CEP of under 1km, and even then the ships would probably remain afloat. Underwater detonation is orders of magnitude more damaging and energy efficient for sinking ships. With the same exact CEP, you can be absolutely sure of outright sinking every ship in the CSG or rendering every single one completely incapable of being recovered due to radioactive steam/water/particle contamination.
>Starts with obvious troll post. >Fills with people who don't know what they're fucking talking about making valid points because they actually used their fucking heads and thought about what knowledge they do have. >Answered by people who DO know their shit, listing the solutions the Navy has developed to the real problems the first anons identified. >nobody gets assblasted >nobody fiddycents
Today OP was a faggot, but /k/ sure as hell wasn't.
>>28593072 It's hit or miss. They have some amazing interviews with pilots and so on about stuff they flew, but they also parrot hatchet pieces. It's the usual Gawker Network editorial nonexistance issue.
>>28595339 Nothing beats sensationalism for selling ad space in the media except more over the top sensationalism, and there's even less integrity and responsibility in the age of internet blog journalism.
Anon, in the 70s we were operating a fuck-ton of WWII vintage carriers which only carried Skyhawks and SB-2s (fixed-wing ASW planes) and anti-submarine choppers. We literally had entire fleets of ships just for ASW patrols, specifically to pin down all those fucking Russian SSNs.
I'm not so sure about those. Yeah, the Russkies make a big fucking deal out of them, but the problem is that they can't see out of their own cavitation bubble. The Russkies claim to have invented terminal guidance for them now, but honestly, I'll believe it when I see it.
Sure, they move hideously fucking fast, which makes targeting easier and increases the range - but so do airborne missiles, and airborne missiles most certainly do need terminal guidance to hit, even sea-skimmers that don't use pop-up attacks (such as many big Russian carrier killer missiles.) They're coming in "flat," 2D, so over or under shooting isn't a big deal, but do you think they'd have a significant chance of hitting the target if they came in completely unguided? The guidance issues really limit the effectiveness of supercavitating torpedoes.
The other issue is that their very nature makes them easier to intercept or destroy. Anti-torpedo torpedoes are fucking insane sci-fi shit that we're only just fielding because of the inherent fire-control issues in the problem. But there's other methods. The Russians were fielding a system that'd launch a three-layered barrier towards incoming torpedoes for years - the first layer is a shitload of bubble decoys to blind, and the second layer were basically neutral-boyancy depth charges that'd detonate in an effort to destroy, damage or decoy the incoming torpedo. Didn't work very well - torpedoes are pretty hard to kill with anything but a direct hit or very near miss, similar to depth-charges against subs - but it was something. But knocking in the gas bubble around a supercavitating sanic torp..?
>>28595369 For meta humor irony like the bingo card to work, at least a couple people on /k/ have to know what's actually going on. /k/, for all it's faults, actually does have a core handful of people with a clue. Shocking, I know.
>>28595117 >>28595117 I don't think so anon. Base security is like the TSA - it's simply impossible to defend against a smart, determined attacker.
Naval based are not isolated, secure environments. There are people and cargo constantly going in and out, dependents living nearby, too many people to keep track of. Too many ways for a saboteur to slip through.
Say we install billion dollar magic railgun laser defense systems in all bases that can stop any conceivable missile attack. OK, now foreign commandos bomb the base elementary school. How many sailors abandon their post to check on their families? Or they suicide truck bomb the main gate during rush hour. Etc etc etc.
All to cause enough chaos and confusion to slip in whatever they need to pump a Burke's radar full of .50, or poison the water well, or set the jet fuel stockpile on fire, or poison the food in the mess hall or you get the idea.
You don't even have to touch a carrier to mission kill it. Get creative about the logistics it relies on. Because it's the hieght if idiocy to challenge a CSG on it's own terms. I garuntee our enemies are thinking about this stuff.
>>28595357 IIRC, supercavitating torps were developed more as a retaliation weapon than as an offensive asset. If the Russian sub was getting pinged by something they'd shoot the torpedo at the source and hope the target wasn't fast enough to get out of the way.
>>28595357 Don't bother, anon. He doesn't even understand how impossible it is to actually guide a supercavitating torpedo.
>Anon, in the 70s we were operating a fuck-ton of WWII vintage carriers which only carried Skyhawks and SB-2s (fixed-wing ASW planes) and anti-submarine choppers. We literally had entire fleets of ships just for ASW patrols, specifically to pin down all those fucking Russian SSNs. Daily reminder that Russia actually operates less than a tenth the number of submarines they did at their height in the early 80's, and the USN has enough attack boats plus force multipliers like the G-I-UK gap SOSUS systems to track almost every single one every time they leave the barn.
>>28590403 >Picture of a damaged Carrier. >From a conflict where carriers were by far the most important vessels available to a navy and where carriers were constantly the difference between victory and defeat. >T-THEYRE USELESS.
>>28592465 The weakness of a CSG is the carrier's dependence on other ships for significant parts of its defense, and the distributed nature of its defensive systems. This means the CSG must wage a "war of pickets". It must be strong enough to resist attack everywhere, while the attacker only needs to be strong enough to overwhelm the CSG's defenses at a point of its choosing. This situation favors the attacker.
An asymmetrical engagement wipes out most or all of the attacker's advantage. However, there are two recent findings by the USN that offer hope to would-be opponents of a CSG.
One is the discovery in recent years that a well-built diesel-electric submarine can be very difficult for modern ASW to detect. The USN is undoubtedly working to close this gap, but if an opponent is able to maintain technological superiority in this one area even at the expense of all others, they should seriously consider doing so.
The other is the recent finding by the USN that swarms of cheap drones can overwhelm a destroyer's defensive systems. The USN is already acting on plans to turn this finding on its head, and prototype their own swarms for this purpose. They're also almost certainly upping their defensive game to close this gap as well.
I think China's force projection into the South China Sea makes for a good hypothetical scenario: Say China starts perpetrating shenanigans in the region, and the US wants to send a CSG in there to slow their roll. If China were to sortie several D-E attack subs, and launch several flights of drone swarms from one of those fancy new islands they've built out that way, the results could be very interesting and awkward for the CSG. Especially if China lobs salvoes of ASBMs from the mainland as well.
>>28595408 Organized and sustained asymmetric attacks really only work if the population, or at least a large sect of it, actively support it. Even major terrorist attacks in developed nations have often been carried out because said nations have a large and militant muslim minority that can count on for support.
Really, I think the biggest risk the US faces is more from rogue domestic militias than actual foreign combatants.
>>28595408 >All to cause enough chaos and confusion to slip in whatever they need to pump a Burke's radar full of .50, or poison the water well, or set the jet fuel stockpile on fire, or poison the food in the mess hall or you get the idea. Yeah, this could happen. However, this is a small potatoes attack considering the scale of the response it would receive.
>destroy two faces of an AN/SPY-1D on a Burke with a sneak attack in port >receive a country-leveling air campaign against your home country, your neighbor countries and every country you operate out of >followed up with a ground invasion and occupation
Honestly, I think the US response to 9/11 caused a lot of the state-employed and connected terror sponsors to take a step back and think hard about facilitating major attacks against the US. Clearly it's still a threat and clearly idiots will still attempt/succeed in it, but they definitely sit back and weigh the risks now. They know we will come and flatten EVERYTHING they love. They know the target better damn well be worth it.
The kind of penny-ante bullshit you're describing (yes, it would suck, and yes, it'd be terrible for the families of the slain sailors, but it's still small potatoes on a Pearl Harbor or 9/11 scale while still provoking a similar response) is just tactically and strategically stupid.
>>28595441 On the flip side, if the balloon goes up, probably the first thing the US will do is interdict the motherfucking shit out of those islands which might threaten the passage of a CSG. Rubble don't make trouble, after all.
D-E subs would be a little harder to deal with, but in a shooting war it might be worth the risk.
Keep in mind that Japan is also effectively a giant fucking aircraft carrier already, and they've invested heavily in ASW "escorts".
>>28595441 While area denial is nice and all, it still all boils down to actually FINDING the carriers, like this article that was linked before talks about.
The USN has consistently demonstrated it has had the ability to park carriers in visual range of hostile shores without the opponents even realizing it. It's not just about technology, but also having the doctrine and strategies to use it effectively. Those drone swarms and subs won't do much good if they get drawn away to the wrong part of the ocean by a well placed decoy E-2.
>>28595441 Don't forget the range/speed disadvantages for DE boats as range increases. Every bit of standoff for a CSG is radius squared for DE boats to search, picket and get into position.
Also, >If China were to sortie several D-E attack subs, and launch several flights of drone swarms from one of those fancy new islands they've built out that way, the results could be very interesting and awkward for the CSG. China's DE subs are little more than obsolete Kilos and Mings, and their training, boat design and sensors are abysmal. As far as China has come with designing and building surface combatants, they're still decades and generations behind the US in sub ops training, tradition and equipment. Of all the things in the threat environment mix with the PLAN, the subs both nuke and DE/AIP are the very last of my worries.
>>28595428 >Daily reminder that Russia actually operates less than a tenth the number of submarines they did at their height in the early 80's, and the USN has enough attack boats plus force multipliers like the G-I-UK gap SOSUS systems to track almost every single one every time they leave the barn.
Ayep. Fuck, we were tracking every single one of them back in the Cold War, too! The vast drawdown of their boat numbers is why we no longer have all those carrier fleets, natch. But with P-8s stationed around the world, we probably don't need them.
>>28595513 Not to mention that the biggest thing people forget about A2/AD or area denial strategies is that they're DEFENSIVE. They force the country to constantly defend and deny, rather than be aggressive, choose their time and place and attack to roll back enemy capabilities. Carrier standoff capability means they can avoid the counter strikes or severely degrade their capabilities while constantly choosing the time and place to roll back their defenses, capabilities and ability to resist.
At best, they are delaying tactics. Defense doesn't win wars. The USN didn't win in the Pacific through defense; Midway was a success not because the US was defending Midway but because code breaking and intel allowed the USN to dictate the nature, time and place of the engagement and attack the IJNs most important assets and put them on the bottom.
>>28594238 This plan totally works, as long as you're operating close to your own shores, under the air cover of your land-based air force.
The USN actually uses exactly the same plan, with one major modification. USN research has shown that a missile boat operating far from shore must also act as an escort for its air cover. And the best kind of missile boat for this purpose is multi-purpose ship that is capable of fulfilling the ASW, air defense, and surface combat roles simultaneously.
Look at the weapons loadout on a Burke some time. It's basically a next-gen OSA, a Perry-class ASW frigate, and God's own air defense system all at the same time. Which is exactly what you need when Eagleland is half a world away and your only air cover is whatever is on that fleet carrier you brought with you.
>>28594374 >At the low end of the spectrum, a swarm of suicide boats could be problematic. Start by swarming the escorts, one at a time. Figure each boat has 500 pounds of explosive, small arms, a couple of RPGs and some Strelas or comparable. Crew of 6 or thereabout. Swarm a Burke or Tico with 30 of them, from all points of the compass. Once 2 hits are achieved, the survivors withdraw.
Not that I don't think it would work, anon, but how exactly do you envision surrounding a Burke with small craft undetected? Wouldn't it have to be really close inshore for you to do this? And wouldn't its ass be covered by other CSG assets to prevent exactly that possibility?
>>28595651 Not to mention the fact that two hits from what amounts to small arms on a naval scale would not even mission kill a Burke. If the Stark could survive two exocets and not lose combat capability and Sammy B Roberts could eat a large mine directly under the keel, breaking her back, and still stay combat capable, two RPG equivalent hits on a ship twice the size is not going to do the trick, even if both shots are extremely lucky.
>>28594573 >Missiles cannot really jink to dodge incoming fire (with the notable exception of the terminal maneuver most missiles use to dodge the last-ditch point-defense fire,) they cannot react to "pop-up" threats (i.e. a new ship revealing itself between the missile and intended target when it turns its radar on to start engaging the missiles,) and in general they're just... dumb.
>>28595651 This is also assuming that the target ships are stationary, as well. A carrier group is ALWAYS mobile, and can go up to 30 knots. Regular civilian boats are considered "fast" if they can go past 20.
And those speedboats that go sanic fast? They're purpose built and not designed to carry heavy loads, are expensive as hell, and generally are very rare and you typically won't see bumfuck jihadis putting around in them.
>>28595704 They were meant to be nuke delivery vehicles, which means "general vicinity is good enough". This means that to use them, you've first escalated the conflict to nuclear exchange. Secondly, they're super loud, so any ASW assets in the zip code can drop ASROC or even nuke depth charges on the sub's head for an almost assured kill. Thirdly, the range at which it would have to fire these torps ENSURE that the CSG would have ample time to maneuver and possibly avoid the kill radius. You can't launch a spread of these things, as fratricide ensures that only one, or if you're super lucky two, actually detonate before being destroyed by the shockwaves of the other torp in the spread.
>>28595725 This. Anyone who's actually been at sea, chime in and remind these anons just how incredibly unpleasant and damn near impossible it is to do 20knots in a 20ft speed boat in even relatively moderate sea state 3.
However, I'm not describing a terror attack. I'm talking about a tactical strike in service of a greater war.
Say for example, China one day decides to conquer Taiwan after all. Part of their strategy involves taking the American Pacific fleet out of action for a week or two. They disable our fleet with naval commandos (they don't even have to kill a single sailor - carriers aren't going anywhere if Burke escorts don't have radar) and by the time we've gotten our shit together and ready to strike back, we're left with no options.
1. Do we try to remove Chinese troops from Taiwan? Full scale megacity skyscraper urban warfare in AA/A2 environment. Holy fuck.
2. Declare total war against China. Another holy fuck
3. Just eat it. Egg on our national face. But apocalypse averted, for today.
Our entire foreign policy is based around CSG force projection and pixie dust. They are the keystone of the current world order. They are vulnerable, and so is America.
>>28595704 The Shikval has INS, so as long as it is given a general area to detonate in, it will try to guide itself there. While good enough for its original role as a nuclear torpedo, this is less than useless in terms of hitting actual moving targets. The reason for this is because in order to go fast, the Shikval needs to supercavitate, which means basically forming a giant air bubble around itself. However, this air bubble, as well as the high speed water getting kicked up around it, make it impossible for any current terminal homing system to see outside of it. Russia claims that they have one for the Shikval now, but it's really most likely them posturing.
Anon, read the Able damage report. Just read it. Unarmored ships, even relative near the blast, were not sunk and even sustained minor damage. Also, a carrier deck is anything but thin against something like a shockwave. Against a penetrating HE bomb? Trouble. Shockwave? Totally different bag of cats.
>>28595779 Programmable dog-leg and course changes. All torps can be programmed with guidance and run out waypoints. Normal torps like the Mk-48ADCAP have silent-run long range propulsion modes that allow the launching sub to disguise it's firing point datum by "dog legging" the torp in from a different heading before it goes active at full spead. They can also be wire guided.
Shkvals are too loud for a deceptive run out but can still be maneuver programmed to accommodate for different tactics (dog leg into a harbor, for instance). Unfortunately, no sub would be able to wire guide a Shkval because they're so loud they'd immediately have to cut the wire and maneuver to avoid ASW munitions.
>>28595795 A Chinese attack on American assets basically guarantees war. It will definitely be option 2. Remember the last time an overconfident Asian power tried to disable the American Pacific Fleet?
>>28595204 >At which point it is already 200nmi inside the F-35's combat air patrol radius, and 300nmi inside the kill radius for the AIM-120D, and has been on scope for the E-2D AWACS bird for over 200nmi, if not more. Good luck with that.
>>28595795 >Say for example, China one day decides to conquer Taiwan after all. Part of their strategy involves taking the American Pacific fleet out of action for a week or two. They disable our fleet with naval commandos (they don't even have to kill a single sailor - carriers aren't going anywhere if Burke escorts don't have radar) and by the time we've gotten our shit together and ready to strike back, we're left with no options. This whole scenario is basically a rehash of Japanese/IJN reasoning before the Pearl Harbor attacks. Maybe the Chinese should ask them how their "negotiated peace" and "American acceptance of losses" worked after Pearl Harbor.
I don't think anyone in Chinese planning is dumb enough to make the same mistake twice.
>3. Just eat it. Egg on our national face. But apocalypse averted, for today. See, that's the thing. Even if China sinks HALF the entire USN, the USN is still 1.5 times it's size plus help from Japan, Korea, Australia and pretty much every other country in SEA/SCS. That's just displacement tonnage, though. USN SSN gear and training alone makes this an incredibly one sided fight. All the USN would have to do is sink every single freighter bound for China while sinking their navy piece by piece, rolling back their land based IADS little by little and then striking high value targets inland. All while China is effectively unable to strike back against the mainland US or even really overcome the USAF/USN/USMC defenses on the vast number of Pacific air bases and ports. Sure, the US would lose some, but not anywhere close to half or even 1/4.
Meanwhile, the coalition could completely ignore all but the most obvious PLA force concentrations on Taiwan and just pick away at and strike the Chinese mainland from standoff range.
The scenario you describe is indeed HOLY FUCK, but I see almost no endgame where it's not HORRY FUCK from a Chinese perspective.
>>28595795 >Our entire foreign policy is based around CSG force projection and pixie dust. They are the keystone of the current world order. They are vulnerable, and so is America.
You do realize that this is why we don't keep all our carriers in one place, right? At any time, half of them are out at sea, and the other half are in port distributed across different shipyards. And the ones you hit in port are usually in for refits anyways, so the best you do is extend their refit schedule a little longer.
Unless you can decisively destroy the carrier AND the port facilities supporting it, all you're going to do is just piss off the US.
>>28595894 Name a single country other than Russia which could execute such a strike. The best China can do is hit a double handful of targets on the west coast. The only way they actually hit nuke launch assets is if they get lucky and catch an Ohio in port. After which the US counterstrike levels every even remotely strategically interesting target in mainland China.
>>28595265 > who Russia and only Russia, these days > MAD doesn't really work if your missile fields are actually crater fields now, Barksdale is glowing softly and the surface fleet is gone you only have the subs, and those are only sufficient for countervalue now
>>28595949 > What about the 40+ airframes in the hangar deck? good luck operating the elevators good luck operating anything with 1/3 of your deck operations qualified people gone and the other 2/3rds in the initial stages of radiation sickness > What about the replacement airframes almost immediately delivered? delivered from where, lol > counterweight to win against the US you have to strike first and strike hard enough to ablate the USian counterforce strike capability. NUTS is wishful thinking
>>28596005 >doesn't really work if your missile fields are actually crater fields now, Barksdale is glowing softly and the surface fleet is gone >you only have the subs, and those are only sufficient for countervalue now
What is early detection? The US maintains a satellite network specifically to warn of ICBM launches so they have enough time to launch their own, ESPECIALLY if their own nuclear assets are being targeted. That's basically the tenets of MAD.
>>28596005 >doesn't really work if your missile fields are actually crater fields now, Barksdale is glowing softly and the surface fleet is gone you only have the subs, and those are only sufficient for countervalue now You're implying the US doesn't launch the second the Russian launch detection systems light up. The kind of strike you describe is a use it or lose it situation for the US, which is immediate and comprehensive launch territory. Would Russian warheads hit US launch facilities and command? Yup. Would there be anything left inside those silos when they did? Nope.
And then the USN STILL has all the SSBNs left, while hunting down and destroying every single Russian SSBN they can find. There's no way this doesn't end badly for everyone, but much much worse for Russia.
>>28596036 You still haven't addressed how a Bear is going to live long enough and get close enough to actually get a target track on a CSG.
>good luck operating the elevators >good luck operating anything with 1/3 of your deck operations qualified people gone and the other 2/3rds in the initial stages of radiation sickness You are now aware that deck elevators are some of the most robust systems on the entire carrier. It would take a nearly direct hit to put all three out of commission. You are also now aware that you have no clue how radiation sickness works.
>delivered from where, lol Within 24 hours, they'd have replacement squadrons from any NAS within 2,000 miles if still capable of flight ops. Within 72 hours there'd be a second carrier on station. Within 7 days, there'd be a third nearby as the first carrier retired for repair and decontamination. Congrats. You've damaged one carrier. We've got 9 more plus another 9 gator flat tops, and at least 5 of those carriers will be surged and up your asshole with a blow torch within two weeks. The SSN/SSGN fleet has executed unrestricted merchant and military asset erasure on all your assets plus launching saturation cruise missile attacks at your high value targets and NUTS weighted counter strike nukes have been launched from Ohios with depressed trajectory and almost no warning.
Have fun with all that.
>to win against the US you have to strike first and strike hard enough to ablate the USian counterforce strike capability. NUTS is wishful thinking The only country in the world that can do this is Russia, and exactly no one in the world can do this without the US detecting and counterlaunching. Good luck.
>>28596127 Except that was never really a serious issue thanks to Russia's bastion strategy, which basically kept all their nuke subs close to their own shores anyways. The US actually has a much better capability to first strike Russian assets in this field.
>>28596127 The Russian SSBNs can never even leave their bastions anymore, they cannot achieve the range for a depressed trajectory launch, and their launches are just as visible as land launches no matter where they launch. Why are you so lazily ill informed?
>>28595886 How exactly do you think USA could possibly conquer China? Are you imagining the USMC rolling tanks into Beijing? No.
Full scale nuclear war is the only way. Maybe our politicos are dumb enough to start that kind of shit, but good lord I hope not. The only rational thing to do is back down, let China turn Taiwan into history's biggest clusterfuck, and pray to God that shit isn't the harbinger of WW3
>>28596238 >How exactly do you think USA could possibly conquer China? Why would they even try? It's a fools errand. If you want to stop China from fucking with Taiwan, all you have to do is destroy all their shipping, roll back their IADS and then level every strategic target and production facility you can reach until the CCP cries uncle or the starving populace revolts.
>>28596288 but such a feeling of inadequacy is inevitable! already the US is just as powerful militarily as the rest of the world taken together! NUTS is wishful thinking! > m-maybe if we nuke them just a little, just to show we're serious...
>>28596280 Holy kek. First, you think the Russian Navy has the ability, even with nukes, to take down 6 CSGs almost simultaneously, next you actually believe that the outdated and almost completely Soviet-designed surface fleet can "hunt down" the 688Is, much less the Seawolf and Virginia class boats. Would the USN lose a few boats? Absolutely. Would it stop the USN from destroying every major Russian port and shipyard with cruise missiles, putting 4 out of every 5 SSBNs on the bottom, almost completely destroying the entire Russian SSN fleet and putting 2 out of every 3 sortieing surface ship on the bottom? Nope. There's not a fucking thing in all of Russia which would stop this, especially after they try to nuke 6-10 carriers.
>>28595795 >Say for example, China one day decides to conquer Taiwan after all. Part of their strategy involves taking the American Pacific fleet out of action for a week or two. They disable our fleet with naval commandos (they don't even have to kill a single sailor - carriers aren't going anywhere if Burke escorts don't have radar) and by the time we've gotten our shit together and ready to strike back, we're left with no options.
All of my what.
Anon, the CSGs are *already at sea*. All the time. The ones in port are their reserves. At best your naval commandos will have created a situation several weeks from now, where US naval power is somewhat degraded. In reality, the US would probably shift CSGs from other regions to cover the gap.
>1. Do we try to remove Chinese troops from Taiwan? Full scale megacity skyscraper urban warfare in AA/A2 environment. Holy fuck.
Why? If the US and Japan can cut off resupply, the occupying forces will have to surrender in a few weeks regardless.
>2. Declare total war against China. Another holy fuck.
Which is what would happen. Which is why China won't start shit.
>3. Just eat it. Egg on our national face. But apocalypse averted, for today.
I'm not gonna lie. With the right President in power, this could actually happen. Maybe someday we'll see if China feels lucky.
>Our entire foreign policy is based around CSG force projection and pixie dust. They are the keystone of the current world order. They are vulnerable, and so is America.
CSGs on deployment may be vulnerable, but not to your fantasy ninja commandos in their home port.
>>28596306 The problem which you completely ignore is that not even Russia has enough nukes to completely destroy or even render the US industry incapable of outproducing it.
And the US has better nukes with much, much smaller CEPs. There's literally no nuclear exchange with the US for any country or even group of countries in the world that turns out well for the side first launching. There's absolutely no reason so suggest they wouldn't take it just as hard if not hard than they give it.
>>28596354 Russia has exactly two (reduced capability compared to the late 80's sats they launched) RORSATs aloft, and neither of them are the planned Naval version, which has been delayed over 18 months and counting. Do you have any clue how many RORSATs are required to keep a constant track of just ONE CSG while dealing with orbital LOS windows?
>>28596354 >Implying the USN doesn't calculate movements specifically to avoid being seen on satellite.
Anon, satellites have been a major concern since the '50s and even then, CSGs can just move to a different direction so by the time that data is relayed to the proper parties that can actually act on the intel.
Satellites and ICBMs are only good at spying on STATIONARY targets. Guess what CSGs can do? MANEUVER. This is precisely what makes them so damn hard to attack.
>>28596326 > the Russian Navy has the ability, even with nukes, to take down 6 CSGs almost simultaneously with nukes, yes, easily enough > hurf durf retaliation that is to be expected. however, our hypothetical mad-dog Russia only needs about an hour for a devastating first strike, plus the ability to disperse its few remaining SSBNs and bombers to provide credible deterrence against a USian countervalue second strike
>>28594238 >According to the learned naval tacticians here on /k/, we should just build thousands of small missile boats. This is literally what naval aviation is anon. Uber fast missile boats. They are so fast that can even fly!
>>28596422 >with nukes, yes, easily enough Anon. Excuse me, I mean, retard. Read the fucking thread. Either address the detailed objections to the fact that Russia would have a hard time getting target track on ONE CSG much less six of them simultaneously or fuck directly off.
>that is to be expected. however, our hypothetical mad-dog Russia only needs about an hour for a devastating first strike, plus the ability to disperse its few remaining SSBNs and bombers to provide credible deterrence against a USian countervalue second strike How retarded do you have to believe that there is ANY deterrence value in ANY platform in the situation you describe, or to believe there is much of anything left of Russian C4SIR after the American response to the detection of a Russian alpha strike? There is NO way, ZERO chance that Russia lands a full value first strike on US nuclear facilities that does not result in an immediate US counterlaunch while the Russian birds are still incoming.
>>28596422 Again, early detection. How is Russia going to launch without the US knowing and launching in response before those missiles even land? How do you evade the vast American surveillance network PURPOSE MADE to warn us if the Russians are even having a vague thought about launching their missiles?
>>28596444 So, how do you propose that you'll actually GUIDE your ICBMs to the CSG? Which can maneuver? Or you know, use its built in ABM capability?
>>28596444 >full time global coverage is not needed in a first strike scenario You don't even have a single naval RORSAT aloft. With the two you have jury rigged for the job, the best you can do is get a vague target track on a SINGLE CSG, which would still require further recon to refine. Even if you launched on it and got lucky, those sats get immediately shot down, and good fucking luck hitting the other 5 carriers at sea, much less the rest of the USN, USAF or USMC.
>>28596466 > address the detailed objections radar and electro-optical tracking from satellites and naval surveillance aircraft passive sonar tracking from ships, subs, buoys and hydrophone chains SIGINT and good old HUMINT > immediate counterlaunch a counterforce first strike is the only credible option left for Russia. the effectiveness of this counterlaunch is given by the effectiveness of said first strike "ideally", only the SSBNs would be left
>>28596488 >>28596518 It is exact case of asymmetrical warfare small but ridiculously fast and heavily armed combat vehicles brought down battleships. It right here before you eyes but you are blind to see it.
>>28596564 Except the effectiveness of air power against ships was well known and already demonstrated. Force Z was originally supposed to have a carrier present to provide them their badly needed air cover, but were forced to go without it after the carrier accidentally grounded itself. Plus, Force Z was never intended to be an actual combat force, but a "fleet in being" to deter Japan from attacking Singapore.
This was less about asymmetric tactics and more about Britain being horribly unprepared for a full scale Japanese offensive.
>>28596477 > early detection air and sub-launched cruise missiles, SLBMs, good old GRU Spetsnaz > GUIDE your ICBMs to the CSG don't be daft. that's Chinese thinking. Russia would do it with stand-off supersonic sea-skimmers with fuckhueg radars that can generate their own tracks
>>28596573 once the political decision is made, all there remains to be done is to wait for a day when all relevant CSGs' positions are known, if even for a few minutes I hereby posit that it's more like four than six, given that one is in the middle east usually and one keeping an eye on China
>>28596605 So how do you expect to get those airplanes within range of any US asset without being shot down first, and what makes you think a sub launch can't be detected (Because they can)? How are seaskimmers going to change anything when the USN has spent the past 50 years learning how to specifically counter them? GRU Spetsnaz could cause some damage but I doubt it would be serious enough to really factor into a full scale nuclear exchange.
>>28596540 >radar and electro-optical tracking from satellites You don't have the assets aloft to provide a target refined track for ONE CSG, much less all at sea.
>naval surveillance aircraft Don't have the sensor range coupled with radar horizon to detect and achieve target track on a CSG without being in range of hard kill CAP weapons for over 300nmi
>passive sonar tracking from ships, subs, buoys and hydrophone chains You don't have any understanding of how SONAR works. Even from out at the first convergence zone, which is pretty close in the grand scheme of things, you could not refine a target track beyond a 5km radius and a vague idea of course. Only by getting extremely luck are you getting closer with the ridiculously loud Russian boats. And you don't have ANY installed seafloor hydrophone nets installed beyond certain protected bays and harbors plus in the Sea of Okhotsk. None of them or the processing monitoring them were enough to significantly deter the USN in 1990, and they haven't been updated significantly since.
>SIGINT Because the USN has no clue about LPI comms and EMCOM. Because they haven't been playing and winning this game for 70 years. Riiiiiiight.
>"ideally", only the SSBNs would be left Why do you keep completely ignoring the fact that the US is more than capable and has stated doctrine which requires immediate and comprehensive launch against Russia before those alpha strike missiles land? Use it or lose it works both ways, dumbass.
>>28596605 >with fuckhueg radars that can generate their own tracks Surely you can provide a link to such a thing and some clue how it could possibly bypass the EW systems on Burkes and Ticos which are several orders of magnitude more powerful.
>>28596630 >I hereby posit that it's more like four than six, given that one is in the middle east usually and one keeping an eye on China God, I love that slavaboo delusion. He actually thinks the USN keeps FOUR CARRIERS on station to keep an eye on Russia. Holy kek.
News flash, you vodka-addled product of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: RUSSIA IS ALMOST COMPLETELY GEO-POLITICALLY IRRELEVANT outside of eastern Europe. CHINA exerts more worldwide influence on economy and diplomacy and projects more soft power than Russia does.
You vodka niggers are just sad, empty shells of what you once were.
>>28596598 >Except the effectiveness of air power against ships was well known and already demonstrated. It doesn't change fact that nature of that battle was asymmetrical. Not battleship vs battleship action but aircraft vs battleship action. You asked for asymmetrical warfare you got it. Naval powers transferred from huge size low numbers combatants to the swarm of expandable relatively cheap vehicles as primary anti-ship power.
>>28596632 > how do you expect to get those airplanes within range by a combination of trickery and not caring if they come back or not > sub launch detected ideally it would be too late to do anything > supersonic seaskimmers change everything because you need to first find them, then vector things to intercept them, then deal with there being a lot of them > Spetsnaz ideally they'd kill some important people, cut some important comm links and disable some important EW radars, which will in itself constitute early warning but might not provoke a full countervalue strike, especially with NUTS in place > you could not refine a target track beyond a 5km radius and a vague idea of course which is more than enough for a swarm of nuclear armed supersonic sea skimmers which also have radars for terminal guidance > you don't have ANY installed seafloor hydrophone nets except for those that are installed and the extensive network of active LF sonar buoys > the processing don't be daft. processing is no longer a bottleneck, everyone can just buy Chinese > playing yes > winning sometimes. you only have to lose once... > completely ignoring i'm not ignoring anything. precisely because of this, Russia must make sure that only a few, if any, of the silo-based nukes and of the bombers actually get to launch this means depressed SLBM shots this means the CSGs MUST die, before they can shrek Russian SSBNs
>>28596865 > SM-6 a credible counter to Oniks. trouble is it has to achieve 100% success on its first operational employment, or else the CSG dies in a ball of nuclear fire > AEGIS a battle management suite from the seventies. much vaunted, much improved, still way too expensive for what it can do. > CIWS a fucking joke you made for some reason, the engagement window is non-existent
>>28596811 >And you still haven't espoused why lots of cheap little speedboats are going to overthrow the current carrier doctrine They will not. Becuase aircraft is better 'speedboat'. Carrier doctrine is pinnacle of speedboat warfare itself (you still don't see a forest behind trees). Why should it fall against inferior version?
>>28596819 >except for those that are installed and the extensive network of active LF sonar buoys Gee, I'd love to see any sort of source for this.
>don't be daft. processing is no longer a bottleneck, everyone can just buy Chinese Holy kek. Chinese sonar processing is even worse than Russian.
>this means depressed SLBM shots YOU CAN'T PHYSICALLY DO THAT FROM BASTIONS. Period. And if the SSBNs begin moving out from the bastions, they'll each grow their very own tail. One with teeth and a very tense trigger finger. Soviet/Russian boats haven't left bastions since the mid-70's. Them leaving en masse is in itself a high alert event.
>this means the CSGs MUST die, before they can shrek Russian SSBNs Dipshit, for the last time, CSGs have NOTHING to do with hunting SSBNs. That's SSN work, 668s, Seawolfs and VAs. And they are very, very good at it. There's not a fucking thing the Russian navy can do to stop them, even within bastions.
>>28596869 I lived in Russia for half a decade. I have a very good appreciation for Russian psychology, history and am fluent in their language. You're the one consistently ignoring or handwaving reality.
>>28596966 >a credible counter to Oniks. trouble is it has to achieve 100% success on its first operational employment, or else the CSG dies in a ball of nuclear fire Ok, cool, lets totally ignore EW, SM-2ER, ESSM and Sea-RAM, and pretend like SM-6 is the only weapons system available to counter this threat.
>a battle management suite from the seventies. much vaunted, much improved, still way too expensive for what it can do. Too expensive you say? Even though it tracks four times the targets and coordinates the AA fight across ALL platforms, compared to Russian systems which have laughable 1970's era fleet integration? Jesus, you're thick. However "old" the baseline Aegis system is (which resembles modern Aegis almost not at all), Russian systems are a decade older and far less upgraded.
>>28595651 Run the boghammers from a few motherships. Where to get motherships? Piracy! Integrate the whole mess into a civil fishing fleet to complicate the targeting picture for countermeasures.
This isn't exactly a blue water counter to CSGs, it's more like the naval equivalent of IEDs or maybe punji sticks. It's something that irregular forces could do, maybe in conjunction with regular naval forces. Covering for DE subs or something. Or maybe a few real gunboats with real AShMs.
Figure this whole jihadi mess doesn't venture more than 200 miles offshore.
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